ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN MODERN HISTORY

The Global History of the Balfour Declaration

Declared Nation

Maryanne A. Rhett

The Global History of the Balfour Declaration

This book examines the development and issuance of the Balfour Declaration, the document that set the stage for the creation of the state of Israel, within its global setting. The heart of the book demonstrates that the Declaration developed and contributed to a juncture in a global dialogue about the nature and definition of nation at the outset of the twentieth century. Embedded in this examination are gendered, racial, nationalistic, and imperial considerations. The work posits that the Balfour Declaration was a specific tool designed by the manipulation of these ideas. Once established, the Declaration helped, and hindered, established imperial powers like the British, nascent imperial powers like the Japanese and Indians, and emerging nationalist movements like the Zionists, Irish, Palestinians, and East Africans, to advocate for their own vision of national definition.

Maryanne A. Rhett is Associate Professor of Middle East and World History at Monmouth University.

Routledge Studies in Modern History

1 **Isolation**
Places and Practices of Exclusion
Edited by Carolyn Strange and Alison Bashford

2 **From Slave Trade to Empire**
European Colonisation of Black Africa 1780s–1880s
Edited by Olivier Pétré Grenouilleau

3 **Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Revisionism in Postcolonial Africa**
The Case of Mozambique, 1975–1994
Alice Dinerman

4 **Charity and Mutual Aid in Europe and North America Since 1800**
Edited by Paul Bridgen and Bernard Harris

5 **Churchill, Roosevelt and India**
Propaganda During World War II
Auriol Weigold

6 **Genocide and Fascism**
The Eliminationist Drive in Fascist Europe
Aristotle Kallis

7 **Scientific Research in World War II**
What Scientists Did in the War
Edited by Ad Maas and Hans Hooijmaijers

8 **Restoration and History**
The Search for a Usable Environmental Past
Edited by Marcus Hall

9 **Foundations of Modernity**
Human Agency and the Imperial State
By Isa Blumi

10 **Transpacific Revolutionaries**
The Chinese Revolution in Latin America
By Matthew D. Rothwell

11 **First World War Nursing**
New Perspectives
Edited by Alison S. Fell and Christine E. Hallett

12 **The Ideological Cold War**
The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland
Johanna Rainio-Niemi

13 War and Displacement in the Twentieth Century
Global Conflicts
Edited by Sandra Barkhof and Angela K. Smith

14 Longue Durée of the Far Right
An International Historical Sociology
Edited by Richard Saul, Alexander Anievas, Neil Davidson and Adam Fabry

15 Transnational Perspectives on Modern Irish History
Edited by Niall Whelehan

16 Ireland in the World
Comparative, Transnational, and Personal Perspectives
Edited by Angela McCarthy

17 The Global History of the Balfour Declaration
Declared Nation
Maryanne A. Rhett

This page intentionally left blank

The Global History of the Balfour Declaration

Declared Nation

Maryanne A. Rhett

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
NEW YORK AND LONDON

First published 2016
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business.

© 2016 Taylor & Francis

The right of Maryanne A. Rhett to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Rhett, Maryanne A., author.
The global history of the Balfour Declaration : declared nation / by Maryanne A. Rhett.
pages cm. — (Routledge studies in modern history ; 17)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Balfour Declaration. 2. Zionism—Great Britain—History—20th century. 3. Zionism—History—20th century. 4. Palestine—History—1917–1948. 5. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Turkey. 6. Turkey—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 7. Arab-Israeli conflict. I. Title.
DS125.5.R54 2015
956.04—dc23 2015035512

ISBN: 978-1-138-11941-3 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-65233-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC

For Sarah,
The other book you have in your head

Contents

List of Figures xi
Acknowledgments xiii

1 **Introduction** 1

2 **One Key Paragraph** 14

3 **It's a Boy!** 44

4 **Quasi-Barbarians** 71

5 **What Is a Nation?** 98

6 **Expectations and Entitlement of Empire** 138

7 **Epilogue** 160

Index 167

This page intentionally left blank

Figures

2.1 "British Propaganda Poster Intended for Chinese Muslim Audience" c. 1918 includes 'Moshi Letter.' 18

2.2 "Britain Expects Every Son of Israel to Do His Duty." World War One recruitment poster, in Yiddish, c. 1918. 21

2.3 "The Jews the world over love liberty, have fought for it & will fight for it . . . enlist with the infantry Reinforcements" World War One recruitment poster, in English, c. 1918. 22

6.1 "The European officer and his Chinese awkward squad." 1911. *Puck* 146

This page intentionally left blank

Acknowledgments

When you finally sit down to finish that book you have been working on for the better part of ten years, it is hard to keep in focus all of the people who have been there along the way helping you and guiding you. That said, there are a lot of people who have helped me get to this finished work.

The first person who introduced me to the Balfour Declaration was Shahrough Akhavi, at the University of South Carolina. Dr. Akhavi handed out, in a class, a list of drafts of the Balfour Declaration. I carried that handout with me in my master's work and doctoral work, and still have it with me today. I doubt I knew at the time how profound an impact that handout would have on my future.

At Washington State University I was introduced to world history as a research field, not just a tool of pedagogy. Heather Streets-Salter (now at Northeastern) guided me through the doctoral work, allowing me to fully explore the topics I was drawn to, and giving me the tools of the world historian along the way. She and Robert Staab helped me hone my skills and develop my ideas.

Since graduating I have benefited from a wealth of support from friends and colleagues. Washington State University, Vancouver's Candice Goucher in particular, has been a font of support and guidance. Her enthusiasm and support made getting over all of those little academic hurdles so much more manageable.

It is beyond the classroom that so much of the work I offer herein was developed. The weeks in the archives gave me the raw materials, but it was the conversations with and support of the World History Association community that helped me bring those raw materials together. I have made lasting friendships and academic partnerships that feed into the many hours presented in this work. There is no other academic organization like the WHA, and I am grateful I found my way to that first meeting in Fairfax all those years ago.

I am eternally grateful to all of the scholars with whom I have had the pleasure of working. I have amazing, supportive colleagues at Monmouth University and have built lasting friendships at all of my previous academic homes. Beyond the academic world, however, it is the love and support of

my family that has helped me weather all of the crises of this life. Thank you, Mom and Dad. Thank you, Barbara (not only my mother-in-law, but my colleague as well), John, Heather, Chris, and Gage. Thank you with all my heart, Colin, Alfred, and Henry.

Perhaps more important than any other "thank you" I have to give is that which belongs to my sister, Sarah. For years Sarah has been my sounding board, my first editor, and the single greatest assistant I have had in this process. She has read this book more times than I'm sure she would like to acknowledge, but in every revision she has been essential.

1 Introduction

In early November 1917, Secretary of State for India Edwin Montagu wrote in his diary a fateful paragraph.

> By the by, I see from Reuter's telegram that Balfour has made the Zionist declaration against which I fought so hard. It seems strange to be a member of a Government which goes out of its way, as I think for no conceivable purpose that I can see, to deal this blow at a colleague that is doing his best to be loyal to them, despite his opposition. The Government has dealt an irreparable blow at Jewish Britons, and they have endeavoured to set up a people which does not exist; they have alarmed unnecessarily the Mohammedan world, and, in so far as they are successful, they will have a Germanized Palestine on the flank of Egypt. It seems useless to conquer it. Why we should intern Mahomet Ali in India for Pan-Mohammedism when we encourage Pan-Judaism I cannot for the life of me understand. It certainly puts the final date to my political activities.[1]

Montagu wrote this shortly after arriving in India, on a mission to slow calls for total Indian independence. He was there to listen to Indian and Anglo-Indian grievances and protect British interests in the subcontinent, the first time a British official was there to explicitly listen to the Indian voices. The passage is as off-handed in the diary as it appears here, but the deeply invested sentiments expressed in it were not flippant. They represent a complex web of global concerns, and at the nexus of it, as Montagu rightfully noted, sat the newly issued Balfour Declaration.

The Balfour Declaration, the document that set the stage for the eventual creation of the Israeli state, had ramifications beyond the aspirations of political Zionists and the dashed ideals of anti-Zionists. As Montagu contended, the Declaration was, and is, a challenge to the definitions of nation and national identity. Its production was not merely a question of local concern to the peoples of the Levant, but at the center of global discussions. Where Montagu questioned what right the British government had to intern Mahomet Ali, he could have as easily questioned what right the

British government had to stop Irish home rulers. Montagu understood, in a way many British policy-makers seemed ready to ignore, the global ramifications of creating in Palestine "a national home for the Jewish people."

History tells us that this phrase, "a national home for the Jewish people," relates to a specific time and a specific place. The story around this phrase is inherently area-specific, that the phrase's home in the Balfour Declaration is itself area- and time-specific, and that, as a result, the narrative about the Declaration's production, issuance, and reach were limited to that same area and time. In short, the history of the Balfour Declaration is the history of Israel, or perhaps, a little more broadly, the history of the Levant and the British Empire in World War One. This vision of history is limited and cursory.

Emerging scholarship is consistently showing the global nature of nationalism. Like Harald Fischer-Tiné's "Indian Nationalism and the 'world forces'" Montagu's diary entry unwittingly charts the global nature of the Declaration's significance and character. This book takes a world-historical approach to understanding the place of the Declaration in a global dialogue concerned with nation and identity formation. In this approach, the Declaration itself becomes an actor in the narrative and supports an exploration of a vast array of assumptions and constructions that had far-reaching consequences for peoples far removed from the geography of the Middle East.

The map that Montagu provided is a simple one mirrored in this book. Each chapter examines an expanding set of ideas, taking in different perspectives on the issues at hand and is reflective of global scales of inquiry. At the personal level, Montagu believed the Declaration was an intentional blow aimed at himself, a Jewish member of the British government and, by extension his constituents, the Indian populace. Historically, because Montagu takes the Declaration's issuance so much to heart, his opinions about and indeed impact on the Declaration have been largely ignored. However, the rest of the Montagu's paragraph suggests that his opinions went well beyond personal grudges. The Declaration, he noted, called into question the place of Jewish Britons whose national identity was torn between a Jewish 'homeland' and their native Great Britain, a question that continues to drive debate in the twenty-first century. Moreover, Montagu's question, "Why we should intern Mahomet Ali in India for Pan-Mohammedism when we encourage Pan-Judaism," casts doubt on the role of the British government in arbitrarily defining nationhood. Here the global realities of the Balfour Declaration come fully into focus. Not only did this argument have implications for how nation was defined in the Middle East, India, Africa, and even Ireland, but was fundamental to how nation has come to be defined since.

Who had power to define their own national identity and who had identity thrust upon them is thickly digested in Montagu's passage. Questioning the reaction of the Muslim world when the news that a piece of land considered holy to Muslims (as well as Christians and Jews), populated by

a Muslim majority, was to be turned over to the control of a non-native, non-Muslim population was a realist's vision of the limits of Empire. Montagu understood that the Zionist enterprise was more than state-building in a vacuum. Rightly or wrongly, his assertion that the Balfour Declaration will have "Germanized Palestine on the flank of Egypt," underscored the nature of Zionism's own self-definitions. For anti-Zionists like Montagu, the World Zionist Organization's (WZO) power to shape imperial policy and questions about the obligations the Empire has to its allies—particularly if an "increased German influence"—placed the region in military jeopardy.

* * *

From the ashes of World War One, nations emerged vying for self-governance. New contenders for imperial rule countered the old in advocating a newly defined world hierarchy, representative of new racial values, yet surprisingly or not, clothed in the same old rhetoric. Questions emerged about 'civilized' assumptions. The fiction of the world as a collection of discrete and isolated (or isolationist) states[2] prior to 1914 has been universally thrown over, but the seemingly isolated agitation of nationalist sentiment, so prevalent by the end of the Great War, remains a clinging counterpoint to global history. The idea that nationalist history is mutually exclusive from a global historical account still inhibits our vision of the historical record. In fact, the actions of Zionists, Arab nationalists, Indians, Africans, Irish nationalists, Japanese imperialists, and so on, are all interwoven. The story of how some nationalist and imperialist efforts succeeded where others failed is an inherently global one. Zionists did not win support for their cause in a vacuum, free from Irish or Indian considerations, and the notion that they did is absurd, despite the fact that it remains the dominant narrative. Shyamji Krishnavarma, founder of the Indian Home Rule Society, and "his disciples not only studied Italian *risorgimento* nationalism but also the Irish Home Rule Movement and became ardent admirers."[3] World history is more than models; it is more than grand theories and sweeping narratives devoid of characters and nuance. A world-historical vision allows us to see how, in gaining the Balfour Declaration, political Zionists used and circumvented the rhetorical devices of the day successfully, and at the expense of others. In the same rhetorical soup, which brought forth Zionist success, Home Rule was denied or curtailed for Indians and Irish; racial stereotypes allowed Africans to continue under the 'guardianship' of the British Empire; and the aspirations of fledgling empires, like Japan, were watched with a wary eye. In short, the Balfour Declaration and its history, hitherto the purview of area studies and imperial studies scholars, is much more than the history of Israel's foundational document. It is a foundational piece to the whole world history of national definition.

* * *

Nearly one hundred years ago, the British government issued a brief letter to Lord Walter Lionel Rothschild (1868–1937). This letter is commonly known as the Balfour Declaration. Almost as soon as the ink was dry on Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour's signature, scholars and politicians began analyzing the text. While this deluge of analysis has yet to abate, historians and political theorists alike have maintained a limited scope with which to view the Declaration's impact. The Declaration figures prominently into the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and British imperial policy, but for all of this examination surprisingly little attention has been paid to the Declaration's place inside the broader global context. Certainly discussion abounds as to the Declaration's importance to the War effort, particularly with regards to Germany and Russia, even America, and the fact that the document discusses Palestine explicitly demands consideration of the history of the Levant. The tendency among scholars to circumscribe the examination of nation *vis à vis* the Declaration to "nationalistic solipsism," as Fischer-Tiné discusses in the context of Indian nationalism, "often disguises the complex set of global historical constellations, transnational political interaction and translocal ideological exchanges that are constitutive factors of most national movements."[4] When that larger world is taken into focus, greater complexity emerges. The world is engaged not only in the physical war of trenches, but also in the rhetorical war of 'nation' identification and legitimation.

While Zionists and politicians wrangled over the text of the Declaration, they did so amid a global discussion of nation set within a radicalized, racialized, and gendered framework. Events and personalities in Ireland, India, Japan, and East Africa become important features in the Declaration's creation and impact, despite their common exclusion from the narrative. When viewed through this new lens, the images of those discounted as 'emotional' or 'romantic' become increasingly relevant, and the world into which the Declaration was planted grows. The story evolves.

Nested inside the text of the Declaration is the passage that allows us to view its history as a global one: "a national home for the Jewish people." This purposely vague phrase left unclear what constituted a state or nation, and has long been understood to relate only to the geographic region of Palestine and that region's relationship with the British imperial government. However, when this last assumption is thrown out and the phrase is examined in light of the larger question of 'nation,' we see that the phrase and its home in the Balfour Declaration become a key feature of early twentieth-century global history. In conjunction with the Anglo-Irish conflict or the growing demand for Home Rule or independence in India, early twentieth-century British imperial policy-makers found themselves changing what it meant to be a nation according to a variety of internal and external pressures. The issuance of the Declaration offers a publically explore-able tool for understanding imperial rationale, if any exists. The British failure to maintain control over Palestine, India, or Ireland was in part brought on by the internal division among the ruling elite as to what the definition of nation was and, perhaps

more importantly, how nations and imperial need were to be reconciled. At the same time as the Declaration was sent to Lord Rothschild, a tidal wave of nationalist, imperialist, and anti-imperialist movement throughout much of the non-Western world began to crash on the shores of traditional hierarchies. Thus Japan and East Africa similarly figured into the discussions of self-governance and racial rights to rule right alongside Zionist leaders.

The unassuming paragraph that became the Balfour Declaration makes up the bulk of a letter sent from Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild.

> His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status of Jews in any other country.[5]

While the Jewish case has the most obviously global connection to the narrative of the Balfour Declaration, widening the narrative's historical scope reveals how the variants of Palestinian, Arab, Indian, Muslim, East African, and even Irish and Japanese nationalism were influenced by—and played a role in forming—the vague Declaration. Conscious of the pressures imperial obligations put on the creation of policy, British statesmen juggled the demands of Irish Home Rulers, Indian Nationalists, Pan-Islamists, Indian and Japanese imperialists, and regional ethnicities in their creation and implementation of the Balfour Declaration.

A BRIEF HISTORIOGRAPHY

In the case of the Balfour Declaration, its history and its historiography are inherently linked to and crucial components for understanding how and why the narrative has been developed the way it has. This book looks well beyond the traditional boundaries of the Declaration's history, and simultaneously seeks to break new ground in the field of world history. Thus, a brief historiography is necessary.

Production

The "whys" and "what fors" of the Balfour Declaration have largely focused on two rationales in explaining its production: British imperial wartime needs and/or the moral obligation felt by some influential politicians to the world's Jewry. These accounts, while important, only explain part of the document's total significance. These narratives tend to exclude the role of anti-Zionists in the creation of the Declaration, the role of non-Westerners and only a limited

number of Arabs in the Declaration's issuance, and rarely explore the document's importance outside the Middle East.

Those scholars who have focused on British interests or imperial wartime needs include (but are not limited to) Meir Vereté, author of "The Balfour Declaration and Its Makers," Charles Smith and his *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,* and James Renton's (2007) *The Zionist Masquerade: The Birth of the Anglo-Zionist Alliance, 1914–1918*. According to Smith, "Lloyd George's accession to the prime ministership . . . Coincided with a reassessment of Britain's war objectives. . . . British statesmen and generals began once more to look favorably upon a campaign in the East."[6] Vereté argued, in fact, that "the British wanted Palestine—very much so—for their own interests, and it was not the Zionists who drew them to the country."[7] Indeed, Vereté's work is central to the Balfour Declaration's historiography, but even as he himself notes, vast portions of it are conjecture.[8] Other historians agree that increasing attention in the petroleum potential of the region was enough to motivate deeper interests in the Near East.[9] Such narratives tend to privilege the place of pro-Zionist British politicians—especially David Lloyd George, Arthur Balfour, and Mark Sykes—in the development of the Declaration. These men, according to historians of this school, created the Declaration because they saw imperial and military advantage in the establishment of a Jewish homeland/state at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, or at the very least "claiming" to aid in the establishment of such a place. Built into this set of beliefs was the idea that because the majority of Zionists were well-educated Europeans, their influence in the Levant would benefit the "quasi-barbarian and backward Arabs" in showing them how to become "civilized."[10] British statesmen asserted Palestine would become a cultured Western center, though perhaps not an independent outpost in the midst of the Arab Middle East.

The other main historiographical school in approaching the Balfour Declaration's production addresses three intertwined concepts: moral obligation, a *reaction to* anti-Semitism, and a *favourable policy of* anti-Semitism. While it seems contradictory that proponents of and opponents to anti-Semitism would rally around the same cause, it does not make it less true. Anti-Semitic events, like those in Russia in 1881–82, spurred on the creation of an active political Zionist endeavor. Founders and proponents of the political Zionist movement knew that by using Christian Zionist and philo-Semitic rhetoric—playing to the sympathies of people keen to expedite the 'Second Coming'—and encouraging the European anti-Semitic desire to rid Europe of Jews, their political ambitions for a national home could be more readily met.

This particular historical narrative places a great deal of emphasis on the role of individuals like Chaim Weizmann, Vladimir Jabotinsky, and Nahum Sokolow and, as a result, this historical school tends to romanticize figures like Weizmann and his role in creating the Balfour Declaration. Scholars Norman Rose and Ronald Sanders credit the "seemingly unlikely rise [of] a humble provincial chemist,"[11] Chaim Weizmann, with full responsibility for the Balfour Declaration.[12]

Jehuda Reinharz's (1992) "The Balfour Declaration and Its Maker: A Reassessment" rightly notes that neither Vereté's contention that Weizmann was simply a pawn of the British Empire, nor the other end of the spectrum that granted god-like dimensions to Weizmann's character, are fair in their conclusions. Reinharz notes, "The factors leading to the Balfour Declaration are so complex and intertwined that a decisive, one-sided evaluation on either side of the spectrum is clearly inaccurate."[13] I would go further still, arguing that the questions surrounding the Balfour Declaration do not represent a spectrum, a flat line, but a three-dimensional web of radiating circles and paths.

It should be noted that James Renton's work is an important departure from the works of Smith, Schneer, Rose, and Sanders, in that he fuses together the two traditional rationales and reorients the place of Zionist efforts within the British policy-making structures. Renton contends that "Weizmann's contribution to the rationale behind the British decision to issue the Balfour Declaration was indeed minimal. But, the efforts of a number of other Jewish activists, whose role has been obscured within the Zionist collective memory and historical literature, were of critical significance."[14] This book does not dispute Renton's claim, but insists that the history is even broader still. In expanding the scope to incorporate unheard voices from the Zionist collective, anti-Zionists, non-Zionists, and seemingly unconnected others, the history becomes fuller.

Outcomes

The historiography of the Declaration is equally narrow in the examination of its outcomes. This narrative focuses almost exclusively on the impact the Declaration had on the rise of Arab—especially Palestinian—nationalist movements. Little to no mention is made of how the Declaration is linked to the rhetoric of nation more broadly. A limited number of works draw distinct parallels between Palestine and Ireland, but most focus on the period during the height of the Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization activity in the 1960s through the 1980s. All of this, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, is despite evidence that draws these linkages much earlier.

Most "outcomes historiography" contends that the heart of Palestinian nationalism rests in two powerful, elite families, the Nashashibis and the al-Husaynis, although newly emerging work reaches beyond the Muslim-centric role to incorporate Christian activism as well.[15] According to Glenn E. Robinson, "British policy contributed significantly to the maintenance of this [elite] power," and this power in turn fostered Palestinian identity based on anti-Zionist rhetoric.[16] Robinson's assessment echoes F. Beiruti, speaking on behalf of the Muslim Christian Association, in 1919:

> We the inhabitants of Palestine, 700,000, representing and acting for 800 million Christians and Moslems in the Holy Land, shall [raise] our voices and say: 'After the blood we have shed and after that which was

> shed for us, is it permissible for the existing conscience of the world to give out land to a mixture of emigrants, called the Zionists, coming from the five continents of the world and wanting to appropriate our land . . .?[17]

Similarly, Baruch Kimmerling notes that "when Britain took the land from the Muslim Ottoman Empire and granted it, via the Balfour Declaration, to the Jews in order to create a Jewish 'national home' (namely a state) . . . The Arab national institutions in Palestine were promptly formed."[18] According to this historiographic perspective, Palestinian nationalism is only reactionary to British imperial policy. Like the narratives that examine the Balfour Declaration's issuance, this record leaves out critical components of the story, namely Palestinian agency in their own national definition. This narrative denies Palestinian, even Arab more generally, nationalism prior to the advent of Zionism. This *ipso facto* logic feeds well into later Zionist rhetoric that "there is no such thing as a Palestinian."[19] Palestinians are thus behind the eight ball. Because they did not exist as an organized *legitimate* nationalist entity, they thereafter do not have the same *legitimate* claims of those who did.

The Text

Critical to this work is the shockingly under-examined historiography of the Balfour Declaration as a historical character in its own right. Because this book is inspired by the ideas of global microhistory, the entirety of Chapter 2 focuses on the "birth" of the Declaration. This personification of the text is deliberately done, not only to mimic the microhistory tradition, but also to lead Chapter 2 into Chapter 3.

The traditional historiography of the Declaration vastly undervalues the work that led to the document's issuance. Leonard Stein's (1961) *The Balfour Declaration* is the canonical assessment of the document's history, but it lists only five drafts, including the final text, a point reinforced in other canonical works like Vereté's. While other works, like Reinharz's or Ronald Sanders's (1983) *The High Walls of Jerusalem* include more drafts, none of the histories to date include all eleven iterations (including the final draft) of the Declaration. It is surprising how little work has been done regarding the political jostling taking place in the development of the wording of the document, considering that so much the Declaration's history is wrapped up in it.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Given the global scope of this work, it is best to root the history in the very document around which the story radiates. Chapter 2 looks at the

textual development of the Balfour Declaration through a detailed discussion of all ten drafts, as well as the final document itself. Notable and largely unexamined changes to the document's final form came from a variety of sources, including ardent anti-Zionists like Edwin Montagu. In looking at the change undergone over time by the document, historians and political theorists can better situate their understanding of the development of the modern state of Israel and wartime British imperial policy within the global historical context.

Part of the significance of the Balfour Declaration is that while it was very much shrouded in religious consideration, it was political through and through. Religious rhetoric is moving, and people are sensitive to it, especially in a time when nations are shifting and developing, and peoples are scrambling to align and define themselves. Yet religion is only one feature of national identification. Nation is complicated by racial and gendered constructions as well, and Chapters 3 and 4 examine these concepts more fully. Chapter 3 examines how the gendered stereotypes reinforced assumptions that informed decisions about the Declaration. Nationalist enterprises are all set within a gendered framework. Consciously, political Zionists sought to cast off the effeminate stereotypes foisted upon the European Jewish community over the centuries, setting them on the shoulders of anti-Zionist Jews who worked to derail settlement goals. Zionist rhetoric of the era focused on a distinct effort to 'remasculinize' the community through a process of militarization and gendered 'Othering'. Such re-gendering of advocates and detractors was paralleled in the efforts of other parties, as in Ireland and its creation of the "New Gaelic Man." The gendered dialogue of protective paternalism inherent in imperial rhetoric was a convenient vocabulary implicitly understood in global political discourse. Gendering reinforced global assumptions and altered means of legitimation.

Chapter 4 explores how the embedded qualities of racial definitions and sentiments accounted for the working out of the definition of nation, and how this is interrelated with the gendered principles examined in Chapter 3. Building on gendered power negotiations, the definitions of race that factored into the Balfour Declaration's issuance become vital constructions brought into particularly sharp relief by their militaristic linkages and how those links reinforced ideals of loyalty and nationhood. These ideals were used just as thoroughly in the effort to legitimize a nationalist movement as had been the gendered ones in the previous chapter. The feminized vision of anti-Zionists, Indians, Africans, and Arabs stunted the development of self-governing institutions in the Middle East, India, and Africa while at the same time helping to promote the efforts of Zionists in Palestine.

Examinations of race and gender inform how individuals self-defined or were defined by others, and how in turn, they became powerful agents of the global theories. The correspondence and personal statements of Jewish and Christian Zionists, anti-Zionists, devoted imperialists, and disenfranchised imperial subjects like Annie Besant, Mahatma Gandhi, the Aga Khan III,

Eamon De Valera, and the Husayni and Nashashibi families, despite their seemingly unconnected nature, created the linkages between national struggle and identity formation, thus solidifying a web of dialogue centered on nationalist agendas and the formulation of imperial policies between the 1880s and 1920s.

Chapter 5 pulls the threads of the previous chapters together to examine how 'national status' and 'legitimacy' were understood by the late 1910s. The British comedian Eddie Izzard once quipped, "Do you have a flag?", noting that without a flag a people lacked legitimacy in the eyes of would-be conquerors, and thus conquest is rationalized.[20] Izzard humorously encapsulates the global tensions at hand in the period around World War One and the truly incoherent nature of national definition created in that era.

Competing for legitimacy as a nation, various members of the global community constructed and reconstructed the ideology of nation in the fluid environment created by World War One and the Interwar period. Informing the rhetoric and policy decisions surrounding the Declaration's creation and issuance, "What is a nation?" was an important question at the heart of the discussion, as well as the global struggles to cast off, or even create, imperial rule. This chapter looks at how events in the nineteenth century created the idea of the 'nation,' and how this idea in turn inspired anti-imperialism or local imperial endeavors and new forms of self-identification.

While World War One marked the beginning of the end of Europe's global empires, it did not wholly destroy them. In fact, the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and subsequent treaties reinforced them and set the stage for post–World War Two decolonization efforts. The conclusions Chapter 5 draws are pertinent to the struggle for national legitimization. The British government, then the most powerful state in the world, and the great powers—i.e., the United States and France—decided the nature of national definition in their dealings with fledgling nationalist movements and emerging imperial powers. Unless legitimized in their nationalist efforts on this international stage, these peoples lacked the structural support necessary to allow them fully to realize their state or imperial aspirations.

Chapter 6 steps out still further to examine the expanding global empires and collapsing feudal systems that made space for these discussions. By the end of the nineteenth century, a scramble was underway among European powers to assert cultural superiority, solidify control of imperial possessions, and sustain the precarious balance of power in Europe. At the same time altered paradigms, shifting political ambitions, and military setbacks overseas indicated a need to tighten cultural mores in metropolitan centers. The metropole was very clearly no longer insulated from the rest of the Empire, and the impact this change had on British policy-making decisions rattled other states' imperial ambitions. The idea that a legitimate state must also have an imperial component remained a strong one in the early twentieth century. Zionists actively used the term 'colonization,' Indians like the Aga Khan and Gopal Gokhale tied nationalist rhetoric to the effort

of imaging Indian colonization throughout the Indian Ocean basin, and the Japanese worked to assert their own claims for participation "at the table" through the emergence of their own stronger empire. Empire was ultimately the avenue through which nation was legitimized.

The book concludes by investigating the repercussions of the Balfour Declaration's issuance in global terms. By 1924, despite the attempts of individuals across the world to define and understand the notion of a "national home," no one seemed able to do so. The impact of the Balfour Declaration did not cease in 1924 or even in 1948, when Israel declared independence. The Balfour Declaration, although obscured by more recent events, continues to inform international policy both directly and indirectly.

NOTES

1. Edwin Montagu, *India Diary* (Cambridge: Montagu Papers: Trinity College, 1917–1918), 87–88.
2. How is it possible to see the British Empire as isolationist? It is not exceptional in the way so many American historians contend the history of the United States is, but rather, at the time the British maintained a belief that the metropole was distinct, separate, from the colonies. The idea was that London was isolated, or insulated, from the rest of the Empire. Of course, like the idea of the U.S. as an isolationist state, this was in reality absurd.
3. Harald Fischer-Tiné, "Indian Nationalism and the 'World Forces': Transnational and Diasporic Dimensions of the Indian Freedom Movement on the Eve of the First World War," Journal of Global History 2, no. 3 (2007): 340.
4. Ibid., 325.
5. The Zionist Movement, 31 October 1917, War Cabinet: The National Archives, London.
6. Charles Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Fifth ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2004), 69.
7. Meir Vereté, "The Balfour Declaration and Its Makers," *Middle Eastern Studies* 6, no. 1 (January 1970): 50.
8. See: Ibid., 71, footnote 8.
9. Marian Kent, "Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire 1900–23," in *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent (London: Frank Cass, 1984), 183.
10. Alfred Mond, "Alfred Mond to David Lloyd George, 8 April 1920," David Lloyd George Papers, London.
11. Ronald Sanders, *The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour Declaration and the Birth of the British Mandate for Palestine* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983), xviii.
12. Norman Rose, *Chaim Weizmann: A Biography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 187.
13. Jehuda Reinharz, "The Balfour Declaration and Its Maker: A Reassessment," *Journal of Modern History* 64 (September 1992): 493.
14. James Renton, *The Zionist Masquerade: The Birth of the Anglo-Zionist Alliance, 1914–1918* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 6.
15. Laura Robson's *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011) is one such work considering the relationship between British policy and Arab Christians in Palestine. Noah

Haiduc-Dale's, *Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism, 1917–1948* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013) also investigates the role of Christianity in Palestine and its role in nationalist sentiment.

16. Glenn E. Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 5.
17. Haiduc-Dale, 19.
18. Baruch Kimmerling, *Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War Against the Palestinians* (Verso: London, 2003), 21.
19. On 15 June 1969 in the London *Sunday Times* Golda Meir famously argued, "There were no such thing as Palestinians. When was there an independent Palestinian people with a Palestinian state? It was either southern Syria before the First World War, and then it was a Palestine including Jordan. It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not **exist**." Similarly in 2011, then presidential hopeful Newt Gingrich "declared that the Palestinians are an 'invented' people who want to destroy Israel." "Palestinians Are an Invented People, Says Newt Gingrich," *The Guardian*, 9 December, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/10/palestinians-invented-people-newt-gingrich (accessed 20 July 2015).
20. *Eddie Izzard: Dress to Kill*, directed by Lawrence Jordan, featuring Eddie Izzard (Ella Communications, 1999).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Eddie Izzard: Dress to Kill. Directed by Jordan, Lawrence. Ella Communications, 1999.

Fischer-Tiné, Harald. "Indian Nationalism and the 'World Forces': Transnational and Diasporic Dimensions of the Indian Freedom Movement on the Eve of the First World War." *Journal of Global History* 2, no. 3 (2007): 325–44.

Haiduc-Dale, Noah. *Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism, 1917–1948*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013.

Kent, Marian. "Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire 1900–23." In *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, edited by Marian Kent, 172–205. London: Frank Cass, 1984.

Kimmerling, Baruch. *Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War against the Palestinians*. Verso: London, 2003.

Mond, Alfred. "Alfred Mond to David Lloyd George, 8 April 1920." David Lloyd George Papers: F/37/1/5. Parliamentary Archives/House of Lords Records, London, 1920.

Montagu, Edwin. *India Diary*. Montagu Papers. Cambridge: Trinity College Library, 1917–1918.

"Palestinians Are an Invented People, Says Newt Gingrich." *The Guardian*. 9 December 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/10/palestinians-invented-people-newt-gingrich (accessed 20 July 2015).

Reinharz, Jehuda. "The Balfour Declaration and Its Maker: A Reassessment." *Journal of Modern History* 64 (September 1992): 455–99.

Renton, James. *The Zionist Masquerade: The Birth of the Anglo-Zionist Alliance, 1914–1918*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.

Robinson, Glenn E. *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

Robson, Laura. *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011.

Rose, Norman. *Chaim Weizmann: A Biography*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987.

Sanders, Ronald. *The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour Declaration and the Birth of the British Mandate for Palestine*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983.

Smith, Charles. *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Fifth ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2004.

Vereté, Meir. "The Balfour Declaration and Its Makers." *Middle Eastern Studies* 6, no. 1 (January 1970): 48–76.

The Zionist Movement, 31 October 1917, War Cabinet: CAB 24/3, No. 261 (12). The National Archives, London.

2 One Key Paragraph

For all of the historiographic ink spilled in discussing the Balfour Declaration, examination of the rhetorical war waged on behalf of and surrounding this one paragraph is surprisingly slight. Ten drafts of the Declaration, in addition to its final form, appear nowhere together in the historiography and the topic is surprisingly under-discussed in British imperial history. Although the repercussions of the affairs of 1917 and the creation of the Balfour Declaration still resonate in global politics, we have an imperfect understanding of how the document itself came to be.

* * *

The aspirations of political Zionists were well known in London long before 1915, but it was not until then that the efforts of their lobby were seriously considered among top British officials like Herbert Samuel (First Viscount Samuel, 1870–1963) and Lord Edward Grey (First Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 1863–1933). Samuel, then President of the Local Government Board (February 1914 to May 1915), put before the British Cabinet a memorandum cautiously advocating for the subject of Zionism,[1] and was subsequently attacked by Edwin Montagu (Samuel's cousin and then Chancellor of Lancaster). On 16 March 1915, Montagu assailed Samuel's cautious support for Zionist ambitions, stating:

> I believe that the Jewish hopes of once again finding themselves in Palestine are based on their interpretation of divine prophecy in the Old Testament; but the return of the Jews to the Promised Land was predicted in that book of divine agency and by miracle, and I think it would require nothing short of a miracle to produce a Jewish State in Palestine.[2]

Montagu concluded his memorandum by stating, "If only our peoples would cease to ask for special favours, if they would take their place as non-conformists, Zionism would obviously die and Jews might find their way to esteem."[3] While he acknowledged age-old prejudices against Jewish

peoples and how they continued to plague global politics, Montagu did not believe these misperceptions could be altered by recreating a Jewish state. At the outset Samuel and Montagu spoke for very different viewpoints on the issue of political Zionism, but ironically it was Montagu who had the greater hand in the final wording of the Balfour Declaration.

While the British Government was slow to take up the Zionist cause, the Board of Deputies of the British Jews—the self-proclaimed voice of the British Jews—was not.[4] Lucien Wolf (1857–1930), the head of the Conjoint Foreign Committee (CFC) of the Board of Deputies, spent several years grappling with the needs of the less fortunate Jewish populations throughout Europe, particularly through the establishment of a stable living arrangement for their people and culture. The Board and he did so by encouraging the philanthropic tendencies of Jews living more comfortable lives in Great Britain, the United States, and several Western European countries. By 1915, brainstorming notes from the Board of Deputies, apparently in Wolf's handwriting, suggest that the issue of political Zionism was problematic in its potential to split the Jewish community. These notes suggest a great deal of debate about the nature of political Zionism and its goals and indicate three particular points of concern. First, what is 'Palestine'? Second, because Palestine is not largely Jewish in 1915, what is to be done with local inhabitants? Third, a charter is impossible in the eyes of the CFC, as

> It means handing over Government of [the] country to a minority or to an artificially created influx of alien immigrants. Powers could not propose this without condoning Russification of Finland, Prussification of Prussian Poland and Ulsterification of Ireland. Democratic sentiment of the world would not tolerate it. Mohammedan sentiment all over the world would rebel against it. The Bedouins would fight and the Bedouins would perhaps be right.[5]

Even after the British government took up the question of political Zionism and the Board of Deputies was pushed out of the dialogue, Wolf's concerns remained central to the debate.

Until late 1916, the British government considered the Zionist enterprise impractical and unnecessary. While individuals like David Lloyd George and Samuel continued to advocate for a statement favourable to the Zionist endeavour, the Asquith government consistently tabled the matter as unimportant in comparison to the events at the Somme, in Ireland, or the efforts of the Arab Revolt. The December 1916 change of government, however, gave Chaim Weizmann (then head of the English Zionist Federation, EZF) and political Zionists a more sympathetic ear in then Prime Minister Lloyd George. Even still, not all British officials were agreeable to, or convinced of, the necessity for the Zionist scheme.

As of June 1917, the War Cabinet largely concerned itself with how promoting a pro-Zionist statement could benefit the Allied cause. This is

evident in the creation of the Jewish Legion, which some believed would bring thousands of Jews otherwise not serving the war effort into the British army's ranks.[6] Colonel John Henry Patterson, who was chosen to lead the Jewish fighting outfit, had already been cast as 'Moses' when he commanded the Zion Mule Corps at Gallipoli.[7] The regiment was approved in April and came into being in August 1917. While Vladimir Jabotinsky, the scheme's most assiduous proponent, argued that thousands would leap at the opportunity, in the end it took four months to build one battalion, and eventually only three regiments were created—the 38th, 39th, and 40th Royal Fusiliers, known as 'the Judaeans.' Nevertheless, even a smaller success than expected was still a success.

The War demanded that only those things beneficial to the effort should be considered. It is perhaps for this reason that a number of historians, like Meir Vereté, have chosen to contend that the Declaration was for political expediency only. On 13 June, Weizmann wrote to Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary Sir Ronald Graham that "it appears desirable from every point of view that the British Government should give expression to its sympathy and support of the Zionist claims on Palestine."[8] That same day, Graham pointed out to members of the Cabinet that there should be an effort on the part of the Allies "to secure all the political advantages we can out of our connection with Zionism," further noting the possibilities it held for "reaching the Jewish proletariat" in Russia.[9] Lord Robert Cecil (1864–1958) is noted for having said that "I do not think it is easy to exaggerate the international power of the Jews."[10] The propaganda qualities Zionism appeared to offer garnered support among officials who might not have been swayed by purely ideological considerations.

Zionism as a propagandistic tool was a common theme in Cabinet documents and political discourse, but tools for propaganda were coming from all angles. During 1917, rumors began to circulate in London that the Germans were considering the propagandistic advantages of issuing a pro-Zionist statement, and as it turns out, trying their hand at a number of the same propaganda themes the British were using. A great deal of work has been done connecting these rumors to the hurried pace of the Zionist work in London after 1917, including an attempt by some scholars to add the Zimmerman Telegram into the mix.[11] By the time World War Two began, war propaganda production was a well-conditioned, smoothly running system, but at the outbreak of World War One it was undoubtedly a new factor in the changing landscape of war. In September 1914, as a response to the profusion of German propaganda, Great Britain established the War Propaganda Board, more commonly known as Wellington House. Focused largely on the production of pamphlets, and later graphics and film, Wellington House was largely kept a secret from members of Parliament and the public.[12] As a result, British war propaganda fell into two broad categories: overt government productions and covert materials. Recruitment posters were overt products of the government, intended for

public consumption. Wellington House's materials were covertly produced and disseminated, often via private outlets like newspapers. The rationale for this secretive production was to lend legitimacy to the materials being disseminated. Working under the belief that the populations targeted by Wellington House would not trust overt governmental materials, journalists and authors were hired to write believable articles and stories that could be used in mainstream media and would thus carry the weight of legitimacy. Among others, historian Arnold J. Toynbee (1889–1975) and journalist Lewis Namier (1888–1960) contributed to the Wellington House efforts.[13] Toynbee, although largely responsible for propaganda in the United States, wrote several essays and pamphlets about the Armenian genocide, including the 1915 "Armenian Atrocities: the Murder of a Nation." Ultimately, overt and covert propaganda worked in combination to restructure global perceptions in accordance with British policy regarding the war and the way British officials envisioned the post-war world.

British propaganda was especially "directed towards influencing the United States of America" and encouraging the world "to take a right view of the actions of the British government since the commencement of the war."[14] While the largest focus of Wellington House's activities remained centered on convincing the U.S. to enter the War on the side of the British, this was far from the only concern pertinent to its work. During the course of the War policy-makers came to the realization that propaganda distribution in neutral countries was just as vital as in allied and enemy states. The Islamic world in particular became an important front in the propaganda wars, especially after 1916.

In the war of propaganda that Wellington House waged, a document found during General Jan Christiaan Smuts's East Africa campaigns, in the town of Moshi (now in Tanzania), proved useful. By June 1917, Wellington House began using this document, generally known as the 'Moshi Letter' in its Islamic world propaganda. According to the Wellington House records, this document condemned "Mohammedan worship amongst East African natives" and "orders [were] given to encourage them to keep pigs—unclean animals."[15] The Moshi Letter was translated into Chinese and combined with photographs of Dr. Heinrich Schnee (German Imperial Governor of the region), who had signed the order. Fifty thousand posters with this letter and photograph "were printed for the benefit of the Chinese Moslems who live mostly in the provinces of Kansu, Hsin-Hsiang, Chihli, and Yunnan."[16]

Whereas it is not known exactly how many Muslims lived in China during World War One, current estimates run near 30 million. If the Muslim population of China in the 1910s was only a fraction of that, the power of persuasion would still have been an important consideration for British propagandists. Producing propaganda for use throughout the Islamic world, even in areas not predominantly Muslim, indicated the British government's knowledge that undermining the stability of the Ottoman Empire could be done in terms of religious division as well as military campaigns. Similarly, Wellington House made great use of the Sharif Husayn of Mecca's



Figure 2.1 “British Propaganda Poster Intended for Chinese Muslim Audience” c. 1918 includes ‘Moshi Letter.’[17]

June 1916 ‘Declaration of Independence,’ which initiated the Arab Revolt. Tens of thousands of posters and pamphlets extolling the Arab alliance with the Entente Powers were produced. Like the Moshi poster, these were distributed throughout China as well as across the Islamic world.

Propagandists worked diligently in the Islamic world, largely for two reasons: to counteract anti-Islamic rhetoric wittingly or unwittingly issued by the British government's officials, and because war with the Ottoman Empire meant war with the Sultan *and* Caliph. British officials had not always been careful in their verbiage regarding war with the Ottoman Empire. In October 1914, Lord Crewe (Robert Crewe-Milnes, 1858–1945) suggested to David Lloyd George that he, Lloyd George, should speak with the Aga Khan[18] about the Queen's Hall speech on the subject of 'International Honour' (given 19 September 1914). During the speech, Lloyd George derided the Kaiser's warmongering. Quoting from the prior week's *British Weekly,* Lloyd George went on, noting that the Kaiser proclaimed:

> Remember that the German people are the chosen of God. On me, on me as German Emperor, the Spirit of God has descended. I am His weapon, His sword, and His vizard! Woe to the disobedient! Death to cowards and unbelievers![19]

After noting the Kaiser's vehemence, Lloyd George went on to state: "There has been nothing like it since the days of Mahomet. Lunacy is always distressing, but sometimes it is dangerous."[20] Not only did comparing Islam's Prophet Muhammad to the Kaiser touch a nerve among Muslim subjects of the British Empire, but that both the Kaiser and Muhammad were equal 'lunatics in their leadership' was not a flattering image to create for an empire that controlled the largest Muslim population in the world. Crewe suggested that Lloyd George try to explain that "no offense to their religion was intended," but noted too that any public statement would draw attention to the original words and would imply "that the general impression of the Prophet in the West is that he was a Blasphemous impostor, which is not conciliatory when one comes to think of it!"[21] Lloyd George's later act of paralleling Allenby's triumphs with that of the Crusades suggested that the war in the Near East was being fought against Islam, not the political entity of the Ottoman Empire, and further exacerbated these tensions.

Biblical allegory and allusions to the Crusading era were strong components of press and popular discourse throughout the War, in relation to more than the Islamic world. The creation of the Jewish Legion, the eventual capture of Palestine, and the release of the Balfour Declaration "from the viewpoint of the British government . . . appealed to both imperial and religious sentiments, which had become intertwined though the popular rhetoric of 'holy war' and the construction of Germany as an apostate nation."[22] During Herbert H. Asquith's administration he was careful "not to represent the 'spiritual conflict' as a solely British or Christian matter, and acknowledged the contribution of the Hindu and Muslim subjects."[23] Lloyd George did not shy away from the religiously heavy rhetoric, however. In early 1918, he dubbed "Allenby's conquest of Jerusalem 'the last and most triumphant of the crusades.' "[24] While it was not uncommon for anti-Islamic rhetoric to

appear in letters and statements of British policy-makers, the Islamic world was increasingly important to sustaining British war efforts. Alliances with the Islamic world needed to be strengthened and maintained and not derided.

A relationship with the Islamic world was not the only one the British tried to cultivate through its propaganda campaigns. In 1918 several recruitment posters were produced for use in Canada. One stands out as particularly unique in regards the story of Zionism and nationalism.[25]

Issued in both Yiddish and English, the poster was purposefully aimed at Quebec's Jewish population and featured the images of three prominent Anglo-Jews across the top: Herbert Samuel, Lord Reading (Rufus Isaacs), and Edwin Montagu. Below, the Union Jack–festooned header was an illustrated image of a British soldier undoing the bonds of a Jewish man.[26] This 'breaking of the bonds' visually reinforced Lord Cromer's sentiment that "the Anglo-Saxon in modern times comes, not to enslave, but to liberate from slavery."[27] While overtly pro-Balfour Declaration in intent, the choice of the three prominent Jews is also representative of the variations in Jewish nationalism throughout the Anglo-Jewish community. Herbert Samuel, the most ardent Zionist of the three, and Edwin Montagu, the anti-Zionist, flank a more centrist Lord Reading. It cannot be known what the intention of the poster-maker was in choosing the placement of these three men, the juxtaposition of the illustrated centre, and why specifically, aside from their common heritage, they were chosen. Nor can it be determined whether Montagu, Reading, and Samuel were aware of the use of their images in this way. What is certain, however, is that each man represented a crucial component of official perspectives on the questions of nation and the Zionist enterprise and that propaganda was one of the most important vehicles for expressing these viewpoints.

Despite the momentum favourable to Zionist efforts in early 1917, several obstacles remained, deterring the expediency Weizmann sought. First, the Turks were not yet defeated, and issues pertaining to Allied control following such a defeat, grounded in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, were not altogether supported by British officials. Military setbacks, like those at Gallipoli (1915) and Iraq (Baghdad was not captured until March 1917), made officials leery of dividing "up the skin of the bear before they had killed it."[28] Moreover, although the Sykes-Picot Agreement did just this, and the British gained substantially by it, the agreement was not universally welcomed by members of the government. It remained a source of contention for the remainder of the War and during the post-War peace efforts. Brigadier-General Macdonogh (Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office), Sir Arthur Hirtzel (of the India Office), and Cabinet Minister Lord George Curzon opposed the Agreement. Some concern stemmed from the deep distrust British officials had for their French counterparts. One indication of this comes from a meeting between Weizmann and Professor Victor Bache, a Frenchman, in which they discussed France's desire to complete a separate peace with the Ottomans. Bache stated, "We shall not continue to fight for England's absurd ideas of conquest in Mesopotamia or Palestine."[29]

Figure 2.2 "Britain Expects Every Son of Israel to Do His Duty." World War One recruitment poster, in Yiddish, c. 1918.

A second obstacle was that even some of the more ardent Zionists did not support the creation of a British protectorate in Palestine. Graham, for instance, only a few days after pointing out the political advantages of Zionism, stated that he "never meant to suggest that the question of 'protection'

Figure 2.3 “The Jews the world over love liberty, have fought for it & will fight for it . . . enlist with the infantry Reinforcements” World War One recruitment poster, in English, c. 1918.

should be raised at all."[30] His understanding was that the Zionists only asked for public support of their scheme, not the actual means by which a state could be developed. A great many British politicians, feeling the strain of Indian and Irish nationalist agitation, argued that adding further territory to the guardianship of the British Empire would only harm the empire.

Lastly, political Zionists faced the claim to legitimacy for speaking on behalf of the Jewish people. In Great Britain the Anglo-Jewish community continued to be represented by the Board of Deputies of British Jews, although the 1910s marked an era of growing frustrations with the Board's arcane structure. The demand for greater administrative transparency culminated in the Anglo-Jewish community's split between Zionist and anti-Zionist factions. This division was marked most notably by the CFC's attempts to edge out the EZF's direct access to the British government, as the EZF was trying to act as the voice of the Anglo-Jewish community and circumvent the Board and its subcommittees.

THE 'WOLF FORMULA' AND THE COUNTER PRELIMINARY ZIONIST DRAFT

In an attempt to assert its place as spokesman for the Anglo-Jewish community, the Conjoint Foreign Committee proposed a 'Suggested Palestine Formula' (the Wolf Formula), drafted 1 December 1916 and submitted to His Majesty's Government 3 March 1917.

> In the event of Palestine coming within the spheres of influence of Great Britain or France at the close of the war, the Governments of those Powers will not fail to take account of the historic interest that country possesses for the Jewish community. The Jewish population will be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and colonisation, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown necessary.[31]

The Wolf Formula contained many of the same elements included in the Balfour Declaration's final composition, but clearly maintained a cultural Zionist outlook.[32] In particular, the notion that "equal political rights with the rest of the population" would be secured, suggested that even a large immigrant Jewish population to Palestine would, or at least should, remain smaller than the native Palestinian population. The delineation between this form of cultural Zionism (Wolf Zionism) and political Zionism (Weizmann Zionism) was articulated in a November 1916 letter from Wolf to Israel Zangwill. According to Wolf:

> Through the Board of Deputies, the Conjoint Committee concerned itself with Palestine over a hundred years before Zionism was dreamt

> of. In conjunction with the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Alliance Israelite, and the Ica, it has much larger interests in Palestine in the shape of schools, colonies, and other institutions, than the Zionists have.[33]

Disagreement between the Board of Deputies and the EZF should have signaled problems to come.

For political Zionists, while a public display of support was important and the securing of 'civil and religious liberty' crucial, the ultimate goals of the World Zionist Organization and the EZF were nothing less than establishing an independent Jewish state in Palestine. The problem was that a 'state' was more difficult to convince the British government of, particularly as Palestine was still part of the Ottoman Empire. It was not until well after the Balfour Declaration's final release that 'state' became common usage in reference to the Zionist program in Palestine. In an effort to elaborate on the goals of the political Zionists, without treading too closely to the question of a Jewish state, Nahum Sokolow (the Zionist diplomatic agent in London) issued the Preliminary Zionist Draft (PZD) on 12 July 1917. The wording of the PZD was such that, if issued by the British government, it was faithful and favourable to the essential principles of the political Zionist endeavour.[34]

> His Majesty's Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organization, accepts the principle of recognizing Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people to build its national life at the conclusion of peace following upon the successful issue of the War.
>
> His Majesty's Government regards as essential for the realisation of this principle the grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish National Colonizing Corporation for the resettlement and economic development of the country.
>
> The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy and a Charter for the Jewish National Colonizing Corporation should, in the view of His Majesty's Government, be elaborated in detail and determined with the representatives of the Zionist Organization.[35]

An internally autonomous 'national home' became the euphemism employed by political Zionists, like Weizmann, for a Jewish state. Significantly, the PZD purposefully eliminated the Board of Deputies of British Jews by asserting that the Government will meet with "representatives of the Zionist Organization." The same letter between Wolf and Zangwill illuminated just how determined political Zionists were in side-stepping the Board of Deputies. Wolf pointed out that

> They [political Zionists] have had the opportunity of coming to terms with us [Conjoint Foreign Committee]. I may tell you that, at the very

> commencement of the negotiations, I had a letter from one of the representatives of the Zionists, threatening me that, if we did not accept all the Zionist proposals—I quote the exact words—'we shall do what within us lies to destroy any authority they (the Conjoint Committee) may claim in Jewry, or beyond Jewry, to speak for the Jewish people; we know we have the power to do it'. They have been as good—or rather as bad—to their word. This threat was made formally on behalf of the Zionist leaders.[36]

Political Zionists made it clear that unless the voice of the Anglo-Jewry was whole-heartedly behind their version of Zionism, the Board of Deputies and its committees would be cut out of the decision-making process. From Wolf's perspective, this was inconceivable. Wolf argued that not only were political Zionist organizations "largely composed of enemy aliens," but the Board was defined by its Britishness and as such should have a direct say in British policy.[37] In consulting these 'enemy aliens,' or simply foreign nationals, therefore, the British government was explicitly signaling this as a global question, not a local or even simply imperial one. Still the leadership was coming from Britain, and the assumption remained that it would be a tool for British use.

Instead of recognizing the 'historic interests' of the Jewish peoples, as the Wolf Formula suggested, the PZD sought the recognition of "Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people," although a 'National Home' was purposely left open to interpretation. From the political Zionist standpoint there was little doubt that the ultimate goal was an independent Jewish political state. Given that neither Ireland nor India had yet earned for itself a similar right, however, the Jewish National Home was a convenient alternative to an outright declaration of statehood. Ireland had been granted Home Rule in 1914, but the 'necessities of war' postponed implementation. The delay only incited more animosity from the Republican parties. In the previous year, the Irish nationalists undertook the Easter Rising in the name of full independence. The 'Provisional Government of the Irish Republic' declared "the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible."[38] The Easter Rising carried with it similar global ramifications. American interests in Ireland were well known (as indicated in the "Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland"), and included funding and sending arms to Irish nationalists. It is interesting to note, though, that while the connections between Ireland and the United States, not yet in the War in 1916, were well known, the possibility of "kind" treatment of Ireland in wooing America did not seem to carry the persuasive power that a pro-Zionist statement carried in wooing global Jewry.

To achieve statehood, the Zionists recognized that more than political maneuvering was necessary; proof of the Zionists' abilities to 'govern responsibly' had to be offered. Zionists distinguished their version of nationalism from that of the Irish and Indian cases, maintaining that Ireland

and India retained too many of the 'primordial' qualities that made them unsuitable candidates for immediate statehood. While Graham argued that "all they [the Zionists] ask for is a formal repetition, if possible in writing, of the general assurances of sympathy which they have already received from members of H. M. Government verbally,"[39] it is clear from the PZD that the Zionists themselves had much more in mind. Not only did they seek "protection to be established at the conclusion of peace," but they also wished that the protecting nation would grant the principle of "internal autonomy to the Jewish nationality in Palestine."[40] In other words, a state.

ASYLUM OR REFUGE? THE FOREIGN OFFICE PRELIMINARY DRAFT

Sometime, presumably after the issuance of the PZD, the Foreign Office submitted its own text on the question of Palestine. Known as the Foreign Office Preliminary Draft (FOPD), no actual document remains extant. What information does exist comes from Leonard Stein's (1961) *The Balfour Declaration*, in which he claims a private conversation with Sir Harold Nicolson, where Nicolson noted the key words of the FOPD as being *asylum* and *refuge*. Stein asserts that the "British Government was to declare itself in favour of the establishment in Palestine of *a sanctuary for Jewish victims of persecution*."[41] For political Zionists this must have been distasteful, although the intention might have been in line with general Zionist aims. According to Stein, Sokolow expressed dislike for the wording and pushed harder for the phrase "a national home for the Jewish people." Whether Sokolow believed this or not, the term "sanctuary" in particular implied the paternal status of the British state in relation to the Zionists that must have rankled Zionists. In some ways this missing draft may offer some of the best insights into the British imperial mind with regards to the Palestine Question. The protected status of Palestine was certainly at the forefront of negotiations in 1919 and it continued to be a thorn in the side of the mandatory administration after 1920. In 1952, Nicolson remembered that the sense among his colleagues working on this draft was that "we were founding a refuge for the disabled and did not foresee that it would become a nest of hornets."[42] If Nicolson's memory serves, there is ample evidence that the intentions of the British government did not line up with the desires of political Zionists and that non-political rationale were in play when considering Zionist schemes (i.e., use of the term "disabled").[43]

THE ZIONIST AND BALFOUR DRAFTS

The PZD, and perhaps even the FOPD, was reviewed by Sir Mark Sykes, Graham, and Lord Rothschild. Deemed too specific on the sensitive topic of

the future governance of Palestine, these first drafts were set aside. On 18 July, Lord Rothschild sent a letter to Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour reiterating the Zionist desire to 're-constitute' the national home for the Jewish people. That same day, a second official draft—the Zionist Draft (ZD)—circulated among the Cabinet. This draft reflected the two most essential components of a possible resolution, as seen through the eyes of the Zionist Political Committee:

> 1. His Majesty's Government accepts the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish people.
>
> 2. His Majesty's Government will use its best endeavours to secure the achievement of this object and will discuss the necessary methods and means with the Zionist Organization.[44]

In the wake of the disagreements with the Board of Deputies of British Jews, this second component began to carry a great deal of significance for pro-Zionist factions. Balfour's response was received in the middle of August and a nearly exact copy of the ZD was brought before the War Cabinet. This draft, the Balfour Draft, only made a slight change in the second clause:

> His Majesty's Government accepts the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people.
>
> His Majesty's Government will use their best endeavors to secure the achievement of this object and will be ready to consider any suggestions on the subject which the Zionist Organization may desire to lay before them.[45]

The most significant discrepancy between what Rothschild advocated and what Balfour purposed existed in the idea that the Government would "discuss the necessary methods and means with the Zionist Organization" to achieve these ends, and that the Government would be "ready to consider any suggestions on the subject, which the Zionist Organization may desire to lay before them."[46] The distinction between *discussion* and *consideration* is one of power. British statesmen like Balfour, despite being favourable to Zionism, were careful not to give too much power to the Zionist Committee. This certainly reinforces the point of view of scholars like Vereté. Instead of making the Zionists equal partners and discussing with them the future of Palestine, the British government retained the right to consider ideas handed up to the Government by the Zionists. Still, this would have been a significant step away from the "sanctuary" offered in the FOPD. What is more, given that non-Jewish Zionists still had not come to equate a national Jewish home with a Jewish state, a divide continued to exist between what the British government offered and what the Zionists aimed to achieve.

MONTAGU AND HIS 'ANTI-SEMITISM' DRAFT

At the end of 1916 the effects of a worsening war helped prompt the downfall of Prime Minister Asquith's government. It came as a surprise to many that Edwin Montagu, a close friend and political ally of Asquith, secured a position in the Cabinet under the newly installed Lloyd George government. According to Lady Violet Bonham-Carter (daughter of Asquith), Montagu's eventual acceptance of a position in the Lloyd George Government was best described by Winston Churchill:

> I have no right to be squeamish about changes from front—but this—it is as if one's own lap-dog turned around and bit one.[47]

Montagu was certainly no lap dog, but such imagery accurately demonstrates perceptions of him.

On 17 July 1917, Montagu took his position in the Cabinet as Secretary of State for India. Although this position did not entitle him to regular participation in the War Cabinet, he was nevertheless granted occasional access. As a result, anti-Zionism gained a clear foothold in the Cabinet, while at the same time the Cabinet was missing one of its strongest behind-the-scenes Zionist supporters. Chaim Weizmann was sent, on behalf of the British government, to stop American diplomat Henry Morgenthau from continuing on his mission to discuss a separate peace with the Turks.[48] As a result of this changing dynamic, it did not take long for the first major clash between the ideals of the Zionists and those of the anti-Zionists to appear in governmental records. On 23 August, Montagu issued his memorandum, "The Anti-Semitism of the Present Government."

Based largely on the same arguments Montagu used in 1915 and 1916, "The Anti-Semitism" memorandum focused on his belief that a 'national home for the Jewish people' created in Palestine would have two distressing consequences. First, Montagu understood this phrase to mean "that Mohammedans and Christians are to make way for the Jews, and the Jews should be put in all positions of preference."[49] Second, as a result of such actions, "the Jews should be . . . peculiarly associated with Palestine in the same way England is with the English or France with the French."[50] Muslims and Christians in Palestine, he argued, "will be regarded as foreigners, just in the same way as Jews will hereafter be treated as foreigners in every country but Palestine."[51] Generally left out of the historical discussion about the shaping of the Balfour Declaration, Montagu himself offered wording for the proposal of support for a Jewish national home:

> that the Government will be prepared to do everything in their power to obtain for Jews in Palestine complete liberty of settlement and life on an equality with the inhabitants of that country who profess other religious beliefs.[52]

While it is true that Montagu's version comes nowhere close to the Zionist vision, it is also evident that he was not indifferent to the suffering of those living in less desirable situations than his own. Jehuda Reinharz does include a short discussion of this wording in his article, calling it an anti-Zionist *tour de force* and that "His impassioned arguments nevertheless raised new questions about the solidity of the Jewish consensus in favor of the Zionist program."[53] Montagu's text is crucially vague, leaving the passage to significantly different interpretations. On the one hand, he appears to refer solely to Jews already in residence in Palestine, i.e., "obtain for Jews *in* Palestine." On the other hand Montagu could be discussing both Jews who are already residents in Palestine and those who wish to become residents, i.e., "obtain *for Jews* in Palestine." Because Montagu does not use any punctuation to direct the reader, his meaning on this point is not entirely clear. Although empathy can be implied in the fact that he offers "complete liberty of settlement," his stance is tempered with concern for the other inhabitants of the region and a general sense of rhetorical vagueness.

MILNER DRAFT

Late in August 1917, shortly after Montagu released his memorandum, the War Cabinet met to discuss the declaration on Palestine. Lord Alfred Milner, also a member of the War Cabinet, "evidently had concluded that the Balfour draft declaration . . . was a bit too strongly Zionist,"[54] and as a result proposed a new declaration that maintained the same appearance as Balfour's, but changed the language.

> His Majesty's Government accepts the principle that every opportunity should be afforded for the establishment of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine, and will use its best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, and will be ready to consider any suggestions on the subject which the Zionist organisation may desire to lay before them.[55]

Where Montagu wished to gain equality for Jews, Milner, Balfour, and Sokolow remained focused on the specific task of acquiring a specific *place* in Palestine. On 11 September 1917, Colonel House (Edward Mandell House, 1858–1938) in responding to Lord Cecil's enquiry into President Woodrow Wilson's sentiment on the possibility of a pro-Zionist declaration of sympathy, cabled that "the time is not opportune for any definite statement further perhaps than one of sympathy provided it can be made without conveying any real commitment."[56]

After Weizmann returned from his meeting with Morgenthau, his attentions returned to the actions of the War Cabinet and what appeared to be the unraveling of Zionist hopes. In a letter to the Manchester *Guardian* editor C.P. Scott, on 13 September 1917, Weizmann voiced concern that

Montagu posed a threat to the Zionist endeavor and argued that he might have a profoundly negative effect on the procurement of a pro-Zionist declaration. Weizmann, who already blamed Montagu for weakening the effectiveness the Jewish regiment,[57] feared he would do this, or worse, to the more important objective, Palestine.

MONTAGU'S SECOND SUGGESTION

Montagu's apparent dislike of the Zionist endeavor prompted Lord Milner and Lord Robert Cecil to raise objections to Montagu's memorandum on the grounds that his views were those of the minority. Whereas political Zionists sought to change policy, Montagu *appeared* to be speaking for the minority opinion because his was that of maintaining the status quo. In this regard it is clear that Weizmann Zionists had won a victory. Many of Montagu's concerns were not new to the conversation, but echoed the now quieted Board of Deputies of British Jews. Moreover, anti-Zionists and non-Zionists felt little need to actively lobby against Zionism, believing that political inertia would be enough to undo the ambitions of political Zionists. However, while it is not clear whether Zionists or anti-Zionists spoke for the majority, it is clear that Montagu was by no means alone in his opinions. In an attempt to disprove his 'lone wolf' image, on 14 September, Montagu sent a letter to Lord Cecil further explaining his position. The letter used indirect evidence that Zionism was not an ideology held by the majority of England's Jews. Once again, Montagu offered suggestions for the wording of a possible resolution.

> His Majesty's Government accepts the principle that every opportunity should be afforded for the establishment in Palestine for those Jews who cannot or will not remain in the lands in which they live at present, will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, and will be ready to consider any suggestions on the subject which any Jewish or Zionist organisations may desire to lay before it.[58]

Perhaps realizing that his first suggestion was too mild for even the moderates in the Cabinet, Montagu took up some of the language used in Milner's draft and went so far as to state that His Majesty's Government was 'ready to consider any suggestions on the subject' from both Jewish and Zionist organizations. This distinction is, of course, important in light of Montagu's belief that the Jewish community was not united behind the political Zionist cause, and had it been taken seriously, would likely have led to consultations once again with the Board of Deputies. Still, Montagu's new proposal did actually concede to one of the Zionists' two main principles.

In July 1917, when the Zionist Political Committee articulated the two main goals it felt should be reflected in a British pro-Zionist declaration, the simple recognition of the Zionist Organization ranked only behind the

recognition of Palestine as the national homeland of the Jews. To this end, Montagu's suggestion that His Majesty's Government be prepared to "consider any suggestions on the subject which any Jewish or *Zionist* organisations may desire," was clearly in line with the very terms set out by the Zionists themselves. This new draft represented a tremendous concession on the part of such an ardent anti-Zionist. Moreover, his second proposal clarifies which Jews with whom Montagu was concerned, all of those in residence and wishing to be in residence in Palestine, whether by necessity or choice. Both 'cannot' and 'will not' suggest force, either external or internal, signifying that Montagu was aware of the potential of doors closing and the 'big picture' realities these questions assumed.

Despite this rather significant concession, Montagu did not win friends in Weizmann's circles. On 16 September Weizmann argued that despite "three years of hard work, after having enlisted the sympathies practically of everyone who matters in England," the possible declaration then being considered in the War Cabinet was "hung up owing to opposition of a few . . . 'Englishmen of the Jewish persuasion.' "[59] To further this particular point, Weizmann and Rothschild sent a joint letter to Balfour "setting forth the Zionist arguments and objecting strongly to the 'one-sided manner' in which the views of Jewry had been presented through Montagu's participation."[60] The fact that the people who mattered in the British Government happened to also be in favor of Zionism—as a result, it seems, of Weizmann's group's lobbying efforts—is also significant. While Lord Curzon, for example, certainly ranked among the most influential members of the British Government, he did not like the Zionist scheme, and one wonders if he was one who ranked among the people Weizmann believed did not matter in British politics.

MILNER-AMERY DRAFT

On 4 October 1917, Lord Milner and Leopold Amery (the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Colonial Office) issued what appeared to be an appeasement draft. The Milner-Amery Draft went into greater detail than had any draft since the PZD:

> His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish Race and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed in any other country by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship.[61]

The language between the Milner Draft and the Milner-Amery Draft was markedly different. Instead of simply accepting the idea that a *home* of the

Jewish people should be created in Palestine, His Majesty's Government was suddenly fully in favour of the establishment of a *national home* not for the Jewish *people*, but for the Jewish *race*. This last term in particular raised a series of questions, even within the pro-Zionist camp. Weizmann believed *race* was the better of the two terms, but others, notably American Justice Louis Brandeis, argued that the word *people*, was less aggressive and more practical.

In subsequent debate, Montagu raised objections echoing Wolf's earlier contentions, noting:

> that most English-born Jews were opposed to Zionism, while it was supported by foreign-born Jews, such as Dr. Gaster and Dr. Herz, the two Grand Rabbis, who had been born in Roumania and Austria respectively, and Dr. Weizmann, President of the English Zionist Federation, who was born in Russia.[62]

Balfour countered that the Zionist movement, "though opposed by a number of wealthy Jews in this country, had behind it the support of a majority of Jews, at all events in Russia and America, and possibly in other countries."[63] Although the Milner-Amery Draft did take steps to secure the rights of Jews not living in Palestine, Montagu continued the assault on Zionism five days later in his "Zionism" memorandum. Here he made it clear that Milner-Amery still had not done enough, that Jews should have a national home in one place as well as protected rights in another, remained oppositional ideas.

This early October attempt to derail the Zionist endeavor was a constructed, if passionate, plea for the Government to reconsider its position on a Jewish national home in Palestine. To further prove his contentions, and to counter the argument that he represented a rogue minority, Montagu included a list of prominent anti-Zionists as well as a series of quotes from foreign-born and foreign-citizen Zionists—the *alien* essence of the ideology. Montagu then went on to argue that "whatever safeguarding words might be used in the formula, the civil rights of Jews as nationals in the country in which they were born might be endangered."[64] Lord Curzon too voiced opposition, stating, "from his recollection of Palestine, that the country was, for the most part barren and desolate."[65] Thus how was the world's Jewry not only supposed to thrive in the region, but deal with the large numbers of native Arab inhabitants as well? Curzon's concerns spoke directly to points raised by Montagu in his "On the Anti-Semitism of the Present Government" and suggestions for possible declarations, but only Curzon's comments were noted as being "strong objections upon practical grounds."[66] In discussing Montagu's role *vis à vis* the Balfour Declaration's construction and his anti-Zionist sentiment, Jonathan Schneer echoes what many historians say: "Montagu took the issue personally."[67] Schneer even goes so far as to contend that Montagu's contentions were a "*cri de coeur*" and his fellow Cabinet ministers would have been "taken aback."[68] This reading is

a bit melodramatic. Montagu certainly had strong opinions on the matter, but they were no less logical, rational, or emotional than those carried by strident Zionists. Despite Montagu's numerous and thoughtful contentions, Zionists (and subsequent narrators) have depicted him as too emotionally attached to be taken seriously on "practical" grounds.

With regard to the Milner-Amery Draft, Weizmann submitted three suggestions for alterations.[69] The first was that "instead of 'establishment' would it not be more desirable to use the word 're-establishment'?"[70] Weizmann, consistent in his arguments, pointed out that re-establishment indicated historical connection between the Jews and Palestine.[71] Moreover, while 're-establishment' indicated connection, it could also underscore the idea that Jews belong nowhere else but Palestine, which is of course at the heart of anti-Zionist opposition like that posed by Montagu. What is more, in direct opposition to the safeguarding words meant to appease anti-Zionists like Montagu, Weizmann suggested that the phrase "the rights and political status enjoyed in any other countries by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship," should be replaced with "the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country of which they are loyal citizens."[72]

Had this wording been accepted, later questions of a sovereign states' rights and the loyalty of its citizens would have had to be addressed. As it was, although the wording did eventually change, the sentiment that one could be both a citizen of one and a loyal member of another country was established. This issue, in particular, was revisited by the July 1950 Israeli Law of Return, which allowed Jews to obtain dual citizenship in Israel and other states (one can be both an Israeli and a U.S. citizen, for instance). This was, in part, a conscious effort to allow members of the world's Jewry to be both Jewish and members of a variety of other states. In so doing, nationality and statehood became officially recognized as distinct concepts in Israeli rhetoric. In 1917, Weizmann's removal of 'nationality' was consciously done so that Zionist national identity could only be defined by Judaism. Looking toward the creation of a Jewish state, there is logic in doing this. If Zionism is the ideological underpinning of the state's structure, then it logically follows that Judaism is the defining feature of national affiliation. What is more, Weizmann argued that the original wording might suggest that to be loyal citizens of the nation in which they lived they would have to "totally dissociate themselves from the Jewish national home, showing no interest in or sympathy with, its successful development."[73]

Finally, the Milner-Amery Draft went through the hands of Justice Louis Brandeis, who, on the request of President Woodrow Wilson, worked to redraft it "in slightly stronger and cleaner language, substituting 'the Jewish people' for 'the Jewish race.'" [74] Although Weizmann typically preferred using the term 'race,' as had Theodor Herzl before him, the switch muted the "vexing question of who's-a-Jew" when coupled with the final clause protecting the rights of Jews choosing to stay outside of Palestine.[75]

It is evident from the type of language used in successive documents that Zionists felt much more pressure to act quickly than did anti-Zionists. Whereas Montagu sought moderation and further discussion on the issues pertaining to Palestine and Jewish nationalism, by the middle of September Weizmann believed that "these dissensions are most harmful at this critical moment"[76] and sought to achieve a declaration as quickly as possible. Growing unease with the War, fears that the Germans might release a pro-Zionist declaration before the British, and Montagu's continued anti-Zionist activities in the War Cabinet drew anxiety among Weizmann's cohort.[77] Clearly, Weizmann put much stock in the notion that Montagu was capable of defeating any proposed declaration and, as a result, harbored a great deal of resentment toward him.

As October came to a close, the issue was once again discussed in the War Cabinet. To the great relief of Zionists, Montagu was not present, having recently left for duties in India. However, despite Weizmann's deeply held belief that he would be offered a chance to speak in person before the Cabinet, he too was not in attendance.

A FINAL FORM: THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

On 31 October 1917, Balfour began discussion on the issue of Palestine by suggesting that all seemed to be agreed, and that "from a purely diplomatic and political point of view, it was desirable that some declaration favorable to the aspirations of the Jewish nationalists should now be made."[78] Not to ignore the numerous contentions of Montagu and other anti-Zionists, Balfour thought that two outstanding problems needed to be addressed. First, the adequacy of Palestine for forming a home for the Jewish, or any other peoples. Second, the difficulty felt with regard to the future position of Jews in Western countries.[79] Balfour's first point, building on Curzon's 'desolate' description, anticipated the issues that arose subsequent to the establishment of the state of Israel: that the region of Palestine was environmentally inadequate for the Jewish Zionist community in combination with the communities already there. Curzon had not been alone in raising concerns about the productivity and capacity of Palestinian land or the matter of the population already present in the region, but the potential of scientific advancement largely negated these concerns. According to the minutes from 31 October, Balfour reiterated the beliefs coming from scientists on the ground, saying that "if Palestine were scientifically developed, a very much larger population could be sustained than had existed during the period of Turkish misrule."[80] In 1920, in a letter from Weizmann to Curzon this idea was revisited:

> Palestine is at present very uneconomically cultivated. The Arab method of agriculture is primitive and extensive. With irrigation, modern roads, sanitary conditions, and the use of machinery and other methods of modern farming, probably not more than one-sixth of the land which

> at present is used by an Arab farmer would be required to yield a livelihood for a family accustomed to European standards.[81]

In 1917, it was the work of intelligence agent and agronomist Aaron Aaronsohn that supported the notion that with scientific analysis and development, the region of Palestine could certainly sustain the agricultural pursuits of a Jewish and Palestinian state.[82] The possibilities that science held were, thus, enough to allow the question to be dismissed. Never, however, was the other part of this question, regarding the roughly 600,000 native inhabitants of the region, fully discussed or concluded.

The second concern, while certainly a main focus of anti-Zionist rhetoric, misjudged the breadth and scope of the nationalism question. Accepting the Zionist enterprise *and* protecting the rights of Jews in *Western* countries were, as Montagu and the anti-Zionists argued, two distinctly separate issues. The definition of nation that underlay the Zionist movement begged a clear answer to the question of whether Judaism constituted a nation or only a religion. Conversely, the Zionist New Jew rhetoric, most notably put forward by Max Nordau, intended to overturn centuries of negative traits ascribed to Jewish communities, and argued that Jewish nationalism is "not meant for those people who have cut themselves adrift from Jewry, it is meant for those masses who have a will to live a life of their own."[83] From the Zionist perspective, if one accepts Judaism, how does one simultaneously deny Zionism? The Cabinet's succinct interpretation of the problems that faced a potential Declaration simply ignored the question of national identity altogether.

Not having a clear idea of what a nation is, and what rights a nation has, eventually harmed the British effort in Palestine. Globally, too, the question of nationality had much broader implications. The reassessment of the obstacles to a Declaration singled out the future of *Western* Jews, and although the eventual Declaration made no distinction on the question of Western, Eastern, or Asiatic Jewry, the mention here of the future and rights of only Western Jewry simply reinforced the racialist overtones of imperial hierarchy and unclear definitions of national identity. There remained hundreds of thousands of Jews outside Europe and North America, but their opinions as to national identity were neither consulted nor considered in the pursuit of a Zionist Palestine. From a political point of view, Montagu in particular argued that if nationality is defined by religion, otherwise well-established nationalities like the English and French must be re-examined and reconsidered as a result. In the rising tide of questions pertaining to Indian and Irish nationalism, it is surprising this concern did not carry more weight with the British statesmen.

In an attempt to define the language presented in the proposed declaration, Balfour stated that he understood a 'national home' to be

> Some form of British, American or other protectorate, under which full facilities would be given to the Jews to work out their own salvation

> and the build up, by means of education, agriculture, and industry, a real centre of national culture and focus of national life. It did not necessarily involve the early establishment of an independent Jewish State, which was a matter for gradual development in accordance with the ordinary laws of political evolution.[84]

As had been the case with Graham in the preceding months, it appears Balfour wanted to understand Zionist aims in his own way, whether accurate or not. What is clear, however, was that Curzon believed a declaration would only complicate British goals for the eastern end of the Mediterranean and that the more important ambitions for Palestine should relate to maintaining peaceful relations with the Arab communities. Curzon attached a great deal of importance to

> the necessity of retaining the Christian and Moslem Holy Places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and, if this were to be effectively done, he did not see how the Jewish people could have a political capital in Palestine.[85]

Eventually Curzon acquiesced to the scheme, doing so only with the strictest interpretation in mind.

In the end, the outcome of the 31 October meeting was the authorization of what has since become known as the Balfour Declaration:

> His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status of Jews in any other country.[86]

The document did not fade into historical obscurity. Written into the language of the British Mandate for Palestine it lived on, laying the groundwork for the eventual Israeli state. What the document actually said and did, nevertheless, remained a point of question and concern. A year after the Declaration's final release in a letter to Balfour, Curzon raised objections to the creation of a Jewish *state*. Noting Weizmann's call for "the 'whole administration of Palestine' being so constituted as to make a Jewish Commonwealth under British trusteeship," and that "a Commonwealth as defined in every dictionary is a 'body politic,' a 'state'."[87] Continuing, Curzon noted, "I feel tolerably sure therefore that Weizmann may say one thing to you or while you may mean one thing by a National Home, he is out for something quite different. He contemplates a Jewish State."[88] For Curzon there should be no Jewish 'state,' only a Jewish entity within the larger British imperial framework.

Waiting for news of the Declaration's final form, Weizmann paced in the corridor like an expectant father. At last Mark Sykes came to him exclaiming, "It's a boy!"

NOTES

1. See: Michael Berkowitz, *Nationalism, Zionism and Ethnic Mobilization of the Jews in 1900 and Beyond* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004), 143; Bernard Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life* (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1992), 208–11. The definition of political Zionism specifically and Zionism more generally will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 of this work.
2. Edwin Montagu, "Untitled, 16 March 1915." David Lloyd George Papers, London, 1.
3. Ibid., 4.
4. The Board of Deputies of British Jews, first known as the London Committee of Deputies of British Jews, was founded in 1760. It was concerned with issues of Jewish education, rights, and foreign matters. The C.F.C., one of the subcommittees of the Board, established in 1878, represented the interests of the Anglo-Jewish community to the British government on questions of foreign affairs. It was not until the 1800s that the organization was recognized by the British government as *the* representative body for British Jewry. Members of the Board were influential, well educated, and typically affluent members of what Chaim Bermant has termed the 'Cousinhood.' See: Chaim Bermant, *The Cousinhood* (New York: Macmillan, 1972). Neither the Board nor its various subcommittees were, strictly speaking, democratic. The Board's election and selection process was a haphazard result of over a hundred years of appointments, volunteers, and internal community selections.
5. "Difficulties of Political Zionism." c. 1915. The Board of Deputies of British Jews Papers, London, 1–8.
6. See: Vladimir Jabotinsky, *The Story of the Jewish Legion* (New York: B. Ackerman, 1945); J. H. Patterson, *With the Judæans in the Palestine Campaign* (London: Hutchinson, c. 1922); Alyson Pendlebury, *Portraying 'the Jew' in First World War Britain* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2006).
7. Pendlebury, 124.
8. Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann*. Vol. One (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1949), 203.
9. Minute R. Graham, 13 June 1917, FO 371/3058, as cited by Devorah Brazilay-Yegar, "Crisis as Turning Point: Weizmann in World War I," *Studies in Zionism* 6 (Autumn 1982): 252.
10. Meir Vereté, "The Balfour Declaration and Its Makers," *Middle Eastern Studies* 6, no. 1 (January 1970): 69, footnote 5.
11. For further information see: John Cornelius, "The Balfour Declaration and the Zimmermann Note," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, 1997; Isaiah Friedman, *Germany, Turkey and Zionism 1897–1918* (New Brunswick, CT: Transaction Publishers, 1997).
12. Of the 203 employees at the London office—Wellington House, by the end of the War had offices scattered across the Empire—only 47 were men. This disparity in the female to male ratio is in part due to the fact that men were encouraged to serve in more 'front line' positions, but is also representative of the continued disparity between managerial and staff positions held by women and men in World War One. None of the 156 women employed at Wellington House held decision-making positions. See: "Activities of Wellington House During the Great War 1914–18," The National Archives, London.
13. M. L. Sanders, "Wellington House and British Propaganda During the First World War," *The Historical Journal* XVIII, no. I (1975): 144.
14. Ibid. 119–20.
15. "War Propaganda, May–August, 1917," The National Archives, London.

16. Ibid.
17. *British Propaganda Poster Intended for Chinese Muslim Audience*, c. 1918, Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, accessed 20 July 2015, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3g11304.
18. Sultan Mahommed Shah, Aga Khan III (1877–1957), was the forty-eighth Imam of the Ismaili Shi'a sect. Believed to be the descendent of the Prophet Muhammad via his daughter Fatima and cousin/son-in-law Ali, the Aga Khan wielded a great deal of spiritual and political power in Islamic communities throughout the Indian Ocean world.
19. David Lloyd George, *The Great War: Speech Delivered by David Lloyd George at the Queen's Hall, 19 September*. Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, Limited, 1914. 12.
20. Ibid.
21. Robert Crewe-Milnes, "Lord Crewe to Lloyd George, 2 October, 1914," David Lloyd George Papers, London.
22. Pendlebury, 133.
23. Ibid., 53.
24. Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 52. Nor was this the first time Lloyd George had made such claims. At the outbreak of the war, Robert Graves remembers that when Lloyd George, a Welshman and devout Protestant, "became Minister of Munitions, and persuaded the chapels that the War was a Crusade, we had a sudden tremendous influx of Welshmen from North Wales." Robert Graves, *Good-Bye to All That* (New York: Anchor Books, 1998), 80.
25. *Britain Expects Every Son of Israel to Do His Duty*, c. 1918, Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, accessed 20 July 2015, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3g11300.
26. *The Jews the World over Love Liberty Have Fought for It & Will Fight for It*, c. 1914–18, Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, accessed 20 July 2015, http://loc.gov/pictures/resource/cph.3g12406/.
27. Evelyn Baring, "The Government of Subject Races," in *Political and Literary Essays 1908–1913* (London: MacMillan, 1913), 4–5.
28. George Macdonogh, "Brigadier-General Macdonogh to Sir A. Nicolson (Received 7 January)," c. 1917, The National Archives, London.
29. Ronald Graham, "Minute by Sir R. Graham, 23 June 1917," David Lloyd George Papers, London.
30. Brazilay-Yegar, 253.
31. Lucien Wolf, "The Palestine Question, Suggested Palestine Formula, 1 December 1916," The Board of Deputies of British Jews Papers, London.
32. Religious, or cultural, Zionism is part of devout Judaism, and built on the understanding that God will restore the Jews to Israel with the coming of the Messiah and the redemption of the world's people.
33. Lucien Wolf, "Lucien Wolf to Israel Zangwill, 10 November, 1916," The Board of Deputies of British Jews Papers, London. ICA is the name by which the Jewish Colonization Association was known. According to Albert Hyamson 'the institution [was] formed and endowed by Baron Maurice de Hirsch with his millions, and devoted to the assistance of Jewish emigration from the East of Europe, and to the establishment in the first instance of Jewish agricultural colonies in North and South America'. (116) Alternatively the Anglo-Jewish Association and the Alliance Israelite 'confine their work in Palestine entirely to education,' the former being based in British funding and structures, the latter in French (219). Albert M. Hyamson, *Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1917).

34. Sokolow was assisted by Sir Mark Sykes, then a conservative Member of Parliament, and Sir Harold Nicolson, a member of Britain's Foreign Office.
35. Ronald Sanders, *The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour Declaration and the Birth of the British Mandate for Palestine* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983), 558.
36. Wolf, "Lucien Wolf to Israel Zangwill, 10 November."
37. Ibid.
38. "Poblacht Na H Éireann. The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic to the People of Ireland," 1916.
39. Brazilay-Yegar, 253.
40. Sanders, *The High Walls of Jerusalem*, 558.
41. Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), 468. Emphasis added.
42. Ibid., 468, footnote 24.
43. A rebuff to those who argue for a solely political reading of the Declaration's history.
44. "Letter to Arthur Balfour from Lord Rothschild, 18 July," The National Archives, London.
45. "Draft Reply to Lord Rothschild from Mr. Balfour," The National Archives, London.
46. The Zionist Movement, August 1917. The National Archives, London.
47. Edwin Montagu, "Personal Memorandum/Diary, 9 December, 1916," British Library, London, 14. Churchill made this observation to Lady Bonham-Carter in the summer of 1917, shortly after Montagu accepted the Secretary-ship for India. The statement was remarked upon by Bonham-Carter in a cover letter from 1949 which preceded and was in reaction to Montagu's memorandum. It should also be noted that another entanglement connected Montagu more closely with Asquith than other Liberals. In 1915 Montagu married Venetia Stanley, a socialite and confidant of Asquith. It is generally accepted that Asquith was deeply in love with Stanley and that his increasingly frequent attentions were the reason for her accepting Montagu's proposal of marriage (which she had initially declined in 1913). Losing Stanley to Montagu does seem to have strained the friendship some, only further strained after Asquith's loss of the Prime Ministership.
48. Not only was Morgenthau's mission disliked by the Government because of what it might do to the war effort, it also looked as though it might cause a serious setback to the Zionist endeavor as well, in effecting the chances of Great Britain securing control over Palestine and thus aiding Zionist ambitions for the region.
49. Edwin Montagu, "The Anti-Semitism of the Present Government, 23 August 1917," War Cabinet: CAB 24/24, The National Archives, London.
50. Ibid. In 1919, at the Paris Peace conference Weizmann reiterated this same contention, indeed hoping this was how a future Israel would be understood. In 1922, the issue was revisited in the Churchill White Paper. This time, however, Palestine was not intended to become a wholly Jewish region, that it should not therefore be as Jewish as England is English. It is particularly interesting that Montagu made this assertion given how he has been read in the years since. Schneer, who argues that "We cannot know whether true assimilation was possible for Jews in Britain in 1917," recounts a story from Aubrey Herbert's diary in 1917, after a meeting with Montagu in Italy, in which Herbert states "It's ridiculous to pretend he is an Englishman . . . He is every inch an Oriental." See: Jonathan Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Random House, 2010), 341.

51. Montagu, "The Anti-Semitism . . ."
52. Ibid.
53. Jehuda Reinharz, "The Balfour Declaration and Its Maker: A Reassessment," *Journal of Modern History* 64 (September 1992): 465–66.
54. Sanders, *The High Walls of Jerusalem, 575*.
55. "Alternative, by Lord Milner, to Draft Declaration," The Zionist Movement, August 1917, War Cabinet: CAB 24/24/4, former reference G. T. 1803A. The National Archives, London.
56. Daniel Gutwein, *The Divided Elite: Economics, Politics and Anglo-Jewry, 1882–1917* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 355; Ben Halpern, *A Clash of Heroes: Brandeis, Weizmann, and American Zionism: Brandeis, Weizmann, and American Zionism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 167.
57. Chaim Weizmann, "To Charles P. Scott, 13 September 1917, Doc. 501," in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Vol. VII, Series A* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975), 510.
58. Edwin Montagu, "Edwin Montagu to Lord Robert Cecil, 14 September 1917," in *Edwin Montagu and the Balfour Declaration* (New York: Arab League Office, 1966), 15.
59. Chaim Weizmann, "To Philip Kerr, 16 September 1917, Doc. 502," in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Vol. VII, Series A* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975), 511.
60. Reinharz, 478.
61. The Zionist Movement, 4 October 1917. The National Archives, London.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Schneer, 338.
68. Ibid.
69. James A. Malcolm cites this version of the Declaration as the 'Weizmann Draft,' although it is simply an edited version of the Milner-Amery Draft. For Malcolm's history, moreover, this is the only version of the document cited aside from its final form.
70. Chaim Weizmann, "To Sir Maurice Hankey, 15 October 1917, Doc. 524," in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Vol. VII, Series A* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975), 534.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Donald Neff, "Britain Issues the Balfour Declaration," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, 1995, 81. Also see: Weizmann, *Trial and Error,* 207.
75. Neff, 81.
76. Chaim Weizmann, "To Harry Sacher, 18 September 1917, Doc. 505," in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Vol. VII, Series A* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975), 514.
77. Rumors circulated in London that the Germans were considering the propagandistic advantages of a pro-Zionist statement. A great deal of work has been done connecting these rumors to the hurried pace of the Zionist work in London after 1917, including an attempt by some scholars to add the Zimmerman Telegram into the mix. (For further information, see Cornelius; Friedman.)
78. The Zionist Movement, 31 October 1917. The National Archives, London.
79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.
81. Chaim Weizmann, "Chaim Weizmann to Lord Curzon, 2 February 1920," British Library, London.
82. Patricia Goldstone, *Aaronsohn's Maps: The Untold Story of the Man Who Might Have Created Peace in the Middle East* (Orlando: Harcourt, 2007). Aaronsohn's work was predicated on the idea of an independent Palestine, not necessarily an independent *Jewish* Palestine.
83. Chaim Weizmann, "To Philip Kerr, 7 October 1917, Doc. 517," in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Vol. VII, Series A* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975), 527. The 'New Jew' is discussed further, herein, in Chapters 3 and 4.
84. The Zionist Movement, 4 October 1917. The National Archives, London.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. John Fisher, *Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East 1916–19* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 214.
88. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Activities of Wellington House during the Great War 1914–18." Department of Information: INF 4/1B. The National Archives, London.

Baring, Evelyn. "The Government of Subject Races." In *Political and Literary Essays 1908–1913*, 3–53. London: MacMillan, 1913.

Berkowitz, Michael. *Nationalism, Zionism and Ethnic Mobilization of the Jews in 1900 and Beyond*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004.

Bermant, Chaim. *The Cousinhood*. New York: Macmillan, 1972.

Brazilay-Yegar, Devorah. "Crisis as Turning Point: Weizmann in World War I." *Studies in Zionism* 6 (Autumn 1982): 241–54. *Britain Expects Every Son of Israel to Do His Duty*, c. 1918, Lithograph, Montreal Litho, Montreal, Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, WWI Posters [LC-USZC4–11300], accessed 20 July 2015, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3g11300. *British Propaganda Poster Intended for Chinese Muslim Audience*, c. 1918, 1 photomechanical print. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, WWI Posters [LC-USZC4–11304], accessed 20 July 2015, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3g11304.

Cornelius, John. "The Balfour Declaration and the Zimmermann Note." *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*. 1997.

Crewe-Milnes, Robert. "Lord Crewe to Lloyd George, 2 October, 1914," David Lloyd George Papers. House of Lords Records/Parliamentary Archives, London.

David Lloyd George. *The Great War: Speech Delivered by David Lloyd George at the Queen's Hall, 19 September*. Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, Limited, 1914.

"Difficulties of Political Zionism." The Board of Deputies of British Jews: ACC/3121/E/03/207. London Metropolitan Archives, London. c. 1915.

Fisher, John. *Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East 1916–19*. London: Frank Cass, 1999.

Friedman, Isaiah. *Germany, Turkey and Zionism 1897–1918*. New Brunswick, CT: Transaction, 1997.

Goldstone, Patricia. *Aaronsohn's Maps: The Untold Story of the Man Who Might Have Created Peace in the Middle East*. Orlando: Harcourt, 2007.

Graham, Ronald. "Minute by Sir R. Graham, 23 June 1917." David Lloyd George Papers: F/3/2/28. House of Lords Records/Parliamentary Archives, London.

Graves, Robert. *Good-Bye to All That*. New York: Anchor Books, 1998.
Gutwein, Daniel. *The Divided Elite: Economics, Politics and Anglo-Jewry, 1882–1917*. Leiden: Brill, 1992.
Halpern, Ben. *A Clash of Heroes: Brandeis, Weizmann, and American Zionism: Brandeis, Weizmann, and American Zionism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Hyamson, Albert M. *Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1917.
Jabotinsky, Vladimir. *The Story of the Jewish Legion*. New York: B. Ackerman, 1945. *The Jews the World over Love Liberty Have Fought for It & Will Fight for It*, c. 1914–18, Lithograph, Montreal Litho, Montreal, Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, WWI Posters [LC-USZC4–12406], accessed 20 July 2015, http://loc.gov/pictures/resource/cph.3g12406/.
Macdonogh, George. "Brigadier-General Macdonogh to Sir A. Nicolson (Received 7 January)." Foreign Office: FO 371/2767. The National Archives, London. c. 1917.
Malcolm, James A. *Origins of the Balfour Declaration: Dr. Weizmann's Contribution*. London: British Museum, 1944.
Minault, Gail. *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
Montagu, Edwin. "The Anti-Semitism of the Present Government, 23 August 1917," War Cabinet: CAB 24/24, The National Archives, London.
————. "Edwin Montagu to Lord Robert Cecil, 14 September 1917." In *Edwin Montagu and the Balfour Declaration*. New York: Arab League Office, 1966.
————. "Personal Memorandum/Diary, 9 December 1916." European Manuscripts: MSS EUR F170/10. British Library, London.
————. "Untitled, 16 March 1915." David Lloyd George Papers: C/25, C25/14/1. Parliamentary Archives/House of Lords Records, London.
Neff, Donald. "Britain Issues the Balfour Declaration." *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,* 1995, 81–82.
Patterson, J.H. *With the Judæans in the Palestine Campaign*. London: Hutchinson, c. 1922.
Pendlebury, Alyson. *Portraying 'the Jew' in First World War Britain*. London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2006.
"Poblacht Na H Éireann. The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic to the People of Ireland." 1916.
Reinharz, Jehuda. "The Balfour Declaration and Its Maker: A Reassessment." *Journal of Modern History* 64 (September 1992): 455–99.
Sanders, M.L. "Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World War." *The Historical Journal* XVIII, no. I (1975): 119–46.
Sanders, Ronald. *The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour Declaration and the Birth of the British Mandate for Palestine*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983.
Schneer, Jonathan. *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. New York: Random House, 2010.
Stein, Leonard. *The Balfour Declaration*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961.
Vereté, Meir. "The Balfour Declaration and Its Makers." *Middle Eastern Studies* 6, no. 1 (January 1970): 48–76.
"War Propaganda, May—August." Foreign Office: FO 228/2732. The National Archives, London.
Wasserstein, Bernard. *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life*. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1992.
Weizmann, Chaim. "Chaim Weizmann to Lord Curzon, 2 February 1920." India Office Records: IOR/L/PS/11/170, 2478. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London.

———. *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann* Vol. One. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1949.

———. "To Charles P. Scott, 13 September 1917, Doc. 501." In *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann,* edited by Leonard Stein, vol VII, Series A, 510. Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975.

———. "To Harry Sacher, 18 September 1917, Doc. 505." In *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann,* edited by Leonard Stein, vol VII, Series A, 514. Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975.

———. "To Sir Maurice Hankey, 15 October 1917, Doc. 524." In *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann,* edited by Leonard Stein, vol VII, Series A, 534. Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975.

———. "To Philip Kerr, 7 October 1917, Doc. 517." In *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann,* edited by Leonard Stein, vol VII, Series A, 527. Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975.

———. "To Philip Kerr, 16 September 1917, Doc. 502." In *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann,* edited by Leonard Stein, vol VII, Series A, 511. Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975.

Wolf, Lucien. "Lucien Wolf to Israel Zangwill, 10 November 1916." The Board of Deputies of British Jews: Conjoint Foreign Committee: ACC/3121/E3/204/3. London Metropolitan Archive, London.

———. "The Palestine Question, Suggested Palestine Formula." The Board of Deputies of British Jews: Conjoint Foreign Committee. London Metropolitan Archive, London. 1916.

The Zionist Movement, August 1917, War Cabinet: CAB 24/24/4, former reference G. T. 1803A. The National Archives, London.

——— "Alternative, by Lord Milner, to Draft Declaration." The National Archives, London.

——— "Draft Reply to Lord Rothschild from Mr. Balfour." The National Archives, London.

——— "Letter to Arthur Balfour from Lord Rothschild, 18 July." The National Archives, London.

The Zionist Movement, 4 October 1917, War Cabinet: CAB 23/4, No. 245 (18). The National Archives, London.

The Zionist Movement, 31 October 1917, War Cabinet: CAB 24/3, No. 261 (12). The National Archives, London.

3 It's a Boy!

Mark Sykes may have simply demonstrated a dry sense of humor or sexist sentiment with this jubilant outcry, but it was nevertheless, symbolically, a powerful statement. The equation of the Declaration with the birth of a boy encapsulated one of the most essential efforts of political Zionists, and all nationalist movements of the time: casting off an effeminate image in the quest to establish 'legitimate' national claims and prove national viability. Gender constructions permeate questions and definitions of race and nation, thus teasing out what is 'gender'-specific from what is "racial" or "national" is practically impossible. There are, however, darker and lighter shades on the spectrum, and this chapter will examine the more 'gendered' concerns.

According to Anne McClintock, all nationalisms are gendered.[1] Certainly the nationalisms vying for recognition in the 1910s were. More than the dichotomy of male and female, however, nationalist agendas represented a spectrum of gendered definitions/relations. Gender "is socially constructed and better described as a continuum rather than a dichotomy."[2] Masculinity was defined in opposition to femininity, yes, and effeminacy as well. Joane Nagel asks whether or not it is possible for nationalist projects, described by "state power, citizenship, nationalism, militarism, revolution, political violence, dictatorship, and democracy," to be "best understood as masculine projects, involving masculine institutions, masculine processes and masculine activities."[3] If, as she notes, the "scripts in which these roles are embedded are written primarily by men, for men, and about men,"[4] then it is important to know how men saw one another *vis à vis* the nationalist cause.

Manhood and masculinity are complex umbrella terms that will be viewed in this chapter as spectrum-like and best understood in the negative, that is, by what they are not. Robert Cornell notes that 'subordinated' forms of masculinity emerge as countertypes in juxtaposition to 'dominant' (or normative/hegemonic) masculinities. Conversely, subordinated masculinity can be defined racially—being a (white) man is not being a 'Jew,' an 'Asian' or a 'Bengali,' for example—or sexually—a man does not act 'feminine' and/or is not homosexual.[5] This chapter is more concerned with the latter expressions in defining the former, and the following chapter more the

reverse. The intertwined nature of this matter is made more apparent in George L. Mosse's observation that "Modern masculinity from the very first was co-opted by the new nationalist movements of the nineteenth century,"[6] and thus, as Cynthia H. Enloe notes, nationalism typically sprang "from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope."[7] As masculine and manhood are defined here by their countertypes, it is worth noting that the *subordinated* masculinities created their own 'others' to strengthen their emergent *dominant* forms. This examination of the spectrum of gender, in particular masculinity, better contextualizes the world into which the Balfour Declaration was *born*.

Enloe's *masculinized memory, humiliation*, and *hope* offer starting points for understanding the gendered dynamics at play in the world surrounding the Balfour Declaration. Political Zionists linked masculinity and militarism in the masculinized *memory* of Biblical David, Judas Maccabeus, and the Hebrew military leader Bar Kochba to inform their own nationalist doctrine. The *humiliation* of centuries of perceived effeminacy was set on the shoulders of detractors like Jewish anti-Zionists, and all around this existed the *hope* that Zionist national claims would be recognized as masculine and thus national. The Zionist story, central to the Balfour tale, is strikingly similar to other nationalist causes of the time. Indian nationalists worked to overcome their subordinated form of masculinity. Their national frustration "at being 'emasculated'—or turned into a 'nation of busboys'— . . . [was] the natural fuel for igniting a nationalist movement"[8] and Irish nationalists had their own struggle to overturn the perception of the "feminine nature of Ireland."

THE EFFEMINACY CASE

The birth of the Declaration was recognition not only of nationalist claims, but of the re-masculinization of the Jewish community, at least the Zionist component of that community. This success in so doing was of global significance. Zionists were not *avant-garde* in the masculinization efforts; Irish and Indian nationalists at the same time noted their own needs in defining the masculine nation, and thus Zionist successes were marked as openings for their own demands.

Sexualization: Biological and Cultural Constructs

For political Zionists, creating in the minds of the British policy-makers the idea of a "masculine" Jewish nation meant reversing nearly 1,800 years of counter-stereotypes pertinent to the European Jewish experience. Political Zionism was, essentially, a European Jewish ideology. Non-European Jews certainly faced their own forms of discrimination, but their experiences were notably different from the European context. This became apparent

when, as a result of the Zionist endeavors, European Jews came into close contact with Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Jews, who had largely dissimilar experiences, and therefore relationships, with the term "Zionism." The figure of a passive European Jew defined by submissive and feminine characteristics saturated European cultural imagination, but was not typical of Jewish archetypes elsewhere.

According to Daniel Boyarin, "The topos of the Jewish man as a sort of woman is a venerable one going back at least to the thirteenth century in Europe, where it was widely maintained that Jewish men menstruate."[9] This long history, Boyarin explains, was due in part to the traditional Jewish practice of circumcision, frequently interpreted as a feminizing ordeal. In Medieval Europe the curse of male menstruation was closely linked to fears of Christian children being abducted and what became known as Blood Libel. Popular belief held that the curse could only be lifted with the blood of Christian children. Charges of Blood Libel leveled against European Jewish communities first appeared in the Middle Ages and involved "allegations of Jewish ritual murder of Christian children and use of their blood in secret religious rites."[10] Such fears only strengthened cases against European Jews during and after the organized religious persecutions like the Inquisition. The records of the Board of Deputies of British Jews are beleaguered with Blood Libel cases indicating that this remained a concern for European Jews up through the first half of the twentieth century. In short, such claims defined a great deal of Jewish life in Europe for the Diasporic years, in particular from the twelfth century forward.[11]

Otto Weininger's (1903) work *Sex and Character (Geschlect und Charakter),* ultimately and fully, articulates the internal perspective of a Jewish feminine identity construction. Weininger himself inhabited a problematic place in Jewish history. His work was particularly misogynistic and anti-Semitic. Although he was himself Jewish, he claims to 'prove' the fusion of masculinity with Christianity, and conversely femininity with Judaism. In these most extreme forms, arguments like Weininger's gave voice to Theodor Lessing's (1930) contentions that for some members of the Jewish community "concerns with identity crystallized into a repugnance for their Jewish identity, a phenomenon described as 'self-hatred.' "[12]

Beyond such extreme examples, of the feminization of peoples, nationalist movements face the impact of explicit sexualization as well. Few modern works on imperialism fail to acknowledge the "penetrative" nature of the imperial process as a meta-symbolic statement about the sexual overtones of imperialism. Nations, thus, on the global level, are inadvertently or not, assigned sexual dimensions, and one of the most well-developed examinations of the sexualization of people relates to the European relationship with the Islamic world.

Modern European ideas about Muslims were shaped by a variety of factors. In 1707, *The Thousand and One Nights* was translated into English and first published in Britain. The work provided "a provocative and

imaginative vision of the East . . . that helped galvanize the image of the lascivious harem woman in the minds of European readers."[13] The image of an overly sexed Middle East persisted, becoming an enduring image of Islam more generally. This perspective asserted that women 'obeyed' men's sexual demands and desires and were themselves objects of community watchfulness as well as the external gaze.[14] In turn, the feminized Islamic world was penetrated by the external gaze of the European colonizer, and much the same can be said for how the Ghetto or the Indian subcontinent was perceived. Even more explicitly, of course, the violence of colonization in Africa is often described as rape and the symbolic nature of Commodore Matthew C. Perry's forceful opening of Japan, too, can hardly be ignored.

Such gendered understandings of peoples were significant in the campaigns to legitimize European imperialism. The role of women as makers of cultural identity became a central theme in imperial policy constructions, and thus men—by virtue of their cultural relationship to women—came under imperial reassessment. In post-colonial literature the 'imperial gaze,' developed over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, grew out of a desire to visually dominate, and at the same time be distant from a culture, which the imperialist (or empire) was observing or seeking to control. This form of observation, necessary for the purposes of knowledge gathering, created a dynamic of visual power that "occurs time and again in Orientalist discourse, the invulnerable position of the observer affirms the political order and the binary structure of power that made that position possible."[15] In Islamic society perception and protection of a woman's honor and virginity was intimately tied to communal morality. Thus, a community's internal watchfulness—*visualizing* the proper Islamic woman—is central to a community's identity formation. Women, who are considered central to the development of identity, become the focal point of internal and external knowledge production.

Although Orientalist images focused primarily on the sexual appetite of women, men remained parties to the imagery, if for no other reason than because they were too 'weak' not to give into the wonton lustfulness of the women. As "Western writers believed that the effect of the hot climate on an individual's physiological development led to, in Arabs, an over-active imagination, an over-passionate nature, and a susceptibility to sexual arousal,"[16] the distinction between the effects of a temperate climate (as in Great Britain) on controlling culture and the overly heated Mediterranean world continued to be reinforced. A similar dynamic appeared in other non-European and non-Christian communities as well. The place of women became an avenue through which the 'morally superior' imperial power could assert its right to rule either by protecting the women of the 'morally inferior' cultures or by virtue of a more dominant masculine ethos which was more suitable for leadership than the abilities exhibited by the native population's own males.

As a result, throughout the Islamic world both men and women were regarded as equally demonic and problematic. Sexuality became the defining

feature of nineteenth-century scholarship and artwork dealing with the Ottoman Empire. In British policy Muslims were noted for their 'immoral' conduct. On 7 August 1916, R.W. Graves of the Cairo Office commented on an attempt at wartime propaganda, "Germany as a Friend to Islam," written by Flora Annie Steel, a late nineteenth-century novelist and the wife of a member of the Indian Civil Service. According to Graves, Steel was too kind in her view of "the pure Standard of Islam" as

> the horror of the Moslem for the defilement of contagious disease seem almost ironical to any one acquainted with the conditions which prevail in Constantinople, Cairo, and the great cities of Syria and Irak, not to mention Mecca, which is notorious among Moslems as a sink of immorality.[17]

It is unlikely that any Muslim in the 1910s would have referred to Mecca as a sink of immorality, but Graves's view of the Islamic moral code reveals how Muslims were imagined by many Britons.

Similarly, the Ilbert Bill Crisis in India in the 1880s took on a distinctly gender-oriented dimension when Anglo-Indian women became actively involved in anti-Bill protests. Annette Ackroyd (Beveridge) offers one example of how vehemently Anglo-Indians protested the Bill's passage. In *The Englishman*, Ackroyd claimed:

> I am not afraid to assert that I speak the feelings of all Englishwomen in India when I say that we regard the proposal to subject us to the jurisdiction of native Judges as an insult. It is not the pride of race which dictates this feeling, which is the outcome of something deeper—it is the pride of womanhood.[18]

The proposal, as she goes on to note, "to subject civilized women to the jurisdiction of men who have done little or nothing to redeem the women of their own races and whose social ideals are still on the outer verge of civilization"[19] strikes at the heart of racial and gendered dynamics in the late nineteenth-century British Empire.

Mrinalini Sinha further notes that opponents of the Bill protested increased native power in the structures of the Civil Service, by equating the Civil Service with "sweet girl graduates from Griton."[20] Building on well-established stereotypes of an appropriate 'woman's sphere,' the patriarchy of empire was reinforced through the process of effeminizing native civil servants. As Sinha observed, women were naturally 'unfit' for political roles, but effeminized natives were 'unnaturally unfit.' According the conventional wisdom, it was natural for a woman to lack attributes allowing her to be an active member of the political process, but it was unnatural for men to share these same characteristics.[21] Sinha argues that "the Ilbert Bill controversy also witnessed an impressive and unprecedented mobilisation

of white women in India."[22] As Ackroyd noted in her tirade against the Bill, British women had advanced along the lines of emancipation, but Indian women, in large part because Indian men had done little to speed the process, languished in servitude. According to Sinha, the "politics of colonial masculinity reconstituted Anglo-Indian racial privileges as the benevolent protect[ers] of native and white women."[23] During Montagu's tour of India in 1917, he had the opportunity to meet with Home Ruler Annie Besant, who represented a different form of white woman—one advocating for the native, both male and female. Montagu noted with amusement and not a small dose of paternalism, that "If only the Government had kept this old woman on our side! If only she had been well handled from the beginning! If her vanity had been appealed to!"[24] While the anti–Ilbert Bill group couched its opposition in terms of protecting native women, the perceived threat against white women, which such reforms inspired, translated into a perceived threat leveled at the entirety of the British race.

The cold war embedded in racial and gender politics is seen in the feminine characteristics attributed to Europe's Jewish society, the particular backwardness associated with the Ghetto, further isolating much of the Jewish community from European sociopolitical life. The Ghetto "symbolized the distinction between enlightenment and superstition, progress and reaction, even beauty and ugliness."[25] These cultural opposites were largely internalized not only by Christian Europe regarding Ghetto life, but by the well-to-do and assimilated classes of Jews in Western Europe as well. According to David Lloyd George, Edwin Montagu once claimed, "I have been striving all my life to escape from the Ghetto."[26] Assertions made by Lloyd George with regard to Montagu, in particular, need to be taken with a grain of salt. In his *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*, from which Montagu's biographer S. D. Waley derived this quote, Lloyd George also claims that, after the release of the Balfour Declaration, Montagu actually came around to the idea of the scheme, and accepted it as a political necessity. There is no material evidence to support this assertion. Lloyd George's memory of Montagu's sense of his relationship to the Ghetto is intriguing, since Montagu had no practical or physical knowledge of life in a Ghetto. He was a member of a very prominent Anglo-Jewish family, part of what Chaim Bermant has dubbed 'the cousinhood,' and his eldest brother was, after all, Lord Swaythling. The point is not whether Montagu actually made this claim, or if the claim was simply symbolic, but that the perception (and thus power) of the Ghetto remained strong in the identity construction of Jews, even among well-to-do, highly assimilated Jews as late as World War One.

The Ghetto was a slice of the general fears urban and environmental degeneration created. The term 'degeneration' was widely used in the latter half of the 1800s, and as Robert Nye has noted, "There was wide medical and scientific agreement . . . about the threat of an inheritable and worsening biological degeneration," which was interpreted according the sociopolitical settings of various national communities.[27] Degeneration "characterize[d]

those whose nerves had been shattered by poisons like alcohol and opium, through inherited bodily malfunctions, but also by their social milieu and moral debility."[28] As a result, different populations appeared to be in greater danger, differing outcomes were predicted, and solutions reflected nationalist tendencies.[29] The result of changing political structures in the middle of the 1800s, notably a growing demand for the empowerment of the lower classes, was that "Biology suddenly became useful for thinking about politics, and a medical model of diagnosis and cure became a fashionable way of analyzing problems of poverty, education and labour."[30] Of the biological models, that of degeneration quickly rose to the top.

Paralleling the fluidity between the science of Darwinian evolutionary theory and the pseudo-science of Social Darwinism, there was an equal progression in thinking about the biological nature of sex and gender, and social constructions of sex and gender. The "twin perspectives of gender and sexuality, conceived as separate but intricately linked"[31] today, were interchangeable notions at the outset of the twentieth century. Moreover, "The idea that female and male bodies are fundamentally different is relatively new. Historically, women's sexual organs were believed to be the same as, but less developed than, those of men."[32] This historical shift appears to have taken place in the eighteenth century, and notably resonates with other ways of constructing differences and similarities among populations of humans. Indian, Irish, and political Zionist nationalist narratives are linked through the perceptions of their abilities. All three populations faced perceived obstacles to their national freedom because of their "biological inadequacies."

Land and Manhood

The fears which urban degeneration encouraged among Great Britain's elite further enhanced an additional feature of the nationalist re-masculinization campaign. Urban degeneration, in any climate and potentially affecting any race, pitted "the physical characteristics of the London poor, with 'white dull skin that looked degenerate,'" against the "health and hardiness of country folk", who lived with "Fresh, bracing air, [and] physical labour."[33] Indeed, in talking about the immigration problems facing the British mainland, a series of articles in *The Standard* in 1911 noted that Jewish immigrants "are afraid of fresh air and open windows."[34] A culture's relationship to land, agricultural endeavor, and landownership was pivotal to manhood. Links between property and masculinity pulled together the active physicality of masculine pursuits, and frequently militarism, with other power relationships.

A series of special laws were established and upheld (to differing degrees and at differing times) across Europe that forbade Jewish landownership, participation in the state militaries, and otherwise full membership in a given society throughout much of European history. It was not uncommon,

for example, for Jewish landownership to be prohibited in Medieval German kingdoms. Until the political revolutions of the nineteenth century, landownership was a requirement to full citizenship and, frequently, the right to participate in the military. Because European laws were typically restrictive of Jewish employment, other avenues for income opened. These were usually more 'intellectual,' e.g., banking, rather than 'physical,' e.g., agricultural. It was not uncommon for military historians at the turn of the twentieth century to note that the "splendid military ardor [of the Jews] lay dormant during the Middle Ages in the absence of any incentive for active patriotic life."[35] The European Jewish community defined this era as one "of oppression and martyrdom"[36] and Theodor Herzl noted that European Jewry was barred "from filling even moderately high positions, either in the army, or in any public or private capacity."[37]

The linkages between land/property and manhood cannot be overstated. Jews faced bars to national service because of the relationship, and Irish peasants were emasculated by their difficulties in owning the land they worked. Irish "masculinity became more and more attached to ownership of land through the course of the nineteenth century"[38] and it "was the means by which young Irishmen achieved adult status or manhood. Only men who owned land were capable of fulfilling the 'peasant' tenant-farmer ideal of masculinity. Land was the key ingredient in the passage from boyhood to manhood."[39] Similarly, in India, "'manhood' in colonial society was based on a particular relationship to property; it was this relationship to property that was gradually eroded for the Bengali middle class in the second half of the nineteenth century."[40] Owning land, and in turn working your own land, was an essential step to masculinizing the nation, let alone establishing the nation. Thomas Jefferson has been often cited as an advocate of agrarianism in the name of national definition. In 1785, Jefferson wrote to John Jay that "Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country and wedded to its liberty and interests by the most lasting bonds."[41] If the land was owned or worked by someone else, it was not in the hands of the nation.

Intellectualism

Intellectualism was an important feature of early twentieth-century nationalist movements, but it too was a double-edged sword. An understanding of the nation's literary and historic culture was essential for moving the effort forward, but it produced feminine traits which Western powers like the British or the French derided for their inauthentic qualities.

Thus, European Jews were imagined as passive intellectuals, distinguishing them from their more 'manly' Christian counterparts. The 1894 'Dreyfus Affair' is just one example of the negative impact of intellectualism.[42] The Affair questioned a Jewish man's allegiance to any state beyond the

Jewish nation and, in turn, his ability to *be* a military man. The trial was more than simply anti-Semitism writ large, and historians who view it as such "have tended to ignore the complexity with which Dreyfus himself was viewed."[43] Because, in France, the intellectual and the Jew had become nearly indiscernible from each other, Dreyfus came to represent a variety of officers criticized for being a *functionary*, rather than action-oriented.[44]

Similarly, intellectualism became a feminizing force in the Indian context, as in their comparison to the 'ladies of Griton.' Western-educated Indians, "a class of persons Indian in colour and blood, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect," began to be viewed in the second half of the nineteenth century with increasing mistrust because "these groups began demanding a share in the exclusive privileges of the British colonial elite," and the "colonial 'discourse' . . . characterized them as an 'artificial' and 'unnatural' class of persons: in short, 'effeminate *babus*'."[45]

Padraig Pearse, the noted Irish nationalist executed in the wake of the Easter Rising of 1916, derided the intellectualism of the British Empire for its feminizing and thus nationalistic negating force. Pearse condemned "the educational values of imperial England, which produced an Irish race of 'mental castrates' and 'eunuchs' who had no understanding of the greatness of its literary or artistic history." [46]

Manhood had to be proven in the face of countervailing perceptions. According to Sinha, "The figures of the 'manly Englishman' and the 'effeminate Bengali *babu*' were produced by and helped to shape, the shifts in the political economy of colonialism in the late nineteenth century."[47] Matthew Arnold, posited that "no doubt the sensibility of the Celtic nature, its nervous exaltation, have something feminine in them, and the Celt is thus peculiarly disposed to feel the spell of the feminine idiosyncrasy; he has an affinity to it; he is not far from its secret."[48] Ernest Renan, of whom a great deal more will be said in Chapter 4, agreed, declaring in his *The Poetry of the Celtic Races* that "If it be permitted us to assign sex to nations as to individuals, we should have to say without hesitance that the Celtic race . . . is an essentially feminine race. No human family . . . has conceived with more delicacy the ideal of woman, or been more fully dominated by it."[49]

THE PROCESS OF RE-MASCULINIZATION

As nations were defined by the negative traits of which imperial powers like the British wished to see the opposite in themselves, nationalist leaders actively utilized these definitions to their own ends. The masculinization of a nationalist cause then had a two-fold advantage. First, and most obviously, it helped ground the nationalist agenda, and even to help advance imperial agendas. Second, in establishing the masculine national self, a useful "other" was also established. As the imperial powers defined their constituent parts by their "otherly" qualities, these nationalist movements used

their own "others" to distinguish themselves. What is more, masculinization efforts were not limited to parties looking to define their legitimacy on the global stage; even those with power were similarly engaged in their own masculinization and militarization efforts, and like other ideologies these efforts impacted the ideologies of rising nationalists in turn.

Flexing Muscles

By the end of the nineteenth century, a scramble was underway among European powers to assert cultural superiority, solidify control of imperial possessions, and sustain the precarious balance of power in Europe. At the same time, altered paradigms, shifting political ambitions, and military setbacks overseas indicated a need to tighten cultural mores in metropolitan centres. In Great Britain, this tightening of 'cultural sensibilities'—cultural standards regarding morality and mores accepted by a society, although not defined by any one person—resulted in the development of Victorian-era notions of manliness, militarism, racial superiority, and patriotism, culminating in the ideals of Muscular Christianity and Anglicization. According to Donald E. Hall, the "central, even defining, characteristic of Muscular Christianity [is]: an association between physical strength, religious certainty, and the ability to shape and control the world around oneself."[50]

The policies of 'Anglicization' and the prevention of societal degeneration were much the same. In Victorian England, the Public Schools played a crucial role in developing the Empire's leaders. These schools pursued a policy which focused on anti-intellectualism and games-dominated imperial ambition.[51] The late Victorian era produced in Britain's Public Schools

> The precarious fusion of Christian gentility and social Darwinism. Three sets of values became enmeshed: imperial Darwinism—the God-granted right of the white man to rule, civilise and baptise the inferior coloured races; institutional Darwinism—the cultivation of physical and psychological stamina at school in preparation for the rigours of imperial duty; the gentleman's education—the nurture of leadership qualities for military conquest abroad and political dominance at home.[52]

Not only did this refocusing of the standards of Britain's elite alter the ways in which the right to rule was understood, but this process eventually filtered down to the lower classes as well. Social mobility was linked to a submission to the ideals of Anglicization. Accepting the regulations and structures laid out, first for the upper classes, but then co-opted by the lower classes, not only created a unity of nation in the definition of cultural self, but projected a unified image witnessed globally as well.

'Anglicization' was not only top-down in its cooption by lower classes in Britain; it was cross-religiously coopted as well. The policy of 'Anglicization' carried out by the British elite was paralleled by the Anglo-Jewish elite

in the institutionalization of the 'New Jew' and countered by Irish nationalists in creating what Debbie Ging calls the 'New Gaelic Man.'[53] Despite the fact that Anglicization was closely associated with an Anglican Christian viewpoint, it nevertheless shaped the identity construction of all Jews, Catholics, and other Christian denominations. Among the Anglo-Jewish elite, identity construction manifested itself not only in sending their sons to the same schools as their Christian counterparts, but in establishing parallel Jewish organizations, like the Anglicized Boy Scouts, for immigrant Jewish boys and girls. Conversely, the "New Gaelic Man was an antidote . . . not only to Britishness but also to feminisation and infantilisation of Irishness inherent in the colonial dynamic."[54] For Irish nationalists these desires were carried into being through the ideology of Muscular Catholicism, a counterpoint to Muscular Christianity. Finally, it should also be noted that not all paths to national definition, and particularly citizenship, were thought to lead through religion. The Judæo-German publication (in Russia), *Der Jüdischer Arbeiter*, ran a series on "Nationalism and Assimilation" (starting in 1904), which discussed the German philosopher and historian Bruno Bauer's (1843) *The Jewish Question* and essay "The Ability of Contemporary Jews and Christians to Become Free." According to research notes from the Board of Deputies of British Jews (likely written by Lucien Wolf), "The Jewish Question is solved by Bruno Bauer very simply: In order to become worthy of political rights, the Jews must renounce their 'privilege' of being Jews and become 'Men.' As the substance of a Jew is his religion, and as every religion is not more than a changeable stage of development, the Jews are recommended to think it over, to throw off the old form and assume a new one."[55] Similarly, the notes observe that Bauer also contends that for Christians to gain emancipation, they too must also cast off their religion and become 'Men.'

Muscular Christianity as a means for inculcating the Protestant Christian youth of Britain into the certainty that they can "shape and control the world around" themselves was paralleled in British Judaism's efforts of revitalizing its own militaristic past with the development of paramilitary organizations like scouting groups. The Jewish Lads' Brigade, the most prominent example of these groups, was founded in Great Britain in 1895 and largely subsidized by the aptly named Maccabæans, "a society of English Jewish intellectuals and professional men who supported Jewish culture."[56] The Brigade sought to instill in "a rising generation, from its earliest youth, habits of orderliness, cleanliness, and honour, so that in learning to respect themselves they would do credit to their community and country."[57] The Brigade was a distinct effort on the part of the Anglo-Jewish elite to reform and "help 'Anglicize' and assimilate into English society those recent Jewish immigrant boys from eastern Europe," representatives of the Oriental branch of the Jewish family.[58]

The Jewish Lads' Brigade drew several of its members from the Jews' Free School Cadet Corps, which had access to a rifle range (opened in 1908) and

practiced drilling, marching, and gymnastics for the "fulfillment of physical vigor."[59] The school consciously used Anglicization to teach "the pupils to adapt to English usages in speech, in manner, in mental attitude, and in principles, in such a way as to enable them to integrate successfully into the wider community."[60]

The Brigade received a great deal of press at the turn of the century, a time marked not only by the development of the Aliens Question, but also by "growing anxiety over physical deterioration and increasing militarism" throughout British society.[61] The Aliens Question dominated British politics in large part between 1888 and 1905. During these years, increased immigration from Eastern Europe raised questions among the British populace, in particular the elite, about the moral, physical, and economic effects unrestricted immigration had on the nature of the British nation. Up until 1880 there were about 60,000 Jews living in Great Britain, nearly 40,000 of whom lived in London and as a result of the 1881–82 pogroms, another 30,000 Eastern European Jews, nearly doubling the city's Jewish population. Already an easily scapegoated community, the Eastern European Jewish immigrants, who settled largely in London's East End, became a focal point of concern.[62] *The Standard*'s "Problem with the Alien" series expressly spelled out anti-foreigner, anti-Jewish sentiment, noting that moral degeneration took place in both sexes and that while the native Jewish Englishwoman was virtuous, the rise in alien Jewish numbers had led to a corresponding rise in loose women.[63]

The Board of Deputies of British Jews aggressively campaigned against prohibitions placed specifically on Jewish immigration. One avenue for counteracting the apparent 'evils' of the large influx of Eastern European Jews, therefore, was the establishment and furthering of the educational structures such as the Jews' Free School. Although not universally aimed at the immigrant children, these educational structures actively pursued a policy of assimilation. The ultimate outcome was an attempt to mitigate the effects of increased immigration and create a smooth transition for immigrant communities into British life.

The *Jewish Chronicle* in particular observed with delight how the "ghetto-bend" was being "ironed out, and the keen bright faces seemed remarkably free from most of the outlines and curves which are conventionally considered Jewish." [64] The ghetto bend's association with social degeneration encouraged Jewish leaders to focus on treating its existence. Not all attempts at Anglicization in Jewish communities were simultaneously Zionist in ambition. Frequently the process of Muscular Judaism simply sought to create loyal citizens of the home state, Great Britain. In a 1907 edition of *The Jewish World*, Lady Sassoon (born Aline Caroline de Rothschild), speaking at the Butler Street Girls club, deprecated "the spread of the Zionist movement among the younger generations, remarking that 'we need not chafe for the freedom of tomorrow while we are enjoying the freedom of today.' "[65]

Although the Jewish Lads' Brigade was only intended to make 'good Britons' out of the boys, and not part of the Zionist agenda, the component of militarism it introduced to immigrant communities was ultimately useful for political Zionist aspirations. Loyalty, mental and moral improvement, and national pride were all the indicators of true patriotism, which, it was believed, nations *should* have in order to be legitimate claimants of national status. Given that the capacity of Jewish patriotism had already been in doubt among large segments of Europe's population, focusing attention on patriotic tendencies were crucial features of Zionist goals. In the years after the creation of the Jewish Legion and the Balfour Declaration, activist youth Zionist organizations, like Betar[66], increasingly sought to instill the patriotism the Brigade found so important. When coupled with a political and cultural agenda, the Zionist youth organizations became an echo of British cultural inculcation, and masculinization efforts, as well as linked nationalism to militarism.

The New Jew was the regeneration of the Jewish people, a masculinized Jew who fulfilled Max Nordau's doctrine of *Muskeljudentum*—Muscular Judaism. As "the victims of anti-Semitism [the Jews had] suffered from their own disease, a condition he called *Judendot*, or Jewish distress. Life in the *dirty* ghetto had afflicted the Jews with effeminacy and nervousness."[67] Modern Zionists "could show their worth as a fighting force, deserving of their own nation and Jewish national honor"[68] and the Jew, Nordau ultimately believed, "must be transformed from one who shared many characteristics of the degenerates to an ideal of manhood which exemplified society's standards of looks, comportment and behaviour."[69] Mosse observed that "for many Jews, the Jewish anatomical structure [both figuratively and physically] was inherently different from the norm and it had to be reshaped if the Jews were to escape from their stereotype and recapture their dignity."[70] According to Nordau, recapturing this dignity meant creating "deep-chested, powerfully built and keen-eyed *men*."[71] Not only was military heroism important, but defeating the feminizing effects of the ghetto was crucial.

The New Jew underwent two distinct but intertwined manifestations over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first of these, which is the main focus here, was a product of the Enlightenment and the Victorian eras. This stage of development manipulated the rhetoric of Muscular Christianity to alter the perception of Jews as submissive and feminine into the definition of directed, heroic nationalists. The second phase took hold after the Balfour Declaration's issuance, when colonization and land accumulation in Palestine became the internationally recognized object of political Zionists. Connecting the people to the earth through agricultural pursuits was a key feature of the post-Balfour state-building endeavor. In fact, in 1920, Chaim Weizmann wrote to Lord Curzon that "The land question is a crucial one. The Jewish national home must be rooted in the soil and grow up about a sturdy Jewish peasantry."[72] This

connection between state-building and agriculture was a close one and crucial for understanding post–World War Two Israeli nationalism, but comes as a distinctly second step after masculinization efforts. The first phase is almost entirely masculine; however, the second introduces significant feminine traits. As in McClintock's basic view of the relationship between gender and nationalism, this evolution in the development of the New Jew fits. McClintock notes that "All nations depend on powerful constructions of gender"[73] and while the idea should be to create "popular *unity*, nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalization of gender *difference*."[74]

Women's Work

Amid the discussion of masculinity and militarism, in the Zionist case, women appear to have played a limited role. There may be two reasons for this. First, Jewish women were not as maligned as Jewish men in nineteenth-century stereotypes. From the Christian Zionist's perspective (of which more will be said in Chapter 6) women could still be 'saved' (converted to Christianity), whereas the process of circumcision had irreversibly altered Jewish men. Second, if as a whole the Jewish people were to become 'manly,' shaking off centuries of effeminate characteristics, the 'womanly,' even among women, must necessarily be downplayed. Michael Berkowitz briefly notes the roles of some Jewish women in World War One in his, *Western Jewry and the Zionist Projects.* Their role is limited to the traditional dynamics between prostitutes and virtuous women or those who had been corrupted by the assimilationist practices of the nineteenth century and ardent believers in the national cause. Zionist women were "morally upright, well behaved, and display[ed] a keen sense of purpose."[75] These women "understand that nationalism is not a series of slogans, but rather a philosophy of life."[76]

One woman most intimately connected to Zionist aims, Vera Weizmann, Chaim Weizmann's wife, inhabits an interesting place in this discussion. Although Vera Weizmann did not initially share her husband's passion and determination for the Zionist cause, the passage of time allowed her to develop her own zeal for the subject. Eventually she became as significant a player as her husband in the endeavor. Like her husband, Vera[77] was well educated; having received medical training in Geneva, she practiced as a pediatrician until 1916, when she gave up her practice to work more closely with Chaim in his discussions with British politicians and prominent Jewish leaders. Although the record is brief on her role in shaping the Zionist cause, the letters and papers of Chaim clearly indicate that she was fully aware of all important events, personages, and ambitions of the Zionist organizations.

Scholars who have acknowledged Vera's commitment and contribution to the Zionist endeavor are few. Only Ronald Sanders's *The High Walls of*

Jerusalem gives her an index entry. Even there her role is described as a passive player in the history of Zionism—recipient of Chaim's letters. It is clear in reading Chaim's letters, however, that Vera was active in the development of the Zionist endeavor. In December 1914, while Chaim traveled throughout Europe drumming up support for the Zionist enterprise, he wrote to Vera that "You will remember that what we are building, we are building together."[78] By June 1917, after much insistence from various members of the EZF (English Zionist Federation), an official office for Zionist political activity was to be opened. According to Shmuel Tolkowsky, a central member of the EZF, at least part of the reason for the need of official office space was to "escape from the constant presence and interference of Mrs. Weizmann," who was continually present at the unofficial headquarters, the Weizmann home.

Nordau, for one, remained conservative with regard to women's roles in social and political leadership, although he did advocate their participation. In 1911, Sarah Thon, a Zionist working for the Zionist Central Office, wrote:

> Woman, as we well know, plays a prominent part in the colonizing achievement of every people, but for our particular colonizing work she is of quite exceptional importance. For while other peoples have only the difficulties of climate and district to combat, we have in addition to wipe out years of subjugation and *Golus*, with the ingrained lassitude and indolence they have produced, and to infuse vital energy into the people that for centuries has languished in Palestine in helplessness and lethargy. This task is a very difficult one; and if it is to be performed thoroughly, it must be tackled not only by men, but also by women, and through women.[79]

Reliant on the belief that culture is passed from mother to child, the role of women in the Zionist endeavor was a supporting one, focused on the dynamics of the private sphere, and the salvation of resurrection of the Zionist-inspired culture. This "traditional" place was certainly echoed in other nationalist endeavors like the Irish cause.

Similar to the New Jew, Irish nationalists sought to personify the New Gaelic Man. Like the New Jew and similar masculinization efforts among the upper classes of the English elite, the New Gaelic Man was saturated with religious morality. Whereas Protestants turned to 'Muscular Christianity,' the New Gaelic Man worked with a philosophy of 'Muscular Catholicism,' of which sport was an equally central feature.

Patrick F. McDevitt links the gendering of Irish nationalism to the standardization of hurling and Gaelic football following the 1884 establishment of the Gaelic Athletic Association. The period between 1884 and 1916 was notable for a "nation-wide campaign to resurrect the physical stature of the manhood of Ireland," through the public forum of the games.[80] The athlete's "beautiful, healthy and vigorous Irish male body counteracted the Victorian

English characterizations of the Irish as," among other things, "effeminate and feckless."[81] The case of hurling in particular "stretches back into the time of Irish legend and was intimately connected to warfare and warriors [and] . . . is still perhaps the most hazardous game in the Western world and has been described as 'the nearest approach to warfare consistent with peace.' "[82] The warrior ethos instilled in the Irish national was for the benefit of the nation, not the Empire.

Propaganda circulated late in the course of World War One, a leaflet "A Call to Irishwomen," proclaimed the coming threat of England worse than "the days of Cromwell." The leaflet, which found its way into David Lloyd George's papers, is not terribly unique in the grand scheme of anti-war propaganda, but it does reinforce some of the salient points about the positionality of gender and national rhetoric. The leaflet reads:

> Irishwomen! Your Country is threatened with a calamity more deadly and appalling than anything that has confronted it since the days of Cromwell. England in her malignant hate of our small nationality has declared a war of extermination upon the last remnant of the Irish race which has survived her brutal rule of famine and persecution. England declares War upon **YOU** by her decision to seize by force the bodies of **Your** Men—those nearest and dearest to you—and compel them against conscience and national honour to wear the shameful livery of their country's implacable enemy—to become helots in body and soul!
>
> Irishwomen! Take your stand with Ireland. You must realize your power and use it, whatever be the cost. There must be no **blacklegs** amongst you base enough to help the British Government in their dirty work. There must be no question of women filling men's places or taking any part, **active or passive** in this Crime against the Irish Nation.
>
> Women must resolve to sacrifice everything in their efforts to oppose, thwart, and render impossible this murderous attempt on the life and honour of Ireland.
>
> CONSCRIPTION FOR IRELAND MEANS ETERNAL SLAVERY for OUR COUNTRY.
>
> Irishwomen! You must choose Death itself rather than suffer this National Disgrace!
>
> The Time to Make Your Choice is NOW![83]

This is the same sentiment behind Thon's statement on the role of women. As with the Zionist militarism and masculinization, women were crucial to the nationalist effort; however, they were more overtly engaged in Irish politics. Encouraged to seize their men and abandon life in the name of the nation was a cry of activity, despite the admonition to not take men's places at work.

Similarly, playing on the martial qualities of the Indian peoples was, at least for early twentieth-century Indian nationalists, an important part of

the overall picture of national viability. While Gandhian nationalism took a non-violent approach, other Indian nationalists used the same set of national definitions with which the Zionists and Irish played. The change in 1903, when the "native army, was superseded by the more appropriate term 'Indian Army,' "[84] was an important shift recognizing "a national and territorial basis, instead of being merely a racially different auxiliary of the British forces holding the country."[85] Making the Indian Army a "truly national force, like armies of any normal country in any part of the world," was for nationalists essential in proving national claims to viability and legitimacy. The Aga Khan, citing *The Times,* noted that in the wake of World War One, "It is now recognised by the most conservative experts, in the light of war experiences, that the demarcation between martial and non-martial races in India has been too rigidly drawn."[86] In proving that there was more than one path to national definition, Indians celebrated the turn of phrase moving from 'race' to 'nation,' while political Zionists celebrated the separation of religion as national identifier in the creation of the Jewish Legion. Even more interestingly, despite the efforts of Zionists to create the Jewish Legion, Weizmann, "wrote to Sir George Macdonogh, the director of Military Intelligence Department, and asked that Albert Hyamson, Samuel Landman, Leon Simon, Israel Sieff, Harry Sacher, and Simon Marks be exempt from military service since without their assistance 'the cause of the Zionist movement in this country could not be carried out.' "[87] Building a nationalist cause was, as it happened, a powerful tool in gaining exemptions from military service in the War. Irish nationalists fought hard against conscription, which was not introduced there until 1918, two years after it had been introduced in the rest of Britain. Lord Milner took up a thoroughly imperialist view that "there would be bloodshed in taking them [Irish conscripts] but the use of firmness by the British government would have a great 'moral' effect there and would be welcomed by townspeople eager to rid themselves of the 'loafing population.' "[88] Despite this, Lloyd George remained conservative about conscription as a tool for "controlling" Ireland. In February 1917 he wrote to Lord Riddell: "What would be the result [of Irish conscription]? Scenes in the House of Commons, a possible rupture with America . . . They [allies around the world] would say, 'You are fighting for the freedom of nationalities. What right have you to take this little nation by the ears and drag it into the war against its will?' "[89] In the end, of course, conscription was passed, and passed hurriedly. Sinn Fein did not get exemptions for their members to help "build the nationalist cause."

Heterogeneity

It is easy to be lulled into a false belief that all nationalist movements created a uniformity that thoroughly pervaded the community. In the gendered restructuring undertaken to create, or even 'recreate,' nations at the turn of the twentieth century, the nuance in plurality of gender becomes evident.

Ernest Gellner argues that "nations are the artefacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category of persons (say occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership in it."[90] Using gender (and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, race) to recognize inclusivity was at the heart of these constructions. Embedded in the wording debate of the Balfour Declaration, as discussed in the last chapter, these questions of inclusion and exclusion were paramount. In the Milner-Amery Draft, the authors included the passage "the rights and political status enjoyed in any other country by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship." Weizmann simultaneously stitched together nation and Jew in his suggested counter phrasing, "the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country of which they are loyal citizens"[91] *and* derided Jews like Montagu for denying such linkages.

Montagu's opposition opened the door for further gender-mandering.[92] He became the symbolic antithesis of the Zionist and of the New Jew. Just as the Zionist looked to the Biblical military hero, so too were Biblical symbols useful in discussing anti-Zionists. Amid the militaristic society of Ancient Israel, there remained a pacifistic undercurrent, frequently derided as the antithesis of the military hero. Had it not been for the discord that appeared between the pacifists and the militarists, some historians argue that "the Jews might have withstood the [Roman] siege" of Jerusalem and the final destruction of the Temple.[93] The effect of this discord echoed down to World War One, as when Rabbi H. G. Enelow noted that peace was the thing that Israel's leaders strove for—but not peace at any price. The parallels Enelow drew between contemporary events and the Biblical past were not accidental. Noting that war is a necessary component of life so long as the "world is dominated by wickedness," Enelow argued that "There can be no peace in the world as long as righteousness does not rule."[94] In the time of the Roman siege, those who did not take up arms allowed 'wickedness' to rule, and this foil of the warrior-hero was a useful tool for militant and political Zionists in the 1910s. These Zionists maintained strict distinction between themselves and Jews who did not take up arms in the name of a reestablished Israeli state (although those same Jews very likely took up arms in the name of other states, as, for example, Montagu frequently wished he could). Such 'passivity' prohibited the return of 'righteousness,' and thus was a ready-made counter-image of the anti-Zionist Jew, the antithesis of the Biblical hero: effeminate, passive, and not part of the nation.

In the Biblical era, Jewish pacifists were not overtly condemned for aiding in the creation of the Diaspora, but the easy parallel between their role in bringing about the statelessness of their people and modern anti-Zionist Jews' role in perpetuating it was a common, although subtle, theme played with by Zionists. In October 1917, Ahad Ha'am, in response to Montagu's various attempts to derail the Zionist agenda, noted that "we must admit

that there are still too many in our midst whose hearts, like those of the Pharaoh, are hardened and whose eyes are blind to the 'signs' of the time."[95] What is more, the very stereotypes Zionists sought to cast off were doubly useful in distancing themselves from any Jewish anti-Zionists who fought their cause. Chaim Weizmann, for one, described anti-Zionists, particularly Jewish anti-Zionists, as 'dark forces' whose "only claim to Judaism is that they are working for its disappearance."[96] Just as the pacifists in Biblical Palestine allowed 'wickedness' to rule by means of their inaction against the Roman forces, Weizmann believed that modern anti-Zionists did not aid in the restoration of 'righteousness' by contravening Zionist efforts.

Montagu as a representative of the effeminate Jew was not maintained by Zionists alone. The language associated with Montagu, even by supporters and friends, bolstered this sentiment. In the 19 November 1924 *Times* obituary for Montagu, he is described as "abnormally sensitive" and that "He had the trustfulness of a child; it was often betrayed . . . The deep melancholy of his race lay at his heart."[97] Jim Vincent from *The Norfolk Post*, 22 November 1924, noted "I knew him as a Jew, and many people talk flippantly of the proverbial meanness of Jews, but because I have seen and known something of his large-heartedness he has lifted all Jews in in my estimation."[98] Even the histories about the Declaration written since accept these ascribed, and feminized, traits. Jonathan Schneer, for example, describes Montagu as "brooding" and "emotional."[99] Such 'emotional' depictions as were ascribed to Montagu fall in line with general perceptions of Jews more broadly. In speaking of the Aliens Question, *The Standard* noted that Jews are "an emotional and neurotic people in an exceptional degree."[100] That this sentiment pervaded so much of the cultural milieu was useful for Zionists, who struck out to differentiate themselves from these sentiments. Montagu, as the most vocal and recognizable anti-Zionist, could stand in for all that the New Jew was not, and this was advantageous in discrediting or, at the very least playing down, Montagu's vehement attacks against the Zionist scheme. Because of Montagu's "emotional" status, his place has been marked in history as a person solely concerned with Zionism on personal grounds, as we saw in Chapter 2.

In the Indian case the British turned militarism against nationalism by "positioning martial races in opposition to nationalists."[101] Nationalists, Heather Streets-Salter observes, "were depicted as feminine in body or intellect and as racially degenerate."[102] This categorical claim was useful from the perspective of the British military to distinguish loyal martial races, like the Highland Scots or Gurkhas, from the "Celtic Irish [who] were acknowledged as good and brave fighters" but were "construed as dangerously unreliable, with the 'passions' of men but the intellect of women."[103] Among the various Indian populations, racial and gendered constructions pitted masculine 'martial races' like the Sikhs and the Gurkhas against the 'effeminate Bengali *babus*,' succeeding in dividing the Indian sense of national self into a complex array of gendered images. The lack of unity around gendered

perceptions was not unique to the Indian and Zionist cases, either. McDevitt notes that "Irish members of Crown Forces offer one example of Irish men who did not hold that participation in Gaelic games was a central requirement for Irish manhood."[104] For the Indian context though, the imposition of the variety of gendered layers, and, as we will see in the next chapter, racial layers, definitely gave voice to unifying features.

Conclusion

Overcoming the imposed images of femininity in its various forms was an essential part of the nationalist agenda in the 1910s. Being perceived as masculine and able to compete militarily was an essential step toward full recognition of national claims. Still, changing the gender dynamic was not the only necessary step to winning national legitimacy. Gender was intertwined tightly with racial assumptions so much so that the two built on and fed each other. Nations with martial/masculine characteristics may be the martial equals of the British Empire, or the emerging United States, but if racially defined perceptions lingered, legitimacy as a 'national' equal could just as well be denied.

NOTES

1. Anne McClintock, "Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family," *Feminist Review*, no. 44 (Summer 1993): 61.
2. Victoria L. Bergvall and Janet M. Bing, "The Question of Questions: Beyond Binary Thinking," in *Rethinking Language and Gender Research: Theory and Practice*, ed. Victoria L. Bergvall, Janet M. Bing, and Alice F. Freed (London: Longman, 1996), 3.
3. Joane Nagel, "Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 2 (March 1998): 243.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. 246. Nagel offers a detailed examination of the research that informs these questions. This is an excellent starting point for anyone interested in these questions or wanting a basic historiographic overview.
6. George L. Mosse, *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 7.
7. Cynthia H. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 44.
8. Ibid.
9. Daniel Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct the Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man*, *Conversions; 8* (University of California Press, 1997), 210. Also see: Matthew Biberman, *Masculinity, Anti-Semitism and Early Modern English Literature: From Satanic to the Effeminate Jew* (London: Ashgate, 2004), 7.
10. Jeffery S. Victor, *Satanic Panic: The Creation of a Contemporary Legend* (Peru, IL: Open Court, 1993), 230.
11. One discussion of male menstruation and the cure comes to us from 1648 and Yorkshire minister Thomas Calvert's retelling of the prophecy given to him by a recent Jewish convert to Christianity. See: David S. Katz, "Shylock's

Gender: Jewish Male Menstruation in Early Modern England," *The Review of English Studies, New Series* 50, no. 200 (1999): 441. See: "Blood Libel: Pamphlets and Press Cuttings, 1913–1933;" "Blood Libel: Case in the Tyrol Commemorated in Wall Painting, Seditious Libel Prosecution Leese V. Pritchard, 1936;" "Blood Libel: Protest Leaflets, c. 1900," in Board of Deputies of British Jews Papers, London.

12. Chandak Sengoopta, *Otto Weininger: Sex, Science, and Self in Imperial Vienna* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000), 42. Interestingly, Sengoopta does not actually cite Lessing but rather, Sander L. Gilman's work *Jewish Self-Hatred: Anti-Semitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews*.
13. Filiz Turhan, *The Other Empire: British Romantic Writings About the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 54.
14. Ibid.
15. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds., *Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies* (London: Routledge, 2005), 187.
16. David Hammerbeck, "Voltaire's *Mahomet*, the Persistence of Cultural Memory and Pre-Modern Orientalism," *Agora: An Online Graduate Journal* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 11.
17. R.W. Graves, "Note on 'Germany as a Friend to Islam', 7 August 1916," British Library, London. The documents referring to "Germany as a Friend to Islam" describe Steel as 'an old lady' who wanted to do her bit by writing propaganda for the British via the *Times of India*.
18. Annette Ackroyd (Beveridge), 1883, writing in *The Englishman* as cited in: Margaret Strobel, *European Women and the Second British Empire* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 60.
19. Ibid.
20. Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century* (New Delhi: Raj Press, 1995), 34. Griton, Cambridge was the first residential women's college in Great Britain (established in 1869). While Griton was established to occupy for women the same place universities occupied for men coming from public schools, women's education in Victorian England was unequal to men's. This quote reinforces the idea that while a woman may be highly educated, her education is not equal to that of a man's, and thus Indians in the Civil Service are similarly 'well' educated.
21. Sinha's discussion of this distinction appears in Chapter 1 of *Colonial Masculinity*.
22. Sinha, 34.
23. Ibid., 44.
24. Edwin Montagu, *India Diary* (Cambridge: Montagu Papers: Trinity College, 1917–1918), 135.
25. Steve E. Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in Germany and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 6.
26. David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*, vol. II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939), 733. Also see: S.D. Waley, *Edwin Montagu: A Memoir and an Account of His Visits to India* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 139.
27. Robert A. Nye, "The Rise and Fall of the Eugenics Empire: Recent Perspectives on the Impact of Biomedical Thought in Modern Society," *The Historical Journal* 36, no. 3 (September 1993): 687.
28. George L. Mosse, "Max Nordau, Liberalism and the New Jew," *Journal of Contemporary History* 27, no. 4 (October 1992): 566. The term 'degeneration' was first used in 1857.

29. Nye, 688.
30. Ibid.
31. Anna Livia and Kira Hall, "It's a Girl! Bringing Performativity Back to Linguistics," in *Queerly Phrased: Language, Gender, and Sexuality,* ed. Anna Livia and Kira Hall (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 5.
32. Bergvall and Bing, 7.
33. Heather Streets, *Martial Race: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857–1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 106.
34. "Problem of the Alien—III: Morals and Manners of the Ghetto," *The Standard*, 27 January, 1911.
35. Sydney G. Gumpertz, *The Jewish Legion of Valor: The Story of Jewish Heroes in the Wars of the Republic and a General History of the Military Exploits of the Jews through the Ages* (New York: S. G. Gumpertz, 1934), 64.
36. Roman Freulich, *Soldiers in Judea; Stories and Vignettes of the Jewish Legion* (New York: Herzl Press, 1965), 14.
37. Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State*, trans. Sylvie d'Avigdor (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1988), 85.
38. Angela K. Martin, "The Practice of Identity and an Irish Sense of Place," *Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 4, no. 1 (1997): 99.
39. Ibid. 100.
40. Sinha, 5.
41. Thomas Jefferson, "Letter to John Jay, 23 August," Monticello.org, accessed 2 August, 2013, http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/quotations-agriculture.
42. The Dreyfus Affair was a case of treason based on falsified evidence. Dreyfus, a Franco-Jewish Army Captain from the Alsace region, faced the accusation of treason because of his doubly problematic geographic and religious heritage. Because Alsace lay along the Franco-Prussian border, and thanks in large part to the tradition of anti-Semitism already present throughout the country, Dreyfus was an easy target for French patriots, whose definition of loyalty and nationality had been recently tested in the Franco-Prussian War and the uncertainty of French politics. Despite being well known as a loyal member of the military, Dreyfus was convicted of the charge of treason and sent into exile. Eventually Dreyfus was acquitted and he returned to serve his country once again in the capacity of a lieutenant colonel, during the First World War.
43. Christopher E. Forth, *The Dreyfus Affair and the Crisis of Manhood*, *The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science 121st Series (2003)* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 70.
44. Ibid.
45. Sinha, 4–5.
46. Elaine Sisson, *Pearse's Patriots: St. Enda's and the Cult of Boyhood* (Cork: Cork University Press, 2004), 14.
47. Sinha, 3.
48. Matthew Arnold, *On the Study of Celtic Literature* (London: Smith, Elder, 1867), 108.
49. Ernest Renan, *The Poetry of the Celtic Races* (London: The Walter Scott, c. 1896), 8.
50. Donald E. Hall, "Muscular Christianity: Reading and Writing the Male Social Body," in *Muscular Christianity: Embodying the Victorian Age*, ed. Donald E. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 7.
51. George P. Landow, "A Critical View of British Public Schools," accessed 16 April, 2006. http://www.victorianweb.org/history/eh4.html.

52. J.A. Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology* (London: Frank Cass, 2000). 136.
53. See: Debbie Ging, *Men and Masculinities in Irish Cinema* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
54. Ibid., 26.
55. "Nationality and Assimilation II," *Der Jüdischer Arbeiter* 15, no. 16 (c. 1904): 1. The Board of Deputies of British Jews Papers, London.
56. Richard A. Voeltz, "'. . . A Good Jew and a Good Englishman': The Jewish Lads' Brigade, 1894–1922," *Journal of Contemporary History* 23, no. 1 (January 1988): 119.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid. 120. Aziza Khazzom's 'Orientalization' is discussed in detail in the following chapter.
59. Severin Adam Hochberg, "The Jewish Community and the Aliens Question in Great Britain 1881–1917" (Dissertation, New York University, 1989), 216. The Jews' Free School had been founded in 1817.
60. Gerry Black, *J. F. S. The History of the Jews' Free School, London since 1732* (London: Tymsder Publishing, 1998), 123.
61. Hochberg, 227.
62. It is worth considering that Montagu was keenly aware of his own country's immigration issues and bore that in mind when he considered his own wording of the Balfour Declaration. What might the migration patterns to other parts of the world look like if they looked this way in Britain?
63. "Problem of the Alien—III: Morals and Manners of the Ghetto."
64. "Editorial on the Jewish Lads' Brigade," *Jewish Chronicle,* 24 January 1902, as cited in Hochberg.
65. "A Brief for Girls," *The Jewish World*, 1 March 1907.
66. Betar, a Latvian student's organization, established in 1923 is significant particularly for its title's double meaning. On the one hand Betar refers to the last stronghold against the Roman forces in the 130s CE. On the other, it is the Hebrew acronym for 'Alliance of Josef Trumpeldor.' Josef Trumpeldor was a former Russian army officer who was killed by Arab attackers while defending a Jewish settlement (Tel Hai) in 1920 and like Jabotinsky one of the strongest proponents of Jewish legion during World War One. See: Alain Dieckhoff, *The Invention of a Nation: Zionist Thought and the Making of Modern Israel* (London: Hurst & Company, 2003), 198.
67. Franklin Foer, *How Soccer Explains the World* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2004), 69. Emphasis added.
68. Michael Berkowitz, *Western Jewry and the Zionist Projects, 1914–1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10.
69. Mosse, "Max Nordau, Liberalism and the New Jew," 568.
70. Ibid. 567.
71. Max Nordau, *Zionistische Schriften* (Köln: Jüdischer Verlag 1909), 567, 380 as cited in Mosse, "Max Nordau, Liberalism and the New Jew," 567. Emphasis added.
72. Chaim Weizmann, "Chaim Weizmann to Lord Curzon, 2 February 1920," British Library, London.
73. McClintock, 61.
74. Ibid.
75. Berkowitz, 14–5. This discussion of the woman's role in the New Jew, like the masculine imagery, harkens back to the Biblical account of women as well. The juxtaposition of the virtuous women and prostitute women of the Bible help reinforce and re-inform the definitions of the Israeli nation.

76. *Daughter of Zion*, Recruitment Poster, American Federation of Zionists, as cited in: *The Jews in Their Land*, ed. David Ben-Gurion (New York: Doubleday, 1966): 295; Berkowitz, 14–5.
77. In this section, for the sake of clarity the more informal use of the first names of Vera and Chaim will be used. Elsewhere in this work the word 'Weizmann' refers to Chaim Weizmann. Whereas traditional histories of Zionism use the phrase 'Mrs. Weizmann' to refer to Vera, this is consciously not done here so as to reinforce the argument that Vera was herself an active agent in the history of the Zionist endeavor, not only Chaim Weizmann's wife.
78. Chaim Weizmann, "To Vera Weizmann, 22 December 1914, Doc. 82," in The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, vol. VII, Series A. (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975), 97.
79. Sarah Thon, "Women's Work in Palestine," in *Zionist Work in Palestine*, ed. Israel Cohen (London: T. Fisher Wilson, 1911), 99. *Golus* in this passage refers to having been dispersed, that is, having been a part of the Diaspora.
80. Patrick F. McDevitt, "Muscular Catholicism: Nationalism, Masculinity and Gaelic Team Sports, 1884–1916," *Gender and History* 9, no. 2 (August 1997): 262.
81. Ibid. 265.
82. Ibid.
83. "A Call to Irishwomen," David Lloyd George Papers, London. "Blackleg" refers to someone who is a strikebreaker or works against united efforts.
84. Edwin Henry Hayter Collen, *The Indian Army: A Sketch of Its History and Organization* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 37.
85. Aga Khan, *India in Transition: A Study in Political Evolution* (London: Warner, 1918), 176.
86. Ibid., 179.
87. Jehuda Reinharz, "The Balfour Declaration and Its Maker: A Reassessment," *Journal of Modern History* 64 (September 1992): 458.
88. Alan J. Ward, "Lloyd George and the 1918 Irish Conscription Crisis," *The Historical Journal* XVII, no. I (1974): 108.
89. Ibid. 109.
90. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 7.
91. Chaim Weizmann, "To Sir Maurice Hankey, 15 October 1917, Doc. 524," in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, vol. VII, Series A* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975).
92. Jeff Johnson defines "gendermandering" as when a "stereotype is designated to a character but is then manipulated by the writer to expose the stereotype for what it is" and "like gerrymandering, gendermandering can also be culturally subversive, acknowledging and employing stereotypes for dramatic effect while seeming simultaneously to condemn them." Jeff Johnson, *William Inge and the Subversion of Gender* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2005), 20.
93. Gumpertz, 43.
94. H. G. Enelow, *The War and the Bible* (New York: Macmillan, 1919), 109.
95. Reinharz, 476.
96. Chaim Weizmann, "To Philip Kerr, 16 September 1917, Doc. 502," in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann,* vol. VII, Series A (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975), 511.
97. "Edwin Montagu, Obituary," *The Times*, 19 November, 1924.
98. Jim Vincent, "Memoir," *The Norfolk Post*, 22 November, 1924.
99. Jonathan Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Random House, 2010), 337.

100. "Problem of the Alien—III: Morals and Manners of the Ghetto."
101. Streets, 173.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., 169.
104. McDevitt, 267.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arnold, Matthew. *On the Study of Celtic Literature*. London: Smith, Elder, 1867.

Aschheim, Steve E. *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in Germany and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982.

Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds. *Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies*. London: Routledge, 2005.

Ben-Gurion, David, ed. *The Jews in Their Land*. New York: Doubleday, 1966.

Bergvall, Victoria L. and Janet M. Bing. "The Question of Questions: Beyond Binary Thinking." In *Rethinking Language and Gender Research: Theory and Practice*, edited by Victoria L. Bergvall, Janet M. Bing, and Alice F. Freed, 1–30. London: Longman, 1996.

Berkowitz, Michael. *Western Jewry and the Zionist Projects, 1914–1933*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Biberman, Matthew. *Masculinity, Anti-Semitism and Early Modern English Literature: From Satanic to the Effeminate Jew*. London: Ashgate, 2004.

Black, Gerry. *J. F. S. The History of the Jews' Free School, London since 1732*. London: Tymsder, 1998.

"Blood Libel: Case in the Tyrol Commemorated in Wall Painting, Seditious Libel Prosecution Leese V. Pritchard, 1936." Board of Deputies of British Jews: ACC/3121/E/01/016. London Metropolitan Archives, London.

"Blood Libel: Pamphlets and Press Cuttings, 1913–1933." The Board of Deputies of British Jews: ACC/3121/E/03/148. London Metropolitan Archive, London.

"Blood Libel: Protest Leaflets, c. 1900." Board of Deputies of British Jews: ACC/3121/E/03/239. London Metropolitan Archives, London.

Boyarin, Daniel. *Unheroic Conduct the Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man*. Conversions; 8: University of California Press, 1997.

"A Brief for Girls." *The Jewish World*. 1 March 1907.

"A Call to Irishwomen." David Lloyd George Papers: F/44/9/3. Parliamentary Archives/House of Lords Records, London. Undated.

Collen, Edwin Henry Hayter. *The Indian Army: A Sketch of Its History and Organization*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907. *Daughter of Zion*. World War One propaganda: American Federation of Zionists.

Dieckhoff, Alain. *The Invention of a Nation: Zionist Thought and the Making of Modern Israel*. London: Hurst & Company, 2003.

"Editorial on the Jewish Lads' Brigade." *Jewish Chronicle*. 24 January, 1902.

"Edwin Montagu, Obituary." *The Times*. 19 November, 1924.

Enelow, H. G. *The War and the Bible*. New York: Macmillan, 1919.

Enloe, Cynthia H. *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000.

Foer, Franklin. *How Soccer Explains the World*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2004.

Forth, Christopher E. *The Dreyfus Affair and the Crisis of Manhood*. The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science 121st Series (2003). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.

Freulich, Roman. *Soldiers in Judea; Stories and Vignettes of the Jewish Legion*. New York: Herzl Press, 1965.

Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.

George, David Lloyd. *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*. Vol. II, two vols. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939.

Gilman, Sander L. *Jewish Self-Hatred: Anti-Semitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.

Ging, Debbie. *Men and Masculinities in Irish Cinema*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Graves, R.W. "Note on 'Germany as a Friend to Islam,' 7 August 1916." India Office Records: IOR/L/PS/11/107, 2711. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London.

Gumpertz, Sydney G. *The Jewish Legion of Valor: The Story of Jewish Heroes in the Wars of the Republic and a General History of the Military Exploits of the Jews through the Ages*. New York: S.G. Gumpertz, 1934.

Hall, Donald E. "Muscular Christianity: Reading and Writing the Male Social Body." In *Muscular Christianity: Embodying the Victorian Age*, edited by Donald E. Hall, 3–13. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Hammerbeck, David. "Voltaire's *Mahomet*, the Persistence of Cultural Memory and Pre-Modern Orientalism." *Agora: An Online Graduate Journal* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 1–20.

Herzl, Theodor. *The Jewish State*. Translated by Sylvie d'Avigdor. Mineola, NY: Dover, 1988.

Hochberg, Severin Adam. "The Jewish Community and the Aliens Question in Great Britain 1881–1917." Dissertation, New York University, 1989.

Jefferson, Thomas. "Letter to John Jay, 23 August." Monticello.org. Accessed 2 August 2013. http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/quotations-agriculture.

Johnson, Jeff. *William Inge and the Subversion of Gender*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2005.

Kaplan, Danny. "The Military as a Second Bar Mitzvah: Combat Service as Initiation to Zionist Masculinity." In *Imagined Masculinities: Male Identity and Culture in the Modern Middle East*, edited by Mai Ghoussoub and Emma Sinclair-Webb, 127–44. London: Saqi Books, 2000.

Katz, David S. "Shylock's Gender: Jewish Male Menstruation in Early Modern England." *The Review of English Studies, New Series* 50, no. 200 (1999): 440–62.

Khan, Aga. *India in Transition: A Study in Political Evolution*. London: Warner, 1918. Accessed 23 July 2015. https://archive.org/details/indiaintransitio00agakrich.

Landow, George P. "A Critical View of British Public Schools." Accessed 16 April 2006. http://www.victorianweb.org/history/eh4.html.

Livia, Anna and Kira Hall. "It's a Girl! Bringing Performativity Back to Linguistics." In *Queerly Phrased: Language, Gender, and Sexuality* edited by Anna Livia and Kira Hall, 3–18. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Mangan, J. A. *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology*. London: Frank Cass, 2000.

Martin, Angela K. "The Practice of Identity and an Irish Sense of Place." *Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 4, no. 1 (1997): 89–119.

McClintock, Anne. "Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family." *Feminist Review*, no. 44 (Summer 1993): 61–80.

McDevitt, Patrick F. "Muscular Catholicism: Nationalism, Masculinity and Gaelic Team Sports, 1884–1916." *Gender and History* 9, no. 2 (August 1997): 262–84.

Montagu, Edwin. *India Diary*. Montagu Papers. Cambridge: Trinity College Library. 1917–1918.

Mosse, George L. "Max Nordau, Liberalism and the New Jew." *Journal of Contemporary History* 27, no. 4 (October 1992): 565–81.

———. *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Nagel, Joane. "Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 2 (March 1998): 242–69.
"Nationality and Assimilation II." *Der Jüdischer Arbeiter* 15, no. 16 (c. 1904).
Nordau, Max. *Zionistische Schriften*. Köln: Jüdischer Verlag, 1909.
Nye, Robert A. "The Rise and Fall of the Eugenics Empire: Recent Perspectives on the Impact of Biomedical Thought in Modern Society." *The Historical Journal* 36, no. 3 (September 1993): 687–700.
"Problem of the Alien—III: Morals and Manners of the Ghetto." *The Standard*. 27 January, 1911.
Reinharz, Jehuda. "The Balfour Declaration and Its Maker: A Reassessment." *Journal of Modern History* 64 (September 1992): 455–99.
Renan, Ernest. *The Poetry of the Celtic Races*. London: The Walter Scott, c. 1896.
Schneer, Jonathan. *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. New York: Random House, 2010.
Sengoopta, Chandak. *Otto Weininger: Sex, Science, and Self in Imperial Vienna*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000.
Sinha, Mrinalini. *Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century*. New Delhi: Raj Press, 1995.
Sisson, Elaine. *Pearse's Patriots: St. Enda's and the Cult of Boyhood*. Cork: Cork University Press, 2004.
Streets, Heather. *Martial Race: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857–1914*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.
Strobel, Margaret. *European Women and the Second British Empire*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991.
Thon, Sarah. "Women's Work in Palestine." In *Zionist Work in Palestine*, edited by Israel Cohen, 99–104. London: T. Fisher Wilson, 1911.
Turhan, Filiz. *The Other Empire: British Romantic Writings About the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Routledge, 2003.
Victor, Jeffery S. *Satanic Panic: The Creation of a Contemporary Legend*. Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1993.
Vincent, Jim. "Memoir." *The Norfolk Post*. 22 November, 1924.
Voeltz, Richard A. "' . . . A Good Jew and a Good Englishman': The Jewish Lads' Brigade, 1894–1922." *Journal of Contemporary History* 23, no. 1 (January 1988): 119–27.
Waley, S.D. *Edwin Montagu: A Memoir and an Account of His Visits to India*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964.
Ward, Alan J. "Lloyd George and the 1918 Irish Conscription Crisis." *The Historical Journal* XVII, no. I (1974): 107–29.
Weizmann, Chaim. "Chaim Weizmann to Lord Curzon, 2 February 1920." India Office Records: IOR/L/PS/11/170, 2478. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London.
———. "To Philip Kerr, 16 September 1917, Doc. 502." In *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann,* edited by Leonard Stein. vol VII Series A, 511. Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975.
———. "To Sir Maurice Hankey, 15 October 1917, Doc. 524." In *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann,* edited by Leonard Stein. vol VII Series A, 534. Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975.
———. "To Vera Weizmann, 22 December 1914, Doc. 82." In *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann,* edited by Leonard Stein. vol VII Series A, 97. Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1975.

4 Quasi-Barbarians

Between questions of gender and race, militarism beats the short path. In the late nineteenth century, upper-class Britons increasingly feared that their own 'race' was physically threatened by a decline in "the dynamic 'racial energy' that had carried the nation to pre-eminence."[1] The Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 tested the boundaries of the British military and, by extension, moral power. Eugenicist Arnold White "was among the first to draw attention to the connection between physical deterioration and military failure in South Africa."[2] The dread of degeneration was closely associated with a growing sense of decadence among the well-to-do and the decline of the moral stability of society. Such a decline, it was argued, could open the door for a British loss of hegemony, which was maintained via moral and physical superiority. This sentiment was expressed as late as 1921 when the question of racial equality was broached on an international level. A confidential Foreign Office memorandum asserted that "Japan is the only non-white first-class Power . . . If she can enforce her claim she will become our superior; if she cannot enforce it she remains our inferior; but equal she can never be."[3] The perceived intrinsic connection between power and morality underscored the notions of Victorian sensibility and the God-given right to rule that the British Empire enjoyed, but if the connection between power and moral superiority was severed or loosened, other powers could easily usurp Britain's hegemonic position. As a result, social scientists grappled with ways of resurrecting British power by focusing largely on the physical nature of its people and Britons' restructured imperial hierarchies and obligations abroad, and once again reshaped racial dimensions in politics.

In conjunction with this shift in what constituted a gentleman and a leader as addressed in the Anglicization process, a second important change began to appear in what comprised racial identity among the European imperial powers. As Pamela Pattynama notes in her discussion of colonialism in the Dutch East Indies,

> The colonial politics of modernity . . . coincided with an emerging fear of miscegenation in Europe. Invented as a term in the late nineteenth-century vocabulary of sexuality, miscegenation became

> associated with a set of discourses about degeneracy and eugenics. The object of European fear was less inter-racial sexuality per se than it was the decline of the white population that would be its inevitable result.[4]

Racial constructs took on the added element of miscegenation and environmental degeneration as Europeans increasingly feared physical and psychological decline "if they remained in the colonies for too long" or if "long-term exposure to native culture and its vile racial influences"[5] resulted in individuals 'going Native.' As a result, the contradictory desires to 'know the natives' and not to be influenced by them only intensified stratification between the races. Flora Annie Steel believed, like many other writers of the time, that it was her duty to "explore what she perceived to be the dark and dangerous mind of India so that she could bring back intelligence of the bizarre and corrupt, the unintelligible and unthinkable."[6] In order to do this, Steel had to walk a fine line, "for when the English delve into India, they meet with proclivities and customs so primeval that their personal equanimity will be disturbed and their confidence as masters shaken."[7] Knowledge gathering was not without its pitfalls.

Additionally, the physical nature of racial salvation in Victorian 'sensibilities' sought to emphasize what Max Weber termed the 'Protestant Work Ethic.' The process of Anglicization as an outward sign of Christian devotion and the prevention of social degeneration was coupled with Muscular Christianity to reinforce the need for *physical morality*. A Christian, in a constant relationship with God, fellow human, and him/herself, had an obligation not only to his/her spiritual and mental health, but also to physical health by way of regulating the animal within.[8] E. Knowlton's 1869 article on the question of Muscular Christianity notes that "Constant devotion to spirit can never atone for continual neglect of the body; and lying lips are not more truly 'an abomination to the Lord,' than crooked spines, dyspeptic stomachs, and consumptive lungs."[9] Knowlton's inclusion of these particular aliments symbolically discussed specific groups of people, some of whom are central to our own discussion.

Knowlton's 'consumptive lungs' (tuberculosis) were representative of a whole variety of social phenomena, the two leading diagnoses of which were: opium addiction and poorly ventilated living conditions. Both problems were closely linked with the lower classes, and in the case of opium, with East Asians in particular. Alternatively, dyspeptic stomachs were frequently regarded as women's issues. Women, thanks largely to the use of corsets, commonly fell prey to internal aliments in their abdomens.[10] Finally, the crooked spine, as with the other two aliments, carried several allusions, but in a discussion of race the connection that it drew to the supposed 'ghetto bend' is particularly important. Louis Wirth's 1928 work *The Ghetto* states that the ghetto bend was created by an emaciated physique with flabby muscles and the inability to hold one's spinal column erect.[11] Although, as Wirth notes, the ghetto bend was not an inheritable trait, it was a distinctive feature of Jewish communities, particularly those of immigrant populations or lower

socioeconomic status. (As we have already seen, it was a physical ailment vigorously attacked through Muscular Judaism.) *The Standard*'s series on the "Problem of the Alien" openly reinforced these sentiments noting, "The inhabitant of the Ghetto who has been born abroad is not a fine specimen of the human race. . . . he is stunted of stature, narrow of chest, almost puny. . . . Exercise, as a recreation, seems to be unknown among the aliens."[12] The discernible and hidden (i.e., mental) traits of various strata of society helped to further justify a subject race's relationship to the paternalistic overseer. Aligning with Benedict Anderson's sense of race, the relationship between class and race, rather than race and nation, is significant. Anderson notes that "The dreams of racism actually have their origin in the ideologies of *class,* rather than in those of nation."[13] While class is a vital component of this question, however, Paul Gilroy goes beyond Anderson's reified idea of nation and contends that it is too simplistic for understanding the English/British case, and by extension, the British Empire. For Gilroy, "The politics of 'race' . . . is fired by conceptions of national belonging and homogeneity which not only blur the distinction between 'race' and nation, but rely on that very ambiguity for their effect."[14] Thus, returning to the early twentieth-century ghettos or other marginal spaces, once ascribed these traits based on 'observable data,' subject peoples could manipulate the perceptions they created and turn the traits into self-ascribed characteristics as well, further complicating the picture. The negative qualities which typically came along with these discernible traits were themselves manipulated and ascribed to substrata, creating additional hierarchies and complexity. These recasting, re-ascribing efforts are evident in what Aziza Khazzoom calls 'Orientalization.'

Akin to Edward Said's 'Other,' 'Orientalization' was the process by which Western-European Jewish communities distanced themselves from Eastern-European Jewish communities and, in turn, European Jews distanced themselves from non-European Jews, in much the same way as European empires 'Othered' non-European peoples. This distinction is noted in Chaim Chissin's diaries[15] from the late 1800s, differentiating the Sephardic community (Palestinian Jews) from the Ashkenazi (European Jews) like himself. According to Chissin, 'Jerusalem Jews' carried the stigma of being parasitic and that they "have eyes, yet they don't see; ears, but they don't hear. Even facts cannot shake their prejudices."[16] The distinction between Eastern European Jews and Western European Jews was so well understood in fact that, in his "Dissertation on the Eastern Question," the Aga Khan stated that "the eastern Jews, whom we may encourage to flock to that unfortunate country [Palestine], need careful watching, for they are terrible human blood-suckers in economic questions [and] we must in no way mistake them for the excellent, cultivated Jews of Great Britain or France."[17] Both the Aga Khan and Chissin expressed the heart of Khazzoom's work:

> Diaspora Jewish history in Europe and the Middle East can be conceptualized as a series of orientalizations. Through this history, Jews came

> to view Jewish traditions as oriental, developed intense commitments to westernization as a form of self improvement, and became threatened by elements of Jewish culture that represented the oriental past.[18]

Like Orientalism, Orientalization increased in strength over the course of the nineteenth century.

THE MOHAMMEDAN QUESTION

In the late nineteenth century, British imperial policy rarely distinguished race from religion, particularly outside Christian Europe. As a result, religious communities were ascribed the same physical traits, abilities, and morals by virtue of their common spiritual convictions.[19] The Muslim world, which was generally looked upon unfavourably by Christian Europe, in large part due to Crusader history, was seen as a unified whole. Encompassing features of backwardness, laziness, deterioration, despotic tyranny, and lustful insatiability, the Islamic world was conceived of as a place which was not fully trustworthy, and as a community in need of European leadership, patronage, and moral guidance.

During the years between the fourteenth and twentieth centuries, the tone and tenor with which the Islamic world was viewed by Christian Europe shifted. Initially cast as barbarians, infidels, and apostates—cultural bogeymen for Europeans—later images of Muslims emphasized erotic and exotic qualities alongside governments in decay. The literature, art, drama, and travel narratives depicting the Islamic world during these six hundred years informed Europe's *knowledge* of and about the East, helping to distinguish what traits the Western world did not possess by extension.

One of the strongest features Christian Western leaders emphasized in their relationship with non-Christian and non-Western cultures was the notion of 'degeneracy.' As we have already seen, people living in cultural peripheries—ghettos or locations where itinerant populations congregated (i.e., wharfs)—were seen as racially degenerate by means of the location and the moral reputation of their surroundings. Perception was a crucial part of the construction of racial degeneracy. Consider the power the ghetto's shadow had on the perceptions of Montagu, internally and externally. If a community was *perceived* as being morally lax, this was enough observational material to justify classifying the community as such. Culturally peripheral spaces were not the only locations that incubated degenerate communities. The natural environment could lead to the degeneration of a person or community as well. While European climates were understood to aid in the development of creativity, hard work, and sanity, the regions closer to the equator were associated with opposite features.[20] By this logic, societies living in tropical climates suffered from laziness and despotic systems of government.

Although more typically Jews, vagrants, criminals, the insane, or the permanently sick[21] were viewed as degenerate, Muslims were often portrayed this way as well. Unlike their Jewish counterparts, however, Muslims did not have the advantage of proximity to aid their status in juxtaposition to European Christians. Whereas Jews lived among European Christians, sometimes as equals in citizenship, Muslims were primarily foreigners, and lacked the familiarity of constant contact. As a result, while parallel in their status as second-class members of society, Jewish and Muslim communities were described as possessing distinctly different traits. Whereas the image of the Jew, as will be discussed later, was one developed in terms of servility and demonic femininity, they were still a part of European society. Muslims, on the other hand, retained characteristics that shifted, representing oppositional features of a smoothly functioning ideal European society. As a result, the Islamic world was deemed more dangerous and base in the construction of racial hierarchies. Additionally, environmental degeneration—the idea that peoples "could be rendered racially unfit" even if they were members of the 'superior races'—only further supported this distance between the Muslim Middle East and Judeo-Christian Europe.[22]

Islam's Place in European Imagination

The earliest knowledge about the Islamic world spread throughout Medieval Europe via literature and drama. The Prophet Muhammad was frequently referred to as the anti-Christ, as in the ninth-century *Life of Mahomet*. Here it was claimed that Muhammad had died in 666 AD, underscoring Islam's supposed devilish qualities.[23] In the early fourteenth century, Dante wrote that Muhammad, and Shi'ism's foundational leader Ali, were sent to the eighth circle of Hell, "where the Sowers of Scandal and Schism, perpetually circling, are wounded and—after each healing—wounded again by a demon with a sword."[24] In Dante's time, Muhammad "was believed by some to be an apostate Christian. Whether or not Dante held this belief, he certainly thought of Mohammad as a 'sower of dissention'."[25] Similarly, Ali's condemnation rested on the fact that the *Shiat Ali* (The Party of Ali) was schismatic; he and his followers created further disunity within the religion. Dante's view of Islam is unsurprising in terms of his era. The 1300s were not long after the end of the Crusades, and Constantinople remained a precarious Christian outpost amid newly acquired Muslim lands. Islam represented a barbarian world of apostate hordes, the antithesis of righteous Christianity. That Islam professed a belief in the same god as the Judeo-Christian world, and followed the same prophets, went largely unnoticed for centuries, further distancing the Islamic East from the Judeo-Christian West. As a result, by the middle of the fourteenth century, Europe's view of Islam was a complex blend of anxious coexistence and conflict, only further complicated by Europe's own religious fractures.

In 1567–8, when Nicolas de Nicolay published *Les quatre premiers livres des navigations et pérégrinations orientales*, "certain *topoi* or clichés about the Ottoman Empire had entered the mainstream of western travel writing," which included the knowledge that "an open purse was the key to success in the Ottoman Empire."[26] A stronger relationship developed between the Ottoman Empire and France from the mid-1500s until the early years of the nineteenth century, not only explaining France's political alliances with Turkey (as in the case of the Crimean War 1853–1856), but also the cultural history of Orientalist artwork and literature that became so prominent in France between Napoleon's invasion and the turn of the twentieth century.

Similarly, England, and later all of Great Britain, developed its own tenuous relationship with the Ottoman Empire. England sent its share of forces to the Levant during the Crusades, but in 1581 it established economic ties with the Ottoman Empire through the auspices of the Levant Company. Culturally, Islam continued to remain more obscure in the English imagination, but British literary interpretations of Muslims were "not simply fantasies about fictional demons lurking at the edges of the civilized world."[27] English literature expressed "an anxious interest in Islamic power that is both complicated and overdetermined."[28] In Great Britain, Islam represented an image of empire gone awry. The Islamic world provided a 'morality' tale for the British nation, poised, by the end of the eighteenth century, to colonize and control much of the globe—notably the Islamic world.

The Renaissance, so often thought of as a truly European moment, owed a great deal to the Islamic world. Nancy Bisaha notes that Renaissance Humanists used secular examinations of Muslims to help them "shape new constructs of the 'Western Self'"[29] and by the early fifteenth century the image of Muslims incorporated new characteristics that would eventually support environmental degeneration philosophy:

> The superiority of Europeans to Muslims is asserted in a verse contrasting the Germanic warrior spirit (literally *tedesco furor*) of the people who live in a land "that always lies in ice and frozen in the snows, all distant from the path of the sun" to the softness of Muslim peoples: "Turks, Arabs, and Chaldeans . . . a naked, cowardly, and lazy people who never grasp the steel but entrust all their blows to the wind."[30]

The Humanist influence on the Western world was a mixed legacy, promoting openness and greater understanding while, at the same time, a hostile interpretation of the Islamic identity flourished. This interpretation helped to "nurture incipient ideas of Western superiority to Eastern rivals."[31] By the sixteenth century and the era of the French Enlightenment, during which time negative qualities attributed to Muslims had become entrenched, there was the growing realization in Europe that the Ottoman Empire had a lot to offer, particularly in terms of trade. As a result, a more complex image of the Muslim world began to emerge.

Orientalist literature pre-dates Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, but the field of Orientalism found its most vivid expression in the era following Napoleon's retreat. As it happens, this period was also marked by the rise of romanticism and nationalism and, as a result, was "a watershed in colonial history, witnessing a move from a protectionist colonial system, based upon mercantilist economic principles to a free-trade empire with a political and moral agenda, proverbially described, after Kipling's poem, as 'the white man's burden'."[32] The quickening pace of European imperialism sparked increased interest in the categorization of peoples into nations, races, and genders so as to formalize power dynamics.

Between 1876 and 1888 numerous events reinforced growing distinctions between the Islamic and Christian European frontiers. In particular, these events focused European interests in destabilizing Islamic leaders and gaining colonial footholds in Islamic lands. An uprising of Christian peasants in 1875 in what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbians' active involvement in destabilizing Ottoman control throughout the Balkans, and the outbreak of a second revolt in Bulgaria in 1876 continually pitted European Christians against Ottoman Muslims. These events led directly to Russia declaring war on Turkey and instigating the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). By 1879, the Egyptian Khedive Ismail, who was a nominal vassal of the Ottoman Empire, was deposed by the Ottoman Sultan at the behest of Britain and France. Ismail's fall from power was due largely to the growing debt his state owed European bankers and the British and French governments' desire to protect their investors' interests (e.g., the Suez Canal). In that same year, the Second Anglo-Afghan War was ended with the Treaty of Gandamak. This prevented further British incursion into Afghanistan, although by then it was a foregone conclusion that Britain was the most significant power in the region. In 1881 France invaded Tunisia. In 1882 Britain invaded Egypt. Perhaps most importantly for British identity formation *vis à vis* the Islamic world, in 1885 General Charles George Gordon was killed in Khartoum.

The story of General Gordon is particularly significant, not because of what he did, but because of what he became. John M. Mackenzie asserts that Gordon, Henry Havelock, David Livingstone, and T. E. Lawrence were perceived as popular 'heroes of empire.' These men "journeyed into other cultures, expanding the moral order through [the] defeat of 'barbarism,' the extension of Christendom, free trade and the rule of Western law."[33] These heroes "developed instrumental power because they served to explain and justify the rise of the imperial State, personified national greatness and offered examples of self-sacrificing service to a current generation."[34] Despite Britain being one of the most civilian-driven empires in Europe, these heroes were primarily, and necessarily, militaristic.

The events of the last third of the nineteenth century, combined with the sense of superiority exhibited by the British imperial system—enhanced by gendered and racial considerations—shaped British perceptions of Britons

and others well into the twentieth century. Claude Conder of the Palestine Exploration Fund wrote in the 1880s that the British nation "seems to abound in men specially fitted to govern Orientals by their tolerance, patience, good-humor, honesty, justice and firmness of character."[35] Conder goes on to note that "The Frenchman is often hated, and the German despised, where the Englishman succeeds in winning confidence and esteem and in imposing his will on all the Orientals he meets."[36] It was specifically a Briton, not just any European, who retained these requisite qualities.

The moral and sexual laxity Europeans saw in Muslims contrasted sharply with the view Britons had of themselves. While it was understood that working-class men and women could not control their sexual urges, elite men were taught to control themselves by repressing emotion, desire, and sexuality, and to favour sportsmanship and militarism as the highest forms of masculine existence. Britain's leaders were thus 'truly masculine' and only the truly masculine could lead. The ideals of Muscular Christianity reinforced a cultural aversion to, and distrust of, cultures perceived as careless in their own abilities to control such emotions.[37] The militarism instilled in the British upper classes defined the generation's views of power and superiority, and any indication of weakness, whether emotionally, physically, or sociopolitically was seen as dishonourable.

THE ARAB CASE: QUASI-BARBARIANS AND VERY OLD CHILDREN

It is nearly impossible to broach the subject of race and Arab history without making at least a passing reference to Edward Said's *Orientalism.* To be sure, the book has faced criticism for its limited scope (i.e., its exclusion of German or Italian Orientalist work), and because it places too great an emphasis on the diametrical world view of the West versus some sort of amalgamated Orient. Yet, some of Said's basic assertions ring true about the character and nature of British policy-makers' assumptions, or *knowledge,* about the Middle East and the Arab world. As Said notes, the separateness which defined the Orient in contrast to the West was built on a series of assumptions focused on the Orient's "eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, [or] its supine malleability."[38] Additionally, the imagery which defined Islam in Great Britain was transferred, in large part, to the Arab world, whether or not the population was actually Muslim. The people of the Middle East were characterized as backward, degenerate, decadent, feminine, or, perhaps most universally, child-like. These categories aided the imperial endeavour and reinforced European hegemony by asserting European supremacy and ability to lead.

In 1920, two and a half years after the Balfour Declaration had been issued, but in discussion of some of the same issues raised in drafting the document, Alfred Mond, Great Britain's Minister of Health asserted:

> To place a highly civilized world people like the Jews under the sovereignty of the quasi-barbarian and backward Arabs is unthinkable! Nor from a British standpoint, as a question of policy, could such an enhancement of the insatiable lust of domination of Mahomedan Arabs be anything but disastrous.[39]

Mond's supposition about the quasi-barbarian nature of Arabs derived from on a long tradition of viewing the populations of the Middle East as dichotomously different from Europeans. Built on tenuous assertions about the physical, psychological, and cultural qualities of various communities, even Arabphiles noted 'inherent' differences between the two. Arabists like Gertrude Bell (1868–1926), a political officer for British Intelligence during World War One and later Oriental Secretary to the High Commissioner in Baghdad, noted:

> The Oriental is like a very old child. He is unacquainted with many branches of knowledge which we have come to regard as of elementary necessity; frequently, but not always, his mind is little preoccupied with the need of acquiring them, and he concerns himself scarcely at all with what we call practical utility.[40]

Racial theory and knowledge of the Arab world was based on two necessary assumptions. First, the British Empire was at the top of a global moral, economic, political, and cultural hierarchy. Second, all other peoples fell somewhere below this mark.

In 1908, Lord Cromer (1841–1917)—recently retired from his position as Consul-General of Egypt—published in *The Edinburgh Review* an article entitled "The Government of Subject Races." According to Cromer, the 'reasonable Imperialist'

> will entertain not only a moral dislike, but also a political mistrust of that excessive earth-hunger, which views with jealous eyes the extension of other and neighboring European nations. He will have no fear of competition. He will believe that, in the treatment of subject races, the methods of government practised by England, though sometimes open to legitimate criticism, are superior, morally and economically, to those of any other foreign nation; and that, strong in the possession and maintenance of those methods, we shall be able to hold our own against all competitors.[41]

Cromer's 'reasonable Imperialist' reinforced two important features of Britain's right to rule. One, a reasonable Imperialist, the Briton, had a moral duty to lead and was not out for material gain, unlike the 'earth-hungry' imperialist German, for example. Britain's sense of 'fair play,' made vogue by the Anglicization and Muscular Christianity of Britain's Public Schools, required it to take on a caretaker role in global politics, to bring the 'child-like' races to order. Two, Britain claimed the most prominent role

in the right to rule by virtue of its superiority to all other states, including other European states. A clear testimonial to the nature of Europe's current political environment, Cromer's view placed the British Empire above its European counterparts, while simultaneously locating the 'Subject Races' well below all Europeans on the sociopolitical ladder.

The race and social hierarchy question, as it pertained to Palestinian Arabs, was complicated by the fact that multiple influences vied for the right to define Palestinian Arabs. Palestinians were included and excluded from various Arab categories according to the whims of those forming the definition. Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Arabs were themselves grouped together and differentiated from one another in accordance with the needs of imperial powers like the British. Similarly, racial and social hierarchies were redefined by Zionists and other Arab communities who had vested interests in the region.

The differing visions of Palestinian Arabs depended greatly on the nature of the observer. Occasionally, for instance, Palestinian Arabs were thought of more highly than their neighbours. Former Lieutenant-General John Bagot Glubb (1897–1986), in his autobiographical *A Soldier with the Arabs*, noted that "Jews and Arabs alike have fallen victims [sic] to unscientific modern theories of race."[42] An Arabphile, Glubb traced modern Levantine history back to the biblical era, careful to draw a distinction between the Bible's Israelites and modern Zionists. Glubb also distinguished 'Arabs' from 'Egyptians,' arguing that because the two are conflated, Middle Eastern history has been greatly misunderstood. Setting the stage for underscoring a militaristic, even European-like Palestinian society, Glubb argues that Egyptians, "are physically inclined to be lethargical [sic], a quality doubtless to be attributed to their climate . . . They prefer to settle their problems by intellectual means, rather than by physical action."[43] Alternatively, Palestine's Arab inhabitants "always had more connection with Europe than with Iraq,"[44] or other Arab communities. Glubb is quick to note emotional traits (i.e., hot-headedness and fanaticism) and the outdated education of Levantine Arabs, but it becomes clear from his glowing depiction of Arab abilities and societies that he believed Levantine Arabs were more the heirs of Victorian-era notions of masculinity and nationalism than Egyptians or Zionist Jews.[45] Neither of these last two groups, in Glubb's view, had the requisite abilities to both learn and lead.

Whereas Glubb had a great deal of practical experience in the Middle East, London policy-makers rarely knew one Arab, let alone a population. Such lack of personal contact forced them to rely on second-hand information and general assumptions in defining their own personal hierarchy of cultures and races. In his biography of Musa Alami, *Palestine Is My Country*, Geoffrey Furlonge asserts that Zionists knowingly "played on the [British] ignorance of the Arabs of Palestine by representing them as a collection of illiterate and backward nomads and Zionism as a mission which would bring civilization."[46] Even a cursory glance through the archives indicates that there was a distinct division among British policy-makers and their knowledge of Arab

history, culture, and abilities. This is evident in the wording debate discussed in Chapter 2. Curzon, who had actually been to Palestine, which is more than could be said of most Cabinet members, both doubted its capacity for the Zionist undertaking and acknowledged having an imperfect memory of the area. The lack of definitive knowledge Cabinet members had about Palestine was all the more to the advantage of the Zionists. Orientalist writing had been, throughout the nineteenth century, popular in all of Britain's social classes, and while Said contends that this knowledge was overly rose-tinted, it nevertheless informed London politicians as well as local imperial officials on the ground. The British were certainly not ignorant of the Arabs, but the nature of their knowledge was principally dependent on the individual whims and biases of each person. Because of this, asserting the child-like nature of Arabs who, in turn, require British patronage became widely accepted as it facilitated imperial expansion and reward.

One of the best-known Arabists of World War One was T.E. Lawrence (1888–1935). In his work, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*, Lawrence describes Arabic-speaking peoples as "a people of primary colours, or rather of black and white, who saw the world always in contour. They were a dogmatic people, despising doubt . . . They did not understand our metaphysical difficulties, our introspective questionings."[47] Likewise, in his *Revolt in the Desert,* Lawrence states that "Arabs could be swung on an idea as on a cord; for the unpledged allegiance of their minds made them obedient servants."[48] Much as Bell had done, the entirety of the Arab world was simplified into a population either too simple-minded or, conversely, too pragmatic to be able to deal fully with the complex structures of European politics, culture, and society.

Beyond the official policy-makers and imperial leaders of the British Empire, the abilities of Palestinians were informed by other actors as well. Furlonge's assertion that Zionists manipulated the knowledge British officials had to work with finds support in the memoirs of Chaim Chissin. Chissin's description of the native inhabitants of Palestine—Muslim, Christian, and Jewish—is generally unflattering. Distinguishing the *fellahin* (sedentary peasants), the *belledi* (city dwellers), and the 'Arabs'[49] from one another, Chissin adds further nuance to the socio-racial hierarchy of the region. According to Chissin, the fellahin generally walked barefoot, were less educated, and were members of the lowest economic class.[50] Similarly, the immigrant Jewish population to which Chissin belonged viewed the local Jews with a great deal of contempt. As the local Jews were so completely different in terms of culture, custom, and education, the immigrant Jews found it nearly impossible to communicate with them.[51] Only one group appears to have stood out among the native population, the Christian Arabs. According to Chissin,

> The Christian Arabs, in general, constitute the most intelligent section of the population here. They don't practice polygamy, their women enjoy almost complete freedom, and they educate their daughters just as well as their sons. In their dealings with other people they are much

> more honest and considerate than most of the Arabs and as a consequence their own lives are ennobled.[52]

Reaction to the Palestinian Arab community, from outside sources, was influenced once again by discernible features, like education and social customs.

As will be more fully developed in the next chapter, the Christian Arab community in Palestine was at the forefront of Palestinian national identification and, as a result, played a disproportionately larger role in the historical record of Palestine than Muslim or Jewish Palestinian Arabs. Despite this, however, the average European was unaware of the true demographics of Palestine. Glubb notes that among Europeans "Knowledge of Palestine was to a great extent limited to Bible study."[53] Coupled with a vague sense of Crusader history and the loss of Palestine to the Turks, it is perhaps not surprising that Glubb goes on to maintain that "I believe that many British people in 1917 imagined Palestine to be still the land of the Jews, and it never occurred to them to doubt that the vast majority of its people were not of that faith."[54] By this same token, Muslims in Palestine were attributed a foreigner status, much as was the case in India. Palestine remained either Muslim or Jewish in the imagination of Europeans up until the point when the first official census was taken in 1922. Despite the cosmopolitan and well-educated nature of Palestine's upper classes (largely, but not universally, Christian), the predominant view of Palestinians from the late 1800s until after World War One remained one of uneducated, backward, and disjointed groups.

THE INDIAN COLONIALIST AND THE RACIAL POLITICS OF EMPIRE

India's role in the narrative of the Balfour Declaration comes, in part, from the role it plays in defining race and gender within the greater British Empire. The largest of the British colonial possessions, India is a complicated example of how institutionalized racism impacted imperial policy decisions elsewhere. Additionally, by virtue of its large Muslim, and of course Hindu, population India was a unique governing experience for Christian Britain. Torn between religious and imperialist allegiances, Indo-Muslims inhabited a liminal state between the Ottoman and British Empires. What is more, despite the attempts to compartmentalize communities around the world into racial categories distinct from one another, when non-European peoples began to cast off these designations and seek out their own form of group identity, India provides examples of how such identities reached across what had seemed previously impermeable boundaries.

The Great Rebellion

Fear of cultural stagnation pervaded Edmund Burke's 1790 assessment of the Ottoman Empire in his essay *Reflections on the Revolution in France*

and informed how British imperialists viewed events in their own Empire. Following the 1857 Rebellion in India and the final consolidation of British power over the region, political stagnation and the figure of the child-like 'Other' came to be the most common image of Indo-Muslims.[55] On the one hand, the Rebellion allowed Britons to exhibit "greater confidence in race as a marker of difference," which in turn fed scientific racism and reinforced the principles of Muscular Christianity. The Rebellion and the establishment of the Crown's control over India reasserted Britain's right to rule and sense of moral superiority.[56] On the other hand, Christian militarism was curtailed in its proselytizing zeal, so as to disassociate it with the 'fanaticism' used to identify the Islamic world.[57] It was upon this framework that British policy in India was constructed after 1857.

The Great Rebellion drastically changed the ways in which Britons defined Indians of all creeds, but a particularly notable shift occurred with regard to Indo-Muslims.[58] The Rebellion convinced the British to view Muslims as having a "corporate political character, which in British eyes Muslims had not previously possessed."[59] The potential Islamic unity, of longing to reassert Mughal power and to cast off British imperialism, and this *corporate character*, encouraged Anglo-Indians to view Muslim Indians with suspicion and to avoid allowing too many of them into the Indian Civil Service.

Because British policy became more racial and more anti-Muslim after 1857, some Indo-Muslim communities turned their allegiances toward their religious, instead of their political/imperial, community. As with the Balfour Declaration, while the rhetoric surrounding these issues was shrouded in religion, at the heart of the matter, it was political. Politics forced religiosity. A religio-cultural link with the *umma* (the global community of Muslims) established among some members of the Indo-Islamic community a pan-Islamist world view. The subsequent growth of pan-Islamic sentiment strengthened the political hand of Indo-Muslim reformers while at the same time drawing deep concern from British politicians seeking to maintain imperial stability.

Frustration with British imperial oversight in India also manifested in a desire to re-establish the Mughal Empire or, at the very least, a native South Asian government. In 1889 Viceroy of India Lord Dufferin

> described the Muslims of British India as 'a nation of 50 million, with their monotheism, their iconoclastic fanaticism, their animal sacrifices, their social equality and their remembrance of the days when, enthroned at Delhi, they reigned supreme from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin.[60]

Reinforcing a view taken up by many nineteenth-century Europeans, Dufferin discusses the perception of the Islamic world as having once been powerful, but now in state of decay. Because of the belief that the Mughals had been a foreign power and Muslims therefore were not native to India, not

unlike the British, Islamic claims of legitimate leadership roles were superseded by Hindu claims.

In 1884, the Ilbert Bill Crisis offered one of the clearest examples of how race, gender, and power were institutionalized in the imperial process. As a result of the controversy surrounding the Ilbert Bill, the British colonial world reconsidered the place of European women as actors and definers of racial status, and simultaneously redefined the racial qualities/characteristics of Indians and even Africans, as we shall see. Indirectly, the Bill informed how other imperial policies, like the Balfour Declaration, should be constructed and implemented. At the heart of the debate surrounding the Bill was the question of whether the British government was seeking to educate Indians for eventual self-government, or whether Indian education was intended only to perpetuate the colonial administration and imperial oversight by Great Britain. Similarly, in Palestine after the Balfour Declaration, questions arose as to the role of the British government in administering the region. Was Palestine to become fully independent, a self-governing dominion, or a colonial procession—a part of the British government itself?

The Ilbert Bill, introduced in 1883, was intended to rectify a legal anomaly that disallowed Indian judges in the countryside from presiding over cases which involved European offenders. The Bill aroused vitriolic protest among the Anglo-Indian community and within the more conservative branches of the home government. A *New York Times* 1883 article claimed, in examining the Ilbert Bill and the resentment to it expressed by Anglo-Indians, that "The Bill, by subjecting Englishmen who misbehave themselves in India to the same jurisdiction with natives of the same description, is simply a provision for the equality of all men in India before the law."[61] However, as the article goes on to note, Anglo-Indians believed, as Sir Bartle Frere is quoted as saying, that "this bill is calculated to 'raise dangerous race hatred' by inculcating the idea that justice which is good enough for natives is good enough for Europeans."[62] Implied in this sentiment, is the reverse: Are natives good enough for European justice? Ultimately, what is clear is that the Anglo-Indians won few sympathizers in London. The obstinacy with which they fought the Bill was noted and calculated into the consideration of future policy. Still, the reactions to the racial questions which the Bill raised were not consistent throughout the Empire. Echoing Philip Curtin's concept of "man-on-the-spotism," Edwin Hirschmann argues that the bitterness which defined the debate in India had largely dissipated by the time the question reached London.

In relation to other imperial policies, the controversy of the Ilbert Bill questioned the power of the imperial subjects to govern themselves and, by extension, raised questions of what rights imperial subjects had throughout the Empire. Moreover, the ability of native populations to govern themselves or to need European assistance in their own governance was further explored in the questions raised by enfranchisement debates, international racial equality, and eventually in the Balfour Declaration itself.

Race and Indian Imperial Rights Overseas

While Muslims faced specific concerns with regard to the British Empire and the governance of India, all South Asians shared a common struggle for self-identification and equal rights. When Indians like the Aga Khan, in the 1910s and 1920s, expressed a desire for greater Indian control in East Africa, such demands were not couched in religious terms, but in *Indian* terms. The connections between East Africa and India predate British imperialism and even Islamic influences in the region. For centuries, traders surrounding the Indian Ocean connected South Asia and the Eastern coast of Africa. For the Aga Khan, more specifically, these ties were enhanced by the existence of an Ismaili community throughout the region. Nevertheless, despite historic linkages, European settlers in East Africa and Anglo-Indians spurned almost any attempt by Indians at advancing along the racial hierarchy. The events of the Ilbert Bill crisis and its subsequent passage only made the two communities more vehement in their dislike of increased Indian rights.[63] Coupled with the strong parallels developed between the enfranchisement of Indians in Africa in the 1920s and the questions raised by the Ilbert Bill—specifically the connections between racial and gendered identity—was an emergent Indian national identity.

In 1884, Lord Dufferin (1826–1902) replaced Lord Ripon as Viceroy of India. Dufferin was willing to accept modest concessions to Indians in achieving peace in South Asia, particularly in the wake of the Ilbert Bill crisis; his 1888 *Minute on British Policy in India* only underscored Britain's role as India's paternalistic overseer. Speaking of the newly formed Indian National Congress (1885) and the rights of the most highly educated in India about a future Indian self-government, Dufferin stated:

> To hand over, therefore, the Government of India either partially or otherwise to such a body as this would simply be to place millions of men, dozens of nationalities, and hundreds of the most stupendous interests under the domination of a microscopic minority, possessing neither experience, administrative ability, nor any adequate conception of the nature of the tasks before them.[64]

Dufferin did not doubt that Indians could be taught to govern themselves, but he did make it clear that they had not yet attained the ability to do so. Dufferin's modest concessions in the wake of the Ilbert controversy only exacerbated the dichotomous view of a Hindu-Muslim India—that Hindus were the native inhabitants and Muslims foreign elements. Dufferin added to the above, that "it looks as if the Mahomedans were rising in revolt against the ascendancy which they imagine a rival and less virile race is desirous of obtaining over them."[65] Speaking both of the rights of Hindus and of Britons to rule India (each in its due time) the perceived animosity Dufferin saw among Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim nationalists, while certainly valid in some

circles, was nowhere near universal. Moreover, the question of whether Indians, Hindus or not, were even capable of self-government plagued British imperial discourse. British Cabinet minutes from August 1917, in the very midst of Balfour Declaration debates, indicate that Balfour was highly sceptical of the Indian's abilities. Balfour comments:

> Does India as a whole possess the characteristics which would give Parliamentary Government a chance? To me it seems that it does not. People often talk as if democracy produced equality. The truth is that democracy is only successful where equality—fundamental racial equality—approximately exists already. Where racial differences are clear-cut and profound, where race obviously superior is mixed with race obviously inferior, the superior race may be constituted as a democracy but into that democracy the inferior race will never be admitted. It may be kept out by law, as in South Africa, or it may be kept out by practice, as in the Southern States of America; but kept out it will be.
>
> The problem of India, I admit, is not so simple. The lines of demarcation between races, even when they are emphasized by the system of caste, are not nearly so sharply marked as those which in America and Africa divide white from black. But personally I believe the differences are quite sufficient to make real Parliamentary institutions unworkable in the future, as they are admittedly unworkable in the present.[66]

Of course Indian nationalists like the Aga Khan devoted a great deal of time to Islamic questions, but also discussed Indians as Indians, and more importantly here, as equals—politically, socially, culturally, economically—to Europeans.

In his 1918 work *India in Transition*, the Aga Khan argued that political allegiance rather than race should set the standard for imperial inclusion and exclusion. Seeking to prove this point, he noted that because Austria and Germany had taken up arms against their European neighbours in World War One, "all and sundry have watched the humiliation of these fallen members of the white race" while at the same time "sepoys have fought hand to hand with the fairest inhabitants of Europe. [Thus] The long-maintained racial line of demarcation had been largely replaced by that of allegiance to Sovereign and flag."[67] Unlike the arguments put forward by racial theorists or Khalifatists,[68] group inclusion for the Aga Khan was a political matter, not a racial one. It is no accident that the Aga Khan and Montagu got along so well, sharing as they did such a solid political platform. Despite this bold and well-reasoned attempt to publically shift imperial thinking from issues of race to those of patriotism and loyalty, British imperial policy continued to be defined by race well into the 1920s.

Just as the Ilbert Bill controversy had ultimately upheld racial divisions, a case in the 1920s further proved that Indians, despite the contentions of leaders like the Aga Khan, continued to be cast as unequal to Britons

within the imperial framework. The first hint of this came in 1921, when discussion of Indian enfranchisement in South Africa arose. Just as he had done during the various treaty discussions radiating from the close of World War One, Edwin Montagu and members of the Indian government lobbied hard for greater Indian involvement in the African colonies. Despite their best efforts, however, Indians living in South Africa were denied enfranchisement. As a result of this experience, the pro-Indian lobby shifted its advocacy to Indian enfranchisement elsewhere in Africa. In particular, the focus fell on East Africa. The Aga Khan pressed for greater Indian involvement in the colonial administration of the British-granted colonies (and the colonies already controlled by Great Britain), especially noting the long historical connection between East Africa and India. As with the Ilbert Bill and the South African enfranchisement effort, the events in Kenya (East Africa) again proved that racial hierarchies dominated British policy. Indian leadership in East Africa was derided much as Indian leadership in India had been in the 1880s.

The 1919–1923 correspondence between Montagu and Viceroy of India Lord Reading (Rufus Isaacs, 1860–1935) reveals the administrative anxiety produced by the question of Indian enfranchisement in East Africa. Montagu and Reading were particularly concerned with how the denial of Indian rights overseas could adversely affect changes the government of India sought to make in reforming British control in India. Of paramount importance to Montagu and Reading was the establishment of 'responsible government' in India and implementation of the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.[69] The Reforms aimed to gradually introduce self-governing institutions to India, and by doing so pave the way for eventual Indian self-government. Typically Indian nationalists did not feel these reforms went far enough, imperialists feared they went too far. What they did do, in either event, is add layers to the global discussion of enfranchisement and empowerment of colonial subjects. Additionally, delegations lobbied London politicians for Indian rights in East Africa. One of the most important features of this lobbying effort was that only educated Indians could be an equal footing with their European counterparts, not just *any* Indian living overseas.

Echoing the Ilbert Bill crisis, elevating Indians in Africa to equal status with Europeans incensed Anglo-Africans and motivated the production of propaganda which recalled the gendered and racist tone of anti-Ilbert sentiment. In the summer of 1923, a pamphlet entitled "The Woman's Point of View" was circulated among influential members of the British government.[70] The pamphlet bluntly declares that the issue of Indian rights in Africa was of worldwide importance, as "There is no previous instance where a coloured race has aspired to share the rule of any country with the European."[71] As the pamphlet was intended to be from the perspective of a 'concerned European woman,' its greatest focus was on the potential enfranchisement had for placing "European women under Asiatic administration," a similar argument to anti-Ilbert Bill rhetoric.

The Kenya Indian Delegation, in a 1923 letter to Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin (1867–1947), countered this anti-Asiatic sentiment by asserting that former Secretary of State for India Lord Salisbury "emphasized the obligation of the Imperial Government to accord the Indian Subjects of His Majesty's equality of treatment in the clearest terms."[72] In fact, what had been promised was the same treatment of Indians in India and abroad. Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Indians had continued to gain significant improvements to their rights in India. These improvements had led educated Indians, particularly those in the Civil Service, to consider themselves the intellectual equals of Britons. The logical assumption was that these rights continued overseas. As had already been made clear, however, race continued to trump education, and imperial policy was slow to change, principally when it meant condensing the desires of diametrically opposed constituencies into one functional policy.

The overwhelming emphasis of the Kenya Women's Committee pamphlet was on the degenerate nature of Indians in Africa. The propaganda boldly states "that any outbreak of plague invariably starts in the Indian quarters" and, as if this was not enough, the coeducation of Indian and English children would be disastrous. The pamphlet asserted that Indian children were "trained and initiated into the mysteries of sex."[73] The theme of Indian hygiene, or lack thereof, was nothing new in the assumptions British officials used in understanding South Asians. In an April 1917 letter to Montagu from Vaughan Nash (1861–1932), Secretary for Reconstruction in Asquith's cabinet, Nash writes, "You mention sanitation and education, but the first of these, as you know, is a terrain vague to all Indians and I do not think that it will appeal to them."[74] After debasing the Indians' skills as merchants, potential as agriculturalists, their hygiene, and children, the pamphlet attacks the Indians' military service and capabilities, noting that "The War record of the Indians in Kenya . . . their distinct lack of patriotism and the fact that they use the country as a means to an end, renders them unfit to hold positions in the Civil and Military Services."[75] Then, the pamphlet changes tack, using the familiar rhetoric of Britain's role as paternalistic overseer.

Noting the obvious predominance of native Kenyans over combined European and Indian populations, the author of the pamphlet contends that if the administration of Kenya is handed over to the Indians, "the progress of the Native will be put back 50 years."[76] Beyond this, the pamphlet adds the battle cry of the Ilbert Bill crisis, observing that "On the whole, the Native has taken very kindly to the rule of the white woman—he looks to her as his friend."[77] While the Aga Khan had argued that Indian imperial overseers would act as good intermediaries between the 'backward' native African and the fully modern European,[78] the pamphlet's author fully disagrees. The Indian is portrayed as mischievous in this scenario and the African as child-like and in need of protection. Just as the Indian judges were feared for their potential power over white subjects, the African Indians

were castigated in this pamphlet for the perceived lack of concern for what is 'best' for the native African.

On 27 January 1922, Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, delivered his 'Kenya Dinner Address,' during which he made two significant points. First, he asserted that "We consider we are pledged by undertakings given in the past to reserve the Highlands of East Africa exclusively for European settlers, and we do not intend to depart from that pledge. That must be taken as a matter which has been definitely settled in all future negotiations."[79] Second, "all future immigration of Indians should be strictly limited."[80] Neither point made Montagu or the Indian delegations happy. As Montagu observed in a letter to Churchill on 31 January, "what distresses me is that you seem to think that the existing residents in the country can only mean the European residents. Under every rule of equal rights for all civilised men, the term must mean the residents in the country regardless of race."[81] Racial division, particularly in the case of Indian subjects, was an increasingly difficult question to untangle.

JAPAN AND THE YELLOW PERIL

If there remains any doubt that race played a significant role in the formulation of international policy during the 1910s and 1920s, look no further than the case of Japan and its relationship with the Great Powers. In 1919, Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden (1854–1937) stated that "there were 'only three major powers left in the world: the United States, Britain, and Japan.' "[82] Indeed, "Japan expected to associate with the Western powers on equal terms, but was disparaged as 'a yellow race'."[83] While the Japanese delegation began the conference as one of the 'Big Five,' Japanese efforts at securing equality increasingly marginalized them from the main decision-making at the conference.[84] The status of Japan and their nationals around the world was tenuous. To shore up their status, the Japanese delegation advocated for the addition of a "racial equality clause" to the Covenant of the League of Nations (created at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919). On 13 February, Baron Nobuaki Makino (1861–1949) of the Japanese delegation read his amendment to the 'religious liberty'[85] clause:

> The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.[86]

Attaching to the religious liberty clause, which promised not to discriminate against any of the League and its jurisdiction on the basis of creed, religion, or belief, not only reinforced connections between race and creed,

but sought to equalize a political world dominated by white and Christian hegemony.

This was not the first time the Japanese attempted to secure their place as imperial and racial equals with European powers. As will be discussed further in Chapter 6, the Japanese had consciously entered World War One as a means to solidify that equality. It became increasingly apparent to Japanese leaders by the end of the war, though, that equality was not forthcoming. Baron Nobuaki, in presenting his amendment, noted that "No Asiatic nation could be happy in a league of nations in which sharp racial discrimination was maintained," and that "We are not too proud to fight, but we are too proud to accept a place of admitted inferiority in dealing with one or more associate nations."[87] Unfortunately for Japan, as well as all other Asian and non-European countries, the mystique of white hegemony continued to pervade international politics. Lord Cecil, in response to the proposed amendment "said that, alas, this was a highly controversial matter. It was already causing problems within the British empire delegation."[88] For the British delegation the clearest problem a racial equality clause raised was reconciling it with the continuation of current colonial policy.

By 1923 the discrepancies between white rights and the rights of non-whites throughout the Empire had grown into a monumental imperial dilemma. Representatives of India, in a letter to Minister of Parliament Stanley Baldwin (1867–1947), stated that the "principle of equality in Imperial citizenship has been openly violated by some of the self-governing Dominions" and "is already a cause of grave discontent in India."[89] The seeds of this discontent began to make a clear entrance into imperial and international politics as a result of Japan's attempted amendment, but much like the states-rights issues that dominated politics in the United States—the question of whether international charters could supersede a country's immigration laws—became a central hurdle. The proposed amendment was in direct opposition to British policy regarding non-white, inter-imperial immigration and enfranchisement. According to a confidential memorandum written by the Foreign Office in 1921:

> The 'racial equality' question in its present stage primarily concerns the following countries: Japan, China, British India, United States of America (especially California and the Pacific States), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa. The first three countries demand the right of free immigration and freedom from discriminatory disabilities for their nationals in the territories of the last five countries. The question can be regarded from an economic or from a political point of view, but in its essence it is a racial one. . . . The white and coloured races cannot and will not amalgamate. One or the other must be the ruling caste . . . only one of the aggrieved races has acquired sufficient material strength to demand a hearing, and that is Japan. . . . *In every respect, except the racial one, Japan stands on par with the great governing*

> *nations of the world. But, however powerful Japan may eventually become, the white races will never be able to admit her equality.*[90]

Just as Indian nationalists had attempted to prove, by asserting Indian equality with Britons, the Japanese attempted to prove, in the racial equality clause, the necessity to change racial political thinking on a global scale. The problem, however, was that the European ruling powers were not yet ready to allow significant losses to their status as 'racial superiors.' British imperial policy continued to be dominated by this racial hierarchy in the years following World War One.

In Palestine the racial tensions after World War One continued much as they had in the years leading up to the war. British officials held negative stereotypes of both Jews and Arabs, and these informed policy construction and practice from 1917 onward. The most difficult obstacle facing Palestine, on the ground, was the growing division within the population. European political Zionists continued to migrate to the region, engendering dissatisfaction among the native populations (Jewish, Muslim, and Christian alike); simultaneously, Palestinians struggled to find a voice and a leadership which represented their own wishes for the future of the region.

As the Ilbert Bill was to the Kenyan question, the Balfour Declaration was to the achievement of Home Rule in India. Despite the Aga Khan's basic assertion that Europeans turned on Europeans in World War One while Indians fought loyally alongside the British, policy did not reflect the belief that political allegiance could overcome racial allegiance. The events surrounding the Ilbert Bill, the enfranchisement issue, and as it turns out the Balfour Declaration, all reinforced the tradition of patronage, racial hierarchy, and perceptions of the gendered dynamics of races. During the mid–twentieth century, these dynamics turned on the British Empire, in the form of the Mau Mau Rebellion and the Indian Independence movement. More broadly, the story of India's struggle against racial division is telling of other post–World War One imperial concerns. Churchill's loyalties to white settlers and Montagu's anti-racial stance paralleled the issues of Palestine's administration, hammered out as they were at the same time. The foundation for these events and the role racially determined policy would take appeared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

NOTES

1. Michael Paris, *Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850–2000* (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 85.
2. Ibid.
3. Frank Gwatkin-Ashtor, "Racial Discrimination and Immigration," The National Archives, London. 1921. As cited in: Paul Gordon Lauren, "First Principles of Racial Equality: History and the Politics and Diplomacy of Human Rights Provisions in the United Nations Charter," *Human Rights Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (February 1983): 4.

4. Pamela Pattynama, "Secrets and Danger: Interracial Sexuality in Louise Couperus's *The Hidden Force* and Dutch Colonial Culture around 1900," in *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism*, ed. Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1998), 99.
5. Ibid.
6. Benita Parry, *Delusions and Discoveries: India in the British Imagination, 1880–1930* (London: Verso, 1998), 104.
7. Ibid.
8. E. Knowlton, "Muscular Christianity," *The Overland Monthly* II (June 1869): 530.
9. Ibid., 533.
10. A medical textbook from 1901 notes the connection between corsets, particularly tightly laced corsets, and dyspeptic stomachs. See: Adolf Strümpell, *A Text-Book of Medicine for Students and Practitioners*, trans. Philip Coombs Knapp and Frederick C. Shattuck (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1901), 463.
11. Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto* (Chicago: Transaction, 1998), 71.
12. "Problem of the Alien—III: Morals and Manners of the Ghetto," *The Standard*, 27 January, 1911.
13. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), 149.
14. Paul Gilroy, *'There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack': The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), 45.
15. Chaim Chissin was a member of the Bilu Organization, a group founded in reaction to contemporary pogroms in Czarist Russia. Started in January 1882, Bilu was founded by Israel Belkind and several friends who acquired the means for establishing Jewish agricultural colonies in Palestine. Bilu members, like Chissin, planned to immigrate to and settle in Palestine. This endeavor was intended as a part of a larger renaissance for the world's Jewry. Chissin, a member of this organization, published an account of his experiences in Palestine between 1882 and 1887.
16. Chaim Chissin, *A Palestine Diary: Memoirs of a Bilu Pioneer, 1882–1887* (New York: Herzl Press, 1976), 92–3.
17. Aga Khan, "Dissertation on the Eastern Question," Montagu Papers, Cambridge, 7. The Aga Khan cultivated a place for himself in imperial political circles as the head of the Ismaili sect of Shi'a Islam and thus a significant population of Muslims throughout the Indian Ocean world, and specifically the British Empire. His "Dissertation" offered suggestions on how best the British Empire could deal with the future of Islamic places in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Subcontinent.
18. Aziza Khazzoom, "The Great Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma Management, and Ethnic Exclusion in Israel," *American Sociological Review* 68, no. 4 (August 2003): 482.
19. Even differences among sects were only rarely noted.
20. In an overly simplified reading of Max Weber's work on religion and capitalism, one can see the seeds of cultural and environmental superiority that distinguishes the Protestant societies of Western Europe and North America from the 'Oriental despots' of the Middle East. For further information see: Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904); Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, trans. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1921).
21. George L. Mosse, "Max Nordau, Liberalism and the New Jew," *Journal of Contemporary History* 27, no. 4 (October 1992): 566–7.

22. Heather Streets, *Martial Race: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857–1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 106.
23. David Hammerbeck, "Voltaire's *Mahomet*, the Persistence of Cultural Memory and Pre-Modern Orientalism," *Agora: An Online Graduate Journal* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 5.
24. Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: The Inferno*, trans. Allen Mandelbaum (New York: Bantam, 1982), 259.
25. Ibid., 384.
26. Philip Mansel, "The French Renaissance in Search of the Ottoman Empire," in *Re-Orienting the Renaissance*, ed. Gerald MacLean (London: Palgrave, 2005), 102.
27. Daniel J. Vitkus, ed. *Three Turk Plays from Early Modern England: Selimus, a Christian Turned Turk, and the Renegado* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 3.
28. Ibid.
29. Nancy Bisaha, *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 9.
30. Ibid., 51.
31. Ibid., 174.
32. Tim Fulford and Peter J. Kitson, *Romanticism and Colonialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3.
33. John M. Mackenzie, "Heroic Myths of Empire," in *Popular Imperialism and the Military*, ed. John M. Mackenzie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 113.
34. Ibid., 114.
35. Paul Auchterlonie, "From the Eastern Question to the Death of General Gordon: Representations of the Middle East in Victorian Periodical Press, 1876–1885," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 28, no. 1 (May 2001): 15.
36. Ibid.
37. Margaret Strobel, "Gender, Sex, and Empire," in *Islamic and European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order*, ed. Michael Adas (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 363.
38. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 206.
39. Alfred Mond, "Alfred Mond to David Lloyd George, 8 April, 1920," David Lloyd George Papers, London.
40. Gertrude Bell, *The Desert and the Sown* (London: Virago, 1985), i.
41. Evelyn Baring, "The Government of Subject Races," in *Political and Literary Essays 1908–1913* (London: MacMillan, 1913), 4–5.
42. John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 32.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Glubb's discussion of the racial distinctions and military prowess of Arabs, Egyptians, and Jews is found between pages 27–37.
46. Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country: The Story of Musa Alami* (London: John Murray, 1969), 60. Alami was a Jerusalem native, whose family was "one of the most ancient and influential families in the community, commanding wide allegiances in both the city and the countryside." (3)
47. T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 38.
48. T.E. Lawrence, *Revolt in the Desert* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1927), v.

49. Chissin claims that only the nomadic Bedouin are known as Arabs.
50. Chissin, 60.
51. Ibid., 93.
52. Ibid., 64.
53. Glubb, 29.
54. Ibid.
55. 'The Great Rebellion,' sometimes known as the 'Sepoy Rebellion,' took place in May 1857 as a reaction to the East Indian Company's growing cultural and economic insensitivity to native Indian populations. A series of military and civilian rebellions broke out mostly across northern India and challenged British power in the region. The direct result of the rebellion was the end of the East India Company's rule in India and the crowning of Queen Victoria Empress of India.
56. Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (London: Palgrave, 2002), 45.
57. Ibid., 45, 106.
58. P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 70.
59. Ibid., 62.
60. Ibid., 1.
61. "The Ilbert Bill in India," *The New York Times*, 27 December 1883.
62. Ibid.
63. The Ilbert Bill was finally accepted in 1884, but only with a compromise. Europeans having to be prosecuted by Indian judges could argue for at least half the jury being white.
64. Frederick Hamilton-Temple-Blackwood Dufferin, "Minute on British Policy in India by the Viceroy, November 1888," British Library, London. Dufferin's listed this rationale during a speech he delivered to the St. Andrews dinner in Calcutta, 30 November 1888. Although Dufferin does not distinguish between Hindus and Muslims in this speech, he does talk about the extremely small community of educated elite who would even have the potential for governmental leadership. Given the population ratios and the number of Islamic institutions versus Hindu ones, it can safely be assumed that Dufferin was speaking largely of Hindu leaders, although he must certainly have been considering the even smaller handful of Muslim leaders. Dufferin's 30 November speech can be found in: Frederick Hamilton-Temple-Blackwood Dufferin, *Speech at St. Andrew's Dinner, Calcutta, 30 November 1888*, *Speeches Delivered in India, 1884–8, By the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava* (London: John Murray, 1890).
65. Dufferin, Minute on British Policy in India by the Viceroy.
66. Arthur James Balfour, "A Note on Indian Reform, 14 August 1917 Cabinet: 214, Minute 11: Indian Reforms: Formula of the New Policy," Cambridge: Montagu Papers, 2.
67. Aga Khan, *India in Transition: A Study in Political Evolution* (London: Warner, 1918), 19.
68. Khalifatists preached a pseudo-pan-Islamic doctrine. They were Indo-Muslims who sought to re-establish the power of the Caliph (the spiritual leader of the Sunni Muslim community). The Khalifat Movement reached an apex in India in 1919.
69. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms sought gradually to introduce self-governing institutions to India, and by doing so pave the way for eventual Indian self-government. While Indian nationalists did not feel these reforms went far enough, imperialists feared they went too far. The argument that is important here, however, is the fact that if Indians could not be enfranchised in Africa, how could they ever achieve self-government at home?

70. The copy of this, which can be accessed in the India Office Records at the British Library, was sent to the wife of Humphrey Leggett, who passed it along to Sir Benjamin in a letter dated 1923.
71. Kenya Women's Committee, *The Woman's View Point* (London: British Library, c. 1923).
72. Kenya Indian Delegation, "Letter to Rt. Hon. Stanley Baldwin from the Kenya Delegates, 18 July 1923," British Library, London. The Kenyan Delegation included: M. A. Desai, A. M. Jeevanjee, Hooseinbhai S. Virjee, B. S. Varma, Yusuf Ali A. K. Jeevanjee, and Tayab Ali.
73. Kenya Women's Committee.
74. Vaughan Nash, "Vaughan Nash to Edwin Montagu, 2 April 1917," Montagu Papers, Cambridge.
75. Kenya Women's Committee.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Khan, *India in Transition*, 127.
79. Edwin Montagu, "Edwin Montagu to Winston Churchill, 31 January 1922," Montagu Papers, Cambridge, 4.
80. Ibid. 8.
81. Ibid. 10.
82. Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002), 306.
83. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 277.
84. See: Maryanne Rhett, "Emerging Empires: The Attempts to Create an Indian Empire in Africa and a Japanese Empire in the Pacific," in *Empires in the First World War*, ed. Richard Fogarty and Andrew Jarboe (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014).
85. The 'religious liberty clause' promised not to discriminate against any of the League and its jurisdiction on the basis of creed, religion, or belief.
86. MacMillan, 318.
87. "Says Japan Must Join as an Equal," *The New York Times*, 3 April 1919.
88. MacMillan, 318.
89. Kenya Indian Delegation. The Indian Delegation included the politically active members of the Indian Ocean community: M. A. Desai (leader in the East African National Congress), A. M. Jeevanjee (journalist), Hooseinbhai S. Virjee (Ismaili Businessman), B. S. Varma (Barrister), Yusuf Ali A. K. Jeevanjee, and Tayab Ali.
90. Gwatkin-Ashtor, as cited in: Lauren, 3–4. Emphasis added.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alighieri, Dante. *The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: The Inferno*. Translated by Allen Mandelbaum. New York: Bantam, 1982.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991.

Auchterlonie, Paul. "From the Eastern Question to the Death of General Gordon: Representations of the Middle East in Victorian Periodical Press, 1876–1885." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 28, no. 1 (May 2001): 5–24.

Balfour, Arthur James. "A Note on Indian Reform, 14 August 1917 Cabinet: 214, Minute 11: Indian Reforms: Formula of the New Policy," Montagu Papers: AS4/10/10. Cambridge: Trinity College Library.

Ballantyne, Tony. *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire*. London: Palgrave, 2002.
Baring, Evelyn. "The Government of Subject Races." In *Political and Literary Essays 1908–1913*, 3–53. London: MacMillan, 1913.
Bell, Gertrude. *The Desert and the Sown*. London: Virago, 1985.
Bisaha, Nancy. *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
Chissin, Chaim. *A Palestine Diary: Memoirs of a Bilu Pioneer, 1882–1887*. New York: Herzl Press, 1976.
Dufferin, Frederick Hamilton-Temple-Blackwood. "Minute on British Policy in India by the Viceroy, November 1888." India Office Records: L/P&J/3/86. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London.
———. "Speech at St. Andrew's Dinner, Calcutta, 30 November 1888." Speeches Delivered in India, 1884–8, by the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava. London: John Murray, 1890.
Fulford, Tim and Peter J. Kitson. *Romanticism and Colonialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Furlonge, Geoffrey. *Palestine Is My Country: The Story of Musa Alami*. London: John Murray, 1969.
Gilroy, Paul. *'There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack': The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991.
Glubb, John Bagot. *A Soldier with the Arabs*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957.
Gwatkin-Ashtor, Frank. "Racial Discrimination and Immigration." Foreign Office: FO 371/6684, The National Archives, London. 1921.
Hammerbeck, David. "Voltaire's *Mahomet*, the Persistence of Cultural Memory and Pre-Modern Orientalism." *Agora: An Online Graduate Journal* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 1–20.
Hardy, P. *The Muslims of British India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
"The Ilbert Bill in India." *The New York Times*. 27 December 1883.
Kenya Indian Delegation. "Letter to Rt. Hon. Stanley Baldwin from the Kenya Delegates, 18 July 1923." India Office Records: IOR/L/PO/1/6. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London.
Kenya Women's Committee. *The Woman's View Point*. India Office Records: IOR/L/PO/1/6. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London, c. 1923.
Khan, Aga. *India in Transition: A Study in Political Evolution*. London: Warner, 1918. Accessed 23 July 2015. https://archive.org/details/indiaintransitio00agakrich.
———. "Dissertation on the Eastern Question." Montagu Papers. Cambridge: Trinity College Library. Undated.
Khazzoom, Aziza. "The Great Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma Management, and Ethnic Exclusion in Israel." *American Sociological Review* 68, no. 4 (August 2003): 481–510.
Knowlton, E. "Muscular Christianity." *The Overland Monthly* II (June 1869): 530–33.
Lake, Marilyn and Henry Reynolds. *Drawing the Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Lauren, Paul Gordon. "First Principles of Racial Equality: History and the Politics and Diplomacy of Human Rights Provisions in the United Nations Charter." *Human Rights Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (February 1983): 1–26.
Lawrence, T.E. *Revolt in the Desert*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1927.
———. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*. New York: Anchor Books, 1991.

Mackenzie, John M. “Heroic Myths of Empire.” In *Popular Imperialism and the Military*, edited by John M. Mackenzie. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.
MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2002.
Mansel, Philip. “The French Renaissance in Search of the Ottoman Empire.” In *Re-Orienting the Renaissance*, edited by Gerald MacLean, 96–107. London: Palgrave, 2005.
Mond, Alfred. “Alfred Mond to David Lloyd George, 8 April 1920.” David Lloyd George Papers: F/37/1/5. Parliamentary Archives/House of Lords Records, London.
Montagu, Edwin. “Edwin Montagu to Winston Churchill, 31 January 1922.” Montagu Papers. Cambridge: Trinity College Library.
Mosse, George L. “Max Nordau, Liberalism and the New Jew.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 27, no. 4 (October 1992): 565–81.
Nash, Vaughan. “Vaughan Nash to Edwin Montagu, 2 April 1917.” Montagu Papers. Cambridge: Trinity College Library.
Paris, Michael. *Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850–2000*. London: Reaktion Books, 2000.
Parry, Benita. *Delusions and Discoveries: India in the British Imagination, 1880–1930*. London: Verso, 1998.
Pattynama, Pamela. “Secrets and Danger: Interracial Sexuality in Louise Couperus’s *the Hidden Force* and Dutch Colonial Culture around 1900.” In *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism*, edited by Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, 84–107. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1998.
“Problem of the Alien—III: Morals and Manners of the Ghetto.” *The Standard*. 27 January, 1911.
Rhett, Maryanne. “Emerging Empires: The Attempts to Create an Indian Empire in Africa and a Japanese Empire in the Pacific.” In *Empires in the First World War*, edited by Richard Fogarty and Andrew Jarboe, 49–73. London: I. B. Tauris, 2014.
Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
“Says Japan Must Join as an Equal.” *The New York Times*. 3 April 1919.
Streets, Heather. *Martial Race: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857–1914*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.
Strobel, Margaret. “Gender, Sex, and Empire.” In *Islamic and European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order*, edited by Michael Adas, 345–75. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993.
Strümpell, Adolf. *A Text-Book of Medicine for Students and Practitioners*. Translated by Philip Coombs Knapp and Frederick C. Shattuck. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1901.
Vitkus, Daniel J., ed. *Three Turk Plays from Early Modern England: Selimus, a Christian Turned Turk, and the Renegado*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Translated by Talcott Parson. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1904.
———. *Economy and Society*. Translated by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. New York: Bedminster Press, 1921.
Wirth, Louis. *The Ghetto*. Chicago: Transaction, 1998.

5 What Is a Nation?

On 4 October 1917, only days before the final wording of the Balfour Declaration and amid the various debates surrounding its wording, Arthur Balfour offered his anything but clear sense of Zionist ambition, and more broadly the definition of nation, nationality, and race. In the paragraph, race, nationality, and citizenship are used interchangeably. Balfour "saw nothing inconsistent between the establishment of a Jewish national focus [not homeland] in Palestine and the complete assimilation and absorption of Jews into the nationality of other countries."[1] Already Balfour muddies the waters through the conflation of terms. Nationality is not inherited if this is the case, but Balfour defines 'nation' by religion—"Jewish national focus"—*and* by political citizenship. Continuing, "Just as English emigrants to the United States became . . . American nationals, so, in the future, should a Jewish citizenship be established in Palestine, would Jews become either Englishmen, Americans, Germans, or Palestinians."[2] Here Balfour deemphasizes the religious nature of Judaism and Jewishness and links national citizenship to political/geographically accepted boundaries, while at the same time distinguishing a "Jewish citizenship" as equal to being a Palestinian national. The assumption built in here is that 'Jew' equals 'national' in the same way 'Englishman' equals 'English national.' And yet, Balfour not finished, he continued, "What was at the back of the Zionist movement was intense national consciousness held by certain members of the Jewish *race*. They regarded themselves as one of the great historic races of the world, whose original home was Palestine and these Jews had a passionate longing to regain once more this ancient national home."[3] Race and nation were interchangeable in the 1910s, but Balfour is unclearly articulating the vast complexity that 'nation' created. Irish, Indians, Japanese, and others, certainly saw themselves as members of 'ancient' and 'great' 'races', so what is the difference? Perhaps, how those with international power saw or defined them in turn.

As Balfour's insights indicate, 'nation' was a nebulous term, and as with many other terms used in the humanities and social sciences, the process of codifying and formalizing the definition of nation did not begin until the nineteenth century. Only the year before, Simon Dubnov attempted to elucidate a definition of nation noting that

> Nations can unite themselves—voluntarily or perforce—into States but not into political nations, because one human being can as much belong to two nations as he can have two mothers. The nation, the cultural-historical formation, is an interior union. A State is something exterior and regulative. In homogeneous State they both coincide, but in Nationalities' States there must be a line drawn between the nations.
>
> Therefore, the idea of a political nation can bring about much falsehood and confusion, unless we use it in the sense of distinguishing between a nation organized as a State and one claiming only communal-cultural autonomy.[4]

The communal-cultural autonomy Dubnov refers to mirrors what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz eventually called primordial nationalism.[5] Primordial nationalism focused on unity through ethnic features—religious, cultural, or linguistic unity—racial purity, or communal homogeneity and typically had geographic components. In the wake of the Scientific Revolution, and more importantly the Enlightenment, traditional governmental structures were challenged and national unity manipulated to meet new, 'modern,' and progressive dimensions. This modern sense is distinguished in Dubnov's "nation organized as a State." Although, in practice, the term 'nation' underwent reinvention throughout the course of the nineteenth century, the French Revolution, Greek independence, and Italian and German unification all questioned what qualified as a nation, it was not until the close of the century that Europeans began a concerted academic examination of the term.

The French scholar Ernest Renan (1823–1892) was one of the earliest and most well-known examiners of modern national definition. Renan's work was so important to the field of nation studies that he was cited throughout the World War One era by politicians and nationalists alike. As we have already seen, his opinions factored heavily into the questions this book explores. His engagement in questions of worldwide nationalist movements gave credence to nascent nationalist causes like those in Egypt or among Europe's political Zionists. While Renan's work can be, and should be, critiqued for its racialist overtones related to Arab and Muslim history, particularly as noted in Edward Said's *Orientalism*, Renan's contribution to the field remains a foundation upon which the study of nation and nationalism rests.[6]

Renan wrote several treatises on national definition and religious history, making him uniquely placed for a discussion of religious and political nationalist rhetoric. Aside from his work on the life of Jesus Christ[7], he took both an interest in the Jewish definition of nation and held an ongoing dialogue with noted Arab and Islamic nationalist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.[8] The generally accepted starting point for modern nation and nationalism studies was Renan's 1882 Sorbonne lecture "*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*" ("What is a nation?"). In this lecture, Renan dispelled common misconceptions of the

day and laid the groundwork for future scholarly examination of the topic. It is apparent that much of Renan's impetus for giving this particular lecture was due to current events, notably the consequences of politics in the French Third Republic, German and Italian unification, and the Franco-Prussian War. Significantly, Renan noted that religion, ethnicity, and geography were no longer the defining features of national structure because society's *enlightenment* had challenged and altered this need.[9]

Renan believed that two fundamentally flawed arguments misrepresented the true nature of nations. First, the basis for a national body did not lie in religious designation, linguistic determinants, or political confederations, e.g., Switzerland or the United States. Second, "a far graver mistake is made: Race is confused with nation and a sovereignty analogous to that of really existing people is attributed to ethnographic or, rather, linguistic groups."[10] Despite the practice of using 'race' and 'nation' interchangeably, which persisted well into the twentieth century, Renan's separation of the two concepts was a monumental attempt to shift the discussion into a 'modern' framework. Renan contended that a nation is defined by its *choice* to live together, under a united political structure—a relatively new phenomenon. In Egypt and China, he countered, "They were flocks led by a Son of the Sun or by a Son of Heaven. Neither in Egypt nor in China were there citizens as such."[11] Although citizenship in the state, a critical distinction between modern and pre-modern state structures, was central to Renan's definition of nation, he nonetheless asserted that it was not enough on its own to create the nation. In countries that Renan referred to as conglomerations, like Switzerland or the United States, although citizenship was a given, such an entity was not a nation.[12] Unable to break fully with primordialist conceptions of nation, Renan contrarily noted that France *is* a nation. As he observed:

> A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principal. . . . One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form.[13]

France constitutes an example of a nation because, according to Renan, it is a body spiritually and politically united by choice.

While Renan's work epitomized the great majority of nationalist scholarship between the 1880s and 1920s, and such definitions lay at the heart of some policy-makers' decisions in the post–World War One era, not everyone agreed with his assertions. Despite Renan's arguments against religiously, geographically, or linguistically based national constructs, a tension remained between primordial and modern definitions. As we have already seen, race and nation continued to be conflated, and while nationalist agendas typically espoused a modern tone, they relied on the unity-building symbols of gender, religion, place, and language to achieve the goals of statehood,

self-determination, and legitimization. The manipulation of modern Renanian logic, in combination with cultural symbols and heritage, defined the nationalist rhetoric of World War One–era nationalist movements. In each, pure modern nations do not exist except in their symbiotic relationship to the cultural or ethnic core principles, each built in its own way on an ancient cultural heritage or gendered set of definitions. None of the nations, which were created or manipulated over the course of the nineteenth century, were in fact wholly 'modern,' just as none were wholly 'primordial.' The most important outcome of this manipulated definition of nation, however, manifested in tensions and violent outcries when some groups' national construction was given global legitimacy and others were not, drawing into question what was a legitimate national claim.

Renan's place in the understanding of nation is also significant in terms of the questions with which this book is particularly concerned. Renan's philosophies underlay even how the British positioned themselves *vis à vis* their *own* national definition. H. A. L. Fisher, in a note to David Lloyd George in August 1917, cited Renan on the "necessity of a Franco-English Alliance." Fisher was referring to Renan's reflections on the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and his contentions that

> France is one of the conditions of England's prosperity. England, in accordance with the great law which wills that the most primitive race of a country, in the long run, takes precedent over all is becoming more Celtic and less Germanic. In the great struggle of races she [England] is with us [France], the alliance of France and England is centuries old. Let England consider the US, Constantinople, or India, but in the end she will see she needs France, a strong France.[14]

Renanian understandings of the world were embedded in the thinking of British imperialists and the world's elite as the Balfour Declaration emerged on the scene. This scholastic power not only sheds light on how diplomats and statesmen defined nation, but this particular insight noted by Fisher gives a hint to the hierarchical relationship of nations. France and England (Britain) were, according to this argument, more important to each other, than to other allies (the US) or even to constituent parts (India). Such a hierarchy, as we saw in the last chapter, kept the game of nations an exclusive club, which admitted only 'the chosen' to the inner circles.

It is through the machinations of national legitimacy that the international web connected with the Balfour Declaration became both larger and clearer. Gender and race are smaller variables, almost personal in size, but nation stretches the boundaries well beyond the person and even geographic containment. Despite Renan's admonition to unlink religion and nation, this is also true of religion. As race and nation were often conflated, so too were nation and religion, particularly in the cases emanating around the Balfour Declaration. What also became apparent, as World War One drew to a close,

was that while gender and race had fluidity, useful for maintaining imperial hegemony, they were also characteristics useful for redefining nation and helping to throw off imperial rule. Similarly, religious veils worked as a means of obscuring imperial control over nations *and* as a subversion of imperial hegemony in establishing nations. The crossroads of these questions/discussions became visible in Montagu's observation about the British government's approval of pan-Judaism and simultaneous denial of pan-Islamism.

RELIGION AND NATION: ZIONISM

At its core, the multifaceted belief structure of Zionism is nearly two thousand years old, but despite this age there is a disconnection between modern political Zionism and traditional religious Zionism. In terms of its modern political usage for the Israeli state-building efforts of the twentieth century, it is, first, modern and, second, rooted in nineteenth-century European history. Political Zionism appears against a backdrop of anti-Semitic violence, nationalist rhetoric, and social Darwinism. Religious Zionism, on the other hand, draws its heritage from the history of the Diaspora—the casting out of the Jews from Israel by Roman conquest in the early centuries of the Common Era. Since the destruction of the Temple, Judaic ritual and custom have focused on a return to Israel at the moment of their God's choosing. For years, and still today in conservative and orthodox services and prayers, this factors into the spiritual life of the Jewish community as a philosophical underpinning of the community, unifying the scattered peoples in their common desire to return 'home.' The emphasis placed on Return in religious Zionism was and is still useful to the propaganda campaign of the political Zionists. The popular imagination of large segments of the Jewish and Protestant Christian communities (see below) was well versed in religious Zionism, accepting the politicization of Zionism with a great deal of ease.

Traditional Zionism: Cultural, Economic, and Philanthropic

Religious, or cultural, Zionism is part of devout Judaism, and built on the understanding that their God will restore the Jews to Israel with the coming of their Messiah and the redemption of the world's people—a point Montagu himself noted in his opposition to political Zionism. Since messianic arrival is so inextricably linked to the restoration of the state of Israel, in religious Zionist terms, it is worth noting that the Jewish community has long desired the coming of the Messiah, and at various times throughout history their enthusiasm for the Messianic tradition has waxed and waned. From 1626 until 1676, for instance, such longing in Smyrna, Anatolia led to thousands of Jews following false hopes and prophecy.[15] Ironically, it is this same centrality of Palestine as the homeland of the Jewish people that split the Jewish community during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Despite religious Zionism's focus on divinely inspired Return, which remains the cultural centrepiece of the Orthodox world view, 'returning' to Palestine was actually put into practice over the centuries by Jewish communities in the Diaspora suffering from anti-Semitic attacks and the unequal distribution of rights. The Zionism that developed out of these circumstances—practical, cultural, or economic—was not particularly concerned with the creation of a political state, but rather in protecting and continuing the Jewish community. Since the expulsion from Israel, there has been a tendency toward violent and recurring anti-Semitic attacks on communities throughout much of Europe. Seeking relief from these experiences, Jewish communities sought refuge in more amiable regions. Not only did this tendency develop the traditional European stereotype of the 'Wandering Jew,' but it also set the stage for political Zionist desires and practices at the end of the nineteenth century. A move toward colonization was advocated by Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) in his 1896 work *Der Judenstaat* (*The Jewish State*), building on this historical background.

Broadly speaking, Jewish communities found a great deal of freedom, if not simply safety, in the Ottoman Empire following the re-conquest of Spain after 1492. These early communities of Jews returning to the region of Palestine, while not seeking a political homeland, actively maintained a spiritual centre. Over the centuries, Jews immigrated from the far reaches of the world to Palestine, typically motivated by economic, political, or cultural persecution in the lands from which they came. While entire communities could not usually escape *en masse*, smaller groups and individuals were able to break away. By the late 1800s, Jews immigrated in large numbers from Russia and Eastern Europe to North America, Western Europe, and the British dominions, where religious tolerance was more widely practiced. But it was the smaller, yet significant, numbers of Jews continuing to migrate to Palestine, who began to break down the distinctions between divine and human agency and put into motion the more coordinated efforts of nineteenth-century political Zionist colonists. These waves of immigration to Palestine, known as *aliyah*, marked the beginning of a shift in focus from cultural Zionism to political Zionism. Earlier aliyah (1880s and 1890s) were less state-oriented in ambition, whereas later aliyah (1910s and 1920s) were more so.

As the numbers of Jews immigrating to Palestine grew, Palestine's overall Jewish community found itself increasingly divided in two. The main cause of the difference was a conflicting agenda regarding Palestine's governance. On the one hand, political Zionist colonial efforts understood their movement to Palestine as the basis for the reestablishment of the *state* of Israel. On the other hand, a large portion of the immigrants were Orthodox Jews, who, while interested in preserving Jewish culture and heritage, found the idea of establishing a Jewish state without the aid of God heretical. Although still practicing a form of Zionism, the Orthodox communities were vehemently opposed to *political* Zionism and are thus usually referred to as non-Zionists.

A 1919 British government report on the region of Palestine and Syria noted that the Jewish population in Jerusalem was largely Orthodox in character and few were Zionists.[16] Most, in fact, were quite opposed to the political Zionist endeavor. This Orthodox community fell in step with the old *Yishuv*, the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, who traced their ancestry in the region back generations and even centuries. The old Yishuv was

> either devoted entirely to the religious life or dependent upon the religious devotees. This class of Jews produces no wealth, and depends on charity, being supported by contributions from Jews all over the world (the Halukah). It does not participate in the political life of the country or in the common work of organisation of the colonists.[17]

This form of Zionism, a variation of cultural or practical Zionism, did not intend on superseding Divine Will, but sought to protect Jewish culture and ease the earthly lives of Jews in countries where they lacked equal rights. The bridge connecting religious, cultural and political Zionism was economic Zionism, which, although not concerned with the creation of a restructured Jewish State, was chiefly concerned with the need "to ameliorate the pitiable conditions of Jews living in such countries as Russia and Roumania, without rights of citizenship and subject to all manner of oppression."[18] As with political Zionism, economic Zionism cared little for the more conservative or traditional religious overtones of the Jewish culture, but focused on the survival of the community more generally.

Late in the 1800s, political Zionism gained an ideological foothold among some of the world's Jewry, particularly by using religious rhetoric for political purposes, but Orthodox Jews became increasingly uncomfortable with this new direction. Political Zionism advocated the creation of a Jewish state, contradicting divine prophecy, which dictated that a Jewish return to Palestine could not "be brought about through ordinary human agencies,—not even through a Peace Conference,—but by God Himself."[19] In the eyes of the Orthodox community, side stepping the will of God was simply presumptuous, if not blasphemous.

It was not only the Orthodox community that found the political Zionist agenda problematic. Unlike the Orthodox tradition, which saw no separation between religion and nation, the Jewish Reform community took the modern, non-religious, nationalism of Renanian logic to heart. In Pennsylvania in 1869 and again in 1885, Reform synagogue protests manifested in a claim that the Jewish people are

> no longer a nation, but a religious community; and we therefore expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning a Jewish State.[20]

Similarly, there was strong denunciation from within Germany in 1845, when the rabbis at Frankfurt (15–28 July) eliminated from their ritual "the

prayers for the return to the land of our forefathers and for the restoration of the Jewish state."[21] According to a report compiled by the Board of Deputies of British Jews in about 1905, this sentiment also appeared in the weekly *Die Welt* in 1897 (repeated again in 1905).[22] In this series of articles, the author G. Karpeles states that Judaism was not a religion, but a "set of moral values, world views, and historical facts"[23] and that political Zionism was a false set of promises and hopes that worked counter to modern momentum in nation-state formation.

As we saw in Chapter 2, during the wording debate, this question about the role of the Jewish God in resurrecting the Israeli state versus earthly powers like the British factored into, at least, the Board of Deputies of British Jews' concerns and objections. Whilst assimilationist rhetoric advanced in states where Jews experienced relative equality and freedom, the nineteenth century was also an era of renewed anti-Semitism that came forcefully into contact with Enlightenment ideals of equality and citizenship. This clash manifested partly in an internal schism within the Jewish community marked by notions such as those advocated at the December 1898 conference of Reform Rabbis in Virginia, where assimilated communities declared themselves in opposition to the political Zionist movement. As one member stated, "America was the Jews' Jerusalem and Washington their Zion."[24] With the emancipated participation of Jews in countries like the United States, France, and Great Britain, patriotism, national affiliation, and political citizenship conflicted with older primordial definitions, which relied on rhetorical explanations based on religious ideology and ethnicity. Ironically, the same nationalist rhetoric used by groups like the Reform Rabbis also helped to usher in the creation of Greece, Belgium, Germany, and Italy during the 1800s. In turn, such national self-determination inspired political Zionism to a call for the colonization of Palestine in the name of Jewish political unity and ethnic/cultural communalism.

Political Zionism

The narrative of political Zionism typically begins in the 1880s as waves of *pogroms* (riots and massacres, in this case driven by anti-Semitic fervor) swept across the Russian Pale of Settlement. In 1881 and 1882, Jewish towns witnessed the destruction of businesses and homes as fears of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy were fueled in large part by governmental instability and the anti-Semitic scapegoating of the Russian aristocracy.[25] By 1905, this anti-Semitic rhetoric led to the publication of the fabricated *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, generally believed a product of the *Okhrana* (the Tsarist secret police).[26] The pogroms of the 1880s, coupled with similar anti-Semitic manifestations throughout France in the 1890s, Wales in 1910, and Leeds, England in early June 1917, initiated a series of events and organization-building efforts that created groups like the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and the Jewish Agency.

The use of Zionist rhetoric for political ends first appeared in the 1890s, when Viennese scholar Nathan Birnbaum (1864–1937) published *Die Nationale Wiedergeburt des Judischen Volkes in seinem Lande als Mittel zur Loesung der Judenfrage* ("The National Rebirth of the Jewish People in its Homeland as a Means of Solving the Jewish Question"). Jewish nationalism, manifested in this new political Zionist form, was the unique outgrowth of the events of the nineteenth century. Scholars have argued that Napoleon's emancipation of the Jews reawakened aspirations for a return to Palestine, but this new version of return was couched in the rhetoric that had aided Giuseppe Garibaldi in Italy and Lajos Kossuth in Hungary. This politically motivated idea of return was distinctly different from the form manifested in an Orthodox interpretation of Zionism. Unlike its spiritually defined counterpart, political Zionism was earthly and less esoteric, and related directly to ideological shifts across Victorian Europe.

The development of nationalist rhetoric was one of the most important catalysts in promoting the emergence of political Zionism. Prior to the development of political Zionism, "The thought of Israel's ultimate liberation was remote and found expression principally in prayer as a form of passive messianism."[27] In 1882, Leo Pinsker's publication of *Autoemanzipation* began a process of examining this traditional world view by asserting a new, proactive perspective focused more on the temporal here and now, and less on the spiritual, esoteric ever-after. In it, "he diagnosed a hereditary and incurable 'psychosis of anti Semitism' " and called for the creation of a Jewish homeland as the treatment.[28] Basing much of his idea of nation on the contemporary rhetoric of Renan, Pinsker suggested that although the Jews were certainly a people, they were not yet a nation. To become "that particular sort of human grouping they needed both common residence in the same territory . . . and a determination to live together."[29] For Pinsker, the world's Jewry was

> the shuttle-cock which the peoples tossed in turn to one another. The cruel game was equally amusing whether we were caught or thrown, and was enjoyed all the more as our national respect became more elastic and yielding in the hands of the peoples. Under such circumstances, how could there be any question of national self-determination, of a free, active development of our national force or of our native genius?[30]

If the Jews could be granted a place of their own, "but a little strip of land like that of the Serbians and Romanians," this would allow, he argued, the Jewish people the chance to regain their masculinity as a nation, thus challenging the non-Jewish world to "then prate about our lacking manly virtues!"[31] To achieve this aim the Jews had to regain their lost united political dimension.

By the 1890s, Jewish communities throughout much of Europe were primed for the action and development needed to carry out the goal of

establishing a modern Jewish state. In 1894, the opportunity for structuring this desire for action manifested itself in the trial of Alfred Dreyfus and the subsequent publication of *The Jews' State*. The outcomes related to the Dreyfus Affair were many. Not only did the Affair incite Emile Zola to publish the now-famous article "*J'accuse*", it also produced two distinct reactions among the Jewish populations of France, and Europe more generally. On the one hand, the case tested the limits of assimilation. For many British Jews, as an example, "the answer was still greater assimilation and patriotism."[32] On the other hand, political Zionists had even more impetus for intensifying their efforts to separate from what seemed to be an increasingly anti-Semitic Europe to re-establish themselves in communities of safety and cultural homogeneity. The Dreyfus Affair strained and reasserted many of the stereotypes about European Jews, forcing even those who had never questioned the policy of assimilation to reassess their individual definitions of self. How religion played into the individual's definition became an increasingly prominent component of daily European dialogue. Newspaper editorials, novels, and propaganda tested the limits of nation in terms of religious constraints. A growing uneasiness about the practicality of modern nationalism convinced many to rally around long-held cultural and religious symbols.

Jewish-Austrian journalist Theodor Herzl witnessed not only the mockery of justice evident in the French courtroom during Dreyfus trial, but also the backlash against France's significant Jewish population. Newspapers ran anti-Semitic headlines and cartoons, while posters and other material propaganda insisted on boycotts of Jewish businesses and even violence against Jewish persons.

Prompted by the work of Birnbaum and Pinsker, and the events in France, *The Jews' State, Der Judenstaat,* became *the* foundational treatise on the 'Jewish Question' and of political Zionist ideology. In the preface, Herzl argues that the idea of "the restoration of the Jewish State" is a very old one, but that recent outcries, political changes, and emerging ideologies "have awakened the slumbering idea."[33] Proponents of political Zionism made the claim that ever since the loss of the Temple, the world's Jewry had begun to wither. As Alain Dieckhoff notes, having been "wiped out politically, they had continued to subsist through the mind and had become true living dead."[34] A year after publishing *The Jews' State*, Herzl began a process of rehabilitating this political lethargy by creating the World Zionist Organization. In 1897, the WZO met for the first time in Basel, Switzerland to confer on the plight of the world's Jewry, and to discuss solutions to their problems. Herzl believed that in order to create a Jewish state, preferably in Palestine, which he prophetically declared would be achieved in the following fifty years, the WZO needed the assistance of one of the great powers.

Pragmatically, Herzl first looked to the Ottoman Empire, under which Palestine was then governed. He hoped to convince Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909) that the plight of the Jews in Europe was critical and that the

Sultan could gain infinite glory if he allowed the Jews to immigrate to Palestine. Indeed, a great thread of loyalty to the Ottoman government existed within the Jewish community. During World War One, Menahem Mendel Ussishkin—leader of the colonial organization *Hoveve Zion* (Lovers of Zion)—argued against the creation of a Jewish Legion fighting alongside the Allies, because "Jewry owed a historic debt of gratitude to Turkey for having provided a haven of refuge for the Jewish exiles from Spain during the era of the Spanish Inquisition."[35] That said, Herzl's supplications did not convince the Sultan, and by 1902 it was evident that Abdul Hamid would offer no such aid.

There were several reasons for Abdul Hamid's reluctance to aid the Zionists. The Sultan had become increasingly paranoid about the connections Jews had with Western states and how these connections could lead to his own political downfall. The Ottomans "did not want to increase the influence of the Great Powers over the affairs of the Empire" and a larger European-born Jewish population within the Empire's borders would only seem to encourage it.[36] Additionally, in 1896, when Herzl first requested the charter for Palestine from the Sultan, Abdul Hamid advised him "not to take another step in this matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me, but to my people. My people have won this empire by fighting for it with their blood and have fertilized it with their blood."[37] This sentiment went a long way in underscoring the general fear the Ottoman ruling elite had toward growing nationalist agitation across the Empire. The Balkans and Eastern Anatolia were already clamoring for greater national independence: Adding to this would make the task of maintaining Ottoman hegemony only more difficult.[38] Finally, as the 1919 report *Syria and Palestine* noted, the late 1800s had proven to be a strain on the relationship between the Ottoman Porte and the Jewish population, stating:

> The *Alliance israélite universelle*, of Paris, had introduced a first Hebrew colony to Palestine in 1870. British Jews followed suit in 1878. Four years later there was a veritable rush, as a result of pogroms in Russia and Rumania. With ten colonies already in existence, occupying some of the best land of the maritime lowlands, while Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias, and Safed had long had garrisons of fanatic Jews, the Porte put his foot down. In 1888 it informed the Powers that it would not admit another Hebrew colony into Palestine.[39]

By the first decade of the 1900s, therefore, Zionists realized they had to find other supporters among the Great Powers.

Herzl turned his attentions elsewhere. As is well documented, *fin de siècle* Europe existed in a tenuous balance of power and Herzl's argument that the unstable Turkish power could have been aided by "loans from rich Jews"[40] hinted at the ease with which that balance could shift. As a result, he surmised, "Zionist attention must be fastened on the Empire most concerned

by, and most likely to benefit from, that break-up, the British."[41] Political Zionism had found its goal, its adherents, and was now set to court its assistant.

RELIGION AND NATION: WHAT ROLE OF ISLAM?

At roughly the same time that Jewish nationalism began to manifest in the organized literature of political Zionism, the subcontinent's Indo-Muslim populations began examining their own constructions of nationhood. Weary of the uneven relationship they had with London, nationalism was a tool that countered the policies and practices of the British imperial administration. Similarly, Arab scholars like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani questioned the presupposed structure of nation in their calls for reborn Arab states. The nationalisms that manifested across the Indian and Arab world were not homogeneous; even within smaller segments of these societies, the call for national self-determination and national rights varied widely. Universally, however, all manifestations of nationalism across this region tested the fledging notions of modern nations and the practice of self-identification. Much as was the case with political Zionism, the variation and forms of nationalism across the Islamic world (for our purposes between the western border of modern-day Egypt and the eastern border of modern-day India) compounded the problems in calls for unity and at the same time reevaluated communal dimensions. Despite the problems geographic distance caused, two great strains of national sentiment appeared: The first was religious, specifically Islamic, and the second was more secular, more akin to the nationalism found in Europe.

Although there were sizable Christian and Hindu communities across this segment of the Islamic world, Christian nationalism in the Middle East did not manifest as religious nationalism, but instead tended to align with ideologies of secular, modern nationalism (the second strain). Likewise, at least in the late nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century, Hindus did not tend to unify around religiously based nationalism; these movements only began to make political headway in 1923, with the publication of V. D. Savarkar's *Hindutva* (*Who Is a Hindu?*). Thus, our first form of national ideology, one claiming unity through religion, focused on Islamic principles as alternatives to the European nation-state model. As with political Zionism, Islamism or pan-Islamism drew on religious unity for communal cohesion, but integrated components of modern nationalist rhetoric as viable alternatives to the European imperial process.

Given that Islamism thus did not speak to all members of the region (whether Muslim or not) several Arab and Indian nationalist movements used the principles of nineteenth-century nation-state ideology to create a framework upon which local cultural and geographic features could work to unify large communities under one banner. The earliest stage of these

nationalist movements was a period of supra-nationalism, which advocated 'Arab' or 'Indian' unity. In the case of Arab nationalism, this supra-structure was revisited and refined in the middle of the twentieth century by Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) in his pan-Arab movement, but in the late nineteenth century this superstructure was vague and never all-encompassing. This stage quickly gave way to smaller, more regionally defined nationalist movements. Just as Zionism was subdivided into religious, economic, and political manifestations, Indian and Arab nationalisms by the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century are best examined in terms of their smaller, more localized movements.

One of the most significant features of the scaling down of nation from a supra-regional level to more localized experiences was the fracturing caused by World War One. Instead of pan-Arab unity, Egyptian, Palestinian, or Syrian subsets developed in response to changing regional dynamics, most notably the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the legitimization of Zionist endeavor. While Egyptian nationalism is not generally connected with 'Arab' nationalism until the 1950s and 1960s, and Nasser's pan-Arab vision via the United Arab Republic, Egypt did play a significant role in 'Arab' nationalism of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, for two reasons. First, even though Arabic was not necessarily the only spoken or written language which could unify nationalist movements in this region, as most of the well-educated wrote and spoke in French, English, or German, Arabic language was nevertheless an underlying feature of nationalist rhetoric throughout the Egyptian-Levantine world. Secondly, there was a great deal of movement, particularly among the intelligentsia of the time, throughout Egypt and the Levant as well as the major cities of Europe. Thus, while Syrians and Palestinians saw themselves as distinctly separate from Egyptians, and vice versa, all groups also saw themselves as distinctly separate from Europeans and found unity, if only in terms of cultural mores, with their Arabic-speaking cousins. Similarly, in India, the variation across the subcontinent eventually led to the breaking away of Bengal and Pakistan, and to the subdivisions and tensions within India that have since contributed to language demonstrations, the Kashmir issue, and the religious divisions among Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims. In late nineteenth-century India, however, common anti-imperial cause, in particular, created unity. Nationalism, as a result, was tested and recast throughout the Arab and Indian world in the latter years of the 1800s through the 1920s, leaving unclear boundaries for where nations began and ended.

As this region fell almost entirely under a British sphere of influence (with notable exceptions to French and Russian interests), British imperialists anxiously watched the nationalist fracturing increasingly evident in the region. Pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism were in many ways easier for British policy-makers to deal with as the disenfranchised minorities could be used as imperial leverage, but with each minority or subset developing and unifying around a strong local, nationalist call, the British found themselves

facing all too familiar a scenario. Frequent allusions to the Irish problem appear in the archival record, and a fear that India or the Middle East would go through a process of 'Ulsterfication' helped define the ways in which policy was constructed as it regarded Indian self-government and Middle Eastern state formation.[42]

Fracturing nationalist causes were quite common across the Levant and India in the early part of the twentieth century, and for this reason only the forms which nationalism most prominently manifested here will be the focus of discussion for this chapter. In part this is done to help simplify the narrative of the Balfour Declaration and at the same time to reinforce the interconnected qualities of national movements across the Middle East and South Asia. These regions in particular are chosen as the focal point because they were both important hotbeds of nationalist agitation in the Islamic world during this era and they both were profoundly impacted by the production of the Balfour Declaration. Although it is specifically Palestinian nationalism that most directly comes into contact with the efforts of political Zionists, Palestinian nationalism was nebulous in the late nineteenth century. For this reason, we must take a wider view of the region around Palestine, incorporating Syrian, Lebanese, and Egyptian nationalist rhetoric into the narrative. The roots of what became the Palestinian national cause after World Wars One and Two began with the calls for total Arab unity and pan-Islamism in the Eastern end of the Mediterranean and across the subcontinent at the *fin de siècle*.

Arab Nationalism

The principal concerns for all nationalist movements in Egypt and the Levant rested on a desire to end occupation, be it British, French, or later, Zionist. Much as was the case with European Jews and Indians, however, no single universal Arab nationalism emerged at the close of World War One. In part Arab nationalism claims a heritage in the literature of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1837–1897), his disciple Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and Abduh's disciples Rashid Rida (1865–1935) and Huda Shaarawi (1879–1947), among many others. These Islamic intellectuals each, in their own way, advocated new, modern structures of Arab identity. Similarly, Arab nationalism was informed by the minority groups of Christians living throughout Greater Syria, who had their own loyalties and complaints.[43] The narrative woven by all concerned with Arab nationalism at the time is a depiction of nascent nationalism across the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

At the very heart of al-Afghani's and Abduh's works was the desire to prove that it was not necessary for a devout Muslim to throw off modernity. The reconciliation between religious obedience and independent human reasoning was not so wholly different from the conclusions drawn by eighteenth-century political theorists and philosophers like John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau,

and Thomas Paine. Indeed, al-Afghani used this argument to counter the xenophobic work of Renan and the attempts of the Indian Sayyid Ahmed Khan (see below) to disassociate religion from national definition. Nation was not a rigid set of structures that could be, or more importantly should be, transplanted across the globe, but the umbrella title of nation comprises a loosely linked confederation of concepts. Al-Afghani advocated a political revolution to bring modernism in line with Islam, creating a hybrid of European nationalism and traditional regional structures. His anti-imperial (particularly anti-British) rhetoric not only led him to chastise those he believed were kowtowing, as he insisted Khan was, but it also influenced the rise of resistance movements particularly in Egypt and the Levant in the coming decades. Connections to al-Afghani's philosophy can be drawn between events like the failed Urabi Revolt (1879–1882) and Sa'd Zaghul's (1919) attempts to speak on behalf of the Egyptian people before the delegates at the Paris Peace Conference.

The nationalism advocated by Egyptian activists was substantially different from that of Khilafatist Indians (see below). Egyptian nationalists, even those who still sought to incorporate Islam into a modern state structure, did not, in the early years of the twentieth century, advocate a united umma. If Egyptian rhetoric was at all supra-regional, it was pan-Arab, but even this is a stretch. The supra-regional nature of Egyptian ideals appears most notably in the framework it offered, which could be applied to other Arab nationalist movements in their own quests for independent states.

Outside of Egypt, Arab, or pan-Arab, nationalism found a voice among Greater Syria's elites. The history of Greater Syria's nationalist enterprise is even more contentious than Egypt's or India's. Initially based around the Ottoman imperial framework, the *millet* system, the earliest Levantine national manifestations focused on the unity that the millet offered. An Ottoman millet was a confessional division of populations (non-Islamic). Largely allowed to retain their own customs, laws, rites, language, and cultural hierarchy, the millet fostered a communal sense of unity among groups like the Maronite Catholics or Greek Orthodox. Conventional wisdom asserts that from the 1870s through the outbreak of World War One, Lebanese Christians (largely Maronites) turned to concepts of widespread Arab unity in their calls for national organization. This typical view of early Arab nationalism also asserts that these calls for organization were based on the already strong sense of communal cohesion brought on by millet structures. While it is generally accepted that nationalism did become more apparent in the region during this time, the crux of the debate hinges on the question, 'Who brought nationalism to the Arabs?' For decades it was widely asserted, and accepted, that nationalism came to these communities via Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and the subsequent European/American colonial educational structures established throughout the region. Given that the European/American educational pursuits were also themselves largely organized along confessional lines, this argument only helps to bolster the contention that it was the millet that founded the modern Arab national movement.

In 1920, in writing to Lord Curzon, Weizmann took up the question of Arab identity, drawing a clear distinction in his mind between the nationalism of Zionism and what was present in native circles. Weizmann notes that:

> In Palestine itself there are some clubs and circles, consisting chiefly of young men, in which nationalist ideas are preached and fostered. This nationalism is not free from a strong religious element, and the nationalist teachings assume often the form of hostility against the infidel. It would be difficult to ascribe the movement any great political value. There is no political organisation and no political leadership—the Arab families and tribes are much too divided among themselves and the jealousies between them much too pronounced. They are not welded together and do not form, at least at present, anything like a homogenous body. [44]

Much can be said of Weizmann's assertions. First, in labelling the groups of nationalists in Palestine as "clubs and circles," he indicates informality. This informality, and thus assumed lack of seriousness, is bolstered by his note that 'it would be difficult to ascribe any great political value' to these groups. Second, although Weizmann does not explicitly say Islam, although his use of 'infidel' implies it and thus erroneously ascribes to local nationalism a religiously Muslim flavour. C. Ernest Dawn remarks that "Among pre-1914 Syrian Arab nationalists, persons educated in Ottoman state schools (63 percent) were far more numerous than persons educated in either traditional or Western schools (20 percent and 17 percent, respectively)."[45] What is more, Christian nationalists do not necessarily outnumber non-Christians; although given the respective ratios of Christians to Muslims, they did play a disproportionate role. Weizmann in his letter to Curzon wields the power of an imperial force, determining who is and who is not a 'national.'

Laura Robson argues that, in the Orthodox Christian communities of Palestine, identity was structured by the history of Ottoman institutions, Christian religious and historical considerations, ethnic and cultural coherence, Western concepts of political rights and representation, and anti-imperial sentiment.[46] Additionally, Noah Haiduc-Dale asserts that the early mandatory administration of Palestine (early 1920s) was far more concerned with "dealing with issues relating to the Greek and Latin churches than with the nearly 90 percent Muslim majority."[47] The archival evidence that both Robson and Haiduc-Dale rely on suggests the importance of Christians in the formation of Arab national identity, but also skews the historiographic record. A great deal of the emphasis placed on Christian concerns is the outgrowth of British imperial politics. Internal Palestinian matters were heavily focused on Christian constituencies not only because the Christian component of Palestine's population was important to Palestine's future, but also because the British had to balance their activities in Palestine with the demand and

concerns of the larger Christian world. As a result, early twentieth-century Levantine national sentiment appears to be almost entirely dominated by Christian Palestinians.[48] Some of the most significant players in early Palestinian nationalism, e.g., Khalil Sakakini, Isa Bandak, Yacoub Farraj, Najib Nassar, Isa al-Isa, and perhaps most notably, George Antonius, all came from the active Greek Orthodox community therein.[49] What is more, the influence of the Christian community in shaping the course of Arab nationalism was aided by the fact that of the twenty-five newspapers in Palestine in 1908, nineteen were Christian-owned.[50]

One of the historiographic problems facing researchers of Arab-Israeli history is, as Rashid Khalidi observes, the question of "When did a significant proportion of Arab inhabitants of Palestine begin to think of themselves as Palestinians?"[51] We know that Arabs who spent time in Paris and London, like the Egyptian reformer Rifa'ah Rafi' al-Tahtawi (1801–1873), manipulated the European national concepts, like the French *patrie* (homeland), and Arabic terms like *watan* (similarly, nation or homeland), to create indigenous Arabic concepts of patriotism and national rhetoric.[52] Glenn Robinson observes that in Syria 'notable politics,' elites running the local political scene, gave way to contentions centred on emerging concepts of more localized forms of nationalism, and that in Palestine specifically this nationalism was heavily focused on anti-Ottomanism, anti-Zionism, and, by the 1930s, anti-British sentiment.[53] Mark Tessler adds that as early as 1904 groups like Palestinian-born Naguib Azoury's *La Ligue de la Patrie Arabe* had begun to advocate for pan-Arabism. In time, particularly in the post–World War eras, calls for universal Arab unity waned, and Palestinians, faced with British occupation and Zionist desires, drew on the prior scholarship of Arab nationalism to find a single voice as *Palestinians*. Khalidi's assertion that the formative years of Palestinian national identity coincided with the end of World War One and the establishment of the Mandate System is backed up by the on-the-ground realities as observed by the Director of the Arab Bureau, Kinahan Cornwallis, in 1918. According to his April dispatch to Edwin Montagu, "the Palestinians tend more and more to divorce themselves from the rest of Syria,"[54] a clear indication that they were, for political or cultural reasons, beginning to define themselves separately from their Greater Syrian cousins. This was due in part to the fact that Arab leaders with international power, like Prince Feisal (1883–1933), were less concerned about specific Palestinian issues and more about creating a pan-Arab state. Prior to the arrival of the Zionist Commission (also known as the Jewish Colonies Commission) to Palestine in 1918, a general sense of uncertainty and fear pervaded Palestine's native population. The Zionist Commission's aims in Palestine were to survey conditions and lay plans for the future based on its reading of the Declaration. According to historian Walter Laqueur, Chaim Weizmann and Edmund Allenby did not agree on the future of the region, and Zionists frequently complained about the military administration's insensitivity, even anti-Semitism.[55] Weizmann wrote

that the "messianic hopes which we had read into the Balfour Declaration suffered a perceptible diminution when we came into contact with the hard realities of G.H.Q."[56] Laqueur notes that while Allenby and Weizmann ultimately got along reasonably well, "the commander-in-chief probably never changed his basic view that there was no future for the Jews in Palestine."[57] The cool relations indicated by the two were emblematic of the general relationship between British officials and Zionists from then until the British handover of Palestine to the United Nations in 1947.

In April 1918, Cornwallis also noted that prior to Weizmann's meeting with Syrian and Palestinian officials, a general sense of dread permeated society; "fear that the Jews not only intended to assume the reins of Government in Palestine but also to expropriate or buy up during the war large tracts of land owned by Moslems and others, and gradually to force them from the country"[58] had an unsettling effect on Britain's native allies. Cornwallis further observed that "Everything possible was done by British Officers to allay these fears but here again an ignorance of the exact programme of the Zionists made this task . . . more difficult."[59] The Balfour Declaration left too much room for interpretation and this, coupled with continued war efforts, made defending the policy increasingly frustrating. During the meeting between Arab and Zionist officials, Cornwallis reported, Weizmann declared "that a Jewish Government would be fatal to his plans,"[60] but a cynic may ask why, if this was the case, did British officials find it so difficult to explain what was to happen in post-Declaration Palestine?

Historian A.J. Sherman argues that policy-makers dealing with Palestine assumed an ideal was achievable. Namely, Palestine would be improved by "an industrious, educated Jewish population grateful for British protection" and the improved economic "well-being of the region would reconcile its Muslim and Christian communities to Zionist aspirations."[61] This naïve idealism, Sherman goes on, was perpetuated by the belief that the 'natural authority' of British imperial structures would allow Palestine to "somehow fit into the large-scale Pax Britannica that was to be established throughout the Middle East and on into India."[62] The early confusion over the actual meaning of the Declaration, Arab frustrations and fears, and the impatience of Zionists eroded this sentiment on the ground in Palestine, while London officials continued to chant a mantra of 'stay the course.'

In 1919, Major J.N. Camp, Assistant Political Officer in Palestine, noted that the promises made to the Arabs, and the Arabs to the Zionists, during the meetings between Weizmann and Prince Feisal—codified in the 1919 Feisal-Weizmann Agreement—were less than practical. Camp observed that

> practically all Moslems and Christians of any importance in Palestine are anti-Zionists, and bitterly so. They openly or secretly support or sympathize with the societies in their anti-Zionist and anti-immigration talk and plans for action. In other words, if we mean to carry out any sort of Zionist policy we must do so with military force.[63]

The growing unrest Camp witnessed, he felt, led to two interconnected problems. First, the promises and vague plans for the future of Palestine were certain to spark turmoil throughout the Muslim world, and in turn the Government must prepare itself "for the propaganda that is certain to be made with regard to Jews taking possession of the Holy Places and the Holy Land."[64] Second, Weizmann's agreement with Feisal was "not worth the paper it is written on or the energy wasted in the conversation to make it."[65] Not only did Camp believe that the Zionists were being less than upfront about their intentions, but also that Feisal did not represent the wishes of the Palestinian locals and was not a useful negotiator on their behalf. To make matters more difficult, "the majority of British officials posted there [Palestine between 1918 and 1948] had no great sympathy for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, even if they could have explained what was meant by the phrase."[66] The frustration engendered by the vagueness of the Declaration even began to cause problems for pro-Zionist British officials in Palestine.

In May 1922, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel visited London to urge politicians to "offer an official interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, preferably one that would clarify British policy toward Jewish immigration in a manner acceptable to mainstream Arab opinion."[67] Samuel, who had been one of the staunchest advocates of the Zionist platform represents, to some degree, what Sir Michael Hogan (1908–1986) believed happened to most officials sent to Palestine: "everyone who came to Palestine came there to a certain degree pro-Jew, but after a time became essentially pro-Arab, and generally ended pro-British."[68] Notably, the fact that Samuel found he had to have the Balfour Declaration clarified further proved that a 'national home' was too vague a concept for the practical implementation of policy.

In 1920 Humphrey Bowman (1879–1965), Director of Education and a member of the Advisory Council for Palestine, expressed the general sense of frustrated obligation felt by British officials in Palestine:

> It is indeed difficult to see how we can keep our promises to the Jews by making the country a 'National Home,' without inflicting injury on 9/10ths of the population. . . . we have now got the onus of it on our shoulders, & have incurred odium from the Moslems & Christians, who are not appeased by vague promises that their interests will not be affected.[69]

Bowman was correct in his assessment of the Muslim-Christian sentiment. Before 1917 Palestinian Arabs were generally disorganized in their nationalist rhetoric, largely asserting Greater Syrian nationalism. After 1917, Palestinians began to distinguish themselves from other Arab communities, essentially for two reasons. First, the Arab leaders, like Feisal, who tried to speak on behalf of the Arabs, did so more in pan-Arab rather than Palestinian terms. Feisal was clearly more concerned with the fate of Damascus than

he was with that of Palestinian fellahin (peasants). Palestinian nationalists saw Feisal's agreements with Weizmann and diplomatic intrigues in Paris as a performance of their own region's sacrifice. Palestine, they believed, was sacrificed to secure Feisal's state in Damascus. Second, after 1917, as it was becoming clear that Palestinians needed to fend for themselves, Zionist colonization increased, providing a convenient rallying point for the general desire for Palestinian self-determination. Palestinian Arabs, however, were hampered in their efforts by two further issues: Racially driven British imperial policies continued to dictate what Arab abilities were and were not. Also, internal fracturing made achieving independence, in particular *Palestinian* independence, increasingly difficult.

The necessary unity required to make a strong national stand was long in coming, and it only really formed after World War Two. Even then, Palestinian nationalism remained mired in the pulls and demands of social, economic, religious, and political differentiations.

Another point of aggravation, which Bowman forgot to include, was the active anti-Zionist Jewish population in Palestine, also fighting to prevent the establishment of *any* Jewish state. This population, albeit small, only complicated the politics of Palestine more and further frustrated officials attempting to stabilize the region. Thus, within months of the Declaration's release, the divisions—ethnic, religious, political—which still plague Palestinian-Israeli politics today, were clearly emerging.

Much like their Indian counterparts, but perhaps more keenly aware of the physical results, Arab nationalists were incensed by the creation of the Balfour Declaration. For Arabs living in Palestine, the Declaration created a tangible set of questions about their own nature as a people. In the wording of the Declaration they are only referred to as "non-Jewish communities," negating their claim to definition by location or geographic heritage and questioning the legitimacy of leadership in the region by anyone not Jewish. Although the phrase "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" was purposefully added to the final draft of the Balfour Declaration to safeguard the rights of Palestinian Christians and Muslims, the phrase was intentionally vague.[70] Not only were Palestine's Christian and Muslim inhabitants denied definition as 'Palestinians,' the region's native Jewish anti-Zionist inhabitants were unwillingly grouped with their religious, if not ideological/cultural, cousins.

Nationalism in India

Farther to the East, and no less multifaceted, lay the questions of Indian nationalism. The understanding of Indian history after 1857 is nearly impossible without discussing the Great Rebellion of that year. Although the Rebellion had less to do with religion than with political and cultural oppression, the Mughal emperor's endorsement of the insurgents' cause

did little in the long run to improve a Muslim's status. The emperor Bahadur Shah II (1775–1862) may have had little choice in his approval, but the upshot was a distinct change in attitude on the part of British officials toward Indo-Muslims. As a result of the uprising, Muslims were thought to possess a "corporate political character, which in British eyes Muslims had not previously possessed."[71] The irony of this shifting Muslim imagery lay in the fact that as the Indo-Islamic population became increasingly politically marginalized and were forced to look elsewhere to incorporate, in order to regain political stability. One of the most obvious choices for gaining such leverage was union with other Islamic populations. Coupled with the loss of the promise of eventual Indian self-government, which the East India Trading Company represented to many Indians,[72] the British Crown's direct control over the country meant that all native inhabitants found themselves fighting for national legitimization against the world's largest imperial power. Broadly speaking, the contest for Indian national character manifested in a desire to be rid of British control. Within the Indo-Muslim community, several groups turned toward pan-Islamic unity, while others joined their ethnic, if not religious, cohort in calls for united Indian independence.

In the late 1800s, the first signs of pan-Islamism began to appear in the rhetoric of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan, the founder of Aligarh Muslim University.[73] Khan questioned the role of the Caliph, the traditional titular spiritual leader of Sunni Muslims, in the lives of Indian Muslims. At the time, the Caliph and the Ottoman Sultan were one and the same, but the Ottoman Empire was in obvious decline, even though World War One was several years away, and so the realistic power of the Caliph was widely critiqued and a cause for concern. Khan, a prominent member of elite Indo-Muslim circles, questioned the legitimacy of the Caliph, and asked if in fact the seat of the caliphate should be relocated to a better protected and more powerful place like India. Khan's direct criticism of the Caliph's power reinforced a growing tendency to question traditional power structures. According to Khan, "a ruler who could not in practice protect Muslims and enforce the mandates of the *shari'a* could not be considered *khalifa*."[74] Thus, as Sultan Abdul Hamid II had no effective power in British India, he could not and should not be the Caliph for Indian Muslims.

From this moment until the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the legitimacy and role of the Caliph became a real point of contention. In March 1920, a delegation from the Indian Khalifat movement met with Prime Minister David Lloyd George in London. Mahomet Ali (1878–1931), who had been in jail on and off throughout the 1910s because of his activities with the Khalifat movement, described Islam as "a moral code and a social policy. It recognises no lacerating and devitalizing distinctions between things spiritual and things temporal, between Church and State."[75] Still, in order to function as a viable entity and drawing on the concerns raised by Khan in earlier decades, Ali went on to note that "For the defense of the Faith, the Commander of the Faithful must always retain adequate territories, naval

and military forces, and financial resources, all of which can be summed up in the expression 'temporal power.' "[76] The Khalifat Movement's assertions about the nature of the Islamic populace and the Caliph himself were not without controversy.

Both within the Islamic *umma* (the worldwide Islamic community) and without, in the struggle to establish legitimate claims to national definitions, some British officials recognized the inherent contradiction which would arise from a legitimized Khalifat claim and their own obligations and desires as a world power. In a circa 1919 handbook on *The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate* published by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, the British government cited alternative Islamic sources that contradicted the Khalifat Movement's claims. In Haji Muhammad Ismail Khan's (1906) *A Short Note on the Khalifa,* he is cited as saying, "several Muhammadan thinkers [believe] the true Caliphate came to an end with the death of Ali, the fourth successor of the Prophet."[77] What is more, contrary to the beliefs of pan-Islamists like Mohamed Ali, Sayyid Ahmed Khan argued that "Indian Muslims [should] allow the British to define the terms and conditions of their political life," noting their military and technological prowess would be useful in bettering their lives.[78] Questioning native leadership in the Islamic community set in motion questions about outside leadership, e.g., British imperialists, as well. In the years leading up to World War One, the Indo-Muslim community was increasingly divided about the nature of governmental structure and national self. Khilafatists like Mohamed Ali, his brother Shaukat, and others like Muhammad Ali Jinnah, sought to strengthen Indian Muslim advantages and redefined the issue of the British in India in terms of outside versus internal control. Unlike Sayyid Ahmed Khan, these activists did not see the British imperial enterprise in benevolent terms, but as an obstacle to self-definition. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, in his 1884 article "The Materialists in India," derided Sayyid Ahmed Khan's appeasement of British wishes and flagrant denunciation of Islam as bowing to oppressors, not learning to defeat them at their own game.[79] The turn-of-the-century Indo-Islamic nationalists like Mohamed Ali picked up where al-Afghani left off, using unity against British rule as a foundation on which to build national definitions.

Tensions persisted within the Indo-Islamic community and the larger umma more broadly over what universally defined the nature of their community. As a result, debate among scholars as to what Islam's role was among Indian nationalists exists. On the one hand, pan-Islamism and the Khilafat movement meant to inspire Muslims across the Islamic world seeking a supra-national structure. Alternatively, scholars like Gail Minault have maintained that the intention was not a supra-national movement, but simply an Indian nationalist movement. To view the movement as supra-nationalist "assumes a monolithic Indo-Muslim response to the fate of the caliphate."[80] This assumption is "natural if one's resources are restricted to the statements made by the Khilafat movement's leaders, in English, to their British

rulers,"[81] but does not hold up in the actions undertaken by Hindu, Muslim, or other nationalist agitators during the era of World War One.

Beyond the crisis of definition plaguing those in the Islamic community, which advocated some form of pan-Islamism, others organized a campaign for Indian sovereignty around the philosophical underpinnings of modern nationalism. In 1918, just as the Great War came to an end, Annie Besant, Anglo-Indian advocate for the Indian national cause, argued for Home Rule using the terms of European Enlightenment philosophy, focusing on Natural Rights and noted that:

> As the Tudors established their power over an England temporarily exhausted by the Wars of the Roses, so did the Company establish its power over an India temporarily exhausted by the struggle between the Mahrattas and the Mughals. Such temporary exhaustion occurs in every Nation, and causes weariness and desire for repose. Yet the fierce outbreak of the Sepoy Rebellion showed that a large part of the Indian People resented the subjugation of their ancient land.[82]

Just as Besant placed Indian nationalism in the context of Victorian-era nationalism, so she placed this movement in a primordial context as well. She stated that English literature had given the national sentiment a framework that made communication across the Empire one language, but at the same time

> 'fundamental unity of India' is rooted in her ancient religion, which recognised Bharatavarsha as one; the thousand years of Islamic habitation have enriched Indian culture, and its result is wrought into the fibre of the Indian Nation. The Musalman is not a foreigner, but is bone of India's bone, flesh of her flesh.[83]

The Indian nation was a cultural heterodoxy, but one well versed in prevailing international policy and the definition of nation.

Indian poet, philosopher, and politician Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1939) is symbolic of the ever-changing nature of Indian nationalism. Although he began as an Indian nationalist, with modern definitions of an Indian nation-state, motivated by political independence and sub-continental unity, he eventually advocated Indo-Islamic nationalism, advocating a nation united through the same spiritual world view. Much as Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, argued in Egypt in the 1920s, Iqbal believed that Islam offered alternative models to European concepts.

Although Indian nationalism long pre-dated the 1885 creation of the Indian National Congress (INC), the INC was the first truly viable, modern Indian nationalist organ. In time, splits emerged in the INC, just as other nationalist movements refocused and shifted their goals to better represent their immediate constituencies. In the late 1800s and early years of the

twentieth century, the INC represented the majority of the subcontinent's populace yearning for an independent, self-regulated state.

Indian nationalism varied widely among its advocates, and as a result there was no one reaction to the Balfour Declaration, with regard to how it related to Indian aspirations. For the Khilafatists, Jerusalem was the third-most holy city and the first Ka'ba in Islam. As a result, it was argued that unquestioning leadership of the region should be granted to the Caliph, as the spiritual head of the Islamic (Sunni) world and that "The Arab States, namely Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, the Hejaz . . . may be constituted as independent States free from outside control."[84] Alternatively, Mahatma Gandhi once argued that "In no part of the world are one nationality and one religion synonymous terms."[85] With regard to Palestine specifically, and to the promises of the Balfour Declaration, in a 23 March 1921 *Young India* article, Mahatma Gandhi stated that "All I contend is that they [Zionists] cannot possess Palestine through a trick or moral breach. Palestine was not a stake in the war. The British Government could not dare have asked a single Muslim soldier to wrest control of Palestine from fellow-Muslims and give it to the Jews."[86] In *The Bombay Chronicle* he further noted that

> No canon, however, of ethics or war can possibly justify the gift by the Allies of Palestine to Jews. It would be a breach of implied faith with Indian Mussulmans in particular and the whole of India in general. Not an Indian soldier would have gone, if Britain on the eve of war had declared even the possibility of any such usurpation, and it is becoming clearer every day that if India is to remain a free partner in a future British Commonwealth, as distinguished from the Empire, the terms of the Khilafat have to be settled more in consultation with the spiritual leaders of Mussulmans than with the political leaders of Turkey.[87]

By December 1921, a *Times of India* article concerned with the Zionist scheme for Palestine made it clear that the Balfour Declaration was widely perceived of as a foolhardy policy that, if fulfilled, would only hurt British power in the Middle East and India.

> A correspondent draws our attention to the fact that in outlining the broad principles of a statement of Middle Eastern affairs which would secure that great desideratum, peace with and within Turkey, we took no account of the future Palestine. That omission was deliberate, because the future of Palestine is not worth considering; of all the absurd schemes which sprang from the turbid brains of British statesmen on the termination of the war, the "settlement" of Palestine was the most grotesque. Our position there as the Mandatory Power arises from what is called the "Balfour Declaration" of 1917 . . .
>
> Many people, in the fit of cold reason which has followed the glamour of victory are asking what that Declaration means. None has been

> able to suggest an answer. Least of all, we are convinced, could Mr. Balfour himself furnish an intelligible explanation of the logical application of the policy here outlined.[88]

The question of who has the right to control the land on which one lives played heavily into how the Balfour Declaration was interpreted.

Events in the Ottoman Empire were eagerly watched by most Indian nationalists as they signaled how Europeans might act with regard to their own country. In 1911, Mohamed Ali and his brother Shaukat Ali began publishing the English-language newspaper *Comrade* as a vehicle for their nationalist rhetoric. Historians have observed that *Comrade* was indispensable for helping to stir up support for pan-Islamic sentiment and that, although "The future of Turkey and of the Khilafat had been a matter of concern to Indian Muslims since the last quarter of the nineteenth century . . . pan-Islamism did not have much popularity till Mohamed Ali took up the cause in 1911–12."[89] Contrary to the arguments of scholars who deemphasize the supra-territoriality of Khilafatist sentiment, Mohamed Ali argued that "pan-Islamism is nothing more nor less than Islam itself, the supernational *Sangathan* of Muslims in five continents."[90] Between 1911 and 1915, Mohamed Ali, through *Comrade*, extolled the virtues of this theme of universal Islamic brotherhood, making his co-religionists aware of the conditions of Muslims in India and throughout the British Empire.

Indian Muslims were struck by three political blows between the fall of 1911 and the summer of 1912: the annulment of the partition of Bengal, the rejection of the right of Aligarh University to affiliate colleges all over India, and, most importantly in terms of global history, British non-involvement in Italy's invasion of Tripoli.[91] These events, Mohamed Ali argued, should have taught the Indian Muslim community that "it was futile to rely on anything else but their own God and the strength that He may choose to grant them."[92] From 1913 onward, "Mohamed Ali published accounts of alleged atrocities committed by the Balkan troops and their followers in the war with Turkey."[93] Despite his anti-British sentiment, Mohamed Ali was not ecstatic about the Turkish government either. Where he found a leader of the Muslim community in the Caliph, he found a despotic Turkish national in the Sultan. In a January 1911 issue of *Comrade*, Ali indicated that his dislike for the leaders of the Ottoman Empire hinged on their abandonment of Ottoman imperial identity in favor of Turkish imperial identity, which came at the expense of all nations within the imperial borders who were not Turks.[94] He further noted that this meant constitutional equality among Greeks, Jews, and Arabs was slipping away rapidly.[95] This fear, about the loss of constitutional equality in the Ottoman Empire, indicated a sophisticated understanding of national identity and national rights. Whereas Mohamed Ali was advocating Islamic unity, he was also advocating Indian independence.

By 1914, however, under internment and growing political pressure (not to mention financial constraints), circulation of the *Comrade* ceased.[96] Nevertheless, neither Mohamed Ali nor Shaukat Ali diminished their advocacy of Islamic and Indian rights. Mohamed Ali, who was interned regularly throughout World War One, became an important figure to the question of national definition in India, so much so that in November 1917, Montagu questioned the internment of "Mahomet Ali in India for Pan-Mohammedism when we encourage Pan-Judaism."[97] Informed, in part by the journalism of local Indians, Montagu and other leaders in India drew parallels between pan-Islamism and British imperial policy. The correspondence between Montagu, Viscount Chelmsford (Frederic John Napier Thesiger, First Viscount Chelmsford, 1868–1933), and Lord Ronaldshay (Laurence John Lumley Dundas, Second Marquess of Zetland, 1876–1971) indicate a great familiarity with local journalism. One outcome of this familiarity was a growing belief that the policies of the British Empire were having a disruptive impact on the relationship between it and the people of India.

British policy-makers, who feared the repercussions of a unified Islamic front against continued British imperial policy, took note of the linkages which Mohamed Ali overtly created in the *Comrade*. While in Egypt, en route to India, Montagu stated, with trepidation, the realities that might befall the United Kingdom if it chose not to retain a friendly relationship with the Muslim world. Egypt's ruling elite, he observed, was

> intimately connected with Turkey, particularly on the female side, and it is one of the greatest misfortunes that ever befell a Mahommendan Power like England to have fallen foul of the Turk. What a lot we have to pay for bad diplomacy.[98]

As the Aga Khan III noted in a letter to Montagu in 1919, the future of the Ottoman Empire, by then the 'Turkish Question,' was "indissolubly bound up with the Indian question."[99] Stanley Reed (1872–1969), editor of *The Times of India,* similarly wrote to Lord Lytton (Victor Alexander George Robert Bulwer-Lytton, 2nd Earl of Lytton, 1876–1947) in 1921 that

> For the last two and a half years I have been preaching, in India and in London, the doctrine that the real Indian issue is the question of the Khilafate. For the same period the Foreign Office has been pursuing a policy which not only exacerbates the Indian Moslem beyond bearing, but which is so unspeakably futile that it is a source of as much derision to the world.[100]

For journalists and statesmen alike, the futures of the Islamic Middle East and South Asia were intrinsically interconnected.

Mohamed Ali was concerned with the fighting in Anatolia and the apparent clash of civilizations between the Greek-represented Christian territory

and the Islamic Turkish lands. After *Comrade* fell out of print, these same issues continued to concern Indian nationalists. Although the nature of Jerusalem and its role in Islamic nationalism certainly played some part in the outcry against the Declaration, it was the vagueness with which the Declaration was written that was particularly vexing to the Indian populous.

If policy for such a small piece of land could be issued and acted on, what did this mean for India's hopes of Home Rule and self-government? Indeed, this concern lay at the heart of the racialist and bigoted policy pursued by some British politicians regarding issues throughout the Middle East and South Asia. While advocating Indian right to rule, Indian nationalists had to face the reality that an international hierarchy of civilization, as determined by the European powers, existed and played an important role in the game of national legitimization. Race, gender, and political bigotry were profound rationales for motivating Indians in the nationalist cause, no matter what ideological underpinnings they used. Indians, like their Arab neighbors, had the right to self-rule by virtue of their national definition, but policies like the Balfour Declaration questioned and undercut this.

Irish Nationalism

On the European continent these questions too took hold. Miriam Kingsberg rightly asserts that "At the outset of the twentieth century, Catholic Nationalists identified with the Zionists because they perceived certain similarities between the two self-determination movements."[101] Arguably, Irish nationalism took on a more religious tone at roughly the same time Zionists sought official support for a nation defined by Judaism and as Islamists advocated pan-Islam ideologies. This is not merely coincidental. Nationalism among peoples either under colonial occupation (e.g., the Irish or Indians) or seeking to establish an independent state (e.g., Zionists) purposefully used the rhetoric of modern nationalism (Renanian nationalism) and the symbols of primordial nations (i.e., religion and language) in creating their own definitions of nation. That Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam began to play significant roles in early twentieth-century nationalist movements is further testament to the power of a hybrid modern-primordial nationalist sentiment.

The 1916 Easter Rising marked a turning point in Irish nationalism, triggering a renaissance of myths, memories, and symbols which "spoke to an Irish national perception of the preceding Anglo-Irish and Protestant-Catholic relationships."[102] Much as other nationalist movements focused on 'golden age' imagery, post–Easter Rising Irish nationalism emphasized the restoration of a "mythical 'pre-English' golden age."[103] This restoration was endowed, as was Jewish nationalism, with an overtly religious tone. Republicanism became intrinsically linked to Catholicism.

Over time, the religious character of Irish nationalism developed a series of new rhetorical devices that emphasized a Celtic tradition as well as a 'chosen people' quality. Building on a long-held "belief that the Irish and

Jewish peoples shared a common ancestry,"[104] twentieth-century Irish nationalists were keenly interested in London's interpretation of Zionist rhetoric. Throughout the War and well into the 1920s, a pragmatic Montagu advocated a "simpler and shorter" statement seeking an end to the violence in Ireland without "a recapitulation of history, [as] the addition of qualifications are as dangerous as they are unnecessary."[105] Much as with his arguments about India and Palestine, Montagu believed eliminating romanticized historicity from nationalist discourse would be most useful in moving the Empire, as a whole, in a more modern and open direction.

Still, while Irish nationalists and political Zionists actively advocated national definitions with religious overtones, others, like Montagu, de-emphasized the religious nature of nationalism, and looked on Irish, Jewish, Indian, and Arab national movements as essentially political. Montagu, who had no real connections to Irish politics, nevertheless took every opportunity he could to offer his opinion on how things should be run. For instance, in 1921, when talks between the British Government and the Irish nationalists (including Eamon De Valera) reached a critical juncture, Montagu asserted that "Mr. De Valera ought to take the position of spokesman for all Ireland, both North and South."[106] While some Irish nationalists may have made distinctions between Northern and Southern Irishmen based on religious divisions, Montagu only once again proved that he did not see the need to politically solidify such divisions. For Montagu, and to a lesser extent other politicians in the Government of India, parallels between the Irish case and other nationalist movements across the Empire were abundantly clear. In December 1920, B.U. Basu of the India Office, wrote to Lloyd George encouraging him to appoint Lord Reading to the post of Viceroy of India. Basu noted that "Encouraged by the examples of Egypt and Ireland, Indian extremists are seeking to explore the path of separation from the Empire."[107] Similarly, Ireland and Palestine were not easily disentangled. Into the 1930s, De Valera was sharply aware of what transpired in the Middle East, having appointed Joseph Walshe Secretary of the Department of External Affairs in the Middle East to keep him informed on conditions in the Levant and Egypt.[108] Despite the desires of politicians like Lloyd George and Balfour to keep the Palestinian, Irish, and Indian cases separate, all nationalist movements learned from the successes and failures of one another.

Lloyd George and Balfour refused to view nationalist movements as essentially the same. In two particular documents this is most clearly evident. On the one hand, the pro-Zionist Balfour Declaration certainly asserted a Jewish national identity based on the rhetoric of Weizmann's Zionism. On the other hand, Balfour's (1913) *Nationality and Home Rule* denied a parallel sentiment among the Irish. According to Balfour, "we have not here to do with the ordinary case familiar enough in history of a down-trodden nationality. Ireland is neither robbed nor oppressed. It is not exploited in the interests of British financiers or of British taxpayers."[109] While Irish nationalists

certainly disagreed with this, Balfour, in attempting to break Irish national sentiment in its desire for independence from the United Kingdom, asserted that patriotic sentiment

> may be found in a real or supposed community of race, of language, of religion, of institutions, of culture. It may be due to geographical conditions; or it may be the offspring of common memories, or of common hopes, or of common interests. Only of this we may be sure, that whatever its real origin or justification, it will endeavour to draw nourishment from all sources, and will be especially apt to justify its existence by a version of history which at the best is one-sided, at the worst is purely mythical.[110]

Thus, Balfour argued that national affiliation, in the Irish case, could only be created via multiple angles. Drawn, as he suggests, from the well of patriotic sentiment, Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom's common community. Ireland, by virtue of its geographic proximity and long connections with England, Scotland, and Wales, is not a separate nation drawing on a 'one-sided' history, but a member of the united community of the British Isles. If Balfour had seen nationalist causes as essentially the same, this cosmopolitan view of what defined members of the United Kingdom detracted from the more simplistic national definition put forward by political Zionists, and vice versa.[111]

In the case of India, Montagu's observations on Ireland gave him fodder for challenging the "too wooden, too iron, too inelastic, too anti-diluvian" and "too rigid character of the statute-ridden Government of India."[112] During the period after Asquith left the government and before Montagu was appointed to the India Office, he retained his seat in Parliament and strongly voiced opposition and concern on matters of imperial import. Late in March 1917, he submitted his views on India to the War Cabinet. He remarked that India "had been very loyal, indeed surprisingly loyal, in the war and would expect to be rewarded."[113] Contending that the policy of ignoring Home Rule demands in Ireland was having disastrous outcomes, Montagu further asserted:

> that any attempt to buy off demands for political reform in India by economic concessions is doomed to certain and irretrievable failure. The history of Ireland ought to tell us that. However lavish you may be in the distribution of seed potatoes, the Irishman still wants Home Rule.[114]

Montagu's views were not revolutionary. Increased nationalist agitation in India had already made it abundantly clear that India was not going to remain loyal or content as a second-class member of the British Empire.

The global nature of the War, as well as the treaties and documents produced by it, such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, made the spoils of war a

heavy political and religio-political consideration in the ambitions of both Protestant and Catholic communities, just as with Jews and Muslims. In January 1918, Monsignor Arthur S. Barnes wrote to Sir Eric Drummond with his own version of how Palestine should really be handled. Barnes proposed that

> If only the Government have vision enough to understand, they have a magnificent chance. It need mean almost nothing—*practically* – to name the Holy Father, Protector of the Holy Places, he is so more or less already since they are mostly Catholic property—but the *sentimental* value would be enormous. Give the Jews the political rights if they want them. Give the Holy Father the Holy Places *at once*, reserving the existing rights of the Easterns so as not offend Russia and keep the Mahometans at the Mosque of Omar and at Hebron.[115]

The significant point in Barnes's proposal was that "the psychological effect would be great. It would show the whole world that the Irish and French-Canadian assertion that the British Government is anti-Catholic is untrue."[116] Fostering a vision among these regions that the British government was not anti-Catholic carried valuable political cache. Beyond French Canada and Ireland, the British relationship with Catholic France continued to be a burden to the British Cabinet, as suggested in H. A. L. Fisher's citation of Renan discussed at the outset of the chapter.

Amid World War One and its aftermath, Ireland and Quebec, both predominantly Catholic, proved to be continued nuisances to London. The year 1916 witnessed the Easter Rising in Dublin. Similarly, French Canadians joined the Canadian army at much lower rates than English-speaking Canadians. By 1917, the question of conscription was being raised in the Canadian government and as a result, for the first time, Quebec's parliament debated the idea of secession. In March 1918 anti-conscription demonstrations turned into riots, and the lack of initiative on the part of French-Canadian police to get involved in quelling the riots only further reinforced the rift which was growing between the French, largely Catholic, and English, largely Protestant, sectors of Canadian society. Once again, balancing the demands of different contingencies in creating a statement on Palestine meant that the British government should have taken into account a much wider array of interests, well beyond those of the Zionists and the Palestinians.

CONCLUSION

Over the course of the nineteenth century, nationalism played an important role in how individuals, groups, and whole regions defined themselves in terms of who was 'legitimate' and who was not. Even within communities

that first appear homogenous, like the European Jewish community, there was an internal fracturing which forced deeper consideration about what a nation is. On the eve of the World War One various national contingents were brought to the brink of a political and material crisis over the meaning of physical and ideological spaces. Clashes, apparent in gendered and racial terms, continued to spark controversy in nationalist and religious rhetoric. The role of the British Empire in the government of the lands they saw as their own, or lands which were traditionally in their sphere of influence, became hotly contested as nationalist sentiment strengthened and even occasionally turned into emergent, competing empires. Physical land became the testing ground for the power of national rhetoric and the legitimization of international policy structures.

NOTES

1. The Zionist Movement, 4 October 1917, The National Archives, London.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. Emphasis added.
4. "Notes on S. Dubnov on the Methodology of Jewish History (14 Feburary)," 1916, Board of Deputies of British Jews Papers: London, 9. Simon Dubnov was a Russian, born in 1860. His various scholarly pursuits led him to write works on the history of Hasidism, Jews in Russia and Poland, as well as a universal history of Jewry. He was killed by Nazi forces in December 1941. The author of the notes in the documents of the Board of Deputies (likely Lucien Wolf) notes, that: " 'Communal' must not be taken here in the narrower sense of 'local community', but in the larger sense of 'society', or 'people'."
5. For further information see: Clifford Geertz, "Primordial and Civic Ties," in *Nationalism*, ed. Anthony D. Smith and John Hutchinson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
6. Renan spent time in Syria doing research for his work on Jesus and that, coupled with the widely held racist beliefs of nineteenth-century Europe, led him to consider Islam hostile to science and 'civilization,' and that since "Islam is the most complete negation of Europe,", war should be waged upon it "until the last son of Ishmael shall have died of misery, or shall have been relegated by terror to the depths of the desert." Francis Espinasse, *The Life of Ernest Renan* (London: Walter Scott, Limited, 1895), 95–96. Also see: Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).
7. Ernest Renan, *The Life of Jesus Christ*, trans. Charles Edwin Wilbour (New York: Carleton, 1864).
8. The exchange of letters following Renan's 29 March 1883 lecture at the Sorbonne entitled "Islam and Science" is contained in the 18 May 1883 Parisian *Journal des Debats*. Although al-Afghani disputed Renan for what he saw as a racist attack on the Arab/Islamic world, the two actually saw eye to eye on a number of issues, including the nature of religious clerical hierarchies in holding back scientific and technological progress. Indeed, Renan is noted as having said that al-Afghani was a fellow nationalist. For more see: Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, " 'Exchange with Ernest Renan' in Journal Des Debats (Paris) 18 May 1883," in *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 87.

9. For further information see: Ernest Renan, "What Is a Nation?," in *Becoming National*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
10. Ibid., 42.
11. Ibid., 43.
12. Ibid., 46.
13. Ibid., 52.
14. Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher, "H. A. L. Fisher to David Lloyd George, 28 August 1917," David Lloyd George Papers, London. Citing: Ernest Renan, "La Guerre Entre La France Et L'allemagne," *Revue des Deux Mondes* 89, no. 277 (1870).
15. Yacov M. Rabkin, *A Threat from Within: A Century of Jewish Opposition to Zionism* (Black Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2006), 22. According to Rabkin, the story of Sabbatai Tzevi, the false messiah turned Muslim, served as a cautionary tale of not being too quick to act upon messianic aspirations from Jewish communities throughout Europe and the Levant.
16. It is important to note that Jerusalem remained the focal point of Zionist efforts, despite the number of Jews living in other urban centres like Jaffa. Jerusalem, being the spiritual centre of Judaism, Christianity, and in some ways Islam, was one of the biggest points of contention in post-Balfour Palestine. What populations in Jerusalem believed or advocated carried far greater weight in policy-making than did opinions from Jaffa, Haifa, or Hebron.
17. *Syria and Palestine,* British Library, London, 1919, 60.
18. Morris Jastrow, *Zionism and the Future of Palestine: The Fallacies and Dangers of Political Zionism* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1919), 4.
19. Ibid., 3.
20. Reform Synagogue Protests, c. 1905, Board of Deputies of British Jews Papers: London, 1–2.
21. Ibid., 1.
22. *Die Welt* was founded in 1897 by Theodor Herzl as the organ for the Zionist movement. The modern day German newspaper *Die Welt,* began circulation in 1946.
23. The document reads: "*stittiche Weltanschauung und geschichtliche Thatsache*" which appears to have several misspellings, but roughly translates as above.
24. Reform Synagogue Protests, 3.
25. "Correspondence Respecting the Outrages on Jews in Russia, 1881–1882," The National Archives: London. 16 May and 23 May 1881.
26. A great deal has been written on the topic of *The Protocols*, but perhaps the most easily accessible examination of its history is offered in Will Eisner's 2005 graphic novel which best, and most concisely, depicts the development, publication, and subsequent outgrowth of the anti-Semitic propaganda piece. Will Eisner, *The Plot: The Secret Story of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005).
27. Elias Gilner, *War and Hope: A History of the Jewish Legion* (New York: Herzl Press, 1969), 9.
28. Alain Dieckhoff, *The Invention of a Nation: Zionist Thought and the Making of Modern Israel* (London: Hurst & Company, 2003), 24.
29. Ibid.
30. Leo Pinsker, "Auto-Emancipation: An Appeal to His People by a Russian Jew," accessed 21 April 2006. http://www.mideastweb.org/autoemancipation.htm.
31. Ibid.

32. Severin Adam Hochberg, "The Jewish Community and the Aliens Question in Great Britain 1881–1917" (Dissertation, New York University, 1989), 15.
33. Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State*, trans. Sylvie d'Avigdor (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1988), 69.
34. Dieckhoff, 24.
35. Gilner, 83.
36. Mim Kemal Oke, "The Ottoman Empire, Zionism, and the Question of Palestine," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14, no. 3 (August 1982): 332.
37. Ibid. 330.
38. Ibid. 331.
39. *Syria and Palestine*, 44.
40. Frank Hardie and Irwin Herrman, *Britain and Zion: The Fateful Entanglement* (London: Billing & Sons, Ltd., 1980), 5.
41. Ibid.
42. The term 'Ulsterfication' was used by a member of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, but comments connecting Irish issues to what was happening in India appear throughout Cabinet meeting and official correspondence.
43. I use the term 'Greater Syria' here as a catch-all for what have since become Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. This geographical designation was a common one at the end of the nineteenth century, although a split in European thinking about whether Palestine was in fact part of this region or not was beginning to make headway.
44. Chaim Weizmann, "Chaim Weizmann to Lord Curzon, 2 February 1920," British Library, London.
45. C. Ernest Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 4.
46. Laura Robson, "Demanding a Voice: Christian Palestinians in the Greek Orthodox Church and the British Mandate " (paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association 2007 Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada, 18 November, 2007), 1. Also see: Laura Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011).
47. Noah Haiduc-Dale, "The Influence of Foreign Clergy on Palestinian Christian Political Participation During the British Mandate" (paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association 2007 Annual Conference, Montreal, Canada, 18 November, 2007), 2. Also see: Noah Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism, 1917–1948* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013).
48. The 1922 Palestine census, which included the population of Trans-Jordan, found that Christians made up only 9.6 percent of the total population. "Report on Palestine Administration, 31 December, 1922," United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine. Of that population, Robson asserts, the Greek Orthodox reached 45.7 percent, the largest sub-category. Robson, "Demanding a Voice: Christian Palestinians in the Greek Orthodox Church and the British Mandate,"(2).
49. Haiduc-Dale, "The Influence of Foreign . . .", 4. Khalil Sakakini (1878–1953), author and founder of the Dusturiyyah school; Isa Bandak and Isa al-Isa (1878–1950) were both journalists, al-Isa a co-founder of *Filastin*; Yacoub Farraj was Vice President of the Arab Executive (during the Mandate period); Najib Nassar was the publisher of *al-Karmel*; George Antonius (1891–1941), politician and author of *The Arab Awakening*—George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946).

50. Robson, "Demanding a Voice . . .," 9.
51. Rashid Khalidi, "The Formation of Palestinian Identity: The Critical Years, 1917–1923," in *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*, ed. James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 171.
52. Dawn, 4.
53. Glenn E. Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 5.
54. Kinahan Cornwallis, "Major Kinahan Cornwallis to Edwin Montagu, 10 April 1918," British Library, London.
55. This attitude is noted by several authors dealing with Palestine at the end of the World War One, including, but not limited to, Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972); Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002); Jehuda Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Charles Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Fifth ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2004); Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). Additionally both Chaim Weizmann and Vladimir Jabotinsky note the relationship between the military administration and the Zionists working in Palestine.
56. Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann* Vol. One (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1949), 218.
57. Laqueur, 449.
58. Cornwallis.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. A.J. Sherman, *Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine 1918–1948* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1997), 14.
62. Ibid., 15.
63. J.N. Camp, "Report on Palestinian-Zionist Relations, 1919," British Library, London.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid. As it turns out Camp's assessment was correct. Weizmann ultimately backed out of the agreement, as psychologist Baylis Thomas notes, because Feisal wanted to ally with the Zionists against the French who sought control over Syria. Since Weizmann was not interested in alienating British backing at the expense of a French Syria, the Agreement fell through within months. See: Baylis Thomas, *How Israel Was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Lanham, MD Lexington Books, 1999), 14.
66. Sherman, 27.
67. Tessler, 173.
68. Sir Michael Hogan was the Chief Magistrate for Palestine in 1936. Sherman, 30.
69. Humphrey Bowman, *Diary*. As cited in: Sherman, 54.
70. The Zionist Movement, 31 October 1917, The National Archives, London.
71. P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 62.
72. Francis G. Hutchins, *The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 87.
73. Aligarh Muslim University was founded in 1875 as the Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental College; the name was changed in 1920.
74. Hardy, 178.

75. "Minutes of Proceedings at a Deputation from the Indian Khilafat Delegation to the Prime Minister, at 10, Downing Street, 19 March 1920," Montagu Papers: Cambridge.
76. Ibid.
77. "The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate—the Pan-Islamic Movement," British Library, London. January 1919, 45.
78. Hardy, 179.
79. Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, " 'The Materialists in India' in *Al-'Urwa Al-Wuthqa* (Cairo) 28 August 1884," in *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 87.
80. Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 2.
81. Ibid.
82. Annie Besant, *A Nation's Rights*, *New India Political Pamphlets* (Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1918), 6.
83. Ibid., 6–7.
84. *Report of Deputation to the Prime Minister from Representatives of the Mohammedans of India* (David Lloyd George Papers, London, 24 March 1921).
85. Gideon Shimoni, *Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Jews: A Formative Factor in India's Policy Towards Israel*, vol. 22, *Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1977), 21.
86. M.K. Gandhi, "The Khilafat," *Young India*, 23 March, 1921. As found in: M.K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Vol. 22: 15 November, 1920–5 April, 1921.* (New Delhi: Publications, Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958–1994).
87. M.K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. 22: 23 November, 1920–5 April, 1921 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958–1994), 429. The entire *Collected Works* can now be found online at: "Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Online," GandhiServe Foundation: Mahatma Gandhi Research and Media Service. accessed 18 January 2008. http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/cwmg.html.
88. Stanley Reed, *Times of India*, 6 December, 1921.
89. Aparna Basu, "Mohamed Ali in Delhi: The *Comrade* Phase, 1912–1915," in *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, ed. Mushirul Hasan (New Delhi: Manohar, 1981), 112.
90. Ibid. According to G.R. Thursby, 'Sangathan' meant the acquisition of strength through consolidation of communal resources" (158) and in this sense a logical corollary to the Islamic umma. However, Thursby goes on to note that with the immergence of the 1920s Sangathan Movement "the word became the foremost rallying-cry of those Hindus who believed themselves to be lagging behind Muslims in mobilizing and militancy" (158). G.R. Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: A Study of Controversy, Conflict, and Communal Movements in Northern India 1923–1928* (Leiden: J. Brill, 1975).
91. Basu, 113–14.
92. Ibid., 114.
93. Ibid., 116.
94. Mohamed Ali, "Selections: The Political Situation in Turkey," *Comrade*, 21 January, 1911, 3.
95. Ibid.
96. In 1911 the two also began publishing an Urdu weekly, *Hamdard*. The two newspapers had a combined circulation of well over 10,000 not long after they began. *Comrade* was revived for a short while in the 1920s, but it never regained its once-prominent position.

97. Edwin Montagu, *India Diary* (Montagu Papers: Trinity College, Cambridge, 1917–1918), 87.
98. Ibid., 21–22.
99. Aga Khan, "The Aga Khan to Edwin Montagu, 12 June 1919," Montagu Papers: Cambridge.
100. Stanley Reed, "Stanley Reed to Lord Lytton, 9 December 1921," Montagu Papers: Cambridge.
101. Miriam Kingsberg, "'The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend': Twentieth Century Irish Catholic Nationalist and Protestant Unionist Perceptions of Zionism" (Senior Thesis, Brandeis University, 2003), 130.
102. Jonathan Githens-Mazer, "Myths of Massacre and Nationalist Mobilisation: Ireland and Algeria in Comparative Perspective," in *Ireland and the Middle East: Trade, Society and Peace*, ed. Rory Miller (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 57.
103. Ibid.
104. Kingsberg, 18.
105. Edwin Montagu, "Edwin Montagu to David Lloyd George, 4 April, 1921," David Lloyd George Papers, London.
106. Edwin Montagu, "Edwin Montagu to David Lloyd George, 30 June 1921," David Lloyd George Papers, London.
107. B.U. Basu, "B.U. Basu to David Lloyd George, 3 December 1920," David Lloyd George Papers, London.
108. Michael Kennedy, "'A Voyage of Exploration': Irish Diplomatic Perspectives on Egypt, Sudan and Palestine in the Inter-War Years," in *Ireland and the Middle East: Trade, Society and Peace*, ed. Rory Miller (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 7–8.
109. Arthur James Balfour, *Nationality and Home Rule* (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1913), 7–8.
110. Ibid., 11.
111. It is also interesting to note, but of only peripheral importance here, that one argument put forward by Balfour is that if Ireland were to be allowed to become independent, with or without Ulster, not only would this enrage Australia and Canada, but that such a severing of part of the Kingdom would be as if the American South had gained its cession from the United States in the 1860s.
112. S.D. Waley, *Edwin Montagu: A Memoir and an Account of His Visits to India* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 127.
113. Ibid., 118.
114. Edwin Montagu, "Edwin Montagu to Maurice Hankey, 31 March 1917," Montagu Papers: Cambridge, 4.
115. Arthur S. Barnes, "Monsignor Arthur S. Barnes to Sir Eric Drummond, 9 January 1918," David Lloyd George Papers, London.
116. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din. "'Exchange with Ernest Renan' in Journal Des Debats (Paris) 18 May 1883." In *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, edited by Nikki R. Keddie, 175–87. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

———. "'The Materialists in India' in *Al-'Urwa Al-Wuthqa* (Cairo) 28 August 1884." In *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, edited by Nikki R. Keddie, 175–87. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Ali, Mohamed. “Selections: The Political Situation in Turkey.” *Comrade*. 21 January 1911.

Antonius, George. *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1946.

Balfour, Arthur James. *Nationality and Home Rule*. London: Longmans, Green, 1913.

Barnes, Arthur S. “Monsignor Arthur S. Barnes to Sir Eric Drummond, 9 January 1918.” David Lloyd George Papers: F/60/2/40. House of Lords Records/Parliamentary Archives, London.

Basu, Aparna. “Mohamed Ali in Delhi: The *Comrade* Phase, 1912–1915.” In *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, edited by Mushirul Hasan, 109–25. New Delhi: Manohar, 1981.

Basu, B.U. “B.U. Basu to David Lloyd George, 3 December 1920.” David Lloyd George Papers: F/40/3/35. House of Lords Records/Parliamentary Archives, London.

Besant, Annie. *A Nation’s Rights*. New India Political Pamphlets. Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1918.

Bowman, Humphrey. *Diary*. Humphrey Bowman Collection: GB165–0034, Box 3B (f). St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Oxford.

Camp, J.N. “Report on Palestinian-Zionist Relations.” India Office Records: IOR/L/PS/11/158 (p. 6729) Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London, 1919.

“Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Online.” GandhiServe Foundation: Mahatma Gandhi Research and Media Service. Accessed 18 January 2008. http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/cwmg.html.

Cornwallis, Kinahan. “Major Kinahan Cornwallis to Edwin Montagu, 10 April 1918.” India Office Records: IOR/L/PS/11/135 2163. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London.

“Correspondence Respecting the Outrages on Jews in Russia, 1881–1882.” Foreign Office: FO 881/4673. The National Archives, London.

Dawn, C. Ernest. “The Origins of Arab Nationalism.” In *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, edited by Rashid Khalidi, 3–31. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

Dieckhoff, Alain. *The Invention of a Nation: Zionist Thought and the Making of Modern Israel*. London: Hurst & Company, 2003.

Eisner, Will. *The Plot: The Secret Story of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005.

Espinasse, Francis. *The Life of Ernest Renan*. London: Walter Scott, 1895.

Fisher, Herbert Albert Laurens. “H.A.L. Fisher to David Lloyd George, 28 August 1917.” David Lloyd George Papers: F/16/7/10. House of Lords Records/Parliamentary Archives, London.

Gandhi, M.K. “The Khilafat.” *Young India*. 23 March, 1921.

———. *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*. Vol. 22: 23 November, 1920–5 April, 1921. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958–1994.

———. *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Vol. 22: 15 November, 1920–5 April, 1921*. New Delhi: Publications, Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958–1994.

Geertz, Clifford. “Primordial and Civic Ties.” In *Nationalism*, edited by Anthony D. Smith and John Hutchinson, 29–34. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Gilner, Elias. *War and Hope: A History of the Jewish Legion*. New York: Herzl Press, 1969.

Githens-Mazer, Jonathan. "Myths of Massacre and Nationalist Mobilisation: Ireland and Algeria in Comparative Perspective." In *Ireland and the Middle East: Trade, Society and Peace*, edited by Rory Miller, 56–69. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007.

Haiduc-Dale, Noah, *Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism, 1917–1948*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013.

————. "The Influence of Foreign Clergy on Palestinian Christian Political Participation During the British Mandate." Middle East Studies Association 2007 Annual Conference, Montreal, Canada, 18 November, 2007.

Hardie, Frank and Irwin Herrman. *Britain and Zion: The Fateful Entanglement*. London: Billing & Sons, 1980.

Hardy, P. *The Muslims of British India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Herzl, Theodor. *The Jewish State*. Translated by Sylvie d'Avigdor. Mineola, NY: Dover, 1988.

Hochberg, Severin Adam. "The Jewish Community and the Aliens Question in Great Britain 1881–1917." Dissertation, New York University, 1989.

Hutchins, Francis G. *The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Jastrow, Morris. *Zionism and the Future of Palestine: The Fallacies and Dangers of Political Zionism*. New York: MacMillan, 1919.

Kennedy, Michael. " 'A Voyage of Exploration': Irish Diplomatic Perspectives on Egypt, Sudan and Palestine in the Inter-War Years." In *Ireland and the Middle East: Trade, Society and Peace*, edited by Rory Miller, 7–23. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007.

Khalidi, Rashid. "The Formation of Palestinian Identity: The Critical Years, 1917–1923." In *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*, edited by James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, 171–90. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

Khan, Aga. "The Aga Khan to Edwin Montagu, 12 June." Cambridge: Trinity College Library, Montagu.

Kingsberg, Miriam. " 'The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend': Twentieth Century Irish Catholic Nationalist and Protestant Unionist Perceptions of Zionism." Senior Thesis, Brandeis University, 2003.

Laqueur, Walter. *A History of Zionism*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2002.

Minault, Gail. *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

"Minutes of Proceedings at a Deputation from the Indian Khilafat Delegation to the Prime Minister, at 10, Downing Street, 19 March 1920." Montagu Papers. Cambridge: Trinity College Library.

Montagu, Edwin. "Edwin Montagu to Maurice Hankey, 31 March 1917." Montagu Papers: Cambridge: Trinity College Library.

————. "Edwin Montagu to David Lloyd George, 4 April 1921." David Lloyd George Papers: F/41/1/11. House of Lords Records/Parliamentary Archives, London.

————. "Edwin Montagu to David Lloyd George, 30 June 1921." David Lloyd George Papers: F/41/1/18. House of Lords Records/ Parliamentary Archives, London.

————. *India Diary*. Montagu Papers. Cambridge: Trinity College Library. 1917–1918.

"Notes on S. Dubnov on the Methodology of Jewish History (14 February)." The Board of Deputies of British Jews. London Metropolitan Archive, London. 1916.

Oke, Mim Kemal. "The Ottoman Empire, Zionism, and the Question of Palestine." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14, no. 3 (August 1982): 329–41.

Pinsker, Leo. "Auto-Emancipation: An Appeal to His People by a Russian Jew." Accessed 21 April 2006. http://www.mideastweb.org/autoemancipation.htm.

Rabkin, Yacov M. *A Threat from Within: A Century of Jewish Opposition to Zionism*. Black Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood, 2006.

Reed, Stanley. *Times of India*. 6 December, 1921.

————. "Stanley Reed to Lord Lytton, 9 December 1921." Montagu Papers. Cambridge: Trinity College Library.

"Reform Synagogue Protests." Board of Deputies of British Jews. London Metropolitan Archives, London. c. 1905.

Reinharz, Jehuda. *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Renan, Ernest. *The Life of Jesus Christ*. Translated by Charles Edwin Wilbour. New York: Carleton, 1864.

————. "La Guerre Entre La France Et L' Allemagne." *Revue des Deux Mondes* 89, no. 277 (1870): 264–83.

————. "What Is a Nation?" In *Becoming National*, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, 42–55. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. *Report of Deputation to the Prime Minister from Representatives of the Mohammedans of India*. 24 March 1921. David Lloyd George Papers. House of Lords Records/Parliamentary Archives, London.

"Report on Palestine Administration, 31 December 1922." United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine.

"The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate—the Pan-Islamic Movement." Historical Section of the Foreign Office. India Office Records. British Library/Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections, London. January 1919.

Robinson, Glenn E. *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

Robson, Laura. *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011.

————. "Demanding a Voice: Christian Palestinians in the Greek Orthodox Church and the British Mandate " Middle East Studies Association 2007 Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada, 18 November, 2007.

Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

Sherman, A. J. *Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine 1918–1948*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1997.

Shimoni, Gideon. *Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Jews: A Formative Factor in India's Policy Towards Israel*. Vol. 22. Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1977.

Smith, Charles. *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Fifth ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2004. *Syria and Palestine*. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections: India Office Records. British Library, London. 1919.

Tessler, Mark. *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

Thomas, Baylis. *How Israel Was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999.

Thursby, G. R. *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: A Study of Controversy, Conflict, and Communal Movements in Northern India 1923–1928*. Leiden: J. Brill, 1975.

Waley, S. D. *Edwin Montagu: A Memoir and an Account of His Visits to India*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964.

Weizmann, Chaim. "Chaim Weizmann to Lord Curzon, 2 February 1920." India Office Records: IOR/L/PS/11/170, 2478. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London.

———. *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann*, vol. one. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1949.

The Zionist Movement, 4 October 1917, War Cabinet: CAB 23/4, No. 245 (18). The National Archives, London.

The Zionist Movement, 31 October 1917, CAB 24/3, No. 261 (12). The National Archives, London.

6 Expectations and Entitlement of Empire

In 1914, "with no apparent irony, [Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith] declared 'We do not covet any people's territory. We have no desire to impose our rule upon alien populations. The British Empire is enough for us.'"[1] To some extent Asquith was right. As the realities of wartime obligations became apparent, many British statesmen discouraged ideas of expansion of British imperial territory. Of course, they did not want anyone else to have the territory either. Imperial acquisition and maintenance was fuelled by all of the considerations we have undertaken so far, and by more than the main European powers. Civilizing missions became a rite of passage; Japan eyed China, and India regarded East Africa. In the struggle to create national legitimacy, imperial possession and pre-eminence became vital elements.

As much as the Balfour Declaration was a part of the global war waged in the name of nation, it was fundamentally a document of empire. Twisted into Britain's decision to adopt the Declaration was Christian Zionist ideology, which paralleled the paternalism of empire and imbued more than the Palestine Question with religious overtones. What is more, the recognition of nation-building which came with World War One should have signalled an end to empire if sovereign nations, as the antithesis of empire, were to come into being. The British Empire, while advocating a 'Jewish national home,' articulated the idea of 'Empire now, Empire forever' in its actions in Ireland, India, and even through the Mandatory Governorship of Palestine. Unwittingly the process of imperialism was imparted to those governed, the language of nation as much as the language of empire. As we have seen, the desire for nation became an obsession, and it should, therefore, be of little surprise that the same was true for empire.

CHRISTIANITY, CHRISTIAN ZIONISM AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF EMPIRE

In the Earl of Cromer (Evelyn Baring)'s essay on the "Government of Subject Races," Christianity took a place of pre-eminence. Christianity, Cromer noted, "is our most powerful ally"[2] and "even the bitterest enemies of our

religion will scarcely deny that, upon the whole, a nation imbued with the teaching of the New Testament is more easy to govern than one which derived its notions of divine morality from the stories of the dwellers on Olympus."[3] As nation, race, and gender were intertwined, so too were nation, empire, and religion—one being used to bolster, defend, or legitimize the others. Untangling the web around the Balfour Declaration and empire maintenance or building means looking further into the demands of religion and race in underscoring and motivating nation.

The role Christian Zionism played in the production and issuance of the Balfour Declaration remains hotly contested. James Renton, for one, has acknowledged the place of Christian Zionist rhetoric in the history of the Balfour Declaration, but does not believe it motivated Christian cabinet members in the cause of establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine. Rather, Renton contends, this remained an emotional and romantic notion that was only window dressing for the larger demands of 'practical' military and political concerns. Renton is not alone in relegating Christian Zionism to the realm of emotion and impracticality. Given the difficulty in measuring the impact personal belief has on political outcomes, Christian Zionism is frequently overlooked, or at best footnoted, in the history of the Balfour Declaration. Yet, doing so neglects the fact that Jewish Zionists, anti-Zionists, and non-Christians throughout the British Empire were fully aware of the history of Christian rhetoric in the subjugation of peoples and knew that Christian rhetoric, if used properly, could be a powerful motivating force in appealing to popular support for Zionism, just as it was in maintaining the Empire as a whole.

Christian Zionism is nearly as old as Jewish Zionism and is similar in scope. Instead of the Jewish belief that God will return the Jews to Palestine on the eve of Judgment, some segments of the Christian world argue that a Jewish return to Palestine will hasten the Second Coming of Christ. In retrospect, it is unsurprising that Great Britain was the power chosen by Zionists and its own leadership to take the lead in creating a Jewish state. Britain developed, over the centuries, an arrogance about its land, customs, culture, and place within Christianity that made it an ideal candidate for this particular task. British colonial history is littered with examples of 'manifest destiny' and the role it was 'destined' to play as the guiding force in global structures. Britain's specific relationship to Christianity derived from the belief that it had been asked, "to do for Christendom something which it appears, Christendom [could not] do for itself."[4] Indeed, early Christian Zionist rhetoric was much like Jewish Zionist rhetoric in that it did not carry overtly political tones, but rather focused on what Lucien Wolf called "eschatology rather than . . . practical politics."[5] According to Wolf, the first Christian Zionist tract was published by the legal scholar Sir Henry Finch in London in 1621: *The World's Great Restoration, or Calling of the Jews.* Finch argued that the Bible clearly indicated that a great battle would take place between the Turkish 'tyrants' and the people of 'Judæ,' and to the Jews would go a great

victory.[6] As the remainder of Finch's title indicates, the Return of the Jews to Israel was not meant for the benefit of their own cultural rebirth or political gain, but for the coming of the world to Christianity: *The World's Great Restauration* [sic] *or the Calling of the Jewes and (with Them) of All the Nations and Kingdomes of the East, to the Faith of Christ.*[7]

From the late sixteenth to the twentieth century, England's (and subsequently Great Britain's) special place in Christianity acquired a great deal of attention from those in power. During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I (1533–1603), the poet John Lyly described "the English as 'His chosen and peculiar people. So tender hath He always had of that England, as of a new Israel.' "[8] What is more, Palestine itself held a special place in the imagination of English Protestants. In order to carry out God's work on Earth, they developed an understanding of Judaism, in which the role of the Jew was intrinsically linked to the general spiritual policies of Christianity.

In 1290, Edward I officially expelled Jews from England, and from that point until Cromwell's restoration, England defined itself by its lack of a Jewish population. As a result, historians commonly address Judeo-English history only after 1655, when Oliver Cromwell took power and led the way for the restoration of Jews to England as a result of the Whitehall Conference. It is fairly clear, however, from the historical and literary record that the country was by no means devoid of a Jewish population in the intervening years. A rabbi was consulted, for instance, by Henry VIII in his divorce crisis. Officially, however, they were not a part of the state structure. By the time of Cromwell's reign, a strong desire had arisen in England to see the official resettlement of the Jews to the country. England's Puritan, Protestant reading of the Bible and its belief in the nature of the return of Christ, encouraged a sense of superiority about the country's role in Christian doctrine. It argued that its doctrine was closest, of all Christian doctrines, to Judaism. In 1655, at the Whitehall Conference, this sentiment was reinforced by the contention that before the Jews could return to Israel, they first had to be scattered to every corner of the globe. Thus, without Jews officially living in England, the coming of the Messiah—dependent upon a Jewish return to Palestine—would be delayed.[9] As with Jewish religious Zionism, Palestine and a Jewish restoration were linked to a messianic return and the restoration of the state of Israel. However, the role of human agency in Christian Zionism was much more akin to that of political rather than religious Zionism. Building on the foundations laid by the crusaders, Christians no longer saw themselves as solely the *protectors* of the Holy Places. Rather, they were now being *promised*, in the same way as the Jews had been before them, rights and responsibilities toward Palestine.

In his 1833 work, *The Genius of Judaism,* Isaac Disraeli continued this legacy by stating:

> In happier time, and with a nobler spirit, the Jewish controversy was saved out of profane hands of the sanguinary or the imbecile idolaters

> of the Roman church. The new church of the Reformed enlarged the sphere of religious inquiry; it had itself been too long a school of affliction not to sympathise with the afflicted. The first blessing on mankind by the Reformation was the establishment of that toleration which they had so long wanted. This step approximated Christianity towards Judaism; they ceased to be enemies; they were neighbours. *The Hebrews were no longer hunted down as wild animals, but invited, like sheep straying without a shepherd, into the fold.*[10]

Numerous examples of the belief that England had a special place in the Zionist endeavour appeared long before the Balfour Declaration. W. Young, the first British consul to Palestine (appointed in 1838), expounded upon the belief that Protestant Christianity was the saving grace of humankind:

> Two groups would doubtless demand a strong voice in the future concerns of Palestine; the first were the Jews, to whom God had originally given ownership of this land; and the second were the Protestant Christians, their legitimate successors.[11]

Nevertheless, in 1916, a year before the wording debate came to a head in the British Cabinet, Montagu declared that a pro-Zionist policy was "a rather presumptuous and almost blasphemous attempt to forestall Divine agency in the collection of the Jews which would be punished, if not by a new captivity in Babylon, by a new and unrivalled persecution of the Jews left behind."[12] Not only did Montagu's statement echo the arguments of Orthodox Judaism, it also questioned the presumption of British imperialism based on religious propaganda. This distinction signalled a division between imperialists who placed the power to govern in a category of divine ordination and those who looked on it as a project of progressiveness and modernity, although the two were frequently fused in other ways as well. Most empires had religiously inspired components in their colonial and wartime endeavours, and England's particular pride in its place in the divine world had a long development.

English Protestantism's particular interpretation of the nature of Zionism distinguished Great Britain from its Catholic counterparts in Europe in two ways, opening the door for its eventual role in the creation of the Balfour Declaration. First, when England broke with the Roman Church, as noted by Disraeli above, the relationship between Judaism and Christianity's two newest sects also changed. Some historians point out that England's devout Christians no longer sought solace in the ceremony of the Church, but rather in the literal words of the Bible.[13] The Bible was "for about two and a half centuries after the Reformation . . . the only Book read by the majority of the British people."[14] As a result, even up until the middle of the nineteenth century, "the end of the world [seemed as though it] was imminent, and that the Jews were destined to play a major role in this final drama."[15] Given

England's special place in God's eye, as Lyly described, the argument further insisted that once in contact with Puritan Protestantism, the Jews would no longer resist conversion; they would submit, return to Palestine, and thus the world would witness the Second Coming. Of course, in terms of the Protestant nature of Christian Zionism, England was not alone. In the midst of World War One, particularly during 1917, there was a strongly held fear that the British government must act quickly in proclaiming a pro-Zionist policy as Germany looked poised to do so itself. This fear was fuelled by the belief that the world's Jewry would run to the side of whichever power first declared a pro-Zionist stance and bring with it equal physical and monetary support. Germany, largely Protestant, was no less likely to develop pro-Zionist sentiment than England.

Second, Catholic and Orthodox communities like those in France, Spain, and Russia had been the seat of some of the worst anti-Semitic discrimination and violence over the preceding centuries. The works of contemporary Catholic traditionalists, like Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton, arguably contained "a thread of thinly-veiled anti-semitism running through[out]."[16] Even as late as January 1919, after the Balfour Declaration had been issued, Catholicism's role in the establishment of the Jewish national home continued to be questioned. The English Catholic Cardinal Francis Bourne, sent a letter to Lord Edmund Talbot stating that

> The whole movement [Zionism] appears to me to be quite contrary to Christian sentiment and tradition. Let Jews live here by all means if they like and enjoy the same liberties as other people; but that they should ever again dominate and rule the country would be an outrage to Christianity and its Divine Founder.[17]

Because Catholicism did not accept the Jewish role in the return of the Messiah as Protestantism did, it is less surprising that Great Britain, and not, for example, France, led the way in the creation of a 'resurrected' Jewish national home.

We must be careful not to overstate religious tolerance in Protestant countries. John Foster Fraser's 1915 claim that "Nowhere does the Jew receive better treatment than in Great Britain. There is not a single disability. Anti-Semitism does not exist" was hardly a *fait accompli*.[18] Anti-Semitism remained a problem throughout Europe and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century, but there certainly was a gradation of where that anti-Semitism developed and how virulent it was. The further West one travelled, the more likely one was to run into a Christian Zionism or philo-Semitism—support of, friendship with, and intellectual pursuits in the study of Jewry. Anti-Semitism persisted in these areas, but was less bloody than in more eastern European states.

The Christian Zionist cause fit well within the context of the nineteenth-century imperial enterprise and, as such, the demand reached beyond

philosophy to the ambition of establishing a physical British presence in Palestine so that they might become the protectors and converters of the world's Jewish populations while at the same time securing crucial imperial interests in the region near Suez. Indeed, "English 'Gentile Zionists' of the nineteenth century [were] the forerunners of non-Jewish supporters of Zionism" in the twentieth century.[19] In order to establish such a presence in Palestine, however, British Christian Zionists had to both increase their number of supporters and create an institutional base within the region itself.

Christian Zionism as a Political Tool

The likelihood of Germany releasing a pro-Zionist document at nearly the same time as the British was bolstered historically by the roles Prussian and British Episcopalians played in nineteenth-century Palestine. Although England's emotional relationship with Palestine had been developing for centuries, its modern institutional relationship only began in 1841 with the establishment of an Anglo-Prussian Episcopal See in Jerusalem. The institution of the See was contingent upon an agreement finalized between the Anglican Church and the Prussians such that "the bishops would be appointed alternately by the English and Prussian crowns, but would always be ordained by the archbishop of Canterbury."[20] It was no accident that the first bishop chosen was a converted Jew, Michael Solomon Alexander. Baron von Bunsen, the German diplomat sent to carry out the negotiations with Lord Palmerston to establish the Bishopric, noted of Alexander:

> he is by race an Israelite,—born in Prussian Breslau,—in confession belonging to the Church of England—ripened (by hard work) in Ireland—twenty years Professor of Hebrew and Arabic in England (in what is now King's College). So the beginning is made, please God, for the restoration of Israel.[21]

Bishop Alexander's chief task was to oversee the conversion of Palestine's Jewish population.[22] Needless to say, conversion was slow, and resistance among the local Jews strong. As a result Bishop Alexander's successor, Samuel Gobat (1849), set aside the task and focused on what he saw as more pressing and realistic endeavours, such as the conversion of native Orthodox Christians to Protestantism and establishing a protective presence on behalf of Christendom. The positive relationship between Prussia and the British in the establishment of the See gave way, however, by the time World War One broke out. British propaganda was not shy in its denunciation of the 'Hun' and a widely used image was that of 'Holy War.' As we have seen, the phrase 'Holy War' caused anxiety for a number of communities around the world, but, in this particular iteration, Germany was constructed as the 'apostate nation' and Britain as the 'Chosen state' to lead the world to righteousness.[23]

While securing the region of Palestine began with the establishment of the Episcopal See, securing the minds of England's masses was the unwitting endeavour of nineteenth-century philo-Semitic literature and popular fiction. In English terms philo-Semitism manifested in a desire among some Christians to recognize Judeo-Christian connections and convert Jews to Christianity in an effort to hasten the Second Coming. This type of philo-Semitic literature focused on romantic notions of salvation through love. By the second half of the nineteenth century, however, a new version of this genre began to emerge, which focused on other nineteenth-century themes as well, most notably nationalism. The most important literary work of this genre was George Eliot's (1876) *Daniel Deronda*. Intended to inspire reflection on the issue of Jewish political aspirations, the novel became a cultural link between the British masses and the Jewish political Zionist enterprise. At the conclusion of the novel the main character states:

> The idea that I am possessed with is that of restoring a political existence to my people, making them a nation again, giving them a national centre, such as the English have, though they too are scattered over the face of the globe.[24]

As proof of the novel's power in the imagination of the European public, on 22 November 1895, Chief Rabbi Hermann Marcus Adler remarked to Theodor Herzl that his scheme for Jewish immigration and colonization of Palestine was the same idea as that of *Daniel Deronda*.[25] *Deronda*'s idealized heroic Anglo Christian, with a secret religious past, was not an uncommon motif in mainstream nineteenth-century literature. Literature meant to encourage Christian conversion of Jews, in particular Jewesses, is apparent throughout the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century record. Sir Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe* (1819) finds a thread of this philo-Semitism running throughout in the character Rebecca of York.[26] But *Deronda* was more than Jewish nationalism romanticized. Indeed, as Eliot's last novel, it was a platform on which she denounced anti-Jewish sentiment and, perhaps ironically, anti-colonialism. Even with *Deronda*'s apparent forward-thinking, Eliot's desire to see national self-determination flourish worldwide was not necessarily clear. By way of example, when given the opportunity to help fund Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini's work, she flatly refused, arguing that he did nothing more than promote conspiracy.[27] Additionally, and more importantly for our own concerns, *Deronda* continued to reinforce another pertinent stereotype for the history of the Balfour Declaration and nationalist aspirations, that of the heathen or barbarous Muslim and Arab. The only moment in the novel when Arabs are even remotely alluded to comes in reference to Daniel's adopted family's Crusader legacy. In looking over the family tree, Eliot tells us "Daniel had never before cared about the family tree—only about that ancestor who had killed three Saracens in one encounter."[28] 'Saracen,' non-Christian pagan or heathen, was a term widely applied

to the Turks, and more generally Muslims, throughout English culture from the era of the Crusades to the twentieth century. The labelling of Muslims, no matter their ethnic background, with broad and typically negative terms continued well into the twentieth century. Just as Eliot's philo-Semitic discourse informed the policy-making classes about the cause of Jewish nationalism, so too was it vaguely anti-Ottoman.

MASTER AND PUPIL: NON-EUROPEAN EMPIRE

Neither the Christian world, nor the political Zionist community, had a monopoly on imperial ambition. Nineteenth-century European imperialists taught their imperial holdings not only about the desirability of political nationality and independence, but of the desirability of imperial domain as well. In political Zionist rhetoric this was couched in the Zionist colonial endeavour and, as Weizmann notably contended, for the improvement of the region and peoples of Palestine generally.

> The improvement of the present poor state of the Arab fellaheen also depends largely upon a proper handling of the land in question. Palestine is at present very uneconomically cultivated. The Arab method of agriculture is primitive and extensive. With irrigation, modern roads, sanitary conditions, and the use of machinery and other methods of modern farming, probably not more than one-sixth of the land which at present is used by the Arab farmer would be required to yield a livelihood for a family accustomed to European standards.[29]

While Chaim Chissin may have found some members of the Arab-Christian community well educated and friendly to European traditions and mores, Samuel Tolkowsky, in his 1917 *Achievements and Prospects in Palestine,* did not. According to Tolkowsky,

> Public safety was only a word in Palestine at that time [the late 1800s]. Public hygiene did not receive the least attention from the authorities, and the result was that the most important inland towns, as well as the greatest part of the maritime plain, were infested with malaria-fever and different eye-diseases. There were no physicians, no chemists, no hospitals.[30]

What is more, "with their typical oriental lack of foresight," and indistinct agricultural knowledge, the *fellahin*, Tolkowsky argued, "try to make their fields yield as much as they can with their very primitive methods."[31] *Achievements and Prospects* asserts that the only course of survival in Palestine was through Jewish Zionist control. To rid the region of "oriental lack of foresight" or 'quasi-barbarian' tendencies meant installing new overlords

Figure 6.1 "The European officer and his Chinese awkward squad." 1911. *Puck*.

who had a moral duty or obligation to the land and would be 'reasonable Imperialists.' By the 1910s, Zionists were asserting their right to rule Palestine, using the perceptions of the Arab race to assert their own abilities as 'reasonable Imperialists.'

The complexity created by hierarchies of gender, race, and nation over the course of World War One also led to gendered questions in the Indian case and aided a less rigidly 'nationalist' agenda, as in the Irish and Zionist examples, although a more overtly imperialist one. The ancientness of the Indian experience, and its relationship *vis à vis* the British Empire, encouraged a mirrored imperial thinking among some Indian nationalists.

In November 1911, the American humour magazine *Puck* offered a two-panel cartoon titled "The European officer and his Chinese awkward squad" as a depiction of this educational inversion.[32]

The left side of the cartoon, captioned, "Master and Pupils" showed a 'typical' European officer (likely British) drilling disinterested, homely, and poorly armed soldiers. On the right, captioned "Pupils and Master," the European officer is Lilliputian in stature, while the Asian soldiers are muscular, ordered, and well equipped. A year after this cartoon was published, Pierre de Coubertin echoed the sentiment, observing that while "sports could help make the colonised 'more malleable.' . . . there was always a danger that the colonised would get too good at them. A victory of the 'dominated race over the dominant race.' "[33] The *Puck* cartoon speaks volumes about the fears Europeans and Americans had about possible outcomes of imperial endeavours. Always couched in the language of paternalism, European

imperialism, it was argued, was for the 'betterment' of the 'uncivilised.' The looming question remained, "What happens when they are finally bettered?" The specific example of a European soldier training Asian forces is articulated in the historical relationship among the Japanese, Germans (Prussians), and British. The Japanese took full advantage of German martial training for their army in the late nineteenth century and moulded their navy on the British Empire's. This process meant that the Japanese became the embodiment of the unequal imperial brother, as we saw in Chapter 4.

Japan

Modern Japanese imperial acquisitions began in 1895 with the end of the Sino-Japanese war and the securing of Japanese influence over Korea. Although the Triple Intervention—by the British, French and Russians—at the end of the war meant Japan was "forced to watch with deepening shame, humiliation, and bitterness the almost immediate takeover of her relinquished conquests [by European powers],"[34] the later Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–23) helped to counteract frustration over Russian interests in Japan's perceived sphere of influence, allowed it a free hand over of Korea, and offered a clear avenue for entrance into World War One. Even still, the British, Russians, and French "were not willing to see Japan establish a position of dominance in the Far East."[35] As was evident in the case of the Racial Equality Clause, Japan was increasingly marginalized at the 1919 Versailles Conference. Racially defined norms for imperial acceptance remained the rule. What Japanese imperial ambition could not achieve at the negotiating table was later taken by force.

Since the opening of Japanese ports in the 1850s, Japan's leaders focused their efforts on creating powerful state structures able to rival any of those in Europe, to prove that its civilization was just as capable of pursuing and maintaining the foundations of imperial hegemony and commanding an East Asian empire, not to mention defending itself from the ambitions of others. Japanese policy-makers thoroughly researched the process of imperial development, consciously modelling their efforts on the Western form. Initially reluctant to accept Western aid, trade goods and philosophies, by the 1870s and 1880s Japanese leadership actively courted European tacticians, strategists and armament specialists. It was not only apparent to European powers that modern and innovative armed forces were key to securing and maintaining empires, it was abundantly clear to non-European states as well.[36]

Despite the connections afforded the Japanese navy through the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the British, over the first decade of the twentieth century, became "increasingly reluctant to share information on British naval advances in training and technology" and "reacted coolly to Japanese suggestions for the conduct of joint naval exercises."[37] This reluctance continued to permeate British sentiment toward Japanese territorial and

military ambition throughout World War One. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance referenced "the safeguarding of the special interests of the contracting parties," but in the minds of British officials like Lord Curzon this "raised, in his opinion, a somewhat difficult question, as it was never easy to define exactly what such interests were or to agree exactly on the extent to which a Power was interested."[38] For the Japanese, however, asserting what qualified as their 'special interests' in the Pacific became possible with the outbreak of the war.

In August 1914 Great Britain attempted to avoid "drawing Japan into trouble," but warned "the Japanese Government that if hostilities spread to [the] Far East and an attack is made on Hong Kong or Wei-hei-wei, H. M. Government will rely on their support."[39] On 7 August 1914, "the British government formally requested Japan dispatch its fleet to hunt out and if possible, seize armed German merchant ships."[40] Japan, unwilling to be limited in its actions, claimed that it needed "a free hand and no limited liability." Since the British wanted "to limit the acts of war in [the] Far East to the sea," it was clear from the outset that the two sides had very different visions of the war's potential outcomes.[41]

On 9 August, the Japanese informed British officials that they would "take every possible means for the destruction of power of Germany that might inflict damage on the interests of Japan and Britain in East Asia."[42] The aggressiveness of Japan's assistance unnerved British officials, who certainly wanted the aid, particularly so far from the European theatre, but were not ready to cede control to another power so near their own strategic interests, e.g., Australia or Hong Kong. On 11 August, "Britain gave in to the Japanese intentions and recognized Japan's participation in the war; but restricted the sphere of Japanese operations to the Eastern China Sea and German leased territory on mainland China."[43] While it was the hope of British, French and Russian leaders that Japan's efforts would remain confined to the Pacific, "Japanese belligerent action did in fact exceed the geographical limits the British Government had tried to impose."[44] Japan's navy took part in Pacific actions as far away as Honolulu, and by October 1914 Japanese forces occupied the Marshall Islands and part of the Carolines. In December 1914,

> the Japanese stated frankly that they proposed to keep the German islands North of the Equator. The British Government pointed out that all occupations of enemy territory during the war must be provisional. The Japanese replied that nevertheless they counted on British support.[45]

These assertions of territorial acquisition are strikingly similar to the Sharif Husayn's attempt, in the 1915 Husayn-McMahon correspondence, to draw boundaries around a future Arab state. For both Japan and the Arabs, however, the British remained steadfast in the belief that only decisions of this nature could have any permanency among French, British and

Russian interests. For the Arabs, this referenced what was laid out in the May 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, while for the Japanese it pertained to French, British and Russian strategic interests in the Pacific. Japanese interested in the Sykes-Picot Agreement werereinforced by the concluding line of the Agreement, which read: "His Majesty's Government further considers that the Japanese government should be informed of the arrangements now concluded."[46] In essence, Japan was an ally, but not a party, to imperial manoeuvring and decision-making, a sentiment echoed largely at the Versailles Conference three years later. After the initial aggressiveness on the part of the Japanese, European allies increasingly questioned the nature of the price of their assistance.

As depicted in the *Puck* cartoon, the surprise and anxiety felt by Europeans surrounding Japan's ambitions and abilities set on the tongues of Japan's allies the question "At what price?" In January 1915 the Japanese government issued a secret ultimatum to the Chinese government, the "Twenty-One Demands," at the heart of which was Japan's desire to assert regional and cultural hegemony through greater control over Chinese actions, interests and regions (notably Manchuria and Shandong). According to Robert Gowen, "At stake in the demands was not only Japan's compulsion to control China, but also its desire to lead a pan-Asian movement subversive of the cultural divinity and political hegemony claimed by the West."[47] This was the case in other negotiations with non-European aspirant powers. Not having received a satisfactory answer from the British with regard the future of Japanese war acquisitions, Japan decided to enter into negotiations directly with China. The Twenty-One Demands that "ultimately tied to the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s" was in 1915 "the paramount symbol of Japanese aggression."[48] British documents on the matter note that the "demands made on China were so extensive that they caused considerable embarrassment to Japan's allies,"[49] and that while China was "an unwieldy and helpless country . . . it must naturally be the desire of His Majesty's Government to see China built up again and some sort of cohesion arrived a[t] in that country."[50] The British and Japanese agreed on the need for outside intervention in China; their disagreement centred on who should provide the civilizing mission.

British War Cabinet documents vacillated in their acceptance and fear of the Japanese role as ally and belligerent. That Japan could be seen as an imperial, racial, or military equal unnerved policymakers and remained a point of contention. In 1917, Lord Curzon noted four theatres of war in which the participation of Japanese troops would "be highly undesirable"—India's frontier, the Malay Peninsula West to Egypt and East Africa, Russia, and "Any other European theater of war."[51] The relationship between Japanese and Indian nationalist sentiment had already been noted by the British government, long before the War's outbreak. As the number of Indian students in Japan grew at the end of the 1800s and beginning of the 1900s, and in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, Curzon "warned that

Indian students in Japan were 'likely to be influenced with sentiments tending toward discontent and even disloyalty.' "[52] More will be said below of his second category, but for now it is worthy to note that the potential of Japanese involvement in mainland Europe was significant in underscoring British imperial and racial anxiety. Curzon boldly asserts:

> Here, again, the question is one to a large extent of racial ascendancy and international prestige. I do not suppose that British or French troops would be unwilling to fight alongside of Japanese troops, any more than they are of Portuguese, or Indians, or Annamites, or Pathans. But in Asia itself the impetus that would be given to Japanese ambitions and to racial jealousies between East and West would be enormous, and no one who knows Asia and is anxious to maintain European influence there would lightly run the risk.[53]

Giving Japan the "right" to fight in mainland Europe would, in Curzon's assessment, give too much credence to Japanese claims of equality with the West and would stir jealousies elsewhere in Asia. Indeed, Curzon generally saw little to approve of in Japan's wartime contributions. Japan, he argued, had "far from pulled her fair weight in the war. Her assistance, if not grudgingly given, has been at any rate, narrowly restricted, and . . . qualified at each stage by the most scrupulous regard for her own interests."[54] Similarly he maintained, "Japanese policy towards China . . . has been dictated by similarly selfish and calculating considerations."[55] There were distinctions to be made between the 'earth-hungry' and 'reasonable imperialists.'

India

Curzon's appraisal of Japan's involvement was certainly an extreme view; most Cabinet minutes register gratefulness tinged with caution, but the perception outside of government circles of this imperial relationship was also notably different. In *India in Transition*, the Aga Khan worried about what he perceived as the development of an asymmetrical power structure favouring Japanese over Indian interests. According to the Aga Khan, "There is a school of Imperialistic thought in England ready to trust Japan and accept her as a full equal, exhibiting a strange lack of confidence in the King's Indian subjects, for which there is no single justifying fact in history."[56] In the minds of some, it was as if empire-building in the post–World War One era was a zero-sum game. There was only enough space for one new empire, not many. For the Aga Khan, the fear that Japan would jump the queue, gaining imperial equality before India, was unconscionable. This imperialistic thinking, according the Aga Khan, linked to the

> good many windy phrases such as 'taking up the white man's burden' and reflects a time when Britain was most influenced by German ideas,

> those of Bismarck and William II, Treitschke, and Nietzsche. It consciously or unconsciously desires the perpetuation of racial supremacy in India. The rise of Japan to a position of equality with the great European Powers has but served to concentrate upon the Indian dependency these ideals of race supremacy.[57]

This concern over the place of Japan and India *vis à vis* global racial perception spoke directly to Curzon's concern of Asian jealousies. Not only were Japan and India vying for equality with Europe, they were vying for supremacy in Asia as well.

The Aga Khan was not only speaking of jealousy one child may have over another, he was articulating a frustration in Indian claims for its own imperial ambition. Social and political leader of the Indian nationalist movement Gopal Gokhale (1866–1915) and the Aga Khan were accused of having a 'pet scheme' to colonize East Africa with Indian settlers, suggesting that their notions of national strength must go hand in hand with imperial endeavours.[58] The Aga Khan articulated his belief that Indians should be considered the logical heirs to settlements in East Africa, explaining that it was the "most appropriate field for Indian colonisation and settlement" and colonization was, intricately tied to nationalist rhetoric.[59]

Gokhale and the Aga Khan put forward schemes to colonize East Africa with Indian settlers, building on the population of Indian merchants and civil servants already there, and suggesting that their notions of national strength must go hand in hand with imperial endeavours. Still, despite these historic linkages, European settlers in East Africa and Anglo-Indians (in this case meaning, Britons who lived in or were born in India) spurned almost any attempt by Indians to claim equal political status, just as Japanese attempts to reach racial parity were thwarted.

Shortly before his death in 1914, Gokhale finalized a document for the Indian National Congress outlining plans for constitutional reform. At the very end of it, in what almost appears to be an afterthought, Gokhale claims that "German East Africa, when conquered from the Germans, should be reserved for Indian colonisation and should be handed over to the Government of India."[60] The seeming randomness of Gokhale's choice of German East Africa is explicable in two ways. First, Indian cultural and economic connections throughout the Indian Ocean basin long predated British involvement. As the Aga Khan noted, East Africa "provided a field for Indian immigration and enterprise from time immemorial, and we have seen that Indians played a conspicuous part in their development before the white man came on the scene as a settler."[61] Culturally, India and East Africa shared a religious link through the Ismaili Shi'a community. By the nineteenth century, the spiritual leaders of the Ismaili community had settled in the subcontinent, already endowed with their title 'Aga Khan,' as bestowed upon them by the Persian emperor. Moreover, Indian civil servants spread across the British Empire over the last half of the nineteenth century creating

well-placed and well-educated communities of Indians nested inside the British Empire. This socioeconomic class of British subjects was both invaluable to the smooth running of the Empire, and, as the British were to find out in the first half of the nineteenth century, well educated and desirous of political mobility. Second, the choice of German East Africa was a politically astute way of calling for Indian colonization in East Africa, but not at the expense of trampling on allied toes. If the German East-African colonial holdings came to be redistributed after the war, Gokhale and like-minded Indians wanted to be first on the list; this was unlike the Japanese case, in which such notions were never scrutinized under the 'what price' category. In particular, this was because India was not an independent sovereign state, an actor of its own, while Japan was, although that was certainly the desired outcome.

Going a step further than Gokhale, the Aga Khan called for "the transfer of the administration of German, *as well as British*, East Africa to the Government of India," claiming "It would be vastly better both for the Sultan of Zanzibar and his people that he should be an Indian prince dealing with the Government of India than that he should remain in existing relationships with the Foreign Office."[62] While the Aga Khan spent a great deal of time connecting Indian interests to Africa through politics and culture, embedded in his rhetoric was a civilizing mission, an echo of British imperialism.

> It [Africa] is peopled by vast numbers of dark and aboriginal tribes. India, too, has her Bhils and other wild tribes in much the same stage of development. Her immigrant sons must feel stronger sympathy and toleration for the Africans than the white settler, and will be singularly fitted to help to raise them in the scale of civilisation. The Indian cultivator and the Indian craftsman do some things as these children of the wilds do them, only they do them much better. Indians would teach the natives to plough, to weave, and to carpenter; the rough Indian tools are within the comprehension of the African mind, and even Indian housekeeping would be full of instructive lessons to the negro.[63]

In other words, racial construction was a two-way street. While British officials in London bristled at the idea of granting Indian, or Japanese, imperial ambitions legitimacy, the Aga Khan and fellow imperialists in India and Japan used racial hierarchies and references to further their own agendas, differentiating themselves from the 'Others' they sought to rule.

Just as the Aga Khan mirrored Montagu's positions, Montagu championed the Aga Khan's ideas, and was a direct voice of Indian imperial ambition in the British government.[64] Both spoke at length of the long service by Indian forces on behalf of the British war effort. Vital to the Middle Eastern campaigns, and even serving on the European front,

> During the First World War, Indian troops saw action on the Western Front in France and participated in the campaigns in Gallipoli

> and German East Africa. India's largest contribution to the war effort, however, took place in Mesopotamia. . . . Of the total number of 1.3 million Indians sent overseas to fight for the British Empire, some 600,000 . . . saw service in Mesopotamia.[65]

This service deserved a reward, and justified arguments for Home Rule, outright independence or the creation of an Indian empire. As Montagu noted in October 1918,

> I do submit with all the urgency that I can command that we shall be guilty of grave dereliction of Imperial duty if we do not see that the Indian has some opportunity of colonization arising out of the Indian partnership in this war.[66]

From Montagu's perspective, if the British Empire was unable satisfactorily to acknowledge what it 'owed' to its own subjects, how could it permit similar action from a less-known quantity, Japan?

Anxiety

While the bulk of this chapter looks at how the rise and fall of the empires were played beyond the boundaries of Europe, the place of that anxiety felt in the metropole remains a central theme as well. Curzon's 'four theatres' (see above), speak well to these anxieties, in particular the one which stretched from the Malay Peninsula west to East Africa, notably including Egypt and Palestine.

Speaking with regard to the possibility of Japanese troops being used in Egypt, Curzon argues:

> I place Egypt in this category (though not so confidently as the other areas named) because, although Egypt has geographically a quasi-international position, the assumption of the British Protectorate, with all the delicate problems that it involves, renders it very undesirable that we should appear to be unable either to defend Egypt or to solve the problems without the aid of an Asiatic ally.[67]

Curzon's sentiments only further complicate the story, as we look at it from this global angle, when he goes on to examine the place of Palestine *vis à vis* the British Empire and the potential usage of Japanese forces.

> On the other hand, about Palestine there can be no shadow of doubt. To recover from the Turks the Holy City of the Christian faith by the aid of a non-Christian ally would be universally regarded as unseemly, if not shocking. The same objection does not apply to the employment of Indian troops by ourselves or of Senegalese troops by the French in

> Palestine, because they fight in the armies of their overlords as a natural consequence of their political status.[68]

Indeed, much anxiety followed Japan in European imaginations:

> There is a risk that the Japanese military mission might be used as a cloak for the propagation of 'Pan-Asiatic' doctrines, which are known to find favour in influential quarters in Japan, and for intrigue with the party of disaffection in India, it is submitted that this danger is by no means an imaginary one. We know that sympathy for the 'oppressed Indian' has been widely exploited in Japan, and that there is a party in the country whose watchword is that 'Japan's mission in Asia' is to liberate the subject Asiatic races from the European yoke.[69]

The means of "liberating" the "Asiatic races from the European yoke" were, as we have seen, couched in European-style nationalism and imperialism. As the *Puck* illustration argued, when trained, the non-European could be as powerful, if not more so than the European. This was true in imperial, national, racial, and gendered terms, and the potential outcome greatly unsettled the policy-makers about what should happen next as the World War One came to a close and the vastly changed world demanded direction and guidance.

NOTES

1. Alyson Pendlebury, *Portraying 'the Jew' in First World War Britain* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2006) 53.
2. Evelyn Baring, "The Government of Subject Races," in *Political and Literary Essays 1908–1913* (London: MacMillan, 1913), 52.
3. Ibid., 8.
4. Norman Angell, "Weizmann's Approach to the British Mind," in *Chaim Weizmann: Statesman, Scientist, Builder of the Jewish Commonwealth*, ed. Meyer W. Weisgal (New York: Dial Press, 1944), 80.
5. Lucien Wolf, *Notes on the Diplomatic History of the Jewish Question* (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne, 1919), 100.
6. Henry Finch, *The Worlds Great Restauration or the Calling of the Jewes and (with Them) of All the Nations and Kingdomes of the East, to the Faith of Christ* (London: Edward Griffin, 1621), 3. Although the Bible does not talk specifically about Turks, Finch reads 'between the lines' about "A marvellous conflict shall they have with Gog and Magog, that is to say, the Turke. . . ." Finch's reinterpretation of the Bible to suit the modern issues at hand was certainly nothing new, nor the last time divining such insights was been attempted.
7. Ibid.
8. John Lyly, "Euphues," as quoted in Jeremy Paxman, *The English: A Portrait of a People* (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 273.
9. Ella Frankel. "The Empty Land: Non-Jewish Schemes for the Resettlement of the Holy Land." (Thesis (MA), Federation of Women Zionists, Education

Department, Undated), 1. These arguments for the readmission of the Jews is also discussed in: Barbara Tuchman, *Bible and Sword: England and Palestine From the Bronze Age to Balfour* (London: Frank Cass, 1956).

10. Isaac Disraeli, *The Genius of Judaism* (London: Edward Moxon, 1833), 198. Emphasis added.
11. Alexander Schölch, "Britain in Palestine, 1838–1882: The Roots of the Balfour Policy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 1 (1992): 42. Meir Vereté tells us that a British Consulate was established in Palestine not because of early nineteenth-century Zionist desires, nor at the behest of local missionaries, but "in the interests of British residents and travelers in Jerusalem, and of British policy, as well as on grounds of competition for status vis-à-vis the Turkish authorities and the Catholic powers, it was worthwhile appointing a Consular Agent of Great Britain in Jerusalem." Meir Vereté, "Why Was a British Consulate Established in Jerusalem?," *The English Historical Review* 85, no. 335 (1970): 320.
12. Edwin Montagu, "Untitled, 16 March 1915." British Library, London.
13. Angell, 79.
14. Frankel, 1.
15. David S. Katz, *Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England 1603–1655* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 90.
16. Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (London: Abacus, 1998), 407. It should also be noted that Belloc and Chesterton were the same individuals who accused, via the weekly *Eye Witness,* Herbert Samuel, David Lloyd George, and Rufus Isaacs (two of whom were Jewish members of government) of 'insider trading,' the upshot of which directly led to the Marconi scandal of 1912 and a shaken confidence in the British Liberal Government. While accusations of anti-Semitism circulated, those accused were not all Jewish, (e.g., David Lloyd George) and the scandal had just as much to do with, if not more, party politics and ethics as it did with racism or anti-Semitism.
17. Francis Bourne, "Cardinal Bourne to Lord Edmund Talbot, 25 January 1919," David Lloyd George Papers, London.
18. John Foster Fraser, *The Conquering Jew* (New York: Cassell, 1915), 114.
19. Schölch, 40.
20. Ibid., 42.
21. As cited in: Wolf, *Notes on the Diplomatic History of the Jewish Question*, 106.
22. Schölch, 42.
23. See: Pendlebury.
24. George Eliot, *Daniel Deronda* (New York: Penguin, 1996), 803. *Daniel Deronda* was first published in 1876.
25. Marvin Lowenthal, ed. *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap in arrangement with The Dial Press, 1962), 80. It is also interesting to note that Rabbi Adler retained a thorough Britishness alongside his role as Britain's Jewish spiritual leader. Of a dinner enjoyed at the Rabbi's house, Herzl said it was "everything English, with the old Jewish customs peeping through," and Rabbi Adler's torn allegiances to Britain and the Jewish community, were frequently strained when large numbers of foreign pro-political Zionist Jews moved to the country and found his assessment of political Zionism as "an egregious blunder" problematic. For more see: Elkan D. Levy, "The History of the Chief Rabbinate," www.chiefrabbi.org.
26. For further examination of the role of conversion and particularly the Jewess in nineteenth-century English literature, see Nadia Valman, "The Jewess in Nineteenth-Century British Literary Culture," in *Cambridge Studies in*

Nineteenth-Century Literature and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
27. George Levine, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 43.
28. Eliot, 143.
29. Chaim Weizmann, "Chaim Weizmann to Lord Curzon, 2 February 1920," British Library, London.
30. Samuel Tolkowsky, *Achievements and Prospects in Palestine* (London: English Zionist Federation, 1917), 2.
31. Ibid., 2–3.
32. Udo J. Keppler, "The European Officer and His Chinese Awkward Squad," in *Puck,* New York: Keppler & Schwarzmann, 1911.
33. Laurent Dubois, *Soccer Empire: The World Cup and the Future of France* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), 26.
34. H. P. Willmott, *Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942* (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1982), 22.
35. Ibid., 20.
36. For further detail see: Leonard S. Kosakowski, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Japanese Expansionism, 1902–1923" (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992) and Edward J. Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009).
37. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, *Kaigun: Strategies, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1914* (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1997), 186.
38. "Minutes of a Meeting, 30 May 1921," The National Archives, London.
39. " 'Japanese Co-Operation in the War,' Precis Prepared in the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, 3 October 1917," The National Archives, London.
40. Kosakowski, 79.
41. "Japanese Co-Operation in the War."
42. Kosakowski, 80.
43. Ibid., 81.
44. "Japanese Co-Operation in the War."
45. Ibid.
46. "Anglo-French Agreement of 1916 (Sykes-Picot)," The National Archives, London.
47. Robert Joseph Gowen, "Great Britain and the Twenty-One Demands of 1915: Co-operation Versus Effacement," *Journal of Modern History* XLIII, no. 1 (1971): 76.
48. Frederick R. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan and the Great War, 1914–1919* (Boston: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 85; George Curzon, "Military Co-Operation of Japan in the War." The National Archives, London, 1917.
49. "Japanese Co-Operation in the War."
50. "Minutes of a Meeting, 30 May."
51. Curzon, "Military Co-Operation of Japan in the War."
52. Fischer-Tiné, 336.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Khan, *India in Transition*, 291.
57. Ibid., 291–2.

58. Regarding Gokhale, the accusation of Indian colonization of East Africa comes via T. S. Krishnamurthi Iyer, *Mr. Montagu's Failure and Other Papers* (Madras: Ganesh, 1921), 10.
59. Khan, *India in Transition*, 128.
60. Herbert Luthy, "India and East Africa: Imperial Partnership at the End of the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 6, no. 2 (1971): 80.
61. Khan, *India in Transition*, 123. Also see works like K. N. Chaudhuri's, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750,* for detailed histories of trading centers connecting Indian and East African communities stretching back centuries.
62. Ibid., 129–30.
63. Ibid., 127.
64. This is also true of other pressing matters at the time. The Aga Khan and Montagu spoke at length on questions related to Zionism, for example, and such discussions clearly influenced each other's written works.
65. Thomas R. Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India and the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 89.
66. Ibid., 84; Edwin Montagu, "The Future of the German Colonies, 18 October" (London: National Archives, 1918).
67. Curzon, "Military Co-Operation of Japan in the War," 2.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., 4.; J. E. Shuckbrugh, "Employment of Japanese Troops in Mesopotamia," The National Archives, London.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Angell, Norman. "Weizmann's Approach to the British Mind." In *Chaim Weizmann: Statesman, Scientist, Builder of the Jewish Commonwealth*, edited by Meyer W. Weisgal, 77–84. New York: Dial Press, 1944.

"Anglo-French Agreement of 1916 (Sykes-Picot)" Foreign Office: FO 608/107/3. The National Archives, London.

Baring, Evelyn. "The Government of Subject Races." In *Political and Literary Essays 1908–1913*, 3–53. London: MacMillan, 1913.

Bourne, Francis. "Cardinal Bourne to Lord Edmund Talbot, 25 January 1919." David Lloyd George Papers. Parliamentary Archives/House of Lords Records, London.

Chaudhuri, N. K. *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Curzon, George. "Military Co-Operation of Japan in the War." War Cabinet: CAB 24/28, former reference G. T. 2206. The National Archives, London.

Dickinson, Frederick R. *War and National Reinvention: Japan and the Great War, 1914–1919*. Boston: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999.

Disraeli, Isaac. *The Genius of Judaism*. London: Edward Moxon, 1833.

Drea, Edward J. *Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009.

Dubois, Laurent. *Soccer Empire: The World Cup and the Future of France*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010.

Eliot, George. *Daniel Deronda*. New York: Penguin, 1996.

Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategies, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1914*. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1997.

Finch, Henry. *The Worlds Great Restauration or the Calling of the Jewes and (with Them) of All the Nations and Kingdomes of the East, to the Faith of Christ*. London: Edward Griffin, 1621.

Fischer-Tiné, Harald. "Indian Nationalism and the 'World Forces': Transnational and Diasporic Dimensions of the Indian Freedom Movement on the Eve of the First World War." *Journal of Global History* 2, no. 3 (2007): 325–44.

Frankel, Ella. "The Empty Land: Non-Jewish Schemes for the Resettlement of the Holy Land." Thesis (MA), Federation of Women Zionists, Education Department. Undated

Fraser, John Foster. *The Conquering Jew*. New York: Cassell, 1915.

Gowen, Robert Joseph. "Great Britain and the Twenty-One Demands of 1915: Cooperation Versus Effacement." *Journal of Modern History* XLIII, no. 1 (1971): 76–105.

Iyer, T. S. Krishnamurthi. *Mr. Montagu's Failure and Other Papers*. Madras: Ganesh, 1921.

James, Lawrence. *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*. London: Abacus, 1998.

"'Japanese Co-Operation in the War,' Precis Prepared in the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, 3 October 1917." War Cabinet: CAB 24/27/103. The National Archives. London.

Katz, David S. *Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England 1603–1655*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.

Keppler, Udo J. "The European Officer and His Chinese Awkward Squad." *Puck* 70, no. 1813 (1911 November 29). Library of Congress Prints & Photographs Division, [LC-DIG-ppmsca-27793]. Accessed 21 July 2015. http://loc.gov/pictures/resource/ppmsca.27793/.

Khan, Aga. *India in Transition: A Study in Political Evolution*. London: Warner, 1918. Accessed 23 July 2015. https://archive.org/details/indiaintransitio00agakrich.

Kosakowski, Leonard S. "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Japanese Expansionism, 1902–1923." U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.

Levine, George, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Levy, Elkan D. "The History of the Chief Rabbinate." Accessed 30 September 2007. www.chiefrabbi.org.

Lowenthal, Marvin, ed. *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl*. Translated by Marvin Lowenthal. New York: Grosset and Dunlap in arrangement with The Dial Press, 1962.

Luthy, Herbert. "India and East Africa: Imperial Partnership at the End of the First World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 6, no. 2 (1971): 55–85.

Metcalf, Thomas R. *Imperial Connections: India and the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.

"Minutes of a Meeting, 30 May 1921." Cabinet: CAB 23/25. The National Archives, London.

Montagu, Edwin. "Untitled, 16 March 1915." European Manuscripts: MSS EUR F118/95. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London, 1915.

———. *The Future of the German Colonies, 18 October*. War Cabinet: CAB 24/67, The National Archives. London. 1918.

Paxman, Jeremy. *The English: A Portrait of a People*. London: Penguin Books, 1999.

Pendlebury, Alyson. *Portraying 'the Jew' in First World War Britain*. London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2006.

Schölch, Alexander. "Britain in Palestine, 1838–1882: The Roots of the Balfour Policy." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 1 (Autumn 1992): 39–56.

Shuckburgh, J. E. "Employment of Japanese Troops in Mesopotamia." War Cabinet: 24/36, former reference G.T. 3041. The National Archives, London.

Tolkowsky, Samuel. *Achievements and Prospects in Palestine*. London: English Zionist Federation, 1917.

Tuchman, Barbara. *Bible and Sword: England and Palestine Form the Bronze Age to Balfour*. London: Frank Cass, 1956.

Valman, Nadia. "The Jewess in Nineteenth-Century British Literary Culture." In *Cambridge Studies in Nineteenth-Century Literature and Culture*, 288. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Vereté, Meir. "Why Was a British Consulate Established in Jerusalem?" *The English Historical Review* 85, no. 335 (April 1970): 316–45.

Weizmann, Chaim. "Chaim Weizmann to Lord Curzon, 2 February 1920." India Office Records: IOR/L/PS/11/170, 2478. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London.

Willmott, H.P. *Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1982.

Wolf, Lucien. *Notes on the Diplomatic History of the Jewish Question*. London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne, 1919.

7 Epilogue

In March 2013, the United Kingdom's Consul General Sir Vincent Fean was hurriedly escorted from Birzeit University (in the West Bank) amid protest. Among those calling for Fean's quick removal, some carried placards "condemning the Balfour Declaration of 1917 British pledge of support for the establishment of a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine."[1] The Balfour Declaration, and by extension the State of Israel, has remained a point of extreme contention in the global battle for nation. Written into the language of the Mandate for Palestine, the Declaration and its vague language became a cornerstone of national self-determination. A 'national home' became understood as a state, and the eventually stateless Palestinians continued to exist in the purgatory of "non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The exhausted British Empire, at the time being torn apart by the effects of World War Two and by the ferocious efforts of decolonization movements in South Asia and Africa, turned the Palestine Question over to the United Nations. Since the declaration of Israeli independence in 1948 and the subsequent birth of the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflict(s), the Declaration has rooted itself firmly in the international dialogue of nation, statehood, and imperialism.

Unsurprisingly, anti-Israeli organizations like Hamas and al-Qaeda have pointed to the Balfour Declaration as a document of imperialism, and the maker of Palestinian and Arab oppression. The war against the Declaration is global and there is little doubt of this. In 2002, an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa was attacked, killing ten Kenyans and injuring three Israelis. The attack was claimed by al-Qaeda. Less violently, at non-alignment conferences in the 1960s and 1970s, most discussions about human rights focused on "colonial suppression, specifically directing it against South Africa, Israel, Portugal, and the United States for its policy in Indochina."[2] Similarly, South Africa and Israel were singled out for human rights violations, and a great deal of scholarly work has been done linking and unlinking apartheid South Africa with the policies regarding Palestinians in Israel.

Of course the Declaration continues to weather storms much more nuanced and personal than this as well. In February 2007, a *Guardian* editorial, "No one has the right to speak for British Jews on Israel and

Zionism," examined the relationship between Jewish populations outside of Israel-Palestine, in this case in Great Britain, and those within the region. As part of the larger Independent Jewish Voices (IJV) project, the article noted growing unease among non-Israeli Jewish communities with the realities of the Israeli state. "No one has the right . . . " and the numerous offshoot editorials and letters that appeared in the *Guardian* throughout much of 2007, challenged the notion that anti-Zionism was synonymous with being anti-Israel and, more insidiously, anti-Semitism. IJV is a network of individuals frustrated "with the widespread misconception that the Jews of this country [Great Britain] speak with one voice—and that this voice supports the Israeli government's policies."[3] Despite the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, when speaking about the 2006 invasion of Lebanon, said "I believe that this is a war that is fought by all the Jews,"[4] Brian Klug insisted that the world's Jewry do not speak with one voice. Olmert's assertion, Klug argues, is based on the widely accepted misconception "that Israel represents Jewry as a whole—in Britain included."[5] This fallacy, he continues, is "a dangerous one, since it tars all Jews with the same brush."[6] Such rhetoric was not new in 2007. Among political powers opposed to the state of Israel, e.g., al-Qaeda, the post-revolution Iranian state, and others, such linkages between all of Jewry and Israel have been vociferously proclaimed. The inherent assumptions made linking all of Jewry with Israel draw directly from the history of the Balfour Declaration and the definition of nation negotiated in the early 1900s.

Ever-present in this history of the Declaration and its global narrative is the newspaper *The Guardian*, then *The Manchester Guardian.* In 2007, Klug used *The Guardian* as the soapbox for IJV rhetoric, but the ironic twist of history is that it was C. P. Scott and the *Manchester Guardian* who had so thoroughly backed Weizmann and the political Zionist agenda. Scott was editor of the newspaper for fifty-seven years, and during his tenure notably radicalized the paper in more than just Middle Eastern politics. He was an advocate of women's suffrage and an outspoken critic of the Second Boer War. A voice of the Left, *The Guardian* has maintained that role to the present, taking up the gauntlet for Edward Snowden and the question of digital privacy.

In 1948, *The Guardian* supported the independence of Israel, unsurprisingly, but was nevertheless critical of the British Empire's history in the region. The lead article on the Israeli Declaration of Independence noted:

> Last night the British Mandate for Palestine came to an ignoble end after twenty-five years. The Jews have set up their State and the Arabs have begun to cross the frontiers of Egypt, Syria, and Transjordan. *A civil war will be transformed into a war between nations.*[7]

That the war, between Palestinian Arabs and newly defined Israeli Jews, was first a civil war, only turned into an international one when Egypt et. al. joined the fray is a point worth noting. The article vacillates between

portraying the Palestinians as the same as or distinct from their Arab counterparts. This vacillation, the article notes, is born of the legacy of the Declaration itself:

> The historian of the future, looking back on the history of the mandate, may decide that it perfectly expresses our national virtues and failings. He will see in Balfour's ready response to Zionism the idealism and sympathy of the British people when faced with human suffering. He will see in our simultaneous dealings with the Arabs and dubious attempts to safeguard our own interests in the Middle East something of that Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy which gave us the name of "Perfide Albion." He will see in the Balfour Declaration a characteristic attempt to get out of difficulties by taking refuge in vague and imprecise language which means different things to different people. . . . Since we could never resolve the dilemma in our own minds we could not solve it in Palestine. . . . The historian may wonder why no British Government foresaw the rise of Arab nationalism, since Britain did so much to bring it about, but he will recognise that no one could have foretold the war in Europe and the terrible persecution of the Jews which turned Zionism from a creative movement into a passionate demand and from a disciplined march into a mad rush for safety.[8]

Even here, in the days long after Weizmann met with Sykes, long since Curzon and Balfour dissected the meaning of the text, the nature of Zionism remained enigmatic. That it was simply a "creative movement" before the Holocaust is at odds with its very realist agenda in 1918.

This book has shown that the Balfour Declaration, the debates that led to its issuance, and the political turmoil that erupted after its release all profoundly questioned the role of national identity in the construction of a community. As Brian Klug noted in the summer of 2007, distinguishing Zionism from Judaism has become increasingly difficult since 1917. In Palestine after the Declaration's release, the distinctions between Arab, Palestinian, Christian, and Muslim were blurred and altered such that British statesmen could forge structures compatible with imperial policy. For India the questions raised in London and Palestine *vis à vis* the Declaration further complicated national definition in terms of religion and race, of patriotism to the Empire, and of loyalty to one's community. The Declaration came into direct contact again and again with traditional definitions of nation and the modern struggle for nation-states.

What is more, the ideological and ethical crisis the Declaration's issuance set into motion continue to play out on an international stage. Stephen Glain's 2005 *Mullahs, Merchants, and Militants* examined this global nature of the repercussions of imperial policies like the Balfour Declaration. According to a mufti (Islamic scholar and leader) from Aleppo, "What is happening in Palestine is being done by Zionists, not Jews."[9] This sentiment too, he went on, is also true of Muslim extremists, like those who

perpetrated the 11 September 2001 attacks, in their co-opting of Islam. Zionists, the mufti explained, "are changing the holy concepts to serve Zionism at the expense of their own faith" and that "Muslims were not behind the events of September 11."[10] Again, the mufti concluded, the question comes down to national definition, that Muslims are not fighting a civilizational battle against the West, as authors like Samuel Huntington may argue, but a struggle for legitimacy and to cast off oppression.[11]

The questions that defined 1917, about what a pro-Zionist statement should look like, if issued at all, are the same questions that continue to appear at almost all international diplomatic talks seeking to deal with newly emerging nation-states. The relationship between ethnicity, examined in this book under the guise of race and gender, and nationality, continues to be a crucial component of international politics. In the 1990s, as Yugoslavia broke apart, a new term entered the international lexicon, 'Balkanization.' Balkanization came to be used to describe the ethnic conflicts in places as disparate as the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The same concerns had once again surfaced: What is a nation? Who has the right to define a nation? Is a nation the most effective and appropriate means of creating a state? The politics, theory, and ideology which ushered in the twentieth century helped to show it out; nationality, an outgrowth of the nineteenth century, continued to plague the twentieth, and appears set to follow us like a ball and chain into the twenty-first. That ethnically defined nations have the right to self-determination was the international refrain throughout most of the 1900s. Even in the midst of the Cold War, when international policy was thought simply to be divided between two spheres of influence—the United States and the Soviet Union—decolonization in Africa and Asia proved that the reality was not so straightforward. Nationalism and the struggle for national self-determination continued to be multidimensional and cannot be bundled up into dichotomous global politics. Nationalist movements that defined the latter half of the twentieth century, like those that defined the first half, were more than exertions of diplomatic desires or the concerns of two 'great powers.' In the case of the Balfour Declaration, the future of Palestine was not determined only by the imperial struggles of France and Great Britain any more than it was by the divisions among Zionists, anti-Zionists, and non-Zionists. Likewise, events which sparked decolonization in Africa, when examined more closely, were not solely the result of the Cold War dynamic, nor were they driven by the divisions between white settlers and native Africans. Instead, decolonization, like the era of World War One, was a moment of confluence. Multiple layers of historic and presentist needs and demands came together to create a chaotic and confusing set of structures and outcomes. Like the Balfour Declaration, the whole picture of how a nation goes about defining itself and claiming legitimacy, and how in turn that legitimacy is recognized and codified, is not fully appreciated or understood until the individual, the regional, and the global are taken into account.

The repercussions of the Balfour Declaration are just as seemingly disparate today as the influences that formed it ninety years ago. Today Muslims

throughout the British Commonwealth continue to vie for a voice in British politics, just as Muslims in the 1910s and 1920s struggled to speak for themselves regarding the future of their homelands and their place in the larger political structure of empire. In 2006, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw unwittingly raised the same questions about Muslim abilities and rights as had been raised in the late nineteenth century. In asking female constituents to remove face veils when they came to meet with him, Straw reinvented the idea that British policy is the superior political policy and it is by that standard the tone for statecraft should be set.

On the ground, in what is now Israel, the realities of the issuance of the Balfour Declaration have created a split between the Jewish Israeli state and the stateless Palestinians. For Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, like those living in the state of Israel, their struggle for legitimizing a Palestinian national identity continues. Until late in the twentieth century, the official stance of the state of Israel was that the Palestinians were "a 'community of individuals' consisting of 'Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.' "[12] Former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, who claimed there was no such thing as a Palestinian people, most notably upheld this position. Palestinian Arabs—Muslims and Christians—by virtue of their being 'non-Jewish peoples,' in the language Balfour Declaration, continued to resist this belief.

The work begun in 1917 continues. In 1919, Louis Jean Bols (1867–1930), in a letter to General Allenby, expressed the sentiment that in as little as ten years Palestine could become the land of 'milk and honey.'[13] Sixty years after the founding of Israel, that desire had yet to be fulfilled. In a series of articles examining Israel on the eve of its sixtieth anniversary, an Ethiopian Jew—one of the region's newest immigrant communities—notes that "We thought Israel was the land of honey and milk. . . . But you have to work for that honey and milk."[14] The Balfour Declaration was extolled by many as a first step in securing the rights of all nations in the process of self-determination. Since its issuance, however, many others have condemned the Declaration for establishing only an 'exceptional case.' Today, as then, few who actively work with the Declaration, historians and statesmen alike, can claim with any certainty what the document really sought. The implications of what it could and can mean, continue to confound international politics and, at the same time, celebrate the confluence of modern and primordial nationalism.

NOTES

1. "UK Diplomat Sir Vincent Fean Flees W Bank University," *BBC News*, 2013, accessed 22 July 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21666919.
2. Jan Eckel, "Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions," *Humanity* (Fall 2010): 111–135.
3. "About Us," *Independent Jewish Voices*, accessed 22 July 2015, http://ijv.org.uk/about/.

4. Brian Klug, "No one has the right to speak for British Jews on Israel and Zionism," *The Guardian Unlimited*, 5 February 2007, accessed 22 July 2015, http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,2005843,00.html.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. "Summing-Up," *The Guardian*, 15 May 1948, accessed 22 July 2015, http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2012/5/14/1337004145565/Israel-independence-leade-001.jpg?guni=Article:in%20body%20link. Emphasis added.
8. Ibid.
9. Stephen Glain, *Mullahs, Merchants, and Militants: The Economic Collapse of the Arab World* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2005), 99.
10. Ibid.
11. See: Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49.
12. Eugene Contran, "Some Legal Aspects of the Declaration of Principles: A Palestinian View," in *The Arab-Israeli Accords: Legal Perspectives*, ed. Eugene Contran and Chibli Mallat (London: Kluwer Law International), 67.
13. L.J. Bols, "L.J. Bols to Gen. Allenby, 21 December 1919." British Library, London.
14. Paul Adams, "Journey through Israel," *BBC News,* 2008, accessed 22 July 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7385350.stm.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"About Us," *Independent Jewish Voices*. Accessed 22 July 2015. http://ijv.org.uk/about/.

Adams, Paul. "Journey Through Israel." *BBC News,* 2008. Accessed 22 July 2015. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7385350.stm.

Bols, L.J. "L.J. Bols to Gen. Allenby, 21 December 1919." India Office Records: IOR/L/PS/11/170, 2478. Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections. British Library, London.

Contran, Eugene. "Some Legal Aspects of the Declaration of Principles: A Palestinian View." In *The Arab-Israeli Accords: Legal Perspectives*, edited by Eugene Contran and Chibli Mallat, 67–80. London: Kluwer Law International.

Eckel, Jan. "Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions." *Humanity* (Fall 2010): 111–135.

Glain, Stephen. *Mullahs, Merchants, and Militants: The Economic Collapse of the Arab World*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2005.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49.

Klug, Brian. "No One Has the Right to Speak for British Jews on Israel and Zionism." *The Guardian Unlimited*. Accessed 22 July 2015. http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,2005843,00.html.

"Summing-Up." *The Guardian*. 15 May 1948. Accessed 22 July 2015. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2012/5/14/1337004145565/Israel-independence-leade-001.jpg?guni=Article:in%20body%20link.

"UK Diplomat Sir Vincent Fean Flees W Bank University." *BBC News*, 2013. Accessed 22 July 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21666919.

Index

Aaronsohn, Aaron 35, 41 *fn* 82
al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din 99, 109, 111–12, 119, 128 *fn* 8
Ali, Mahomet 1, 118, 123
Aliens Question 25, 55, 62, 73
Allenby, Edmund 19, 114–15, 164
Amery, Leopold 31
anti-Zionist 5, 7, 9, 20, 23, 28–35, 45, 61–2, 115, 117, 139, 163
Arnold, Matthew 52
Asquith, Herbert H. 15, 19, 28, 39 *fn* 47, 138

Bache, Victor 20
Balfour, Arthur 5–6, 28, 32, 34–6, 98, 122, 125–6, 133 *fn* 111
Balfour Declaration 34–6, 117; 'Anti-Semitism' Draft 28–9, 32; Balfour Draft 26–7, 29; Foreign Office Preliminary Draft 26–7; Milner-Amery Draft 31–4; Milner Draft 29–30; Montagu's Second Draft 30–1; Preliminary Zionist Draft 24–6; Wolf Formula 23; Zionist Draft 26–7
Bar Kochba 45
Baring, Earl of Cromer Evelyn 20, 79–80, 138
Bell, Gertrude 79, 81
Bengali (*babus*) 44, 51–2, 62
Besant, Annie 9, 49, 120
Blood Libel 46
Board of Deputies of British Jews 23–4, 27, 30, 46, 54–5, 105; Conjoint Foreign Committee 15, 23–4
Brandeis, Louis 32–3

Cecil, Robert (Lord Cecil) 16, 29–30, 90
Chissin, Chaim 73, 81, 92 *fn* 15, 145
Churchill, Winston 28, 39 *fn* 50, 89, 91
Cornwallis, Kinahan 114–15
Crewe-Milnes, Robert (Lord Crewe) 19
Crusades 19, 74–6, 82, 140, 144
Curzon, George (Lord Curzon) 20, 31–6, 56, 81, 113, 148–53

Daniel Deronda 144
degeneration 49–55, 71–6
De Valera, Eamon 125
Dreyfus Affair 51, 65 *fn* 42, 107

Easter Rising 25, 52, 124, 127
enfranchisement 84–7, 90–1

Feisal bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi (Prince Feisal) 114, 116
Feisal-Weizmann Agreement 115–17, 131 *fn* 65
Fisher, H. A. L. 101, 127
Fischer-Tiné, Harald 2, 4

Gaelic Athletic Association 58, 63
Gandhi, Mahatma 121
gender 9, 44–50, 57–63, 85, 146
Ghetto 47, 49, 55–6, 72–4
Gokhale, Gopal 151–2
Graham, Ronald 16, 21, 26, 36

Ha'am, Ahad 61
Herzl, Theodor 33, 51, 103, 107–8, 144, 155 *fn* 25
Home Rule: India 3–4, 49, 91, 120, 124, 153; Ireland 2, 5, 25, 125–6
House, Edward Mandell 29
Husayn bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca 17, 148
Hyamson, Albert 38 *fn* 33, 60
hygiene 48, 88, 145

Ilbert Bill Crisis 48–9, 84–91
Isaacs, Rufus (Lord Reading) 20, 87, 125, 155 *fn* 16

Jabotinsky, Vladimir 6, 16, 66 *fn* 66, 131 *fn* 55
Japan 4–5, 11, 47, 71, 89–91, 98, 138, 147–54
Jewish Lads' Brigade 54–6
Jewish Legion 19, 56, 60, 66 fn 66, 108

Khalifat Movement 86, 94 *fn* 68, 118–19; *see also* pan-Islamism

Law of Return 33
Lawrence, T. E. 77, 81
Lloyd George, David 6, 15, 19, 38 *fn* 24, 49, 60, 101, 125

Maccabæans 45, 55
Macdonogh, George 20, 60
masculinity 44–6, 49–52, 57, 80, 106
Milner, Alfred 29–33, 60
Mond, Alfred 78–9
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms 87, 94 *fn* 69
Montagu, Edwin 1–3, 14–15, 20, 28–35, 39 *fn* 47, 39 *fn* 50, 49, 61–2, 87–89, 114, 123–6, 141, 152–3
Morgenthau, Henry 28–9, 39 *fn* 48
Moshi Letter 17–18
Mosse, George L. 45, 56
Muscular Christianity 53–8, 72, 78–9, 83
Muscular Judaism 54–8, 73

New Gaelic Man 9, 54, 58
New Jew 35, 54–8, 61–2, 66 *fn* 75
Nordau, Max 35, 56, 58

Orientalism 74, 77, 79, 99

Palestinians 7–8, 12 *fn* 19, 74, 80–2, 91, 110–11, 114–17, 160–4
pan-Islamism 83, 102, 109–11, 118–24; *see also* Khalifat Movement
Pearse, Padraig 52
Pinsker, Leo 106–7
propaganda 16–17, 20, 48, 57, 59, 87–8, 102, 107, 116, 129 *fn* 26, 143; *see also* Wellington House

Quebec 20, 127

race 32–3, 50, 52–3, 60, 62, 73–5, 86, 89, 90–1, 98, 100–2, 126, 138–9, 146, 150–1, 154
Racial Equality Clause 71, 89–91, 147
Renan, Ernest 52, 99–101, 106, 112, 128 *fn* 6, 128 *fn* 8
Rothschild, Aline Caroline de (Lady Sassoon) 55
Rothschild, Walter Lionel (Lord Rothschild) 4, 26–7, 31

Sacher, Harry 60
Said, Edward 73, 78, 81, 99
Samuel, Herbert 14–15, 20, 116, 155 *fn* 16
Schneer, Jonathan 7, 32, 39 *fn* 50, 62
Scott, C. P. 31, 161
Shah, Sultan Mohammed (Aga Khan III) 38 *fn* 18, 60, 73, 85–7, 92 *fn* 17, 124, 150–3
Sieff, Israel 60
Sinha, Mrinalini 48–52
Sinn Fein 60
Sokolow, Nahum 6, 24, 26, 29
Sykes, Mark 6, 26, 36, 44
Sykes-Picot Agreement 20, 126, 149

Thon, Sarah 58–9
Twenty-One Demands 149

Vereté, Meir 6–8, 16, 27

Weizmann, Chaim 6–7, 15–6, 20, 23, 28–36, 39 *fn* 50, 56–8, 60–2, 113–17, 131 *fn* 65, 145, 161
Weizmann, Vera 57–8
Wellington House 16–7, 37 *fn* 12; *see also* Propaganda
Wilson, Woodrow 29, 33
Wolf, Lucien 15, 23–5, 54, 139
World Zionist Organization 3, 24, 105, 107

Zionism: Christian Zionism 6, 57, 138–145; cultural Zionism 23, 38 *fn* 32, 102–3; political Zionism 6, 9, 14–15, 23–6, 31, 44–6, 56, 60–1, 91, 99, 102–9, 125–6, 144–5, 155 *fn* 25, 161; religious Zionism 102–3, 140