

Black Masculinity and Sexual Politics

Anthony J. Lemelle, Jr.



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Preface

“Boys will be boys,” “All men are dogs,” and similar proclamations are overstatements. Not all males are the same. The ease of thinking in terms of such essences is seductive. However, social facts often contradict such declarations. This book is about some ways social power influences how masculinity is socially distributed. The subject is black masculinity. Anna Gavanas, a fatherhood scholar, stated about black masculinity, “Past policy and academic contestations, which portrayed African American men as simultaneously ‘hypermasculine’ and ‘effeminate’, constitute a political and cultural repertoire . . .”¹ The feminization and hypermasculinization of the black male’s role in U.S. society has been a notable stereotype throughout U.S. history. I have avoided using the term “effeminate” to distinguish a quality of the men that contrasts with the way black men are talked about and manhandled to perform. In spite of the semantics, the observation that something is different about black masculinity is a consistent observation in social science literature. Gavanas continues,

In their influential books on fatherhood, Blankenhorn and Popenoe mention African American fatherhood only in context of social disorder and fatherlessness . . . According to the pop-Freudian views espoused by leading fatherhood responsibility movement figures like Blankenhorn and Popenoe, hypermasculine men are produced by a lack of male “role models” and fears of identifying too much with their mothers. Pro-marriage representatives tend to reserve such notions of hypermasculinity for low-income and poor (minority) men. For instance, David L. Gutmann writes that “Mama’s boys” in “the fatherless inner city” who are most likely to “prove” their manhood by “savaging” women . . . Popenoe writes that “hyper” and “protest” masculinity “of course” is most associated with “inner cities” (again, read: neighborhoods of color) but that it now threatens to “spread” . . .²

Over 25 years of teaching and researching about gender and stratified inequality is the background for this book. Recent discussion about race, gender, and class in the public sphere caused me to recognize that some of

the same old debates and restatements of facts are endlessly repackaged as “the new” when in fact they represent many of the same old race, gender, and class inequities. One reason for this cyclic representation of our social problems is the industry of social problems itself. Everyone knows that black masculinity is a major U.S. industry. When it comes to black males in U.S. society, service agents make money in immeasurable ways by working on them as a social problem.

This book is concerned with the way men and women use power to participate in the industry of black male marginalization. The way some black men join them in intimidating other black men is part of the story. In addition, the book is about how many women from different groups use power to join in activity to establish hegemony over black males. Rather than explaining social hierarchies as caused by past conditions—for example, it began with slavery—I am concerned with how hierarchies are produced in situations where representations are deployed to establish fleeting situational hegemony. Moreover, I propose thinking differently about the state (i.e., the *government*). It is not that the state takes on a life of its own and becomes the major force producing and organizing subordination. Alternatively, I also propose not thinking the state is a neutral mediator between competing interests. Rather, the state is an organization that a political class gains control over to more likely exercise power in social situations. Then at the root of the organization of race, gender, and class inequities are social actors. Therefore, bureaucracies, governments, past historical conditions, gene pools, cultures, or some other condition, do not cause institutionalized discrimination. Individuals and groups use the communication of discrimination in social situations to gain hegemony over those circumstances. They probably do so for many different reasons—for example, they might think certain groups should rule for moral reasons, they might feel that one group is the natural leader, or there might be alternative reasons for supporting situational hegemony. Nonetheless, competitiveness for hierarchy position happens in different societies differently.

In the U.S., race, gender, and class differences are highly competitive. The powerful often avoid difference. In addition, inequality is extreme compared to many other societies, even among advanced societies.³ In spite of this, in other ways, the U.S. is progressive. For example, female and adolescent literacy is high in the U.S. Even among minority groups, educational opportunity is also high. In many societies, this is not the case. Yet, social scientists and family policy experts note African Americans for their difference. This difference has many effects. For example, African American group membership affects educational achievement. Moreover, African American group membership also influences dating, marriage, and family. In recent years, social scientists and policy experts alike have asked questions about the role of African American males in U.S. hierarchies that would give insight about their social conditions. Masculinities research has significantly contributed to understanding men in society, including, to some extent, black masculinity.

Society expects normal masculinity to proceed with three notable markers. Markers of masculinity are birth, marriage, and death. Within this process, society expects males to accomplish education, athletic achievement, stable careers, marriage, and family. Nonetheless, many males do not accomplish these duties in any substantial way.

Relatively speaking, one group that historically has not performed these duties is black males. This has perplexed family scholars. For example, Gavanas described differences between white middle-class masculinity and black masculinity development:

However, the “family man” as a white middle-class standard defined by breadwinning and recreation needs to be contrasted with the working-class man in the nineteenth century, whose family continued to see itself as a work unit. The low salaries of working-class men had to be combined with the incomes of their wives and children, and long working hours were not conducive for working-class fathers to spend leisure time with their families . . . The conditions for nineteenth-century African American fathers and families were even worse . . . Slavery, segregation, racism, and discrimination profoundly restricted the possibilities for African American fathers throughout U.S. history, and they continue to affect African American fatherhood politics to this day.⁴

Gavanas accurately points out that definitions of masculinity change over time. This is also true about subordinated masculinities. Many things have changed since the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example, antidiscrimination legislation has virtually eliminated working-class wage differences. There may still be significant residual discrimination associated with hires and job prestige; however, job prestige is highly associated with educational achievement. Nonetheless, there remains residual discrimination effects associated with educational opportunity, achievement, and outcomes in the labor market. Moreover, pernicious stereotypes, for example, the stereotype that black males represent a criminal class, affect hires. Given all of this, all things being equal, we would expect marriage to be on the increase among African Americans and would have expected family structure among them to be more representative of the norm. This has not been the case.

The state and nongovernmental agencies have had an interest in promoting the formation of families and, more specifically, fatherhood. For example, in organizations such as the National Center for Strategic Non-profit Planning and Community Leadership, the National Practitioners Network for Fathers and Families, the Center on Fathers, Families, and Public Policy, Baltimore City Healthy Start Men’s Services, the Institute for Responsible Fatherhood and Family Revitalization, the National Center for Fathering, and the Institute for American Values, work was done on producing substantial dutiful masculinity. Moreover, mobilizations that included the Million Man March and the Promise Keepers assisted

in the dissemination of knowledge about dutiful masculinity. In addition, the state became involved with faith-based initiatives and laws such as the Responsible Fatherhood Act that channeled dollars to the promotion of desired masculinity. In spite of these efforts, by 2004 nearly half (44.5 percent) of black males between the ages of 15 and 70 years reported “never married” to the U.S. Census.

The only way social scientists might explain the failure of substantial duties among black males is through a relational and multidisciplinary method. I hope this book will contribute to those efforts. What is the condition of gender vis-à-vis black masculinity? I argue that all gender inequality is a matter of domination. Given this, black males will have a choice. They could assist in the reproduction of domination or they could work for the transformation of U.S. society to produce greater freedom and social justice. If they choose the latter, it would mean working for the elimination of sexism. That task would require an enduring engagement in sexual politics.

Many individuals contributed to form ideas presented in this book. Some might not be aware that in our conversations they influenced thinking about this text. Nonetheless, I found their words helpful in thinking through the subject. At the City University of New York, I am grateful to Paul Attewell and William E. Cross. At the Association of Black Sociologists, I am grateful to Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Benjamin Bowser, Art Paris, Barbara Scott, Robert Staples, and Alford Young, Jr. At the American Sociological Association, I am grateful to Judith Blau, Vasilikie Demos, Waverly Duck, Troy Duster, and Joe Feagin. At the University of California Office of the President, I am grateful to Bart Aoki and George Lemp. At the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, I am grateful to Rita Cheng, William Mayrl, Eleanor Miller, Joan Moore, and Carlos E. Santiago. At National Development and Research Institutes, I am grateful to Sherry Deren, Eloise Dunlap, Samuel R. Friedman, and Bruce Johnson. At the National Council for Black Studies, I am grateful to Delores P. Aldridge, Sundiata Cha-Jua, Mark Christian, James L. Conyers, Jennifer Hamer, Charles E. Jones, Maulana Karenga, William A. Little, and James B. Stewart. I am also grateful to undergraduate and graduate students for conversations about my research. They are too numerous to mention; however, Misha Lars deserves special mention for her serious and engaging discussions and toleration of long-winded talk about gender inequality. Vernon J. Williams, Jr. listened to many discussions about gender politics with calm and helpful suggestions; I appreciate his wise counsel. Ruth Russell provided special counsel and challenged thoughts about gender over years.

Anthony J. Lemelle, Jr.
New York City, NY, 2009

1 Black Masculinity as Sexual Politics

RACIALIZED SEXUAL POLITICS

Black males have used the expression “brothers” when greeting one another to refer to the fact of racial conflict. For example, the black revolutionary leader Malcolm X explained that it was not race that made men brothers. According to him, “oppression made them brothers; exploitation made them brothers; degradation made them brothers; . . . humiliation made them brothers.”¹ Since scholars showed the race concept has little merit as a biological variable, it is important to remember when social scientists refer to it they are referring to a social product.² By this, it means that race has meaning in social life and it partially determines economic, political, and social opportunities and rewards. For this reason, we cannot simply erase race from the vocabulary since it is more than merely a word; one could not delete the word “race” and eliminate its effects. In politics, however, many may come to think in this way. Added to the race-as-social-construct problem, are the references that communicate racial categories. Is it possible to eliminate them merely through choosing different words—would not the metonymic structure of racialization remain? This question is a profound one for citizens interested in social justice.

Race means social designation as a “brother,” according to Malcolm X, and being socially designated as a brother occurs because of the systematic organization of oppression, exploitation, degradation, and humiliation. For sociologist Robert Blauner, the purpose of the social oppression was to grant privileges to a dominant group:

But in a racial or colonial capitalist society where the racially oppressed are a numerical minority, how can racism be overcome when the majority of the population gains from it and presumably will defend these privileges as rational and objective interests? Here even the solution reached by victims of classical colonialism, the ejection of the colonizer and the achievement of national independence, does not seem to be a realistic possibility.³

2 *Black Masculinity and Sexual Politics*

Blauner is helpful in defining black males as a subordinate group within a dominant patriarchy. In addition, in his analysis we find that African American assimilation was not similar to that of ethnic-group assimilation. “Assimilation meant modifying or giving up certain ethnic institutions and culturally distinct values as the generations followed one another. . . . Very little of this fits the cultural experience of Afro-Americans.”⁴ For one thing, when blacks entered the U.S. they were largely a “sociolegal category” and their cultural process could not be one that moved from traditional ethnic identification of the entry group to assimilation by the second or third generation. The idea of assimilation is a very powerful ideology and even in its failure for African Americans, many neoliberals felt it was possible to manufacture an image of the success of assimilation that could stand in as a reasonable and convincing representation of progress. Had it not been for the extreme techniques and outcomes of repression needed by certain classes to maintain the image—particularly health disparities and rates of incarceration—the image might have served to wipe out reality.

However, in spite of Blauner’s helpful insights, one of the most significant problems with work on manhood has been the way that masculinity theorists understand sex. There had been some confusion between gender and sex. Toni Lester defines gender as “stereotypes about masculine men and feminine women that are pervasive in mainstream society.”⁵ She continues:

The idea that gender is separate from biology stands in direct contrast to traditional, essentialist notions about the proper roles of men and women embodied in court cases like the 1872 U.S. Supreme Court decision *Bradwell v. Illinois* . . . In *Bradwell*, an all-male Court said that women should be prevented from practicing law because “man is or should be women’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex . . . of womanhood.”⁶

Ann Oakley deserves credit for the introduction of the term “gender” to sociology. In her conception, sex referred to the biological division into male and female; gender to the socially unequal positioning into femininity and masculinity.⁷ Of course, Lester and Oakley may have made gender problematic in ways that do not correspond to the realities of U.S. racial history: In Lester’s definition she omitted that the Court was not simply all male but was in fact all white male. Now, we may also presume that the Court was all heterosexual—here our observation may become a little more tenuous but we can be certain that even if men were not all heterosexual, they were all passing as heterosexual white males.

Here is nuanced territory for the student of black male gender: In this book, I argue that black masculinity is a particular strain of masculinity in U.S. cultural history that is marked by its social feminization and simultaneously by its stereotyped hypermasculinization. Despite Émile Durkheim’s “rules of sociological method,” this is the case. Durkheim

stressed the importance of distinguishing between social facts and biological characteristics.⁸

Masculinity refers to the socially constructed characteristics that society expects for the male sex. For many years, gender theorists did not define these characteristics in sociological studies. One reason is that primarily white males dominated sociology until relatively recently in U.S. history. Earlier studies by them were often male studies. For example, the classic study of *Delinquent Boys* by Albert Cohen was in fact a study of masculinity.⁹ Second wave feminism brought into focus the relative definition of masculinity. Anthropologist Margaret Mead was a major scholar in this development. She studied several South Pacific tribes—the Arapesh, the Mundugumor, and the Tchambuli—and reported femininity and masculinity differently among them. The Arapesh norm was to shun aggression and promote cooperation by both females and males. Society expected both genders to display aggression among the Mundugumor. The norm among the Tchambuli required that men display passive behaviors and dependency on women.¹⁰

Masculinity social scientists thought there was a need for more emphasis on comparisons of masculinity across nations and across subcultures within nations. Therefore, an increasing number of scholars began to focus on issues like heterosexism, patriarchy, and power. This resulted in an increased number of studies that focused on black masculinity. However, the rigid distinction between sex and masculinity may have made unclear the power relations associated with masculine gender expectations and race. This book asks questions about this relationship in an effort to highlight the history of U.S. masculinity and to compare and contrast similarities and differences among the black subculture and dominant culture. Added to this, it is important to consider how male subordination likely globally exports—including exporting it through the mainstream media. In this sense, lessons learned in the U.S. have global implications. The purpose for asking questions about the relationship between expected gender roles and race is not to find out how powerful agents produce and spread the image of black males throughout the world. Rather, the primary concern is with how the typical black male image sorts and excludes black men from goods, resources, and services while they go about their everyday living. In other words, the major concern is not about disorganization in black male and female relationships or the need for black men to play expected roles for moral reasons. This may upset some theorists since the most important ideology starting in the mid-nineteen hundreds has been describing black male pathology as remaining absent from their families. The significance of this book is to reveal whether black males are capable of being included in mainstream U.S. society in terms of its patriarchy. I do not mean patriarchy simply in the sense of the authority of male heads of households. However, characteristics of male heads of households are an index of patriarchy. In this

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book, patriarchy means the group of men able to dominate society. Such men would more readily achieve their individual pursuit of happiness free from the tyranny of powerful groups that might not share all their values. Yet, there is a nuanced concern; the question is not one about individuals achieving happiness. The question is about the likelihood of different aggregates and sectors of the population having advantage to dominate.

RACE AND SEX

Contact between groups often influences social change. Prior to the era of mass communication, it was possible for events to happen on one part of the earth and only slowly or never become available knowledge in other parts of the world. In postindustrial and cybernetic societies, this is now highly unlikely; communication is increasingly possible in real time. In addition, meanings and understandings of events can quickly embed, nest, and saturate cultural products, particularly those cultural products produced by dominant groups. This has importance for international gender relations. Philosopher Etienne Balibar and social scientist Immanuel Wallerstein discussed this problem in their book *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*.¹¹ In a chapter that glossed the history of racism and nationalism, Balibar offered a unique theoretical perspective:

The phenomenon of ‘depreciation’ and ‘racialization’ . . . [is not an] indefinite series of objects independent of each other, but a *historical system of complementary exclusions and dominations which are mutually interconnected* . . . ‘ethnic racism’ and a ‘sexual racism’ exist in parallel . . . *racism always presupposes sexism*. . . . [We need] a more concrete notion of taking into account the necessary polymorphism of racism, . . . [study] . . . the ‘Arab (as) junky’ or ‘delinquent’ or ‘rapist’ and so on, or equally, rapists and delinquents as ‘Arabs’ and ‘Blacks’ [italics in the original].¹²

By recognizing Balibar’s distinctions, much of the focus in this book is on the organization of hierarchy based on the simultaneity and “polymorphism” of gender, race, and sex depreciation. An intersectional approach explains aggregate status positioning in U.S. society. The intersectional approach has been of particular concern among scholars that study inequality; and the empirical historical evidence is overwhelming indicating the intersectional “*historical system of complementary exclusions and dominations which are mutually interconnected.*” One sociologist who applied aspects of Max Weber’s concept of status in writing about race and sex context as it related to the organization of U.S. racialization was Oliver Cromwell Cox.

OLIVER COX: RACE, GENDER, CLASS, AND SEX

One of the most enduring and time-related aspects of Cox's social science is his observation about sex and marriage that he analyzed in the context of caste, class, and race relations. Few other theories of racialized dating, sex, and marriage will help us understand the historical organization of black masculinity. The problem for Cox was that there had been a long desire to maintain the purity of the U.S. "white race"; this was codified as law through initial miscegenation policy, and later, miscegenation legislation. Gunnar Myrdal had discussed this in his distinguished work *An American Dilemma*.¹³ In short, the law denied intermarriage and sexual intercourse with a white woman to most black males. In contrast, blacks did not seem to view racial intermarriage and intersexual intercourse as a major concern in their struggles for civil rights. Cox rejected the conclusions of Myrdal that fear of miscegenation and sexual intercourse between the two races was why white society permanently segregated blacks. In *Caste, Class, and Race*, Cox showed that occupational employment was the central concern of black interests and interracial sex was relatively unimportant for blacks when it came to civil rights concerns. For this reason, Cox wrote, "both the Negroes and their white exploiters know that economic opportunity comes first and that the white woman comes second; indeed, she is merely a significant instrument in limiting the first."¹⁴

In Cox's view, marriage and sex stratification was not part of some essential category. In contrast, it was part of the larger system of gender and race hierarchy where whites required blacks to hold subordinated positions—this was in the context of patriarchy. According to Cox, subordination allowed whites freely to exploit blacks and for this reason, Cox argued, whites could not permit black males to marry white women and white men were not to marry black women. If racial intermarriage happened in large enough numbers, it would have disrupted the social order where it was necessary to direct mass antipathy, if not full-blown hate, toward black *citizens*. Maintaining an ideology and practice of hate was the linchpin for the exploitation of blacks in terms of employment, job status, salary and wage, and income in Cox's explanation. However, "economic opportunity" also included full participation in the economy, including owning businesses, participating in stock exchanges, acquiring loans, and engaging in other commercial ventures that make communities economically viable. Therefore, Cox argued, "Sexual obsessions function in the fundamental interest of economic exploitation."¹⁵ By insisting that black males only marry black women, the controlling political class and its state could then insist that blacks be required to do the most "dirty and menial work" while being paid the lowest wages.¹⁶ Society eliminated most of this old thinking about interracial marriage and segregation.¹⁷ However, we should expect more intermarriage by now, not just related to race, but across class and religious groups. The point is that the social control

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of gender and race may still have some association with what anthropologist Gayle Rubin referred to as the “traffic in women.”¹⁸ Among blacks, for example, most of the large increase in intermarriage happened between black male and white female couples.

For Cox, this dating, marriage, and sex system had to do with the social production of culture. Since the real source of sanctions against interracial dating, marriage, and sex was rooted in the economic exploitation of blacks, miscegenation prohibitions had a cultural advantage to privilege whiteness and the white political class would have been interested in keeping their political class privilege. Their class privilege ensured that blacks would not become cultural equals. It produced and policed white cultural capital. At the same time, it made a subordinated class of citizens that was virtually fully exploitable by white males. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that powerful white males did not merely want to protect their daughters and sisters from the lust of black males, as many race scholars often recite the ideology. Rather, in Cox’s view, they were *primarily* interested in the social, economic, and political domination of black males.

Why did some black men find sexual attraction in white women, according to Cox? In answer to this question, we find in Cox a profound logic. He argued that whites held the ruling class position and this made their women attractive to subordinated men. In other words, the attraction was in the minds of the men who found the women attractive; they believed because of the women’s social position they were the most attractive. This suggests that the men objectified the women. Through social learning, they believed this was the natural order. The origin of this view came from living in a gendered and raced society. Today we might ask where love in this analysis is. Cox would likely think that attraction and affection are emotions that we learn. Cox also made it clear that the ratio of men to women would not influence the dating, sex, and marriage restrictions. Rather, “the cultural advantage which restriction secures to the white group” determines the development of the sexual color line.¹⁹ Yet, the rationale that white men must protect the honor and sanctity of white womanhood also served a symbolic utility in the political class struggle to reproduce domination. Cox wrote, “[T]he greater the insistence upon the purity of white womanhood, the greater is the tendency of whites to conceive of colored women as undespensible wenches.”²⁰ White males could then think of black women as a seductive class of whorish women that *good* white men could not resist despite all their efforts. This phenomenology according to Cox, left black women susceptible to greater possible sexual assault from both black and white men based on an ideology of a black female debased sexual morality.

In addition to Cox’s explanation, others attempted to explain racialized sexual stratification. These theories tend to explain racialized sexual stratification in terms of psychological processes. For example, Franz

Fanon explains the sexual desire for white women among black men as a part of a process of jealousy.²¹ Black men envied white male *possessions*.²² Calvin Hernton's *Sex and Racism in America* and William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs's *Black Rage* explained why black men and white women are comrades in the struggle for economic, political, and social justice.²³ They reject Cox's explanation as being too mechanical. Rather than seeing political economic practices as underlying race, sex, and social stratification, Hernton argued that both white women and black men were in semi-oppressed positions in society and this pulled them together as in the case of two magnets. Grier and Cobbs argued that white women were a forbidden object that aroused black male oedipal fantasies. These authors applied essentialist, largely biological, views to gender and race that assumed that male and female categories were outside of human interaction. They also applied an essentialist view of race that read each category—black female, white female, black male, and white male—as some concrete thing in spite of the fact that social agents daily produce, reproduce, and sometimes modify such categorical labels.

One way to contrast these theories is to divide them into substantial dutiful theory and relational theory. Substantial dutiful theory reasons that people are clear about their duties to society. When it comes to social roles, like being a parent, father, or mother, the roles are well defined and performing them becomes a matter of doing one's duty. According to the substantial dutiful theories, doing what others *expect* is living a moral life. *Due* is the root word of duty. In this sense, social roles are moral performances. Society connects such roles to rights and obligations. For each role, society expects those who play the roles to have certain rights. Alternately, society expects the actor to meet certain obligations in fulfillment of the roles. Gender theorists do not often enough remark that these expectations are also associated with gender and race roles. They tend to think in terms of just gender, only occasionally mentioning race as they tend to their analyses. Often groups and sectors of groups are unable to agree about definitions of systemic discrimination and degradation. It becomes even more difficult when individuals that have something to gain from the definitions are also debating about the definitions. A kind of role strain is likely to develop. This is one major problem with substantial dutiful theory: It fails to explain how duties are committed to as relational theory would explain.

Relational theory is a conflict-driven theory. It considers how men compete for positions. The idea of competition for positions in a society helps to explain how humans use communication to achieve their goals. This book will refer to these communicative themes as *deployments*. This is a helpful strategy to see how men come together in situations and, in those situations, how they compete for dominant status. In this view, hegemonic masculinity—meaning *authoritative* masculinity—derives out of the trouble caused by the goal for social dominance.

In the sense of essentialist thought, we must reject some other major explanations—designated as substantial dutiful theory—of racialized dating, sex, and gender norms. As Cox showed, under the rules of organized plantation-slavery, among slaves, there was no “father” to speak of and likewise slaves could not marry. However, even if black men fathered and played similar roles as married men, they had no claim to patriarchy. Instead, marriage and family for blacks was a derivative form of patriarchy. Privileged groups enjoyed the normative forms of paternity and marriage. Even where marriage and family were enduring institutions on plantations, they organized under the heavy-handed control of white patriarchy. This would mean that the oedipal explanation of family would not fit well for explaining racialized dating, sex, and marriage relations. It might be that given these major perspectives, Cox’s explanation offers the only cogent science on the subject—it is simultaneously an extremely disturbing analysis that women at one time could have been so terribly degraded by such social forces. It might also be very disturbing to some women that they were, in Cox’s theory, viewed as pawns in a larger game of economic, racial, and sexual domination. Cox probably did not intend to arouse their anger.

RELATIONAL APPROACH

One of the major problems in the study of gender, particularly masculinities, has been the tendency to ignore the idea that social status is necessarily a relational process. This is very important because it ensures that we do not think of the social situation in terms of biological or psychological processes, but rather, as social processes. In this sense, classical sociologist Max Weber defined the relational idea: “The term ‘social relationship’ will be used to denote the behaviour of a plurality of actors in so far as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms.”²⁴

According to the concept of a social relationship then is the prediction of lines of action when it comes to masculinities. The organization of society generates these roles; they do not come from internal feelings. These actions are meaningful for the actors. For example, such actions may communicate sexual attraction, friendship, or love; or, enmity and conflict. What is more, such action could be shunning or discrimination against a class that is understood to be worthy of denunciation. Here then, among males, it is likely that one class of males would admire another class while the dominant class might denounce the dominated one as a matter of a social relationship. In the relational study of masculinity, it is necessary to consider these reciprocal conditions in social relationships to understand the organization of masculinity.

It is also important to note that when Weber discussed social relationships, he had in mind that hierarchies developed where certain classes were

“selected” to lead. In this sense, he stressed the importance of class status in the analysis of social hierarchies. For him, “The term ‘class status’ will be applied to the typical probability that a given state of (a) provision with goods, (b) external conditions of life, and (c) subjective satisfaction or frustration will be possessed by an individual or a group. . . . A ‘class’ is any group of persons occupying the same class status.”²⁵

In the relational analysis of black masculinity, individuals or groups belong to a class identified as *part* of the analysis and class. Moreover, given the biological/social rule proposed by Durkheim, the roles for black masculinity exist outside of individuals. The roles impose on individuals through social relationships. In addition, groups and individuals would likely belong to many classes, some that are more enduring than others are; however, all of the statuses would likely be in competition with other statuses that would combine to form social relationships containing reciprocal conditions.

RELATIONAL METHOD

Studies indicated that such reciprocal conditions and change in time and space affected the ways that actors communicate masculinity and the way other actors react to such communication in various situations. Moreover, scholars had to acknowledge the anthropological work showing that gender norms and sex roles were different across cultures. In addition, scholars had to recognize that some forms of masculinity organized as dominated ones, particularly cultures with conquered men or among subcultures that did not reflect the standard image and organization of the masculine role. These two conditions were likely to be extreme ones where the need to control such males would be greatest in the culture. Additionally, males that had found themselves sorted into such categories would likely engage in a higher level of subversive social activities to promote social change that would result in more status for their social orientations. Early research about these forms of stratification generally highlighted differences between such categories of males and *normal* male categories. Scholars did few studies on factional organization where a minority group within a minority group behaved, believed, or thought differently. Many masculinity scholars treated such subcultural groups as if typical of the larger minority group. Some scholars began to question this approach. They recognized that the organization of masculinity was extremely complex.

Much of this recognition developed from research done by feminist and race theorists. Interested scholars began to use the concept of hegemony to assist in doing work on race, gender, and class stratification. “Hegemony” is a term used by a jailed journalist, Antonio Gramsci, in Italy when Mussolini came to power after 1922; Gramsci spent much of his adult life in prison. During that time, he wrote on social change across many social

institutions. At the center of much of his work was the concept of hegemony that generally referred to the authority of one orientation toward life—how members of that orientation organized and ensured that others followed their moral rules. Yet this concept was a complex one and generated a great deal of commentary.²⁶

For the purposes of this book's use of the idea of hegemony, it is important to stress the distinction that Gramsci made between civil society and political society, the latter referring to the state. According to Gramsci,

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural "levels": the one that can be called "civil society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private", and that of "political society" or "the State." These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of "direct domination" or command exercised through the State and "juridical" government.²⁷

What this provides for the analysis of masculinity is a lens to understand the "spontaneous" consent that many men in the population will give to certain groups in authority despite the fact that the authorities might use double standards in efforts to maintain the consenting men's statuses as marginal ones. Therefore, hegemony is a concept that helps us understand non-coercive parts of status-class rule, in other words, to understand self-domination. In this way, dominant sectors of a social stratum are able to use learning and socialization to extract consent from dominated fractions of their own or other classes. Consequently, there are two contents of this hegemony:

1. The "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is "historically" caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.
2. The apparatus of state coercive power which "legally" enforces discipline on those groups who do not "consent" either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed.²⁸

HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY

In his study of manhood in America, Michael Kimmel discussed how hegemony operates in the minds of many males. He discussed himself as

a privileged male in U.S. society when he recalled a discussion he had had with a black woman about his use of the notion of sisterhood in feminist discourse. He responded to her claim that the race lens made her typical experience with sexism and sisterhood different from the experience of white sisters. “‘Well,’ I said, ‘when I look in the mirror, I see a human being.’ I’m universally generalizable. As a middle-class white man, I have no class, no race, no gender. I’m the generic person!”²⁹

Kimmel recognized, following the leadership of Mead, that “[m]anhood means different things at different times to different people.”³⁰ Its meaning might change in experiences between different cultures. Nevertheless, manhood would also change in terms of different subcultures. This is particularly true in cultures that conquered different groups, like in the U.S. experience, and where the societies are highly organized in terms of dominance. A conquering culture might find it necessary to organize its society in more authoritarian ways than one that has had less experience with invasion, population transfer, genocide, or high levels of discrimination associated with its diverse-group population. Added to these reasons for ambiguous meanings of masculinity are the territorial differences for enacting masculinity. For example, one could find certain rules of masculinity operating on street corners in some U.S. cities where engaging in male prostitution might have hegemonic masculinity status but departs from it in terms of sexual activity—in this case, prostitution is usually a woman’s job. This patterned-situational, yet hegemonic, masculinity would need an accounting.

Kimmel acknowledged many such differences associated with age, class, gender, race, regional, and sexual differences. It seems appropriate to think in these ways—however, in another sense; these differences are differences in class aggregates, fractions, and groups. The dominant class status is the fleeting “container” and “territory” for hegemonic masculinity.³¹ In this regard, Kimmel referred to sociologist Erving Goffman’s well-known words:

In an important sense there is only one complete unblushing male in America: a young, married, white, urban, northern, heterosexual, Protestant, father, of college education, fully employed, of good complexion, weight, and height, and a recent record in sports. . . . Any male who fails to qualify in any one of these ways is likely to view himself—during moments at least—as unworthy, incomplete, and inferior.³²

What is ironic about Goffman’s composite is that it would be impossible to realize. Even if some males could deploy such an illusion, this hegemonic masculinity will have a different trajectory for the social control of black masculinity. The class positioning and class status possibilities for them are highly likely not to conform to the normal expectation. Such a paradox is important for historical and sociological accuracy when understanding stratification. This book takes the position that talking about subjects, as inequality, would

not result in social change. Talk is not change. Additionally, framing social structures as psychological possibilities for individual choice is absurd. This is so because social control is uneven in social organization, to think that it is even would be to proclaim that the subfield of political sociology is bogus. Therefore, an inquiry into black masculinity is a broader project of demystifying processes of social change and permanence.

Finally, another distinction needs attention in terms of hegemonic masculinity that ties into the importance of the relational method. It would be rather expedient to think of subverting hegemonic masculinity by subverting the practices of individual men. I do not believe that this is what Robert Connell has in mind; however, there is a tendency to think this way when engaging in conversations about oppression. This thinking is so completely ideological because it stems from a line of paradox associated with a profound belief in individual choice and responsibility. The imminence of choice is not clear. In this way, is choice an essence? Do we find choice distributed where one could find an average and a critical region? It is likely that choice is a probability—I doubt that choosing an element of masculine hegemony and acting on it is as clear-cut as some theorists suggest that it is. Added to this problem are the social constraints associated with choosing to practice masculine hegemony. For example, social psychologists Laurie Rudman and Kimberly Fairchild show in their research that it is not only that individuals accept authority. Often the authority is not in their interest or against their beliefs in equality. Yet, they also police others in multiple ways to comply with known stereotypes. They also retaliate through forms of backlash against those who resist performing stereotypes.³³

Connell's categorization of masculinities as a place where some masculinities are hegemonic, marginalized, or subordinate is problematic for a relational perspective; such a view would treat hegemonic masculinity as an essential characteristic associated with individuals. This view would make unclear the distribution of the performance and performativity of masculinity; it is not only that the performance in any situation is adequate but also that onlookers accept the performance and rank it as adequate. It is then possible to conceive of measuring the probability of convincingly performing hegemonic masculinity in many different social situations and summing those values. Such calculations might result in a distribution of scores where we could determine the average performance of hegemonic masculinity as an activity of daily living or activity over a life course. However, it would also mean that we could sum white gay masculinity in comparison to white straight masculinity and given the environmental conditions during a day, white gay masculinity might sum higher than white straight masculinity—that is, under specific environmental conditions, white male gay masculinity would operate as the hegemonic form. “Same gender loving” black men in Los Angeles would understand this latter perspective since many of them have rejected the gay label because it represents white gay male hegemony for them.³⁴

Therefore, from a relational perspective, hegemonic masculinity is a dynamic power that men *deploy in structural interactions* functioning to legitimize patriarchal relations and guarantees inequality of both men and women—it must result in the subordination of both the “other” men and women. The subordinated may also turn on others in their group to subordinate them based on the deployment of certain elements of hegemonic masculinity. Given this, it would be doubtful that “resistance” to hegemonic masculinity would be transformative for society, even if many males practiced such resistance. To get rid of hegemonic masculinity would require getting rid of all social hierarchy. At that time, we would eliminate incentives for subordinating others. Likewise, rejecting hegemonic masculine language would likely have little impact on social change. Social change would result from changes in the organization of things, not from refusal to sustain hegemonic conventions—as if it were a matter of choice. It is doubtful that oppression is widely chosen by oppressors or the oppressed. Even so, if it is, that might suggest the need for a conversation among the oppressed about it.

HIERARCHY AND BLACK AND ANDROCENTRIC REPRESENTATION: HEGEMONIC FEMININITIES

Political scientist Alyson Cole’s *The Cult of True Victimhood: From the War on Welfare to the War on Terror* engaged in an insightful analysis of the political use of the victim status and how that usage was deployed by reinventing meaning to serve the interest of hegemonic masculinity.³⁵ In one chapter she interrogated U.S. nationalism and the victim status under post-9/11 conditions—9/11 refers to September 11, 2001 when the World Trade Center towers in New York City were demolished along with other acts of carnage that were perpetrated by “terrorists.” She showed that in some journalistic accounts the authors talked about the nation as if it was a raped woman:

Another model for the framing and representing the events of 9/11 has been the crime of rape. . . . Indeed, in the aftermath of attack, public relations metaphorically dressed the nation in a skirt. “Gendered images and narratives migrated from embodied subjects to discursive constructions of the nation,” Mary Hawkesworth observes. “The US was stripped of its sense of invulnerability. The impregnable fortress was breached. America joined the ranks of the violated.” . . . The language of sexual violation genders the victim as less than a man—wounded, exposed, weak, dominated, invaded, in a word penetrable.³⁶

According to Cole, many of the commentators about the rape of the nation had been white females. We do not know if their commentaries

were reflections of free will. It is possible to accept the assertion that white females are free and only need to express their *will* as a matter of choice. This might be asserted despite the fact that George W. Bush declared, “Last time we met in this chamber mothers and daughters in Afghanistan were captive in their own homes . . . Today women are free.”³⁷ Presumably, the women of the U.S. were thought to be free by Bush since he had claimed that through U.S. masculinist intervention in Afghanistan women, with equally taken-for-granted free will as U.S. women, had been freed by *real* U.S. men. Consider these three quotes presented by Cole from powerful U.S. white women—though some might have been born or reared in other nations—who were commentators on U.S. post-9/11 foreign policy:

It is not only that God is back, but that men are back. A certain style of manliness is once again being honored and celebrated in our country since 9/11 . . . —Peggy Noonan

I cannot help noticing how robustly, dreamily masculine the faces of firefighters are . . . They’re not on Prozac or questioning their gender. —Camille Paglia

[I]t is good to see some appreciation for male heroism and even for the fact that traditional machismo always included not only dominance but protection and rescue. —Cathy Young³⁸

What these women share in relation to U.S. political culture is feminine hegemony. They unabashedly sign on to a *woman’s place* in concert with masculine hegemony. Below the theoretical, then, is the real world. Moreover, these women are linking themselves with white male power and they sound little different from Frank Rich. Rich asserted, “In a time of fear, the only battle that matters is the broad-stroked cultural cockfight over who’s most macho . . . the high stakes of an election at hand . . . Mr. Kerry must be turned into a girl.”³⁹

Given this, there must be a serious interrogation of the claim by Connell, “All forms of femininity in this society are constructed in the context of the overall subordination of women to men. For this reason, there is no femininity that holds among women the position held by hegemonic masculinity among men.”⁴⁰ Black womanist literature would make it hard to maintain this claim. And it might be extremely difficult to think in these ways given the social construction of black masculinity—this would be the case even with Connell’s individualist concept of “emphasized femininity” that presumes an award for women who engage in “strategies of resistance” and “forms of noncompliance.”⁴¹ Black men historically have had trouble with white women. When it came to the deployment of gender power, white women could make claims against black males that could cause them life-threatening problems. English professor Riché Richardson discussed how

this trope operated with black males in the U.S. South from the Uncle Tom to the gangsta rap periods.⁴² In this sense, black males may have aspired to become “real men” but the deployment of social control thwarted such aspirations. This led Richardson to opine:

. . . Uncle Tom’s painstaking sanctification reflects the racist Manichean logic at work for Stowe also makes him metaphorically emblematic of the broader economy of subjects identified as black, and the price that he pays for his redemption within her narrative schema, animated as it is by such a metaphysical crisis, is his unsexing and dehumanization. . . . [He] is subjected and subordinated to the point that gender differentiation—as Hortense J. Spillers contends in her essay “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book”—is precluded. For “in the historic outline of dominance, the respective subject-positions of ‘female’ and ‘male’ adhere to no symbolic integrity.”⁴³

The deployment of gender blurring would necessarily have an importance for any sincere conversation about hegemonic masculinity. For this reason, I will claim in this book that black masculinity was socially constructed by the deployment of two gender/power strategies: On the one hand, black males were expected to perform the hypermasculine role; on the other hand, they were expected to be feminized vis-à-vis white males. In short, society stereotyped them as a class of *social bisexual brutes*. This led Richardson to state, “While there is evidence to reveal Malcolm X’s construal of the Uncle Tom as homosexual, it might be more accurate still to describe his formulation of the Uncle Tom as quintessentially bisexual.”⁴⁴

“THE OMNIPRESENCE OF POWER”⁴⁵

This book departs from *most* gender research by making the case that masculinity is not a place. Rather, it is a power relationship: Gender is a form of power. We should not think of gender as a matter of will—one cannot will a performance or the pretension of a performance; the latter might be either the performative or simulacrum; or some related imminence. In this sense, I generally agree with Michel Foucault’s definition of power. He established power as not located in a territory but pervasive in human interaction. What this means is that tactics and whole strategies for power relations geared to specific and generalized goals are produced in masculinity, or more specifically, perhaps, in deployments of masculinities. The roles, however, are outside of the individual. What is more, there are good masculine performances and bad masculine performances; what is more insidious, there is always a probability that social reaction judges a good performance as poor and a poor performance could be highly ranked. For Foucault, gender power must take on its own organization given the “various social hegemonies”:

It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.⁴⁶

It also is important to understand, as Durkheim had, that norms and roles would exist outside of an individual and society would impose such norms on individuals through social relationships. To understand masculinity, then, is to understand it in social relations of various stakeholder classes. We should understand stakeholder groups as engaging in power relations. In addition, as Foucault stated, “the rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed.”⁴⁷ Therefore, it would mean that where there is power there is resistance and individuals have scripts (that is, tactics) available to them at multiple points in the social fabric “to play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations.”⁴⁸

Now we can take one example to show how a major misunderstanding could arise when we are thinking and doing masculinity studies. First, we recognize the hegemony of the field and the intersection between biography and history of the culture makers—the theorists, their departments, their institutions, their intellectual organization of leadership, and their hegemonic power. It is recognized as Goffman said it with some minor modification: *The complete unblushing social theorist in America is male, young, most often married, white, urban, northern, primarily heterosexual, Protestant, father, of college education, fully employed, of good complexion, weight, and height, and a recent record in sport, of publications and control of the discipline.* The first observation is that the talk about gender is a gender project—one that is intersected with race, class, and sexual orientation.

Second, we understand in the example that a definition holding that “sex” refers to biology and that “gender” refers to a social construction is not *merely* a discursive strategy; it is an act of power. Moreover, in fact, biology itself is a social construction with an awkward history, as awkward as the history of anthropology, vis-à-vis definitions of race and history.⁴⁹ It is little wonder, then, that Duke Professor of Law Doriane Lambelet Coleman discussed gender bias in Harvard University’s former president Lawrence H. Summers’s statements about women as if they had some biological foundation. She quotes *The New York Times* article that quotes Summers:

Harvard University President Lawrence H. Summers thus ought to have known better when he allowed himself casually to suggest that “a ‘much higher fraction of married men’ than married women are willing to work 80-hour weeks in order to attain ‘high powered’ jobs” and that “in the special case of science and engineering, there are issues of intrinsic aptitude, and particularly of the variability of aptitude; and that those considerations are reinforced by what are in fact lesser factors involving socialization and continuing discrimination.” Whatever he meant to say, these remarks, given to a conference of economists in February 2005, have been widely read as signifying his belief that he “believes women are intellectually inferior to men.”⁵⁰

Many social scientists would recognize the history of power relations in the social construction of the field of biology. After all, as Professor Coleman wrote, “Therefore, whenever science appears to suggest the existence of new evidence to support these old notions, it is understandable and indeed inevitable that the motives of its authors and purveyors will be questioned.”⁵¹ Therefore, rather than suggest that gender and sex are distinct categories, perhaps it is better that we view gender and sex as two strategies in social relations. When it comes to gender studies, one of the major problems has been the way that scholars use careless language. In the early days of these studies, often social scientists referred to the subfield as “sex roles.” These problems still abound as the subfield attempts to produce a more accurate language that would promote the scientific study of gender.

The first major step to refine the language was to abandon the tradition established by Talcott Parsons⁵² where he followed the lead of Ralph Linton⁵³ by referring to “sex roles.” This work developed into studies that stressed role theory that was primarily concerned with social change and the construction of roles and the performances of them. It was hard to see how these roles were associated with sex, sex category, or gender.⁵⁴ Actors achieve and ascribe gender roles since they have to display their gender and others have to agree that the display is an authentic performance. Here we can immediately see a major problem: Why did the black abolitionist Sojourner Truth ask, “Ain’t I a woman?” In this sense, it could be suggested that one could “do gender” or “display gender” consistently and persistently and have little effect if the hegemonic political class denied access to the gender, sex category, or sex aggregate role. This is largely because all of the categories are socially constructed. Actors must reproduce gender as a part of daily routines.

In the social relations that produced classes and class fractions of masculinity, there is always a possibility of the reproduction of oppression—that is, hegemonic masculinity.⁵⁵ This is likely to occur when social status classes deploy to maintain, reproduce, and salvage its power relations. For this reason, this book asks how patriarchy asserts itself as a “multiplicity of force relations” and finds its limits in the realm of its own organization. As

these lower status classes confront and struggle, and in short, battle with reciprocal forces, they are determined to transform the order of hegemonic masculinity while the order of dominance struggles to reverse any concessions that were necessary in the conflict that sought emancipation. In these struggles, we may determine points where relations are supportive among some fractions, relatively powerful or not so powerful fractions; or, on the other hand, borders, limits, and separations between the dominant masculinities and the dominated ones. All of this occurs in the context of deployments of statuses that actors make concrete through major institutions like education, law, religion, and other social hegemonies. In addition, the major institutions must share most values. For example, they must share a general agreement about their orientation toward black masculinity. The class actors share a core ideology about types of masculinity across-institutional organization; without this across-institutional design, hegemonic masculinity would become super-fleeting. For this reason, social theorist Richard Howson asserted in his interpretation of hegemonic masculinity with respect to the crisis of authority that “Unity is attained primarily through the development and transmission of ideology . . . within which is contained and operate the set of fundamental hegemonic principles that define and expand hegemony as progressive or regressive.”⁵⁶

Howson is clear that the struggle for hegemonic masculinity operates through systemic control over communication and that the powerful never brings the system of control to closure. Lower status classes speak contrary language to assert their emancipation. Therefore, the potential for resistance, concession, and realignment is always present. At moments, the ruling status class will lose its ability to reproduce its order and this could occur simultaneously with the inability of the dominated to produce change. The new patriarchy is just such a moment of development. It is a moment of crisis: The old order of white heterosexual male privilege has been disturbed and has become incapable of entirely reproducing its order; yet, the dominated forces of revised masculinity, ushering in an end to patriarchy, have been unable to imagine and bring into practice new ways of organizing social life. This requires a broadening of categories allowed to share in new patriarchal privileges; some of this has developed with the breakdown of gender norms as some types of women have been allowed to fashionably act out certain masculinist forms of behavior.

PROCEDURE OF STUDY

This book’s approach is a mixed-method reflexive sociology. The mixed-method approach here considers methods of the social sciences as tools that accomplish analytical tasks. This is different from thinking that the tools make an analyst this or that kind of scholar. For this reason, statements such as “I am a Marxist” or “I am an empiricist” have nothing to do with

this study. If the theoretical literature includes claims, or if historical texts include such claims, about black male experiences, they become appropriate for quantitative procedures. Therefore, phenomenological, quantitative, and critical methods will explain black masculine statuses in this book.

The reflexive part of this book is not merely thinking about a subject; nor is it merely an ecological perspective. Sociologist Loïc J. D. Wacquant expressed the idea as Pierre Bourdieu used it in his work:

It [reflectivity] entails . . . the systematic exploration of the “unthought categories of thought which delimit the thinkable and predetermine the thought” . . . as well as guide the practical carrying out of social inquiry. The “return” it calls for extends beyond the experiencing subject to encompass the organizational and cognitive structure of the discipline. What has to be constantly scrutinized and *neutralized, in the very act of construction of the object*, is the collective scientific unconscious embedded in theories, problems, and (especially national) categories of scholarly judgment.⁵⁷

This method would likely disturb the usual way we think about gender in the U.S. For example, we have a national narrative about black masculinity that portrays black males as pathological, contributing to disorganized families, typically engaged in criminality, and lacking intelligence. Social scientists contribute to this narrative. The relational perspective accepts this view as cognitively related to social group position. Therefore, those who accept this view are engaged in a politic. A political class connects that political way of thinking to its members. Commitment to the ideology is the prerequisite for membership in the political class. Nonetheless, there are other political classes. It just so happens that they are not as powerful as the dominant political class. However, the other political classes must necessarily fight against the tyranny of the dominant view because it harms their security and pursuit of happiness. It denies them social and civic respect. Nevertheless, they are in a tragic position; if they fight against the narrative, they become even more alienated from civic success. If they agree with the narrative, they engage in self-degradation and self-hate. The relational method realizes this lose-if-you-do and lose-if-you-don't position.

In fact, sociologist Paul Willis eloquently communicated this in his book *Learning to Labor* that studied working-class boys in Great Britain.⁵⁸ Bourdieu described this calamity where he carefully distinguished between two narratives. On the one hand, there is the narrative of the powerful class and Bourdieu said, “The logic of adjustment of dispositions to position allows us to understand how the dominated can exhibit more *submission* (and less resistance subversion) than those who see them through the eyes, i.e., the habitus, of the dominant or the dominated dominant, that is, less than intellectuals would envision.”⁵⁹ Bourdieu continues, on the other hand, that the boys learning for future employment,

For example, to oppose the school system, in the manner of the British working-class “lads” analyzed by Willis . . . through horseplay, truancy, and delinquency, is to exclude oneself from the school, and, increasingly, lock oneself into one’s condition of dominated. On the contrary, to accept assimilation by adopting school culture amounts to being coopted by the institution.⁶⁰

Black males suffer similar positioning in the U.S. To the extent that institutional discrimination exists, they face these tragic pathways. There is a third alternative, and it is to play the role of a revolutionary class. However, it is highly unlikely that any class could play such a revolutionary role consistently given the lack of resources and organization to fight systemic inequality. Therefore, we would likely see intermittent resistance from them. In order to understand these social relationships requires that one use the relational perspective; it is a reflexive method. In this book, this is the procedure for analysis.

THE DUTIFUL BLACK FAMILY

The patriarchal organization of society expects males to marry and function as the breadwinner and head of household. Many black males are in a position to play this role. For the most part, in this section, is the observation of data from males between 25 and 45 years of age with head of household status. This seems appropriate because by the age of 25, many males would typically have settled into their procreative familial and occupational roles. The purpose of the analysis that follows is exploratory. It compares and contrasts likely differences between black and white males in the context of substantial dutiful ideas that expect males to gain employment, organize families, and play the primary leadership role in the household. Many of the observations are statistical ones. Therefore, they are graphics to help readers visualize comparisons. Figure 1.1 displays comparisons between black and white males in terms of marital characteristics. Most black males marry. For example, in 2004, 45 percent of black males aged 15 years and older reported never married. Nonetheless, contrasting black male marital totals to white male totals (29 percent) is dramatic. Despite less marriage among black males compared to white males, the divorce totals are nearly equal. Nineteen percent of black males experience divorce, contrasted with 22 percent of white males. White males are far more likely to marry three or more times (3.3 percent) compared to black males (1.7 percent). Black female never married totals are similar to black males, 44 percent never marry. White female never married totals are 30 percent.⁶¹ The bars for marriage show that when contrasted to white males, black males are much less likely to marry, marry once, marry twice, or marry thrice. They are equally

likely to divorce. A chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated a significant association between black/white male and ever/never married status, $\chi^2(1, N = 102,662,000) = 1270.22$, $p = .001$ (two-tailed), $\phi = -.11$. If marriage is an element of masculinity, as many substantial dutiful commentators submit, then black masculinity is not that ideal form.

The mean index of annual personal income for married head of household black and white males aged 25 to 45 is also different. Figure 1.2 graphically displays this difference. The white male mean is 11.38 and the black male mean is 11.0. The mean difference is significant, $t(199.37) = -2.14$, $p < .05$ (two-tailed). Likewise, there is a significant difference between white male family income and black male family income. The white male mean is 11.68 and the black male mean is 11.29, $t(200.25) = 2.62$, $p < .01$ (two-tailed). Head of household black males who are not married earn incomes comparable to white males. However, married black males earn less income than their white counterparts do. This might serve as a disincentive dutifully to marry as substantial dutiful ideology encourages. In short, one might ask what is rational about marriage. Added to the earnings problem, is the happiness problem associated with marriage.

Substantial dutiful family ideology promotes the view that black families are more egalitarian: Couples in them share more income responsibilities and tend to provide a great deal of happiness for those in them. However, substantial dutiful theorists are unable to overlook the important role of conflict in black female and male relationships. Dutiful theorists explain gender conflict in terms of the organization of structures, rather than as




Figure 1.1 Percent marital characteristics of total racial male population aged 15 and older, U.S. Census, 2004.

$\chi^2 = (1, N = 102,662,000) = 1270.22$, $p = .001$ (two-tailed), $\phi = -.11$

Note: Total black male population aged 15 or over age 70 = 11,985,000, total white male 15 and over 70 population = 90,677,000.




Figure 1.2 Mean annual married head of household and family income for black and white males aged 25–45, GSS 2000–2006.

Note: Not married black male personal income N = 116, white = 477; not married black male family income N = 140, white = 536. Married black male personal income N = 161, white = 1144; married black male family income N = 174, white = 1253.

relational struggles for power, as relational theory would do. In terms of the black family, dutiful ideology consistently recites the impact of slavery and post-slavery but does not empirically demonstrate the relationship between the slavery experiences and today's black family. If we are to believe that the culture of slavery organizes black family, why does not the culture of slavery organize labor relations today? For example, Robert Staples takes this position in his study of black singles when he writes

Unlike the white family, which historically has been a patriarchy sustained by the economic dependence of the female, the Black dyad has been characterized by more egalitarian roles and economic parity in North America. The system of slavery did not permit the Black male to assume the superordinate role in the family constellation, as the female was not economically dependent on him. Hence, the relationships between the sexes were ordered along sociopsychological factors rather than economic compulsion to marry and remain married.⁶²

The notion that sociopsychological factors are more determinative of black gender relationships than are economics is fascinating. However, black males marry later, receive less pay for doing similar jobs that white males perform (and this inequality in pay is observable within educational strata), and marry later than black females do, white males, and white females.

Important sociopsychological factors and economic ones might influence marriage decisions. Even if this is the case, specifically what are the sociopsychological factors? Black women often remark that black men spend too much time with their male friends. They also remark that black males lack emotional expression.

Figure 1.3 displays the distribution of males reporting happiness in marriage between 2000 and 2006 to the General Social Surveys. Among married males between 25 and 45 years old, black males' self-reports show they are less happy in their marriages. Sixty-eight percent of white males reported being very happy contrasted with 49.3 percent of black males. There are likely many factors contributing to greater dissatisfaction with marriage among black males. Few black family scholars have investigated the psychosocial dimension from a relational standpoint. Many scholars have pointed out gender conflicts among black couples. Others have denied these conflicts. Most commentary has been a matter of declaration. Such declarations may contrast with evidence-based research.⁶³

Married black males in their middle ages show greater reticence to marry. They also report less happiness in marriage. One outcome of these conditions might be a willingness to break marital vows. The General Social Surveys provides data to investigate that possibility. Figure 1.4 displays the distribution of head of households that reported extramarital sexual relations when asked between 2000 and 2006. Black males and females are different. For example, black females report the most never married status. Since men usually approach women for marriage and the overwhelming majority of marriages are within racialized categories,




Figure 1.3 Percent married head of household males' self-reported happiness with marriage, GSS 2000–2006, N = 686.

$\chi^2(1) = 10.07, p < .01$ (two-tailed). White male N = 611, black male N = 75.

these findings are interesting for what they suggest. At any rate, since these women are head of households, this fact would indicate a certain economic attractiveness among them. Nonetheless, black males clearly avoid marriage, 44.3 percent, when contrasted with white males, 32.2 percent.

The greatest investment in marital fidelity is among white females. Notice also that white females report the lowest percentage of never married, 19.6 percent. This is phenomenal given the black female percent is 53.9 percent, black male is 44.3 percent, and white male is 32.2 percent. White females have the greatest interest in the institution of marriage. In the context of these data, marriage promotion campaigns are likely white female interested. They do not appear to be of interest to black males without providing them with reasonable happiness and an increase in human provisions. Later in this chapter is a discussion of the politics of promoting marriage with faith-based and government dollars.

Black males (15.4 percent), white males (12.1 percent), and white females (12.1 percent) report the greatest amount of extramarital sex. However, white females report the greatest percentage of not having extramarital sex—there is an interaction with never being married that black females do not enjoy. Therefore, married black females (7.9 percent) are least likely to have extramarital sex. In conclusion, we can say that extramarital sex distributes in racialized ways and it is likely that advocates for marriage promotion and fathering programs are bringing their racial ideologies to the policy-making table with them. One reason for suggesting this lies in the number of children this cohort reports.




Figure 1.4 Percent reporting extramarital sex while married, no extramarital sex, and never married in race and gender categories among 25–45-year old head of household, GSS 2000–2006, N = 3650.

$\chi^2(6) = 2.35, p < .001$ (two-tailed)

Note: Black male N = 221, black female N = 419, white male N = 1396, and white female N = 1614.

Figure 1.5 displays the distribution of mean number of children for race and gendered head of households between 25 and 45 years old within religious categories. The first thing to notice is that a reference to faith-based policies likely means different outcomes for different denominational groups. In addition, there are differences among the race and gender groups. In this sample, for example, there are primarily similarities. However, each religious model contains significant overall differences; the F values for each model indicate this. Under the Protestant condition, post hoc tests with corrections for equal variance violations show that the white male mean differs significantly from the black female mean, $t(841) = 4.56, p < .001$ (two-tailed). Black and white female means also differ, $t(1109) = 3.34, p < .01$ (two-tailed). The None condition also contains significant differences. White males differ from black males, $t(254) = 3.36, p < .05$ (two-tailed). In addition, the white male mean also differs from the white female mean, $t(472) = 3.24, p < .01$ (two-tailed). Yet, there are no significant differences among the Catholics. Black males have more children than white males, and having no religious affiliation decreases the number of children white males report while it increases the number of children black males report. In short, marriage promotion and fathering programs have become very popular. However, what remains unclear is the state function in promoting such programs. Many of the programs offer needed interventions. On the other hand, for one group of citizens, no matter how powerful, to tamper with the preferences of other citizens under cover of the state is what some might view as draconian tactics, particularly in context of the diversity found among different racialized and gendered groups.




Figure 1.5 Distribution of mean number of children for married head of household between 25–45 years old by religious affiliation, GSS 2000–2006. Protestant model, $F(3,1853) = 9.184, p < .001$; Catholic model, $F(3,773) = 2.58, p < .05$; None model, $F(3,511) = 11.17, p < .01$.

**SOCIAL POLICY AND SUBSTANTIAL
DUTIFUL BLACK FAMILIES**

Sociologist John Sibley Butler has promoted one rationale offered for tampering with the privacy of black male masculinity and sexuality values. The justification for such action is social teleology; he argues that we should follow examples of selected leadership and “success stories” and this will result in the uplift of the race. Such thinking underlies substantial dutiful theory. In brief, to save the race, aggressive intervention into the lifestyles and values of black masculinity is required. It is a linchpin of marriage promotion and fathering programs. Moreover, many of these programs earned government grants as faith-based initiatives. Their effectiveness is still undergoing evaluation.

Some classes of citizens likely have a vested interest in promoting behaviors that they deem proper. This paternalism intensifies if the policies target groups with high stigma such as black males. In fact, it is typical for powerful groups to gain control of the state; after doing so they are capable of implementing their deemed proper behaviors. Moreover, their proclamations of propriety could become the law. The powerful group can implement laws that reflect their values. Added to this, the powerful group could use other institutions to coordinate their views of valuables. For this reason, it is problematic to suggest that institutions take on a life of their own. Rather, domination requires cross-institutional coordination. On the one hand, there might be a basic site of dominating implementation but in addition, there must be subsidiary sites for the implementation of domination. The basic site is where the fundamental learning about domination occurs. Subsidiary sites are locations within other institutions that reproduce and manage the values of domination. These relations produce a system of oppression that does not possess a life of its own. Rather, a coordinated system functions in conflict to produce hegemony. Therefore, hegemony is not a site; it is a strategy in the use of power.

There are many examples in U.S. history revealing this process. One example occurred after slavery when powerful groups in the South created Black Codes and Jim Crow laws to guarantee their values. This legislative history is notable for its paternalism. It is important to be careful here. The paternalism does not refer to black males exercising paternity over black families and children. The paternalism referred to here is the paternalism of the powerful group over the subordinated group, including the men of the group. Some black males could participate in some expressions of patriarchy; however, those expressions were virtually always subsidiary and answerable to white male hegemony. The scope of Black Codes and Jim Crow laws are phenomenal. For example, there were rules against a black male looking a white male in the eyes. There were rules against black males looking at white women. In short, these rules sanctioned by the state penetrated the bodies and minds of black males. It would have been

fortunate if these exercises in state paternalism desisted as black males and their allies struggled against them. Alternatively, it would have been fortunate if they remained in their institutional locales. However, this was not the case; other institutions used these forms of oppression as precedence to control *properly* black males. For example, the State of California Supreme Court heard the *People v. Hall* case in 1854. A free white citizen conviction for murder based on the testimony of Chinese witnesses was overturned. The Act Concerning Civil Cases, providing that no Indian or Negro could testify as a witness in any action or proceeding in which a white person is a party, ruled the Court. There was a section covering criminal proceedings as well. It was simply explicit implementing its patriarchy under cover of the state, "No black or mulatto person, or Indian, shall be allowed to give evidence in favor of, or against a white man."⁶⁴

In terms of hegemonic masculinity, similar political class control of the state has intruded on family policies in recent U.S. history. Initially public policy experts concerned themselves with marriage promotion among women on welfare. Welfare policy was a convenient conveyor for promoting new family policy. President William Clinton's administration promoted welfare reform. Ultimately, Clinton signed the welfare reform bill on August 22, 1996. The Act's formal title is the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. The Act culminated after years of work on welfare that was also a part of earlier presidential administrations. For example, Ronald Reagan's administration was concerned with workfare proposals. At the time of signing the Act, approximately 12.2 million were on the welfare rolls. By 2006, recipients reduced to 4.5 million. The Act forced most previous recipients to take menial jobs through the Welfare to Work Partnership. The administration devised Welfare to Work Partnership to manage transition from welfare to work. It required a relationship between government, the private business sector, and poor citizens.

In spite of success for substantial dutiful policy experts, there was a need for other *welfare* interventions. For example, the government also increased the earned-income tax credit for the working poor. Moreover, the administration allocated \$3 billion to assist chronic welfare recipients and poor noncustodial fathers into jobs through the Access to Jobs initiative. These projects added to initiatives reducing taxes and providing transportation for the poor to travel to work. However, the administration was also concerned about criminalizing family behaviors, particularly behaviors of fathers that failed child-rearing values. The Clinton administration, for example, resulted in the toughest child-support enforcement in history. Child-support collections doubled. One result was that child poverty decreased and citizens on welfare declined to its lowest rates in four decades. The economy boomed but disaster was waiting in the near future as the Bush administration's economic roller coaster resulted in the largest depression since the Great Depression. International markets also felt the crash of 2008.

There were three social movements to produce dutiful families in the 1990s: marriage promotion, fragile families, and fatherhood responsibility. The marriage promotion activists were concerned with the decline of marriage in the U.S. However, they noted that marriage was on a decline throughout the world. Many in the marriage movement believed that marriage decline was a matter of contagion—that is, bad examples among some groups caused other groups to choose not to marry. The major example of the lack of dutiful masculinity was, of course, African American men. After all, Daniel Patrick Moynihan produced “the report” that demonstrated black family structure’s femininity. For Moynihan it was not simply that the black family was a matriarch; its power relationships produced males who were not properly prepared to play the role of men. However, much of the irresponsibility found among black males soon became apparent among white males. For example, historian Gary Cross comments,

Our age has systematically rejected the Victorian patriarch without finding an adequate alternative. The decline of deference, the rise of feminism, and the growth of technological innovation has meant that there is much less of a “payoff” for male maturity in families and on the job. Much of this is for the good, but in the process some men have abandoned the traditional ideals of paternal responsibility to family, community, and culture without replacing them with new models of “grown-up” behavior.⁶⁵

The fatherhood responsibility movement primarily targeted white males, and organizations such as the National Center for Fathering and the Institute for Responsible Fatherhood and Family Revitalization facilitated its activities. The fragile family movement, however, primarily targeted black families. Fragile families are low-income, unmarried couples that have at least one child. The concept is that there are economic and social status barriers to family formation that intervention could likely solve. If these “families” could be encouraged to marry, then, the policy leadership reasoned, they would become dutiful.⁶⁶ It is no small fact that the Moynihan ideology remained with family policy experts. While the promotion of marriage movement focused on men’s responsibility, the fragile families movement focused on ending female-headed households. For the latter, female-headed households promoted children’s poverty. For the sake of children, fragile families need traditional nuclear family formation. However, both movements agree that marriage means a relationship between a man and a woman, and both believe that without such an arrangement, children suffer. Additionally, both movements are committed to religious doctrines. The interventions are particularly religious in tone. Nonetheless, the fragile families movement is most concerned about employing men.

The federal government assisted in the promotion of families through a series of initiatives and acts. For example, during the 106th Congress, the

House passed fatherhood responsibility initiatives. The 109th Congress continued funding fatherhood projects. The government has deep investment in family organization and the reproduction of *proper*—dutiful—gender roles. Nonetheless, the differences associated with black masculinity are not seriously considered. For example, religious affiliation might have a much larger effect on black males when it comes to the number of children they have. Additionally, while we need more information about why black males relatively shun marriage, it is clear that differences are notable. For both black females and males, they are least likely to report no extramarital sex. Sexual culture might have different lived experience among blacks. If so, should blacks experience forceful policies demanding their compliance with majority behaviors? Should multiculturalism extend to human sexuality and marriage patterns?

INSUBSTANTIAL DUTIES

The racialized difference associated with substantial difference is also observable on the margins of dutiful masculinity. For example, among men that never married, significant racialized differences still endure. Figure 1.6 displays the distribution of children by black and white males for men with personal earnings above and below \$25,000 per year. Black males have significantly more children out of wedlock than do white males, $t(276) = 8.0$, $p < .001$ (two-tailed). Nonetheless, many in the fatherhood promotion and fragile families movements often think of masculinity as an essence. Many others in society share this view. This has been an important viewpoint among different kinds of, although not all, feminists. It has also been a widespread perspective among proponents of faith-based programs. In the field of public health, the essential masculinity viewpoint prevails. For example, AIDS prevention intervention research is notorious for promoting a one-dimensional masculinity. Moreover, the viewpoint is prevalent among masculinity scholars. While most leading masculinity scholars acknowledge that black masculinity is different from the normative masculinity, the theories typically return to privilege masculinity characteristics among white males as the essential elements for masculine expression.

In black family studies, the ideology of essential masculinity associated with dutiful familial behaviors is pervasive. For example, one view often stated is that black males do not marry because of economic conditions. Job opportunities and job stability are likely major factors associated with marriage decisions. However, it is highly unlikely that these two factors are determinative in marriage decisions. Moreover, women often think men will marry them if they have children for them. The ideology holding that it takes a man to raise a baby communicates the importance of marriage as a part of the fatherhood duty. However, differences in racialized social positions result in different patterns. There is the possibility that different

racialized groups will invest money in families differently. Figure 1.6 indicates some of this reasoning. Notice that among the never married males in this sample, black men tend to have more children than white males in spite of earnings. Earning more income results in fewer children for white males, for black males, it has the opposite effect.

Insofar as dutiful family formation and racialization are concerned, it is likely that social scientists and public policy experts need a more nuanced understanding of masculinity. To initiate such a conversation in the era of post-racial politics—Barack Obama's election as president signifies this moment—it is important to ask what indicators predict marriage among black males. Many factors likely contribute to marriage decisions. Nonetheless, given theory in the area, perhaps it would prove interesting to compare differences between black and white males on a set of predictors that discourses on masculinity suggest.

The dutiful ideology suggests that men should earn income to feed their families. It holds that lacking income affects decisions about marriage. In addition, the attendant argument is that if men do not earn equitably, providing them with adequate incomes would result in increasing marriage among their class. Despite the fact that couples should not remain single too long, largely because of their biological clocks, age enhances maturity and results in willingness for males to settle down. However, men naturally shun familial responsibility, and urban life with its moral density and seductive opportunities for deviance promotes masculine irresponsibility.




Figure 1.6 Mean number of children by black and white never married males aged 18 and older, GSS 2000–2006 (N = 1384).

Income less than \$25,000, $t(90) = 3.99$, $p < .001$ (two-tailed); income greater than \$25,000, $t(79) = 4.72$, $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Note: Black males ($\bar{X} = .74$) earning less than \$25,000, N = 82; white males ($\bar{X} = .21$), N = 418. Black males ($\bar{X} = .84$) earning more than \$25,000, N = 76; white males ($\bar{X} = .13$), N = 409.

Religious life assists in abating profligacy. While religion helps to keep men on the moral path, good home training is necessary to lay the foundation for dutiful marital relations. Men learn from their fathers how to be men and dedicated fathers. Fathers in young boys' and teenagers' family homes provide examples that the young males can emulate. Mothers can nurture young males; however, it takes a man to raise a boy to manhood. Without a father's leadership, males run the risk of developing risky sexual lifestyles and they may learn casual sexual practices. They may become involved in illicit drug use. To test the assumptions of substantial dutiful theory, Table 1.1 displays a logistic regression model using indicators from the General Social Surveys. The table shows that when the theoretically

Table 1.1 Logistic regression predicting black and white males aged 25–45 ever marry among head of household on selected variables, GSS 2000-2006 (N = 1173)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>Odds ratio</i>	<i>p</i>
Black males (N = 155)				
Respondent income	.02	.08	1.02	.823
Rural residence	.04	.09	1.04	.666
Church attendance	.25	.08	1.28	.002
Age	.16	.04	1.18	.001
Homosexual or bisexual sex in last five years	-.44	.82	.64	.586
Not in romantic relationship with last sex partner	-.99	.91	.37	.136
Ever use crack (cocaine)	-.96	.91	.39	.293
Constant	-6.02	1.55	.01	.001
White males (N = 1018)				
Respondent income	.10	.04	1.10	.005
Rural residence	.18	.03	1.19	.001
Church attendance	.15	.04	1.16	.001
Age	.14	.02	1.15	.001
Homosexual or bisexual sex in last five years	-2.05	.39	.13	.001
Not in romantic relationship with last sex partner	-1.40	.23	.25	.001
Ever use crack (cocaine)	-.61	.27	.54	.021
Constant	-6.02	1.55	.01	.001

driven predictors are assessed to predict ever marrying or not, they significantly did so. However, Table 1.1 excludes some of the predictors in the table because they did not assist in predicting marriage for either group, for example, father's education, father's occupational prestige, living with mother and father at 16, and political identification. For black males, when taken together the predictor variables revealed the odds of having characteristics suggested by substantial dutiful theory, $\chi^2 = 46.8$, $df = 7$, $N = 155$, $p < .001$. Only age (1.18) and church attendance (1.28) increases the odds of ever marrying among the 25- to 45-year-old black heads of household. The model has a Nagelkerke pseudo R^2 of .35, indicating that the model explains 35 percent of the variation in predicting if this cohort of black males ever marries.

Table 1.1 displays the data for white males below the black males' panel. For white males, the substantial dutiful theory model was also significant, $\chi^2 = 279.19$, $df = 7$, $N = 1018$, $p < .001$. When considering all the predictor variables together, respondent income, rural residence, church attendance, age, homosexual or bisexual sex in the last five years, not in a romantic relationship with last sex partner, and ever use crack contribute to marriage among white males. The model has a Nagelkerke pseudo R^2 of .34, indicating that the model explains 34 percent of the variation in predicting whether white males ever marry.

The substantial dutiful worldview has little application for black males. For example, many substantial dutiful theorists from the fragile family movement argue that employment and equal pay for equal work will result in greater marriage and family formation among African Americans. However, other factors likely contribute to decision to marry among black males. Nonetheless, greater income relates to white males' decision to marry. It is a wonder why black males in this cohort did not report greater happiness in their marriages. It is likely little surprise to professionals working to decrease HIV among black males that same sex behaviors do not predict marriage. In spite of this, it does so for white males. Moreover, we would likely need to intervene differently in black male social problems from our interventions in white male social problems. To maintain a colorblind and gendered approach to social problems likely would have a devastating effect on black male survival. This chapter's exploratory comparisons demonstrate that the black male population is not statistically the same as the white male population.

ORGANIZATION OF BOOK

Chapter 2 discusses the production of black masculinity as a unique gender form in U.S. history. This history demonstrates how dominated masculinist deployments produced a desire to emulate hegemonic masculinity even when such strategic and tactical deployments were outside the interests of

black masculinity. In spite of this, black men bought into deeply embedded binary categories that provided them the hope to compete with white males who held the lion's share of power in social organization. In comparison to black males, white males represented the *real* patriarchy. However, that hegemonic positioning began to unravel as the civil rights movement and immigration policies changed the landscape of intellectual authority over the Eurocentric canon in the colleges and universities and more generally in society. This resulted in Stephen Steinberg, one of the leading sociologists concerned with race relations and integration, to remark

[Y]et another great wave of immigration that was triggered by the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act. Passed on the heels of the Civil Rights Revolution, this legislation revoked the national origins quotas instituted in 1924 that effectively restricted immigration . . . Though unanticipated by its advocates, the reform precipitated a tidal wave of immigrants, mostly from Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean—totaling over 30 million by 2006.⁶⁷

The change in population and students, and eventually the professoriate, resulted in new ways of thinking about and controlling patriarchy. No longer could the deployment of hegemonic masculinity operate as it had during the 1950s. For this reason, the codes associated with hegemonic masculinity required adjustment and this was particularly the case with respect to controlling the modified images of masculinity.

Chapter 3 discusses the ways that the organization of political and economic order was unique for black males. The state played a major role in organizing black men in the post-civil rights period. State agents used rules to regulate black men that derived from a social imagination that the black male's social position is beneath that of the white male. It meant that most black males could not challenge their social subordination. In fact, if a "text" is an encoded production, the code for the black male position produced thinking of them as a *form of womanhood*. In spite of this, colleges and universities offered more gender studies and masculinity courses, and many scholars interpret masculinity as an essential and normative biological category. This means a penis became a superficial marker of being masculine. To complicate this embodiment strategy for defining masculinity, Chapter 3 opens with an analysis of Abner Louima's forced sodomy at a Brooklyn, New York, police station and ties this event to a history of relations where black male status summoned a distinct deployment of masculine rights. These rights were noticeable in social relations among black males in particular ways and noticeable in social relations between white and black males in comparative and contrasted ways. In this way, some "black males"—particularly black males like President Barack Obama—who have an immigrant minority status as opposed to a colonized minority status and are not descendants of slaves, are able to deploy

masculinity differently. Data from national surveys are analyzed showing that the order of things have not changed in terms of normal indicators of American masculine success; namely, success in households and occupations. Chapter 3 views Louima's sodomy as an important and often ignored marker in the discourse on black masculinity among many scholars of masculinity studies.

Chapter 4 continues with examination of the various ways the culture produced "ideologies of inferiority" to control black males. The examination begins with social control by government, mass media, and schooling. However, taking any one of these institutions singularly would not assist us in understanding the full nature of this social control. Additionally, understanding the ideology of inferiority as a product outside of its historical context fails us in understanding the way it was passed on to future generations. The ideologies of inferiority reemerged from the past to function as controls in the present. Chapter 4 traced this process and shows why it is possible to *imagine* that patriarchy has changed in important ways vis-à-vis black masculinity when, in fact, society only manufactured minor modifications. Society reproduced different but similar forms of racialized domination.

Chapter 5 is concerned with black male agency where some men access patriarchal rights and obligations while society will not allow other men to do so. Permission to participate in the political system is a part of the organization of citizenship. Trouble abounds when certain men are constrained as a condition of stereotype management to play less than full citizenship roles. Here the males have plenty of room to play within domination but the effects of the play are, after all, subversive. The chapter argues that much of the playful performance is actually acting out insurgency. The chapter attempts to locate where in the political order black male citizenship trouble undermines the republic. Given this, hierarchies of authority that black males produce result in their desire to receive acceptance as rightful patriarchs, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, their urgent need to exclude some other men from making claims of belonging to the dominant statuses. These facts challenge the notion of a hegemonic masculinity since hegemony deployment happens in situations—that is, hegemonic masculinity is a struggle for power over others.

Chapter 6 examines how deployment of hegemonic masculinity worked between heterosexual and homosexual black males. Scholars reported black communities to hold greater negative attitudes against homosexual relations. The General Social Surveys is a way to test these attitudes. In addition, U.S. Census data allow us to compare homosexual and heterosexual households in terms of both gender and race. The chapter shows suppression of hegemonic masculinity status under conditions of black male heterosexual claims. Whiteness is the strongest index for predicting hegemonic status even when homosexuality is a condition. The chapter then discusses the relationship between sexism and homosexuality, the discursive ways that society connects sexual identity to the domination of

women—that is, the chapter discusses the work of homophobia and sexism simultaneously. The chapter uses court reports of public sex venues to demonstrate hegemonic masculinity as the deployment of power instead of an actual stratification location. Black secular intellectual leadership is examined vis-à-vis the cultural attitudes about homosexual relations. The chapter views the new patriarchy in context of these relationships.

The education, socialization, and organization of black males are necessary for the maintenance of the sexual politics connected to black male statuses. Chapter 7 discusses black male sex roles future expectations. Society is not likely to eliminate feminizing and hypermasculinizing role statuses. Change requires broader interventions not just for black male liberation, but also for an agenda promoting social justice. This would be important for the development of different sexual politics.

Chapter 8 is concerned with what we can expect for the future by observing *successful* sectors of the black male population. The chapter ends with a policy strategy that suggests the importance of thinking about transformation in multiple ways. Its premise is that entangled gendered and sexual inequality requires transformation through thinking about and doing things differently.

2 Controlling Masculine Hierarchies

LOCATING BLACK MASCULINITY

The often quoted words of W. E. B. Du Bois's 1903 observation that "the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line,—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea" is no longer the most important aspect of U.S. or international race relations.¹ The problem for the twenty-first century has become the question of informing consciousness through the representation of images. The consciousness-producing machinery receives greater and greater investment.² The mass media have become an effective way to inform consciousness. Through it, powerful groups are able to deny, or more insidiously, hide, subjugating practices. Insofar as black males are concerned, the stereotypes perpetuated by the media are important for continuing black male inequality.³ Moreover, the significance of stereotyping black males is the social sorting of them.

Modern-day stereotypes explain individual expected actions. Expected taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly intellectual and moral ones, relate to one another and the stereotypes. The representation industry manufactures motivated views about tastes. Many believe in the dominant views produced by the industry; the views are considered common sense in private and public settings.⁴

Insofar as black males are concerned, the stereotypes perpetuated by the media are important, not determinative, for the continued production of their inequality. Earl Ofari Hutchinson showed in his study of the assassination of the black male image how the media play the crucial role in informing "middle-class" consciousness about the correct, commonsense, way to view black males.⁵

Informing consciousness through the mechanism of stereotyping representations is both consumptive and productive processes. Groups differ in the amounts of consciousness they may produce. In addition, groups differ in the consumption of images. Cultural practice controls the stratification of consciousness. Stratification is a social structure. In stratification, aggregate black male position is different from white male position. This is true

in terms of producing and consuming culture. Stratification of consciousness also positions scholars. Mainstream culture appreciates scholars with more mainstream attitudes and values. For example, Malcolm X used the pejorative language of “field” and “house” Negro to classify ideal forms of black consciousness. Many might feel uncomfortable to acknowledge different forms of black consciousness. However, form of consciousness influences decisions about social actions. Some might feel a need to deny such distinctions. However, this feeling and its consequent actions are also forms of politics.

If the previous paragraph is so, however, it has profound implications. For example, do black male students who behave more in line with typical attitudes of whiteness receive greater privileges and rewards than students who do not? This question is different from one that asks, “Do black males who behave the way whites want them to behave receive greater privileges and rewards?” Of course, students who behave too “ethnically” are likely to be at a disadvantage—this is not a matter of attitudes but rather social performances at school. It is possible to have an attitude and hide it. It is possible to put on an act. Such assimilating codes might also operate at the workplace. However, even if such codes operate at the workplace, they may be distinguishable from workplace stereotyping and discrimination based on skin color. Racialized organization of presentation would likely impact black males in a way that many of them would rather not suffer. Such organizations would traffic in degradation and humiliation offered by formal education and the labor market.

Two works that speak to such stereotyping are important to mention here. One is a book by English professor Andrea Elizabeth Shaw that studied weight related to black women’s bodies and the second is a work by Scott Poulson-Bryant that studied a stereotype that black men have large penises.⁶ What both studies share is the importance of stereotypes to determine the embodiment of a social status. In the case of “fat black women,” Shaw argues that their bodies became a site of political resistance and simultaneously a representation of “unruliness and rebellion that are implicit in her size.”⁷ She continues,

Her resistance to authoritative cultural requirements does not necessarily signal that she is not capable of complying; her fat may indicate an unwillingness to comply, or an indifference to those norms . . . Her size further illustrates her chosen disobedience since its corpulence may also be read as sufficiency and therefore a lack of desire to ingest the alien ideologies that have already rendered her beyond the periphery of the dominant culture.⁸

What Shaw shows us is the way that a typical body shape of a black woman’s buttock represents a spoiled identity. For example, she questions the

representation of Saartjie Baartman's display in Europe. Baartman was a young South African woman that powerful whites took to Cape Town in 1820. When she was 20 years old, her employer took her to England and repeatedly sexually abused her. Her employer changed her name to Hottentot Venus. He caged her and displayed her naked body across Europe. Her rump was infamous in the view of the European imagination. Even after her death, agents displayed Baartman's buttocks and genitalia at the *Musée de l'Homme* in Paris.⁹ Shaw concludes, "Furthermore, the public visibility of the buttocks in the human anatomy make[s] them arguably the most potent cultural signifiers of the black female sexuality."¹⁰

There was not only a concern for the size of Baartman's buttock; likewise, there was an obsessive concern for her labia. The agents used the relatively large buttock and labia as evidence for the imagined degenerate genetic makeup of people of African descent in the imaginations of powerful Europeans. Likewise, the size of the black male penis was a bad object construct. It indicated animalism and degeneracy of African descendants. In addition, much like black women, black men were on constant display for their degeneracy. However, differently from women, there was a deep desire to emulate, or rather, own, black males and their reproductive representations. This was largely due to the ideology of patriarchy that promoted a view that alpha men should always be on top; alpha men are on top of passive men.

So, unlike the case for black women where whiteness and slenderness were the characteristics of true womanhood, both black and white men admired a large penis as an object of one's endowment or an object that may be possessed. For example, Poulson-Bryant in his book *Hung* told a story about a white male he met in the Village of New York City:

I met this white guy ['Ty'] who hangs out with a black buddy of mine, a white guy who thinks himself fairly "close to black"—because he played sports and knew how to break dance when break dancing was all the rage—who is adamant that all black guys are hung bigger than every other race . . . 'So,' he added, 'I *know* that black guys are hung huge.' . . . Ty met a girl named Helen. Helen was European . . . After some unzipping, and undressing, down to underclothes for Ty and nothing for Helen, she grabbed him through his boxer briefs, smiled, and said . . . 'Big dick. You hung like black man.'¹¹

However, Poulson-Bryant revealed to us that not all black men were as hung as the stereotype would have had us believe. In fact, he admitted that he himself could not compete with Ty who insisted on showing him his penis, in spite of Poulson-Bryant's protestations. In the opening of the book, Poulson-Bryant told that he did not have the tool that was necessary for maintaining the myth when he walked around the gym with some other black men. Masculinity scholar Michael Kimmel recites the pretentiously

debated fact about masculinity in his study of young males, *Guyland*, size matters.¹² Where did young men learn this code? To help with the size tension that both does and does not matter, however, Poulson-Bryant said when erect he could likely compete. This was an interesting revelation of imagination since he said that one of the purposes of his book was to put to bed such stereotypes about black men. The lesson we might take away is the enormous power of stereotypes in forcing citizens to conform to them, even when they penetrate their very embodiment.

Yet, what disturbs us more in Poulson-Bryant's account is the way males learn to respect hierarchical positioning. One of his friends revealed this to him when he tried to explain why he thought his penis is small:

My friend, let's call him Rocky, told me that he wasn't exactly the most "endowed" brother on the planet—and he blamed it on his mother. . . . And that was by [not] pulling on her baby son's Johnson, yanking on it every so often—perhaps between changes or feedings . . . That way it would be encouraged to grow. 'You're not serious,' I told Rocky.¹³

However, much of the responsibility for failing to represent imagined characteristics is attributable to another tortured and subordinate social position—that of woman. Since men are imagined to be superordinate to women; imagined aberrational characteristics like a small penis on a black male, homosexuality, and transgender bodies are then often attributed to be caused by either women or womanhood.¹⁴

Cultural studies critic Stuart Hall reminded us that the way we imagine gender is not a moment of simple unity. It is a process where groups try to unify. Nonetheless, groups never totally achieve unity.¹⁵ Another cultural studies critic, Paul Gilroy, supported Hall's conclusion and added that no pure cultures exist.¹⁶ Social patterns subject black statuses and roles to harmful frames by subordinating them in the social hierarchy. Many challenge and contest these patterns, particularly since U.S. society's structure is dominance. Yet, even the forms of degradation and stereotyping that reinforce the structure of dominance directed at black males change with time and place. Dominant cultural groups alter the political domination of black males at different times. One task is to elaborate significations that might take precedence at different times.

People use representation to covertly portray and reproduce power relations of domination and privilege. Representations map the reproduction of domination and privilege; they also map resistance. Significations are forms of rhetoric that constantly change. Such representations are literally ineffectual unless there is a political class behind them that gives them currency. In the relational perspective, making representations effective is a production process. Despite the changing nature of representations, they can help us evaluate possibilities for black male empowerment. Elaboration of structural representations also helps the civic communities in thinking

about social policy that directly and indirectly affects black males. Representations are materials of culture and are specific social disciplines and ways of life. Since social life repeats patterns, it is possible to rely on structural representations as practical predictors of patterned lines of action. In this sense, structural representations are institutions. For example, we can rely upon the handshake as a form of masculine bonding; this means handshakes communicate something important, they are regular, patterned, and institutionalized behaviors—in short, expected lines of action. In many ways, they do not take on a life of their own. This is so because communication is dialogic. Nonetheless, representations also help to clarify value orientations of groups at any given moment in history. Imagine, for example, certain groups of men who refused to shake hands with certain other groups of men. Such exclusion, isolation, and shunning would be important for our understanding of hierarchy. Since a handshake is an encoded representation, it is “text,” a figure of speech—or, a representation.

This book is concerned with delineating the unique historical experiences and development of black masculinity and black male political responses to its socially constructed masculinity. The argument is that while things have changed, patriarchal stratification has largely remained similar to the past organization of it. The purpose is to contribute to a conversation using a specifically black masculine perspective. This perspective does not claim to be comprehensive, it does not seek to be universal, nor does it claim to capture an essence. However, there could be no doubt that the perspective is unique. This perspective disrupts the comfort found in typical discourse about masculinity. It questions the usual arrangement of thought. The usual arrangement of thought is brazen; it often denies free speech. For many years, I personally had my voice stolen by powerful social images that kept telling me what I was required to think and say. Tyrannical strictures had literally stolen my voice and intellect. I imagine that many of us feel this way. The purpose and significance of this book is to say that I listened to the typical masculinity conversations. They are terribly lacking in democracy and freedom. Patriarch and masculine dominance are the foundation for typical conversations about masculinity. Despite a hope that greater numbers of men would become entitled to patriarch status, this has not happened. Even if it were to happen, we need to question whether patriarchy is helpful for equality and justice. This is not to suggest that patriarchy is a bad or good value. This book has no interest in castigating patriarchy. It is interested in presenting a set of often-omitted facts in talk about gender and sexuality. Black masculinity is a useful vehicle to have this conversation about gender and sexual stratification. Black masculinity is an extreme case of male ranking in history. From a relational lens, it offers a rich body of extremes for the study of gender. Foucault stressed the importance of looking at the subaltern extreme to gain understanding of the normal. He also stressed examining resistance. Studying black masculinity helps us to see the possibilities and limits of substantial dutiful theory.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CRITICAL

This book approaches black masculinity from a black critical position. It is interested in providing alternative ways of looking at how black males arrived at their social positions and thereby in suggesting possibilities for realizing greater human freedom, in terms of both life quality and life span. Renowned black feminist Audre Lorde suggested that we should not expect to dismantle the master's house with his tools.¹⁷ I do not think that she meant that science is the master's tool—there are certain conceptual ways of thinking about using science that become tools of the organization of inequality. Inequality produces a master class. A part of critical method is to reveal how it is possible for our identities to be one of the master's tools without us recognizing it. Recognition that we engage in producing inequality might emotionally disturb us; many of us benefit from hurting others. Yet, it is important to recognize that institutions serve as agencies for policing dominance. Often institutions not only reproduce dominance, they also expand dominant-group power relations. Moreover, one of the most effective ways to do so is to acquire the consent of the subordinated.

A most celebrated tool for the domination of the world by Western culture has been science. While the history of science is beyond the scope of this book there are a number of points about science that are important to stress. The organization of science into compartments and specialization is an integral part of controlling the ways that we approach subjects. This book will not follow this tradition. It is writing about black masculinity as sexual politics. Institutions partly facilitate the sexual politics of black masculinity. Interdisciplinary scholarship will help us see this; multidisciplinary and trans-disciplinary scholarship would help us more. Therefore, a reflexive method guides this study. Chapter 1 addressed the significance of using a reflexive method. There is another reason for using the reflexive method. The reason for taking this position is that it is not certain we should understand sociology as only a science. Science fiction has been as important to sociological methods as has been any real scientific advance. In fact, while it is beyond the scope of this book, much of the exclusionary rationales preventing individuals from working as sociologists, or being esteemed among sociologists, breaks down to imaginary views about reality held by powerful groups that are highly positioned in the field. These imaginations are cultural products that will not easily transform. Gender politics and performances are a major part of these ideologies. Social scientists often embrace values that promote stratification. For example, feminist scholars have shown how this impacts women working in the field.¹⁸ In addition, black sociologists showed how they sort as inferior.¹⁹ This is not to say that all outcomes of science, particularly social science, are bad science. It is merely making it clear that scientists are not outside of the organization of society. Social science should undergo reflexive techniques as a normal part of scientific practice.

There are unusual yet important generalizations throughout this book. For example, there is a reference to black masculinity. We recognize there is no single reality that constitutes black masculinity; yet, the concern is not discussing variations of *theories* concerning black masculinity in this book. We recognize there are radical theories of masculinity, feminist theories masculinity, and other kinds of gender theories that their teamed authors own. We also recognize that given any particular category of theory, theorists would have disagreements. When we use the term “black masculinity” it refers to a typical pattern that reproduces black males’ social position. Social scientists can know patterns that amount to a vocabulary of motives for performing black masculinity, through cultural representations. A vocabulary of motives refers to the language people use to describe motivations for their conduct. It is not concerned with inner compulsions, drives, or needs but with motivated talk in particular social contexts. Motivated talk is usually part of a wider ideology but it is not required to be so. Such talk varies based on the social context and such statements are relative.²⁰ The idea is that when people are in conversations, they have many representations stored in their memories to use in framing other individuals in their conversations.

A COMMENT ABOUT CULTURE AND POLICY

The way we think about culture will influence our thinking about social policy. At the same time, culture will largely, though perhaps not entirely, determine how we go about our day-to-day activities, our quotidian activities. One of the major issues confronting U.S. culture today is the debate about the definition of culture. Recent concern about diversity and multiculturalism has added additional fuel to debates about culture. Over time, the definition of culture has been an enduring problem for mainstream scholarship. Afrocentric perspectives question assumptions about the rank of cultures. Yet, Afrocentrists often think in substantial dutiful ways about African-centered cultural values. In spite of this, the most important lesson taught by Afrocentrists is that groups can struggle against oppression. The most regressive lesson learned from Afrocentrism is the iron law of oligarchy.²¹ Ultimately, many black scholars had to rely on Afrocentrists for support under extremely hostile conditions. The second important lesson learned from the Afrocentrist movement is that brothers and sisters, in the sense that Malcolm X used the sibling terms, provide social support in the midst of hostility. Eurocentrism is obstinate.

For one thing, Eurocentric perspectives employed a policy to divide and conquer black populations. Many Afrocentrists lack trust in Eurocentric organizations. They feel Eurocentric agents use smoke-and-mirror tactics to reproduce their political and economic dominance.²² Divide and conquer policies are used in situations with individuals, groups, and cultural

productions. For example, in Eurocentric tradition, universities divide and compartmentalize knowledge; they strictly police the turf of differing disciplines. In contrast, Afrocentrists use multidisciplinary ways to learn and communicate knowledge. Another example is the way we study political culture; many use one Eurocentric method by counting vote behavior, explaining the political processes in ways that politicians communicate it, and discussing U.S. political history as equalitarian and progressive. Afrocentrists use a broader definition, one that is more similar to the way many feminist scholars use the term “political.”

Afrocentric scholars' interdisciplinary methods are mostly concerned about stratification based on race.²³ Therefore, the political functions of culture are an integral part of Afrocentric scholarship. More recently under the banner of postmodernity, many Eurocentric scholars began writing a deconstruction of some Eurocentric scholastic assumptions. Deconstruction work comes at a most opportune time for Eurocentric dominance. Some of its consequences will become clearer later in this chapter, but suffice it to say at this point that the postmodern strategy virtually erases identification with oppressed groups. Its social function seems to be to deny oppressed groups from organizing around similar experiences with domination. This is so because its conceptual framework stresses fragmentation. Therefore, it avoids identity politics. In addition, even if only a few from the dominated classes accept the postmodern view, it functions to fragment organized resistance by demanding more opportunities to multi-identify. Multi-identification produces obstructing political discourses in the face of life-and-death realities. An example of this might be a discourse around the spread of a disease like HIV/AIDS that would require intervention research without reference to race. Accordingly, prevention researchers are required to think of intervention strategies in terms of similarities among all racial groups. Unfortunately, when it comes to HIV and other health disparities, such thinking is woefully insufficient. In spite of this, such thinking prevails because of Eurocentric control of health care. Many Eurocentrists promote a colorblind ideology.²⁴

African and African diaspora scholars first developed much of the resistance approaches, like deconstruction methods, with a different intellectual history. Often, Eurocentric scholars embrace a black scholar who will parrot Eurocentric values, or attempt to judge Afrocentric scholars through Eurocentric canonical authority. We should seek alternatives to Afrocentric and Eurocentric canonical standpoints. Ultimately, this bias will inform the standpoint on black culture used in this book. For example, it will stress that the so-called black underclass culture is, in actuality, the greater part of black culture. In other words, the black underclass concept is, in effect, imaginary. We miss this fact when we buy into a Eurocentric narrative of black history that constructs, through its cultural narratives, Africans in America as a largely pathological group in need of remediation and rehabilitation. Afrocentric and Eurocentric scholars might harshly respond to

this book's viewpoint. After all, for them it is, at least on the surface, a bread-and-butter issue. Many social scientists work for large foundations and hold government grants. The relational approach applied in this book challenges both Afrocentric and Eurocentric paternalism; in brief, it undermines substantial dutiful theory.

THINKING CULTURE AND DOMINATION

One way to interpret black culture is to see its development as a response to Eurocentric cultural imperialism. Eurocentric cultural imperialism means a social relationship of dominance based largely on race that is institutionalized through colonizing methods by a political class. The political class is usually beholden to one, two, or a combination of political parties. One effect of Eurocentric cultural imperialism is cultural authority—that is, cultural hegemony. Cultural authority means that there are particular periods of history in social life when certain sentiments and ways of doing things become predominant. Such predominance constitutes a social formation. U.S. dominance assures that a social formation of stable and self-reproducing racial and hierarchical order based on capital relations is realizable. Through authority, the powerful are able to win the voluntary consent of the ruled because the ruled accept their subordinate positions for the sake of being able to have certain desires, fantasies, and socially constructed identities.²⁵ However, constraint and emotional, physical, and symbolic violence are always lurking beneath the veneer of civility in social formations based on domination. Eurocentric cultural imperialism assists in the persistence of black male domination as well as it does in the contestation of that domination. The method of complementary social positions—the relational perspective—reveals this proposition.

Additionally, in social formations based on domination there is increasing severe constraint, administered by bureaucratic authority; these constraints rest on administrative law. Administrators view behaviors that comport with the consciousness of whiteness as meritorious. Administrators penalize attitudinal and behavioral departures from the norms. Subordinate groups receive disproportionate penalties. Added to this is a double-standard rule where powerful and not as powerful groups receive different outcomes for similar behaviors. Under liberal democracy in late capitalism, the powerful allow normal men to dominate women and behave as sportsmen and managers. The limited freedoms under this authority allow room for some variation of lifestyles but place and location are very important for the operation of the social system. A most important aspect of the system may be to hide the way institutions systematically administer different rewards to black males as a group. Administrators might view black males that dominate women and behave as sportsmen and managers as arrogant, dumb, and misogynist jocks. Administrators'

belief in merit-based decision-making hides the double standard. So black males would have no one to blame but themselves for their out-of-place behaviors; they could avoid their problems if they would only behave as submissive subjects.

Raymond Williams argued that the plurality of cultures or lifestyles in any given social formation is merely an illusion.²⁶ Nonetheless, many believe in pluralism. Culture is complex and requires regulated social practices. Although it may not be very necessary, the practices communicate stratification. Some cultures might promote domination, others, equality, and still, others, subordination. In the U.S., we often think that we live in a melting pot and plural society. Nonetheless, the melting pot view hides the conflicts of interests in the society. When religious or nonmainstream political groups differ about some unified social efforts, it is hard to realize that the voice of the minorities was overwhelmed. For example, issues like equal pay for similar work, antiwar positions during times of national war efforts, and the Equal Rights Amendment were ones that highlighted conflict. Proponents of these issues insisted in submission of the subordinated to the unity of Americanism. The majority could not tolerate these differences found in U.S. subcultures.

Another cultural domination problem has to do with the definitions the powerful allow when we use the word "group."²⁷ For example, when we think about U.S. labor history, we realize that the powerful considered labor to be a legitimate group. However, labor organizations have discrimination in their history. There was discrimination against women as an instance. Black men met a great deal of discrimination in organized labor. This discrimination had an impact on the formation of black families. Usually employers that discriminated neutralized their discrimination by claiming that women or black males were deficient as workers for one reason or another. This also justified paying lower wages when a few women or black males were hired. For long periods of U.S. history, the labor leadership did not consider women or blacks as legitimate labor groups. They thought women were wives and black men were just like other "Americans" with the exception that they were less intelligent. What history has shown is that group formations are much more complex than the labor leaders thought. Not only are there many more groups than had been acknowledged by them, but within minority groups there are splinter groups. Very often, powerful minorities exploit splinter groups in similar ways that majority groups exploit minority groups.²⁸

If we recognize this, then we are able to appreciate how certain African American aggregates or groups might silence other African American groups, precluding any possibility of their speech equitably competing in pluralistic social organization. In short, we could recognize how substantial dutiful theory becomes hegemonic.

For example, think about how both black and white majority power groups have silenced both black and white homosexual and lesbian voices

in so-called democratic civil society. Moreover, when homosexual issues arise, heterosexuals will rush to the airways, pulpits, publication media, and classrooms to speak for homosexuals—thereby assuring that they mute their perspective in public discourse. Of course, there are many other examples of silencing subaltern groups—youth groups not being the least of those that are also so victimized.

It is important to recognize that culture has a political function. Resistance is a dimension of social order when exploitation, inequality, and oppression are elements of a culture. Amílcar Cabral, former agronomist and secretary-general of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, suggested the political dimension of culture during its national liberation movements. In one study, Cabral contrasts the differences between French and Portuguese forms of colonialism, as well as historical and political differences between the resistance movements of Algeria and Guinea-Bissau.²⁹ Cabral argues that “popular culture” forms the basis of the anti-colonial political struggle. Frantz Fanon, the Algerian theorist of the anti-colonial movement, argues that “the people” form the basis for the struggle against colonial oppression.³⁰ For Fanon, national culture cannot exist within colonialism. Cabral thought national culture helps to resolve differences among competing groups. Fanon thought “tradition” makes culture by holding on to “custom.” Many postmodernist writers share Fanon’s view of culture. For example, Edward W. Said, a noted cultural critic of the West, in his book *Culture and Imperialism* describes culture as the best of the tradition and custom of a people.³¹ With these kinds of binary distinctions, such theorists construct categories like elite, high, and real culture that are in opposition to lowly popular culture. In addition, of course, in so doing, they anoint themselves the elite experts and representatives of the best and highest cultural tradition.

PRODUCING AND CONTROLLING GENDERED AND SEXED REPRESENTATIONS

One aspect of Western cultural history is the patterned construction in language and practice of the function of sex, its ethics, and nature. The West is associated with Eurocentric male normality and it has specific meanings of the concept of sex. This is not to suggest that sexual practices were monolithic and that there were not moments and places of contestation; rather, patterned practices and logic related to sex—in a larger sense, to gender roles and behaviors—became embedded in Western culture. William Shakespeare discussed Western sexuality in his 1611 play *The Tempest* and Ronald Takaki in his study of race and culture in the United States discussed it.³² Takaki recognizes the importance of constructing proper sex and gender norms among Eurocentric males.

Prospero is a man of intellect, a scholar, and the antithesis of Caliban, “a savage and deformed slave.” The ex-duke of Milan imagines Caliban as everything he is not: a “bastard,” a “thing of darkness,” “filth,” sexuality, a threat to his fair daughter’s virginity. Racially, Caliban is not white: He is dark complexion, his mother is from Africa . . . he belongs to a “vile race” and Prospero calls him a “devil, a devil on whose nature Nurture can never stick!”³³

Prospero is the master who assigns the title of “a thing of darkness” to the African, Caliban, and reasons that Caliban must be brutalized because he is the animal who seeks to “violate the honor of my child.” Moreover, Caliban is the absence of Eurocentric maleness; European men are civilized. For Eurocentric male culture, civilization meant to be Christian, rational, sexually controlled, and human. Chapter 1 discussed how the claim that white culture’s interest as primarily concerned with the sexual ravage of white females is impractical. Nonetheless, it is a driving motivation for Prospero’s rage according to many Shakespearian commentators.

Winthrop Jordan’s celebrated study of Eurocentric images of blacks pointed out

Intermixture and insurrection, violent sex and sexual violence, creation and destruction, life and death—the stuff of animal existence was rumbling at the gates of rational and moral judgment. . . . But a buck *is* loose, his great horns menacing to gore into us with life and destruction. Chain him, either chain him or expel his black shape from our midst, *before we realize that he is ourselves* [author’s emphasis here].³⁴

Western gender norms constructed black males as close to being males but not quite males—black males occupied a position of otherness, not merely animals, but indeed, another kind of gender. The two dimensions to black male gender were the feminized and hypersexualized images. These images are what most in society will use in situations to establish hegemonic masculinity.

DIFFERENT GENDER FORMS

In an earlier article published by the *Journal of African American Men*, I argued that black men represented a distinct gender category.³⁵ It has become increasingly clear over the years that this is the case. One way of seeing the black male gender status is through what was peculiar about the alleged sexism by black males during the Black Power movement. It was different from the historical relationship white males generally had with white females. As I pointed out in the earlier article, social activist

and Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver represented male and female relationships in one of the most machismo, patriarchal, and male chauvinist ways possible. He wrote his views in his classic autobiography *Soul on Ice*. He argues that black males are eunuchs. Cleaver's chapter "The Allegory of the Black Eunuchs" is about the shame of domination.³⁶ The chapter spills into thinking about black female and male relationships. In summation, one could wonder if Cleaver appreciated black women.

The paradox in Cleaver's mental state is his pathological-like need to marvel at women while he simultaneously engages in an outrageous misandry and self-hate.³⁷ It is clear that Cleaver had sexual orientation questions; without his unusual rapture of the feminine, his masculinity—he reduced masculinity to sexuality and simultaneously reduced male sexuality to a *penis*—is ambiguous. Yet Cleaver not only internalized sexism and heterosexism; he internalized racism. As such, the highest form of his romance with the subjugated feminine was seeing his masculinity through the literal penetration of what he imagined was the subjugated white female. He saw feminized whiteness as the highest form of human beauty.

Sociologist Orlando Patterson helps us to see issues of sexual politics in his work on black masculinity.³⁸ For example, it is clear, also, that many in the African American community had problems with pop musician Michael Jackson and Jackson's transgender appearance that requires toleration of sexual diversity—this was also in Cleaver when he expressed extreme homophobia against the renowned author James Baldwin. Patterson associates former National Basketball Association player Dennis Rodman with femininity. He refers to Jackson as a "she-man" and Rodman as engaging in "Dionysus and Maenads in Gotham . . . rites of reversal."³⁹ Sexual politics require dutiful gender performance. It is likely difficult for sexual minorities to win when social agents evoke substantial dutiful expectations. There have been observations about the "new racism" that claims it is more subtle and informal than past racist practices.⁴⁰ If such a new form of bigotry could serve as an analogy, then it is not difficult to imagine new forms of discrimination directed at sexual minorities—that is, "new homophobia." However, for reasons that will become clear, the best label for this thinking might be the new paternalism. Cleaver was Black Nationalist in his politics, yet many in the new paternalism are integrationist in their politics. Nevertheless, both forms of reasoning that characterize small sectors of both Black Nationalist and integrationist viewpoints share some common ground.

Despite patriarchal pathologies apparent in some Black Nationalist and integrationist ideologies, the fact that dominant feminists were unable to engage Cleaver's clearly pathetic patriarchal desires remains a problematic that must not stay the course of concealment. The lack of feminist clarity about the social status of black males may have happened because of gendered and racialized domination. Authoritative power/knowledge rules became the norm. Let us be clear on this point: It is not simply that feminists used Eurocentric norms when not responding to Cleaver, or rather,

performed Eurocentric norms. Rather, there was an assumption on the part of many feminists that all men were equally complicit in the subjugation of women.⁴¹ Had modal feminists engaged Black Nationalists—or even had they given serious reflection on contemporary intellectuals promoting integrationist strategies—they would have engaged the intersection between heterosexism, patriarchy, and racism. Nevertheless, many feminists likely misrecognized heterosexism, racism, and structural and symbolic reliance on Eurocentric patriarchy. Of course, most of the black feminists were much better on this point; mainstream feminists ignored outstanding black womanist scholars that warned against some of these imaginaries.⁴² Yet, many if not most womanist theorists were deeply committed to “finding a man” and other deeply patriarchal desires. In addition, of course, many believe these desires are biological and natural impulses.

One part of gender and racial stratification is projecting intellectual responsibilities to dominant groups. This also is true, as we shall see, when society places sexual minorities in the social hierarchy. For Cleaver, the stratification practice places black males in the position of physical—largely the penis role—while dominant men represent the intellectual class. He wrote: “There was this single attribute of masculinity which he [the white male] was unwilling to relinquish, even though this particular attribute is the essence and seat of masculinity: sex. The penis.”⁴³

BLACK PENIS IMAGERY

The gender dichotomy to which Cleaver was referring is a historical fact of black male hypermasculine otherness. Scholars have noted that the stereotype has enormous representative power. For example, Professors Alvin Poussaint and Amy Alexander have discussed the body language of crotch holding. They believe it is a subcultural representation of many urban black youth who have little else to be proud of than their perceived sexual prowess. They relate this and other body posturing to learning that happened during slavery. Moreover, they show a relationship between these embodiments and black male suicide.⁴⁴ Likewise, some hip-hop songs and personalities relish in the notion that their penises are major commodities in postmodern popular culture. For example, in the Young Jeezy song, “Tear That Pussy Up,” he brags on both the size and function of his penis:

Slick Consecro, ya boys slingin wood bitch
You want that straight drop dick
Come to the hood bitch
I like scout them ghetto hoes up in 20 grand
Cuz them the ones be wit that freaky shit man
2 drinks, 3 beans, now she rollin man
The tool in her throat, I’m just tonsil patrollin man

True pro's with this shit, we ain't new jacks
 We drill hoes and switch 'em up like fitted caps.⁴⁵

Another example among many would be the consistent lyrical message in songs by Snoop Dogg. In his signature piece “Who Am I (What’s My Name)?” after a celebration of his uncaring and outrageous criminality where he confesses that he has been to prison and will murder cops, he informs us that

My shit’s on hit, legit, now I’m on parole, stroll
 with the Dogg Pound right behind me
 and up in yo bitch, is where ya might find me
 Layin that, playin that G Thang
 She want the nigga with the biggest nuts, and guess what?
 He is I, and I am him, slim with the tilted brim
 What’s my motherfuckin name?⁴⁶

There is a mastery related to the double entendre used by these artists of African descent. They embody domination while they emulate the tradition of the African griot by bringing news of contestation and resistance as a part of that embodiment: In the case of Snoop Dogg, the lyrical style is that of the badd nigger toasts while Young Jeezy saturates his text with sounds from slave work songs.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, as we shall see, U.S. culture also feminized the black male image. Mainstream culture sees black males as otherness. Those groups that represent difference are the other. By attributing black males with other characteristics, status groups can see themselves as more powerful than them. In the act of defining Africans as “black” and “savage,” and thereby positioning them within the Europeanized world, European Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were representing themselves as “white” and “civilized.”⁴⁸ This understanding of otherness is precisely what Jordan highlighted.

Gender studies scholar Susan Hekman identified three dichotomies that, beginning with the Enlightenment, have been associated with gender. These are culture/nature, rational/irrational, and subject/object; the first term of each pair was associated with males and the second with females. Heckman understood the first term to be a position of privilege while she views the second as a position of denigration.⁴⁹ In the stratification hierarchy, society associates the first term to the powerful and the second term to the weaker. This objectifies black males as it does black and white women.

About this dichotomy, we can see that society views black males as labor and white males signify intelligence.⁵⁰ Essential to the understanding of the instinctual life of European American men with power was the possession of a penis. However, as cultural critic Lee Edelman pointed out, racial discourse must position black males in relation to white males. He writes:

He implicitly identifies the narcissism invested in the mythology of “racial” supremacy as reenacting the logic of phallic masculinity under compulsory heterosexuality—a logic of visual difference that necessitates the display of the “other” in the position of “lack” in order to reassure the dominant subject, by contrast, of his (phallic) “possession.”⁵¹

The powerful status classes portrayed black males as subordinate in their talk, and those talking points reflected their subordination in the educational system and labor market. It meant that similar to women, black male bodies became to-be-possessed objects. Initially the possession was literal since European Americans bought and sold black male bodies in the slave market. When powerful groups reestablished black servitude after slavery ended in the U.S., it meant whites once again used blacks as possessions. By the time of the civil rights movement, a total system organized to ensure the possession status of black males. For one thing, the system of buying and selling black athletes was well organized and this reintroduced the slave market exchange of *buck* embodiments. Next, the prison industrial complex organized black familial instability. Initially the convict lease system organized the reintroduction of servitude. In time, the servitude producing convict lease technology expanded into the prison industrial complex. The denial of equality continued during the civil rights movement. In short, the powerful classes ensured that blacks live in slum housing where assimilation and integration would not take place. Once again, powerful status classes were in the position to possess black males. In this instance, the powerful managed black male subordination through poverty programs. It was highly effective but the system had to undergo modification when national economics turned sour. This began in the 1970s when the nation experienced a major depression.

After World War II, the U.S. economy was in such good shape that the powerful had, following magazine magnate Henry Luce, proclaimed the period as the “American Century.”⁵² However, as the U.S. powerful went on a spending spree, they intensified the subordination of black masculinity. By the 1970s, the surveillance of black males resulted in riots in most major urban areas with large black populations. In the cities, powerful social statuses relegated blacks to slum housing where they survived on meager and unstable incomes. The spirit of masculinity, and specifically patriarch masculinity, was routinely broken. When tensions spilled over into riotous behaviors, the powerful responded with mean-spirited jobs programs that paid insufficiently and positioned black males as remedial labor—the organization positioned black men as an appendage to real masculine labor.

President Gerald Ford managed the 1970s depression. According to biographer of Ford, Yanek Mieczkowski, in 1948

[T]he United States produced about 45 percent of the world’s total industrial output, and demand for American exports ran high, as rebuilding countries turned to the lone industrial power that could meet

their needs. The GNP jumped (in real prices) from \$212 billion in 1945 to \$688 billion in 1965. By 1971, the United States had become the world's first trillion-dollar economy.⁵³

However, American progress, Mieczkowski continues, "had lasted less than thirty years."⁵⁴ Many factors contributed to the decline. One major factor was the loss of the Vietnam War. The fact that a small nation could win over a large one contributed to some of the anxiety about U.S. international superiority; however, the fact that a nonwhite nation could do so also contributed to national anxiety. After all, U.S. scholars had stereotyped Asians as intellectually inferior to whites throughout the nineteenth century.

Another factor contributing to the decline of American progress was conflicts in the Middle East. For example, intervention policies in Iran resulted in the taking of hostages there in 1979. Symbolically this had to do with race too; however, it also had to do with religion. For 444 days, Iranian insurgents held 52 U.S. diplomats. These conditions were threats to powerful economic and status classes in the U.S. The conditions stimulated a desire to bring black males under control on the domestic scene.

There were other geopolitical problems for the ruling economic and status classes. The black world misbehaved. This provided additional stimulation for intensifying the surveillance and possession of black males. Formerly held colonies in British Caribbean aligned with the Black Power movement. After World War II, Britain granted political independence to the largest part of its former colonies. In the 1970s, problems began in two of its former colonies (Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago), which raised concern in the U.S.⁵⁵

Jamaican workers began to protest over labor relations in the 1970s. Sectors of the Jamaican army joined the workers' protests. The U.S. placed a naval task force offshore. The mantra of the day was Black Power. Prime Minister Michael Manley declared Jamaica was a democratic socialist society and proclaimed that capitalism was moribund. He also increased tariffs on Jamaican aluminum that U.S. mining companies mined.⁵⁶ This was the mood of the region. For example, by 1979, a Cuban-associated political coup d'état occurred in Grenada.

These events affected the treatment of black males in the U.S. It increased their exclusion and surveillance. However, it was not that protest in the form of black power merely affected social relations. The social relations represented a death sentence for black males. Figure 2.1 illustrates this fact. It shows the percent decrease in death rates of black and white males between 1960 and 2005. From 1960 to 1970, the rates are about the same for both groups of males. In 1970, we see a significant difference between the males. Between 1970 and 1980, the distance between percent decrease in death rates is alarming. White males have the greatest share of decrease with approximately 12 percent difference between their 1970 and 1990 rates. Black males had approximately 3 percent difference. After 2000,

black males made significant progress improving their decrease in deaths. By 2005, whites males' death rate was 951 per 100,000. Black males' death rate was 1,253 per 100,000.

Historians of black masculinity have highlighted stereotyping of black males as runners, dancers, jive talkers, and sexing bucks that are "good for nothing" but primitive sex. An examination of the black male subject as a sociological project misguides us if it omits a typical black male perspective. Cleaver is correct in asserting a betrayal but his logic is problematic in the terms of constructing a site for the black male subject. What is the proper understanding of the black male social position?

Black male gender requires a more sustained examination than the typical practice by both feminist and masculinist theorists, particularly when they assume black men oppress black women *just as* white men oppress white women. The relationship between racism and sexism suggests that racism is a form of sexism.⁵⁷ This reasoning becomes more appealing once we examine the binary gender categories of Eurocentric dominance.⁵⁸

TROUBLING GENDER DEVELOPMENTS

Major social institutions managed the domination of the black males. The basic four cultural institutions are military, jails, organized athletics, and the entertainment industry.⁵⁹ In each case, masculinity is an image of machismo spectacle. In each role, expectations for black males are to produce a particular brand of masculinity. The black male spectacular representation comes from a Eurocentric imaginary that pretends black males are incomplete




Figure 2.1 Percent decrease in age-adjusted black and white male death rates from all causes between 1960 and 2005.

Source: U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Reports. Deaths: Final Data for 2005; Vol. 56, No. 10, April 24, 2008, Table 106.

males; therefore, they do not warrant respect usually accorded among men in the patriarchy. They experience constant supervision, largely by rigorous surveillance in institutions like prisons, organized athletics, military, and to some extent the entertainment industry. The prison is a kind of surrogate for other ways to control black males. For example, Loïc Wacquant has shown that being a black male is a civic felony.⁶⁰ While his views are certainly not original, his analysis underscores the way civil society managed the representation of black masculinity and sexuality. A more original analysis is Neil Websdale's, which shows that housing projects are surrogate organizations for prisons that were surrogates for slave castles and slave ships.⁶¹

This control is also observable in talk; in conversations, Europeans and their representatives constantly correct black males, replacing their experiences with imagined realities that European culture finds pleasant. These relations are part of the organization of surveillance. This is so since language is one domain where Eurocentric culture is most rigid. Eurocentric agents sanction conceptual constructs that are "foreign" to their purposes. In this sense, it is likely, to follow Websdale, to demonstrate that society organizes work sites like housing projects when it comes to the control of black male laborers. For example, within the single firm, it might be the case that we find not only dual labor markets, but also dual organization of workers. Moreover, the organization where we would find more black males might be the organization that is most similar to slave-ship mapping.

One anecdotal example is the type of dual experience where a National Institutes of Health researcher claimed that black males do not understand the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment because many of them say that the U.S. government infected black men with syphilis. In fact, she continued, the Public Health Service did not infect the men; she explained that infected men went untreated by them. Perhaps it is that both statements mean the same thing in the minds of many black men. However, this possibility apparently was unrecognized by her as a possibility.

Insofar as entertainment is concerned, media serve a function of the surveillance of black males. Films, magazines, newspapers, and television degrade black males.⁶² It might be that such images impact our thinking about black males and assist in the reproduction of stereotypes. In addition, such practices tell us more about the producers of such controlling images than it tells us about the black male targets of the stereotyping gaze.⁶³ We now have some preliminary evidence that stereotyped targets receive punishment for not behaving in stereotypical ways.⁶⁴

Black men often resist forced stereotypes when they are the targets for surveillance and control. For many black males, it will take considerable time to recognize the Eurocentric supremacist logic underlying social organizations because of the ideological machinery and its persistent communication of assimilation and pluralism—in fact, so powerful is the assimilation and pluralism machine that one could actually receive lower grades in university courses for departing from the political class dogma.

However, as was stated in Chapter 1, under the rule of Eurocentric folkways it is likely impossible to integrate black masculinity in its “union.” The union may have to undergo transformation before assimilation is possible. Black male social status in this sense is a field where a conquering force primarily externally imposes norms. The hope of some sectors of the society is that black males will join the union. On the other hand, there are social statuses promoting black male exclusion. The overdetermination of blackness—that cultural theorists talk about—is, after all, an imaginary constructed to guarantee domination. This normative narrative traffics in stereotypes and fantasies of a master-standpoint in Eurocentric culture. As has already been discussed, it is a major part of the stereotyping related to the sexuality of African descendants.

Fanon points to the “Negrophobia” in the colonial fantasy in reference to the terrifying spectacle of the black male penis that is an enduring imaginary in the gender and race mindset. Related to this, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak opined:

Within the effaced itinerary of the subaltern subject, the track of sexual difference is doubly effaced. The question is not of female participation in insurgency, or the ground rules of the sexual division of labor, for both of which there is ‘evidence’. It is, rather, that, both as object of colonialist historiography and as subject of insurgency, the ideological construction of gender keeps the male dominant. If, in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow.⁶⁵

Following Spivak renders black males silent since much of their speech has already been determined to be in complicity with gender and race hierarchy. Here the history of subjection grants privileges to women that therefore entitle them to acts of insurgency targeting *all* black males. The problem with this is at least twofold: 1) Such thinking treats gender and sexuality as essential realities; and 2) this thinking identifies with powerful classes within masculinity categories. The binary may also become absurd in other ways. For example, within white “womyn’s” organizations where there is virtually minimal black female inclusion, many commentators have the impudence to label their organization as diverse. Simultaneously, many in such organizations extend their recruitment only to “real women” to the exclusion of transsexuals and transvestites. Yet, when we interview most transsexuals and many transvestites, they refer to themselves as female.

What Spivak missed was the gender reassignment of black males that was necessary for Eurocentric dominance and the binary logic of the repressed fears and anxiety/neurosis projected onto the other *biology*. Powerful forces in society constructed black males as a specific gender position. Spivak, following the universe of Eurocolonial binaries, also repeats the mapping of dominance as a “universal” gender desire; it ultimately reads

that the subaltern woman—most are women of color—may eventually catch up to and surpass her dominant sister, to whom she is subsidiary. A sidebar to this cross-examination is the empirical fact that most dominant women are married to dominant males; they have much greater rational interest in patriarchy and this likely makes a difference. Most black women are not married.

In his incisive essay “Looking for Trouble,” Kobena Mercer revealed the binary problematic in his examination of Robert Mapplethorpe’s photography of black male nudes. Mercer used Fanon to do so when he wrote:

“One is no longer aware of the Negro, but only of a penis: the Negro is eclipsed. He is turned into a penis. He *is* a penis.” . . . In the fantastic space of the supremacist . . . the subordinate black male . . . [is] the “bad object” [and] represents a danger to white womanhood.⁶⁶

However, it is not so much the danger to “white womanhood” that is problematic. It is danger to the organization of exploitation—particularly the exploitation of labor, the necessity of the subservient classes for authoritative masculinity to exist that comes into play.

A HELPING HAND FROM SCIENCE

Western science theoretically viewed black masculinity as a separate sex and gender. Of particular interest, for example, is the work of French craniologist F. Pruner who wrote in 1866, “The Negro resembles the female in his love for children, his family, and his cabin.” He continued, “. . . the black man is to the white man what woman is to man in general, a loving being and a being of pleasure.”⁶⁷ It was clear that many scientists were interested in socially constructing black males with a status position close to white women. James Hunt, president of the London Anthropological Society, described black brains in 1863, “There is no doubt that the Negro’s brain bears a great resemblance to a European female or child’s brain and thus approaches the ape far more than the European, while the Negress approaches the ape still nearer.”⁶⁸ This same kind of logic also influenced Robert Park, the originator of the subdiscipline of U.S. race relations, in his assumption that blacks were the “lady” of the races.⁶⁹ What is equally disturbing is how these men viewed women as biologically less developed. The science reproduced stratified positioning and thereby produced a defense for domination.

The contradiction of penis size and effeminate characterization is peculiar. At any rate, it does not mean that this embodiment was determinative of domination. However, the function of the imaginary likely had two purposes. One is the imaginary animalization of black males. Second, the reversal as a lexicographic became common; where too much signaled

absence of the underlying quality. To be a man required possession of a penis; simultaneously there were different kinds of penises and some—of *white* color and moderate size—became more masculine than others. Perhaps this is part of the rationale to construct a black penis as a part of a specific kind of pseudo male. It is hard to know, yet, we must reason that there is a phenomenology vis-à-vis this grammar. Where in contemporary social theory is there a serious treatment of this phenomenal spectacle? Under this logic, patriarchy bamboozled black males. Language hoodwinked us into believing the order of things is equal to the imagined natural order of things. At the same time, black males were reassigned a gender of black status. As will be discussed later, gender reassignment was not a location; rather, it was an image to deploy in struggles for hegemonic masculinity.

Overlooking or erasing the sorting of black males is a project of anesthetizing ourselves from complicity in constructing Eurocentric values as universal value. Consequently, the result might be cultural imperialism by re-inscribing a master narrative that might ignore the necessity of possessing black males to prevent them from ruining patriarchal society. Is it possible that the best way to prevent black males from becoming too powerful is to treat their class as a *social* form of females? Patriarchy was in a strange position of engaging in an ambiguous relationship with black male genitals in its imagination. On the one hand, there appeared to have been an envy associated with a penis of color; on the other hand, there appeared to have been an obsession with penis size—that is, a form of phallophilia.⁷⁰ In short, the conceptual contradiction inherent in the U.S. version of patriarchy contained its own eventual obliteration. To delay its ultimate fate would require extensive surveillance and constant rationalization.

SPREADING BLACK MASCULINITY

Colonialism was a process that functioned to institutionalize relationships of domination, oppression, and the violent intimidation of all opposition. Perhaps the most essential aspect of its success was its institutionalization. Institutions are social relationships that serve also to force agreement about values, norms, roles, and statuses. Black males entered into a system under construction where patriarchal institutional rules dominated. At the same time, colonial practices imply that the imperial power ruthlessly annihilates the ways of everyday existence of the victims of its process. There is a great deal of debate about the applicability of colonialism to the experience of African Americans. It remains true that colonialism was a technology used to subjugate different classes of humans. Many fiercely opposed it and many black intellectuals used the concept to understand the African American experience. Therefore, the application of the concept of colonialism is a major part of both African American history and African American Studies. Like slavery, it was a particular type of oppression.⁷¹

Slavers transported African American males to the American shores in an attempt to use their labor power for agricultural, and later industrial, needs. This historical fact still has implications for today's sociology of the black male's status. It would be exciting to think of a world that is different from the actual historical facts. For example, it is possible to ask what if, instead of black males being the brunt of domination and policies of exclusion, the experience had happened to white males. Alternatively, to assert, in bolder terms, this could have happened to white males. Such questions ultimately serve the dominating group because they assist in rationalizing a fantasy that all groups have suffered equally. Those that reason in this way are not only using flawed sociology. It is not only a mistake because it presents you-do-the-same-thing reasoning. Its biggest flaw is that such thinking serves the interest of the dominant group—thereby it undermines justice. Distracting questions prevent progress for historically oppressed groups; dominant groups can reproduce their group status while simultaneously condemning oppressed groups for their social statuses. In the dominant culture, colonialism is out of the question because of this or that way of thinking; and so, if one group uses it when the dominant instructions say not to speak that way, correction and punishment results. After all, they would run the risk of the dominant group rendering anyone who dares to recognize the idea as intellectually inferior. Therefore, they would not deserve a serious voice, clearly, because they are unable to distinguish between colonialism and pluralism—what kind of public sociology is this?

The dominant group can pursue another strategy in their organization of the reproduction of inequality. The rhetorical claim that past dominators used oppressive schemes, yet, they are no longer common.⁷² Such claims belie evidence that the dominant European American group remains on the top of social organization with more status, income, and prestige. Their wives and families have longer and healthier life resulting from their statuses. Like a claim that all experiences are similar, the claim that things have changed serves the interest of the European American male group. In this way, the dominant political class can use the rhetorical strategy of looking for deficiency within an oppressed group. The dominant group can organize things where the most reactionary members of their group can become highly respected for producing their ideology. That ideology is interested in creative ways to confirm the inferiority of the oppressed group. Second lines of procedure are to co-op members from the oppressed group and bestow second-rate status on them for reproducing rhetoric that serves the dominant political class's interest.

An example of the former procedure is the social event of the publication of the book *The Bell Curve*.⁷³ The authors worked for many years to produce an ideology that black males were inferior to white males. For their efforts, they received top positions at universities and think tanks. They had impeccable credentials and prestige in terms of whites that work in academia. They earned all manner of institutional support including research grants,

office space, secretarial and graduate student assistants, travel allowances, book contracts, prestigious positions on publication review boards, and the like.⁷⁴ They earned top salaries from which to support themselves and their families. They received the opportunities to drive better cars and live in better homes in better neighborhoods. At the time of the publication of *The Bell Curve*, the authors had reputations the world over to be anti-black rhetoricians. Yet, the publication of the work was a defining white cultural event. Many flocked to booksellers in droves to purchase copies of the antiblack “scholarship.” Many initiated discussion groups where they typically proclaimed that they were not committed to hierarchy; and with all dispatch they simultaneously placed the antiblack diatribe at the top of best-selling lists. Many built a virtual shrine to *The Bell Curve* text in both their public and private libraries across the world. In addition to supporting antiblack scholarship, they made the authors richer than they were before they had produced the text. Many consistently proclaimed all over the world, “I do not dislike blacks but . . .” blacks are inferior.

Political scientist Adolph Reed, Jr. commented,

While reading Herrnstein and Murray and the literature on which they draw, I often felt like a mirror image of Julian West, Edward Bellamy’s protagonist in *Looking Backward*, who fell unconscious at the end of the nineteenth century and awoke at the end of the twentieth. And indeed, the authors’ strategic hedging of their hereditarian claims could presage the return of an updated version of the Lamarckian race theory popular a century ago . . . There’s not much reason for optimism. This past July, Daniel Patrick Moynihan announced at his Senate Finance Committee hearing on welfare reform that we could be witnessing the processes of “speciation” at work among the innercity poor. Nodding their agreement were the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, and her two world-class poverty researcher under secretaries, Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood (the originator of the “two years and off” welfare policy, who incidentally shows up in *The Bell Curve*’s acknowledgments).⁷⁵

The consequence of openly antiblack rhetoric in various social spaces is likely overwhelming. It is not hard to imagine that many blacks suffered feelings of inferiority and shame at the fact high-status personalities in society unabashedly promoted such logic. On the job, many might have felt that their lack of promotion over the years was justified if they, after all, came from inferior stock. Many others who worked in academics probably felt that the rejection of their work by white male-dominated publication committees possibly had merit based on their intellectual inferiority. The cruelty of language generally went unrecognized by most white males. They were comfortable with the public assault on blacks and likely had become comfortable with it because of their historical cultural commitments. Others probably felt powerless to

respond to its claims. A few scholars, media personalities, or leaders offered relief for *The Bell Curve's* torturing rhetoric.⁷⁶ The powerful political class silenced or shelved the work of most of them.

An example of the co-opted black scholars was Thomas Sowell. He explained black intelligence differently. Sowell worked at Stanford University, presented statistics, and interpreted them to mean that U.S. entry ethnic groups, like the Italians and Irish, initially had aggregate lower IQ scores when compared to average scores. According to Sowell, these scores increased with the length of the group's urbanization. Because blacks moved to urban areas relatively late compared to other groups, Sowell believed their scores remained behind white immigrant groups.⁷⁷

Other scientists scrutinized Sowell's work for its factual and logical flaws. However, logical flaws make little difference in terms of the power of a stereotype. The most significant aspect of Sowell's rhetoric was the status it gained across disciplines. For example, many introductory sociology texts reported Sowell's claims as if they are sociological. Yet, Sowell's work is specifically in the field of economics. What is more, Sowell's position supports the reproduction of the status quo; his argument is that there is an actual intellectual deficiency attributable to blacks that could improve under evolutionary conditions. His version of evolution is a form of Lamarckian thinking that the environment would change physiology, learning, and knowledge—a kind of cephalization focusing on sensory and neural organs that would change specific ethnic groups. It is hard to understand how he thought about the process and outcome. How does group intelligence grow? The idea is that living in an urban environment results in culturally transmittable differences among ethnic groups. Apparently, the intelligence tests and placement exams function above environmental influence. For example, one might think that standards would equally evolve to eliminate any possible race, gender, or class biases. In fact, one could extend this reasoning to think that it is possible to evolve different standards for rural and regional targets of examination. Sowell's imaginary did not materialize and neither have any of the alternative imaginaries. It is true that years of schooling increased among blacks. However, the rank of the schools interacts with black graduation rates. Inequality in outcome appears to be as certain as it was in the 1970s and 1980s. This is particularly true for black males.⁷⁸

Such reasoning is not new in the history of ideas about Western gender and race hierarchy. It spans the subdiscipline of race relations when Robert Park made his racial proclamations. For Park, as for Sowell, blacks are below their masters in evolutionary processes; white males are presumably the *men* of the *rac*es. Moreover, naturally, the goal is for the black weaker, more passive, aggregate to emulate as closely as possible the real men of history. Many white males must find solace in the fact that Sowell is black and his views share a *proper view* of history. From their view, his logic might be one that is a credit to his race and a reflection of his intellectual superiority.

SELECTED BLACK DEMOGRAPHICS

The U.S. Census Bureau reported that in 2005 there was an estimated black resident population of 39.7 million. Some of these residents reported more than one racial category. Taken all together, the black population comprised 13.4 percent of the total U.S. population. By 2005, the black population was growing by half a million each year. By 2050, estimates are that the single-race black population of the U.S. is 61.4 million. In 2005, there were 18 states with an estimated black population of at least 1 million. New York had the largest population with 3.5 million. Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia followed it. Cook County, Illinois had the largest number of blacks in July 2005 with 1.4 million and Los Angeles County, California followed with approximately 1 million.⁷⁹

Indicators of black social conditions reported by the U.S. Census Bureau indicated uneven development. Approximately 31 percent of the black population in July 2005 was under the age of 18; 8 percent was 65 years or older. Less than half of black families (44 percent) contained a married couple. Forty-six percent of black households were owner-occupied homes. There were 2.4 million black military veterans in the U.S. in 2005. More military veterans were black than any other minority group. In terms of formal schooling, 80 percent of blacks 25 years of age or older earned at least a high school diploma in 2005; 17 percent had a bachelor's degree or higher. About 1 million blacks who were age 25 years of age or older had earned an advanced degree in 2005—for example, master's, Ph.D., M.D., or J.D.⁸⁰

The integration of black males into mainstream America is incomplete partly because of the history of social exclusion. Its colonial legacy is with us today. As we shall see, among blacks the black male is not where we would expect him given U.S. patriarchy. This is likely a feature of the racialized social context.⁸¹ A sociological feature of black male cultural history is the patterned way that the group remains in a poor position to compete in the U.S. version of “meritocracy.”

The study of black Americans became increasingly concerned about black males.⁸² Some studies have generated an interest in the adaptation process for black males. What typically informs their socialization into the mainstream culture? Important issues are the values and ideology of the *dominant culture* and black male participation in the formal and informal sectors of the economy.⁸³ What has become important are the ways that black males negotiate their social position with kin, friends, and contacts to maximize their human and physical capital.⁸⁴ In a deeper sense, the black male role represents an imitation of a feigned American male role that merely existed as an ideology of white maleness.⁸⁵ Yet, the community relationships that black males had to maintain required that in a general sense they had to modify their patterned role behaviors. Some scholars argue

they construct *their own* oppositional culture within the context of their experiences, norms, and values.⁸⁶ Yet, not all opinion has an equal place at the cultural center. As will be argued, the result is that it is becoming virtually *impossible* to expect the black male aggregate to integrate in the U.S. merit system. For increasing accommodation of black males, the system must transform; or, society must increasingly marginalize, regiment, and perhaps transfer them to holding stations of some kind.

BLACK MALE INEQUALITY AND REACTION WHEN DOMINATION ENDURES

The American ideal preaches a rather simple message about success. If young people would go to school and study hard, they have the opportunity to be successful with their futures despite their childhood conditions. Table 2.1 estimates increased income with greater education in terms of gendered racial identities. For all identities, more education results in an increase in income; however, there is an unexpected indirect relationship between doctorate and professional degrees. We expect in a patriarchal society, females would earn less for their education than males. The idea is that males as head of families need more income to provide for them. These data do not weaken that concept. Black and white males earn more than females. However, the difference between the female aggregates is notable. Black female is much closer to black male income than is white female to white male income. The average difference between white male and female income is \$26,500; between black male and female, it is \$12,454, and between white male and black male, it is \$14,395. In the sense of patriarchy and income, white male remains on top of the patriarchy in 2005.

Table 2.1 Mean income of full-time workers 16 years and older by selected race and gender identities, 2005

	Black Female	Black Male	White Male	White Female
High school graduate	\$12,890	\$19,431	\$26,525	\$12,071
Associate degree	\$23,826	\$31,213	\$39,950	\$23,974
Bachelor's degree	\$32,789	\$43,713	\$59,348	\$30,458
Master's degree	\$41,011	\$53,815	\$68,772	\$39,373
Professional degree	\$59,617	\$86,225	\$107,437	\$59,019
Doctorate degree	\$51,660	\$62,122	\$80,855	\$58,993

Source: American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample

These data indicate that black females and males share a more comparable wage and salary experience in the workplace. In one study of race, gender, and the U.S. labor market, historian Angela Y. Davis indicates that this difference is historical. Davis observed,

Like their men, Black women have worked until they could work no more. Like their men, they have assumed the responsibilities of family providers. The unorthodox feminine qualities of assertiveness and self-reliance—for which Black women have been frequently praised but more often rebuked—are reflections of their labor and their struggles outside of the home.⁸⁷

This observation was important for many organizations that struggled for equality and justice in the labor market. However, those struggles might not have yet yielded equality based on racialized and gendered inequities. The story is much more complicated than this chapter indicates. This is partially so because difference in pay in the labor market stems from many social practices. For example, in schooling Anne Ferguson reported an *industry* producing black males as criminals instead of as citizens.⁸⁸ Judith Blau reports black students are often more enthusiastic about their educations when compared to white students. She also found that black students are less likely to miss classes and to cheat when compared to white males.⁸⁹ It is clear that subaltern racialized students have a different relationship with their schools when contrasted to white students.⁹⁰ This is particularly true for black males.⁹¹ Many black males will feel a great deal of ambivalence about the school system. This ambivalence would likely not be a measure of stated attitudes, but by deeply held beliefs and actual behaviors. For example, anthropologist John Ogbu found in his ethnographic work on black students that there is a kind of oppositional stance in them. This stance is part of a deeply held belief that the powerful rigged the system against them.⁹² In this sense, many black males will attempt to disrupt the normal operation of the system. For example, many of them will disrupt classrooms. On the job, many of them might show less commitment. In families, many of them might share values that are not normal for dominant cultural populations. In terms of style, many of them might oppose the commonplace.

Ogbu used a cultural-ecological framework and pointed out “that throughout their history Black Americans have experienced the burden of ‘acting white’” because of their oppositional collective identity and cultural frame of reference.⁹³ He explained that acting white does not mean to act the typical way that whites behave; rather, it means that white stereotypes forced blacks to behave according to what whites thought the proper way for blacks to behave. “Acting white” is a form of stereotype domination opened for backlash from an external dominant group as well as from an internal subordinated group. Furthermore, “acting white” refers to different

stereotypes at different periods of history; ultimately, its function is the subordination of a targeted group. For Ogbu, then, the power relationship existed between black and white determines “acting white.”

However, after emancipation, blacks were required to behave and talk the way White people actually behaved and talked; (a) in situations requiring the mastery of certain White knowledge, behaviors and speech, such as for formal education, upward social mobility and participation in societal institutions controlled by White people, while (b) Blacks were also now required to behave and to talk like White people to gain social acceptance and to be treated as social equals by white people.⁹⁴

Of course, behaving as instructed by powerful groups is not necessarily the same as being treated a social equal. Ogbu reasoned, “Blacks were often not rewarded or accepted as equal by Whites when they successfully learned to behave and talk like whites or had obtained stipulated educational qualification.”⁹⁵ This idea that social rewards are distributed based on racialized status positions and enforced stereotyped role-play finds equivalence in the distribution of income among various levels of education displayed in Table 2.1. This interpretation of the differences seen in Table 2.1 rests on the cultural history of black males and the fact that in this history, like all blacks, black males fought two problems that Ogbu elaborated in his work: status problems and the management of status problems.

U.S. black males have always encountered status problems in the nation that proclaimed adherence to patriarchy and equality. There were two historically documented problems associated with status, school credentials, and employment qualifications. For example, Ogbu concluded, “Although school credentials were a requirement for employment in the wider society, White employers used a job ceiling to deny them [African Americans] access to jobs, promotion and wages commensurate with their qualifications.”⁹⁶ In addition, this discrimination extended to residential,⁹⁷ sexual,⁹⁸ social,⁹⁹ and school¹⁰⁰ discrimination. Citing Gunnar Myrdal,¹⁰¹ Ogbu remarked,

The beliefs aroused White aversion to Blacks and this, in turn, led to another White belief, namely, that Black Americans were not assimilable. Whites did not mean by this that Blacks were not capable of acquiring the education, economic status, and lifestyle of the White middle class. Rather, what they meant was that it was not desirable or acceptable to assimilate Blacks into White society to share their collective identity because they were colored and inferior.¹⁰²

The strain has become incredible vis-à-vis black males. For example, the state of Maryland and the city of Baltimore are representative of the crisis of the oppositional organization of black males. Table 2.2 presents the total black enrollment in Ph.D.-granting universities in Maryland—this includes

undergraduate and graduate students. Black males are about 38 percent of black female enrollments. Added to this, by some estimates, 56 percent of Baltimore black males between the ages of 18 and 25 are under criminal justice supervision.¹⁰³ The Justice Policy Institute reported, “[W]hile African Americans make up only 28 percent of Maryland’s population, African Americans make up 68 percent of drug arrests, and 90 percent of people incarcerated for drug offenses.”¹⁰⁴ There are several facts to add about skyrocketing incarceration of black males in Maryland found in the Justice Policy Institute report:

Maryland ranked third nationally in the percentage of its incoming inmates incarcerated for drug offenses (behind New Jersey and New York). The increase in African American admissions to prisons for drug offenses was an astonishing 18 times greater than the increase in White drug offender admissions between 1986 and 1999 . . . Between 1996 and 1999, more than 94% of the growth in drug prison admissions were [sic] African American prisoners . . . The Justice Policy Institute reported that disparity in drug imprisonments is not explained by

Table 2.2 Black non-Hispanic student enrollment in Maryland Ph.D. granting institutions, 2005

	Black Men Non-Hispanic	Black Women Non-Hispanic	Black Stu- dents Non- Hispanic Total	% Black Men	<i>U.S. News & World Report Rank</i>
Bowie State University	1300	2287	3587	36	Master’s 4 th Tier
University of Maryland, College Park	2401	4300	6341	32	National #53
University of Maryland, Baltimore	594	806	1400	42	National 3 rd Tier
University of Maryland, Eastern Shore	963	1548	2511	38	Master’s 4 th Tier
Morgan State University	2480	3302	5782	43	National 4 th Tier
Towson Uni- versity	481	958	1439	34	Master’s #4

Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Institution of Education Science. Retrieved April 4, 2007, from <http://NCES.ed.gov>. *U.S. News & World Report, America’s Best Colleges*, 2009.

drug use, as national surveys show that Whites and African Americans report drug use and addiction at roughly the same rates.¹⁰⁵

In addition, we can see that the higher the academic rank of the university, the lower the ratio of black men to black women.

Black males' position in the patriarchal order is a specific way. This fact requires a separate examination of the black male status. Given this, it is important to reflect on the black male aggregate response to experiences with inequality. This chapter was a narrative of the black male social status. This narrative addressed U.S. culture and a relational black male subculture. The subculture response was a new patriarchal organization—more fragmented than previous iterations of U.S. patriarchy. The chapters that follow elaborate this new patriarchal organization. The next chapter is the elaboration of the claim that black males represent a distinctive gender. This will complicate the social construction of black male gender and assist in recognizing difference when thinking about hegemonic masculinity. It will show black male assimilation into mainstream U.S. society is highly unlikely without a major transformation of society. Relational subcultural organizations propel black male resistance. Many black males reject most assumptions held by substantial dutiful theory.

3 Penetrating Matters in Black Male Domination

But before that nameless prejudice that leaps beyond all this he stands helpless, dismayed, and well-nigh speechless; before that personal disrespect and mockery, the ridicule and systematic humiliation, the distortion of fact and wanton license of fancy, the cynical ignoring of the better and the boisterous welcoming to the worse, the all-pervading desire to inculcate disdain for everything black, from Toussaint to the devil, —before this there rises a sickening despair that would disarm and discourage any nation save that black host to whom “discouragement” is an unwritten word.

—W. E. B. Du Bois¹

We will probably never know what happened! The shocking news came over the media: Internet, the international news broadcasts, and world newspapers. A black man accused New York City police officers of his sodomy at a Brooklyn station. The black man was obviously out of his mind. We need not stretch our imaginations too far to wonder why. After all, many men engage in sodomy. Some men and women prefer anal penetration as part of their normal sexual acts.² Some men prefer anally to penetrate their sexual partners. What was unique about the case of Abner Louima was the forced sodomy of a black male at the hands of state agents at the end of the 20th century. What was even more disturbing is the societal reaction to the “rape”: for most organizations, it was not a major event.³ Organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), National Organization of Women (NOW), the National Black Gay and Lesbian Leadership Forum, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF), the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), and other progressive organizations said little. Leaders did not suggest another Million Man March to protest such abuse. However, larger questions lurk behind these immediate ones: How did some police officers come to believe they could avoid prosecution behind this particular act? Does such an attitude have group psychology origins? If so, what are the cultural mechanisms that allow for the production of such thinking and would it be possible to remain sane in a culture that produced such a worldview?

Louima, a black Haitian immigrant, took the witness stand in his case to report the events that occurred on August 9, 1997. He alleged five New York City police officers arrested him in a bizarre set of events ending with his sodomy torture at the 70th Precinct stationhouse bathroom. Louima told a jury that police officers arrested him and took turns beating him before one rammed a stick into his rectum. Louima said an enraged officer

then put the stick “in my mouth and told me, that’s my s---.” He said in an unsure voice during the trial that five white officers violated his civil rights.⁴ Louima identified Officer Justin Volpe as the one that had rammed the stick into his rectum.⁵ After the attack, the police took Louima outside his cell where two ambulance workers cared for him. When he told them what had happened he said they “were looking at me like I was crazy.”⁶

Certainly, by now Louima must have been “crazy.” The fact of the horrible rape and the fact of his blackness must have combined contributing to his temporary insanity. Who could maintain sanity under such mortifying circumstances? Even witnesses who are from his community must have suffered trauma from the realization that it could happen to them. It is clear that the assault on Louima was in fact an assault on the entire national black community.⁷ Initially the officers claimed that Louima had acquired his internal injuries from consensual homosexual intercourse at a popular nightclub, Club Rendezvous, in Brooklyn. The officers said that Louima and another man had gone to the restroom at the club. They said the other man anally penetrated him there. Louima, a then 32-year-old married man employed as a security guard denied the officers’ claim. When he got off work, he stopped by his parents’ house and then went with his brother, cousin, and friends to Club Rendezvous. Louima said after Volpe spent himself he cautioned him saying if he “ever talked to anyone about what they did to me, he’d kill me and my family and he was not joking.”⁸

The prosecutor accused Volpe of sodomizing Louima in a fit of rage. The hospital admitted Louima with severe internal injuries after the incident, which prompted modest demonstrations against police brutality. The police dropped charges against Louima within days of his arrest. It is not certain about the charges brought against Louima. In addition to making the outrageous claims against Louima, the officers apparently used the law as their personal weapon against Louima. According to criminologist Katheryn K. Russell, “hoax perpetrators are most frequently charged with filing a false police report. The number of racial hoaxes suggests that false report statutes do not operate as effective deterrents.”⁹ The officers’ racial hoax was more complex because they dropped the initial charges against Louima. It is doubtful that Louima did anything above assembling with a group. Club Rendezvous closed for the morning. A large crowd flowed onto the street at about 4 a.m. Louima said he noticed an injured man surrounded by police. He said, “There was one guy who had some blood on his face and was complaining that he got hit by cops.” Bystanders grew angry, he continued, and “I was very angry, too.” Louima said he commented that if police “want to make an arrest; they are not to hit him, because the person have his rights.” After that, he said he heard someone behind him say, “Shut up.” He then felt the police knocking him to the ground and handcuffing him.¹⁰

Louima described the police taking him away in a patrol car to a nearby intersection where four white police officers identified earlier by prosecutors as Volpe, Thomas Bruder, Charles Schwarz, and Thomas Wiese began

beating him. Volpe, he said, taunted him, “Stupid nigger. I’m going to teach you a lesson how to respect a cop.”¹¹ How could Louima know if these were the exact words of the officers at that time? Would any of us know? We only know that for assembly and speech, he met the authority of the state. After the officers’ equivocations, they finally offered the rationale that a “sucker-punch” caused Volpe to sodomize Louima. The use of the term “sucker-punch” is unusual. The officers decided, apparently with their lawyers’ advice, that they might reasonably argue that the violation of masculinity from placing Volpe in the role of a “sucker” was the warrant allowing them to penetrate Louima. In this way, the media could present Volpe as “mistaken.” He really was not “sucker punched” by Louima. Low and behold, if we follow the case and the logic, police should have sodomized Louima’s cousin, he actually sucker-punched the officer. Can anyone expect to reason civil rights in terms of such tortured logic?

Louima said the police beat him twice before arriving at the 70th Precinct stationhouse. At some point Officer Schwarz removed Louima’s belt during a search according to one witness. With his pants down at his knees and his hands still cuffed, the officer led him into the bathroom with Volpe following behind, Louima said.¹² This crime, if it happened, is not a rape in legal language. The language of the law implies gender discrimination. It refers to an assault, brutalization, or aggravated harassment. U.S. lawmakers partially created rules to protect white women from their perceptions of *brutish, degraded, and subhuman* black males.¹³

How long has the anal rape of black males been reported in cultural history? We do not have a history to account for anal rape. We do know that there is sodomy by state agents on streets, in jails, and prisons.¹⁴ We have another contemporaneous example of sodomy in Chicago where a police officer, under the color of law, allegedly used his baton to penetrate the plaintiff Frederick Douglas Mason.¹⁵

The facts of the case are in The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division indicating that on July 19, 2000 Mason was arrested at his apartment in the 4300 block of Madison Street in Chicago following an argument with his property owner. The defendant officers, Luis Alejo and Hector Alfaro, had come there and demanded that Mason’s property owner bring a complaint against him. The property owner was opposed to bringing a complaint against Mason. The officers threatened that if the property owner did not sign a complaint, they would arrest him. The property owner then signed a blank complaint form, which the police later filled in with allegedly false information. Mason was thrown into their squad car that headed down Madison Street to Independence Boulevard and then to Harrison Street, where the 11th District police station was located. While in transit, Mason alleged Alejo began calling him names including homosexual, faggot, nigger, and sissy. Finally, Mason claims Alejo said, “Wait until I get you to the station, you sissy!” When they arrived at the station, they pulled Mason out of the car backwards causing injuries to his

feet. In the station, the police took him to an interview room where they cuffed his elbows to the wall. Mason says that at that point Alejo pulled his pants down, took some liquid from a bottle and rubbed it on his baton, then placed his weight against Mason's back causing him to become pinned to the wall. Alfaro then pushed Mason's head to the wall and walked out of the room. At that point, Mason claims that Alejo rammed the baton into his anus and pulled it out quickly causing severe physical injury to Mason. The officers then produced a story charging Mason with domestic abuse, but the court dismissed those charges after his appearance.¹⁶

There are other allegations of penetrations similar to the two cases discussed here; this book does not systematically present them. In fact, we do not have a systematic organization of them. We do have some accounts reported from slave narratives that led political sociologist Manning Marable to conclude the practice of rape of young black boys among Portuguese planters. According to Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, there are also reports of rape of young black boys.¹⁷ The history of the violent penetration of black males is incomplete. The forces of accommodation might impede such investigations. Many may not want to be angered and disturbed about it as a social fact. Likewise, forces of the status quo often view the fact of black male rapes as aberrations and scholars who mention such facts as "extreme." This perspective likely represents an integrationist agenda. Representatives of such thinking believe that we all share a commitment to becoming similar in our social goals and values—they practice substantial dutiful theory. This view is part of colorblind ideology. Yet, penetrations appear to be a form of social control often brought against black males in differing ways.

The case of Rodney King is another example of a penetrating violation of a black male's civil rights by state agents. An onlooker videotaped parts of the events where officers stopped King. In an intense reading of the Rodney King Video(s), Elizabeth Alexander provides us residual memories of violence against black males. King's videotaped beating and bodily penetrations occurred on March 3, 1991 when he was a twenty-five year old black man and was pulled over by a California Highway Patrol officer.¹⁸ Subsequently 21 Los Angeles city police officers with two Unified School District officers arrived when King got out of his car. The short of the story is that King suffered 56 blows, a number of stun gun blasts, and random and savage kicks, and pushes. The police left him with several actual and attempted penetrations including a split inner lip, a partially paralyzed face, nine skull fractures, a broken cheekbone, a shattered eye socket, and a broken leg.¹⁹ Alexander (1994) reminds us of the historical precedence for brutality against blacks in the U.S. from the *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave* (1845). Douglass wrote:

He would at times seem to take great pleasure in whipping a slave. I have often been awakened by the dawn of day by the most heart-rending

of shrieks of an own aunt of mine, whom he used to tie up to a joist, and whip upon her naked back till she was literally covered with blood. No words, no tears, no prayers, from his gory victim, seemed to move his iron heart from its bloody purpose. The louder she screamed, the harder he whipped; and where the blood ran fastest, there he whipped longest. He would whip her to make her scream, and whip her to make her hush; and not until overcome by fatigue, would he cease to swing the blood-clotted cowskin . . . I was doomed to be a witness and a participant. It struck me with awful force.²⁰

Douglass wrote, “I was so terrified and horror-stricken at the sight, that I hid myself in a closet, and dared not venture out till long after the bloody transaction was over. I expected it would be my turn next.”²¹ The idea that under the social order of racialized domination fear drove Douglass to “the closet” is an apt metaphor for the silence we witness surrounding Louima’s buttocks.

INTERPRETING THE PENETRATION

In a perceptive analysis, Carlyle V. Thompson (1999) presented two essential points related to the Louima case. The first is Louima’s own understanding of his assault and the second is an accurate explanation of it. Thompson reports that Louima said, “I believe there are other victims who are either ashamed to come out or did not know how to speak out for themselves.”²² It may be likely, as Louima suggested that any male in modern society admitting publicly to an anal assault is phenomenal. After all, his two children and his wife would come to know! What would be the redefinition of his paternal role after such a public disclosure? What impact would such a confession have on his image specifically for his children? Louima understood his sodomy as a relational fact to other “victims” in the community. Finally, should we consider the anal rape of Louima by state agents as terrorism against a community? Many must see it as a form of a hostage situation. However, most male victims would hide their sodomized status in order to maintain normal masculine status. After all, “real men” in patriarchal societies typically are not penetrated. Forcibly penetrated males are likely in a situation of terror. In this sense, such terrorism is both part of a cultural history and specific cultural practice; it means that an unlimited number of micro-aggressions must occur against black males as a part of their everyday experience. The opening epigraph in this chapter by Du Bois certainly represents the degrading stratification of black males as part of U.S. cultural heritage. Understanding this cultural interpretation helps us in framing a rational explanation of such rape experiences.

Cultural critic Hortense J. Spillers makes an interesting distinction that may be helpful when considering the thread that connects “isolated

incidents” of attacks against black males that have come to national attention so we may understand such practices as normal. Spillers writes:

But I would make a distinction in this case between “body” and “flesh” and impose that distinction as the central one between captive and liberated subject-positions. In that sense, before the “body” there is the “flesh,” that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography. Even though the European hegemonies stole bodies—some of them female—out of West African communities in concert with the African “middleman,” we regard this human and social irreparability as high crimes against the flesh, as the person of African females and African males registered the wounding. If we think of the “flesh” as a primary narrative, then we mean its seared, divided, ripped-apartness, riveted to the ship’s hole, fallen, or “escaped” overboard.²³

The social landscape where we are required to gaze upon the “lacerations, woundings, fissures, tears, scars, openings, ruptures, lesions, rendings, [and] punctures of the flesh” results in public representation of the black male body that is analogous to its torture in previous periods of history.²⁴ The bodies become merely flesh to tear into. Spillers suggested a cultural reception area and culture “whose state apparatus, include judges, attorneys, ‘owners,’ ‘soul drivers,’ ‘overseers,’ and ‘men of God.’ These officials apparently collude with a protocol of ‘search and destroy.’”²⁵ These acts of torture may still be with us as analogue from past practices seen in images daily reproduced in magazines, newspapers, and electronic media. They reinforce the message of domination and torture, and they reinforce the shame associated with social roles that society constructs as ones that should not be tortured and dominated. Real men do not submit to torture, domination, and penetration—yet, it is unclear if the acts are against flesh or bodies—in short, are such acts against both subject-positions. In social work professor Jewell Gibbs’s book *Race and Justice*, she quoted a national staff member for the NAACP Wade Henderson, “Rodney King became a black everyman whose experiences with the police came to symbolize African-American encounters with law enforcement.”²⁶ Gibbs continued

An unprovoked assault on a defenseless black man—a virtual lynching in full view of a public crowd . . . The police had been accused of unprovoked and unjustified assaults against black males since Africans first set foot on American soil in 1619, but an actual beating had never been documented on film.²⁷

What if there was videotape of the penetration of Louima and there was videotape of the medical examination of both victims? We could then have a fuller account to compare and contrast the flesh wounds including King’s

fractured eye socket, broken cheekbone, broken leg, facial nerve severing, stun gun burns, the fillings knocked out of his teeth, and his fractured skull at approximately nine points with the teeth knocked out of Louima's skull, and his severe internal injuries. These late accounts of the descendants of slaves, to borrow and paraphrase the words of the dean of African American poetry, Maya Angelou, the hopes and the dreams of the slaves, are stained with an itemized account of wounds, severed body parts, and flesh penetrations. These social facts are related to social memories that likely result in different groups reading the narratives of penetration differently. The likely status positions of different social groups probably would influence how the different groups would interpret media reports of black males that experience physical and sexual assaults by state agents.

The second point that Thompson raises is that Volpe's fiancée was a black woman named Susan Lawson.²⁸ In fact, Ms. Lawson was Volpe's live-in lover who worked as a clerk at the precinct. When she first heard the charges, she proclaimed Volpe's innocence. As the hoax that the other officers and Volpe constructed fell apart, she excused the revelation by stating that Volpe was not really an evil person. She revealed that they had plans to be married and to have children. Ms. Lawson's occupational and racial statuses likely help to inform her interpretation of the incident. Her relationship with Mr. Volpe also likely complicates the way that she understands the meaning of Louima's rape. She knew Volpe as a gentle and kind man and the report of his sexual assault did not correspond to what she knew about him. In fact, a sociological reading helps us understand the assault more than by reading the consciousness and personality of Volpe. A sociological reading helps us to think about Louima and Volpe as ideal forms occupying roles in a social system that have expectations connected to their lines of action and interaction.

In this latter sense, Ms. Lawson's record is a concealed and sanitized one because its revelations were not widely reported. Yet this "hidden transcript" engages the collective memory of the organization of slavery. Namely, the cultural process of black male gender emasculation that results in Louima becoming Volpe's other woman at the moment of the assault. The assaults continue the tradition of treating black males as "ladies among the races."²⁹ Such anecdotal sentiment captures a larger reflection of a whiteness cultural tradition that manages black males' social positions. It is not that the cultural tradition is an actual place or space; it is an imaginary awaiting deployment—a sense that can be used in situational performance of hegemonic masculinity.

Is it the case that a core value of American culture is to both construct black males as feminized and hypermasculinized? Is it that feminization and hypermasculinization are essential to racialized subordination under the logic of U.S. meritocracy? Is control of the state by a white political class a lens through which we may witness the mortifying process of black male inequality vis-à-vis feminization and hypermasculinization in context of the

field of U.S. patriarchy? Finally, is the desire to violently sexually abuse the feminine and lash the hypermasculine a core taste distinguishing the culture of whiteness? A thesis in this book is that two contradictory cultural products are important for structuring the black male's status in the U.S.: (1) animalistic/hypersexual expectations and (2) feminine expectations. The social function of these two organizing principles has partially been to control and possess the black male. Much of the organization of these principles consists of technologies that change through history. Yet, these contradictory expectations remain as the core mechanisms communicating the black male as a key submissive status. Feminist frequently understand gender as related to power.³⁰ However, they often overlook the dual effects of feminization and hypermasculinization on black males in the culture as a way to reproduce their submissive status. Figure 3.1 graphically displays this logic.

MODERN STATE REGULATION OF GENDERS

The cultural domination of black males means that power relationships prevent understanding gender as a straightforward cultural reality where it either signifies female or male statuses. There are in fact equivocal gender statuses and consequently various masculinities.³¹ We perform masculinity depending on the social situation and the social circumstances we encounter. Passed on from slavery was the imaginary organizational matrix of black male subjugation. However, the cause of contemporary black male status degradation is ill conceived when scholars think it solely descends from slavery. Such a view would depart from the relational perspective. We do not reason, for example, that the successes of Jewish Americans are attributable to the Holocaust. However, some cultural technologies that are still with us today developed during slavery. For example, Angela Davis's study of women, race, and class indicates this when she writes

Slavery relied as much on routine sexual abuse as it relied on the whip and the lash. Excessive sex urges, whether they existed among




Figure 3.1 Hegemonic cultural effect on policing of black male flesh/bodies.

individual white men or not, had nothing to do with this virtual institutionalization of rape. Sexual coercion was, rather, an essential dimension of the social relations between slavemaster and slave. In other words, the right claimed by slaveowners and their agents over the bodies of female slaves was a direct expression of their presumed property rights over Black people as a whole. The license to rape emanated from and facilitated the ruthless economic domination that was the gruesome hallmark of slavery.³²

It might eventually become necessary to revise Davis's assessment to include sexual coercion targeting black males.

There are contemporary analogues to that earlier period that are much like the principles and practices that entitled a racial class to lash, sexually abuse, and whip its subordinates. In many ways, habitual ways of doing things often become ways of doing things in situated spaces. This happens despite the reality that society comes to realize the earlier rules are discriminatory. For example, rapes in prison have become normal and understudied. Human Rights Watch revealed in their report *No Escape: Male Rape in U.S. Prisons* that "at least 140,000 inmates who have been raped" are largely without recourse.³³ Many of the raped are the victims of sexual assault and harassment; many suffer trauma after witnessing the forced penetration of another inmate. In addition, many men may experience posttraumatic stress disorder resulting from witnessing a rape of one or more of the other prisoners. In general, the prison situation represents a contemporary analogue of earlier wholesale penetrating cultural practices. It is knowledge that citizens deny or hide from public records. Nonetheless, many believe prisons have become increasingly rational bureaucratic organizations. White males experience many, if not most, of the direct assaults. It is hard to account for the experiences. In large measure, authorities do not know the communication of assaults, particularly when nonverbal communication manages such assaults. At other times, some authorities may welcome such assaults as a form of social control.³⁴ These cultural practices comprise a long historical pattern of abuse and cruelty. In fact, some evidence shows that rapes in juvenile detention centers might be more prevalent than prison rapes. In the Bartollas, Miller, and Dinitz study of 15 black youths, they found a commitment to sexual exploitation of weaker inmates in a juvenile institution.³⁵ The "booty bandits" expressed indignation about their exploitation by white society and expressed their anger against younger and smaller boys where they avoided emotional involvement and merely used them for their own physical release. These youth develop a career of learning to be exploiters where they first define sexual exploitation as acceptable, they then learn the appropriate technique to exploit sexually passive inmates, and they next establish a social distance between themselves and their victims. The state manages much of this in context of imprisoning citizens.

The social class of the victim was the most important interpersonal variable in the “booty bandits” study. Establishing social distance between perpetrators and victims is a technique many use to reproduce silence that is associated with male rapes. This same device likely operates among legitimate juridical authorities and black males generally. One consequence is that rapes in jails add to the total rapes of black *and white* males that occur yearly in our society.

Forced to satisfy another man’s sexual appetites whenever he demands, they may also be responsible for washing his clothes, massaging his back, cooking his food, cleaning his cell, and myriad other chores . . . They are frequently rented out for sex, sold, or even auctioned off . . . A prisoner that is engaging in sexual acts, not by force, is still a victim of rape because I know that deep inside this prisoner do not want to do the things that he is doing but he thinks that it is the only way that he can survive.³⁶

One way of seeing the instrumental function of juvenile detention facilities, jails, and prisons is to recognize their use in culturally producing the image of black males as feminized and hypermasculinized. Population counts make this view readily apparent. According to Human Rights Watch

. . . in comparison with people outside prison, the [mostly male] inmate population is heavily weighted toward ethnic and racial minorities, particularly African Americans. . . . African Americans make up some 40 percent of the prisoner population . . .³⁷

The balanced observer sees the racialized regimentation of black males into the prison industrial complex has tradition behind it. Folkways, mores, values, norms, and law of the dominant social consciousness influences black male generation-to-generation high incarceration experience. Colonial administrators often treated their subjects the way the powerful political class often treat black communities. The administrative leadership may not view their actions stemming from racial motivation. Nonetheless, the administrative leadership reproduces the image of black males as feminized possessions and hypermasculine brutes. Figure 3.2 graphically represents this reasoning.

CONCEPTS GUIDING THE ANALYSIS

One way of engaging in the sociology of cultural analysis is to derive the analytical concepts from history. This means that patterned ways of acting, feeling, and thinking in U.S. history are predictable. Of course, this does not mean that new patterned ways of life are inconceivable. In spite of this fact,




Figure 3.2 Hegemonic cultural and political influence on black “other” masculinity production.

we know that the term culture implies that cultural change does not occur frequently. A prominent French sociologist named Maurice Halbwachs reminded us that social memories are the products of collective organizations.

We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives, and these are continually reproduced; through them, as a continual relationship, a sense of our identity is perpetuated. But precisely because these memories are repetitions, because they are successively engaged in very different systems of notions, at different periods or our lives, they have lost the form and the appearance they once had.³⁸

Mainstream social science accepts Halbwachs’ ambitious statement as explaining the process of cultural transmission. This is particularly true when talking about hybridity. We need our culture to produce our identities. Our identities are different based on the generalized social norms, organizations, and values that allow for passing on culture from one generation to the next. A group that has a memory of its historical goals can only do this. Different cultures, then, produce different ideal cultural types that result from different ways of rearing and teaching children, a process that sociologists refer to as socialization. For example, as was discussed in Chapter 1, the American anthropologist Margaret Mead convincingly demonstrated that sex roles are culturally rather than biologically determined.³⁹ Actually, black males do not exist. There is no essential or biological thing that is black male. Nevertheless, many call a group of men black. Many of the men identify as black. The construction is external to individual “males.” In addition, the black male is in effect the combination of two fictive concepts, blackness on the one hand and maleness on the other.

Understanding black masculinity in context of United States’ history suggests considering gender and race hierarchy, domination, and cultural capital as important concepts. These three concepts help us to see how

social processes work to reproduce imaginaries of black masculinity in U.S. culture. These concepts also sensitize us to collective memories that play in everyday life producing situational strategies for deploying black masculinity and therefore reproducing how society sorts black males. It also helps us to see how our communications export these representations to other parts of the world. Our representations become ways of generally sorting black males internationally. In brief, from a relational perspective, it would be necessary to examine the concepts from both the black and white cultural memories. We can see how substantial dutiful theory is unrealistic for understanding the deployment of hegemonic masculinity.

GENDER AND RACE HIERARCHY

The idea of gender and race hierarchy is very close to U.S. citizens and it has profound emotional meaning. One way to detach from the emotional investment in the concept of gender and race hierarchy is to look at how it developed and became a practice in another part of the world.⁴⁰ It is impossible to understand black masculinity without a conception of gender and race hierarchy. If we could erase the idea and practice from our understanding and still have a scientific analysis of black masculinity then it would be preferable to do so. However, as we shall see throughout this book, such thinking is fool hearted. At the core of the organization of black masculinity is its complement organization, the organization of gender and race hierarchy. We must keep in mind that gender and race hierarchy has little to do with the genetics of a person. Gender and race hierarchy is a social construct guiding social relationships. Gender and race hierarchy is a deep structure that requires an immense amount of human labor to dismantle it. The southern African region provides a good example of gender and race hierarchy. The United States and southern Africa have substantial inequality when we compare blacks to whites. In the United States, jobs are most important in a post industrial, electronic, and cybernetic economy. The better one's job, the more social status, and income, one acquires. In agricultural economies like in southern Africa, land is the fundamental unit for production. Therefore, the quality and quantity of land determine one's social status and income. This means that in a generic sense, labor and land determine wealth. In southern Africa, blacks work extremely hard and occupy vast amounts of land but are very poor. Their condition is not natural. It derives from a history of social relations. These relations include a settler group of whites conquering blacks and putting in place social rules to keep them subservient.

One way of seeing how the powerful do this is to look at the distribution of land based on racialized ownership. Control of land for agricultural production in southern Africa is fundamental to providing subsistence for the population. Zimbabwe is a good example of a southern African nation

where gender and race hierarchy is normal. Zimbabwe was a British settler nation called Rhodesia, named after the English colonizer and financier Cecil John Rhodes. Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo led a national liberation movement with two separate armies and the support of other African nations that resulted in the downfall of the Ian Smith government that he ruled in Rhodesia for 15 years. This change of government occurred in the early 1980s and Mugabe became the first black president—in his mind, perhaps, president-for-life—after national liberation. During Smith's leadership, he had both Mugabe and Nkomo jailed. The whites not only controlled the government but also the language and grammar, this included naming buildings, land, and national monuments. They controlled the jobs although blacks did the harshest work. They excluded blacks from schools and established a hierarchical order of rules to recognize "meritorious" accomplishment in schools. As the nation developed, they instituted a racialized two-tier schooling system where they withheld information from blacks and miseducated them. Finally, they instituted a symbolic system pronouncing their moral superiority vis-à-vis blacks.

The 2000 population of Zimbabwe was 12.5 million people and 70,000 of that number were white. Many more whites lived in Zimbabwe before national independence; they fled in the mid 1980s when their numbers totaled 280,000. In 2000, whites controlled over 70 percent of the land. This resulted in blacks remaining in wretched poverty even after fighting for national liberation. The blacks in Zimbabwe constitute 99.4 percent and the whites .6 percent of the total population. It is not only that whites control the land, but also they share a worldview, or ideology, that is committed to the history of gender and race hierarchy. In this sense, gender and race hierarchy is a set of rules and interlocking relations that reproduce advantages and disadvantages for racialized subjects. In the case of agricultural based societies, family inheritance, bank redlining in lending practices, loan breaks that reward legacy family business and/or family financial accumulation, and exclusionary clauses in property sales all contribute to the reproduction of gender and race hierarchy. Gender and race hierarchy does not exist in one sector of society. It saturates many societies as a guiding principle. To refer to this concept, some social scientists use the term isomorphic—meaning across institutional—it indicates that gender and race hierarchy is simultaneous in multiple institutions.

Gender and race hierarchy is not a problem within a single nation. For example, it is a widespread problem in Africa; many nations constitute Africa. Gender and race hierarchy is normal in the international organization of late capitalism. This does not mean that people of color are powerless. It refers to the cultural and structural organization of gender and race hierarchy that is now the norm. In this system, Western values are normal. However, an examination of these values is incomplete in terms of producing and disseminating them. Gender and race hierarchy controls the evaluation of individuals in the U.S. Like in southern Africa, the historical

course followed in the U.S. was a course that sociologist Howard Winant tagged as “a *herrenvolk* democracy, a de facto racial dictatorship constituted by the denial of basic democratic rights to racially defined minorities.”⁴¹ Winant refers to the way society positions racial minorities in the U.S. This does not mean that all black males hold low positions. From the relational perspective, the imagined position template is useable in struggles for hegemonic masculinity. It means that the structural technology of U.S. culture must produce a racialized experience for the greatest proportion of black males. This binary organization of society results in whiteness representing the norm. These practices of whiteness contain patterns, in this sense, roles and statuses are predictable. Another caveat helps complete the story; subordinated groups are not innocent in producing or engaging in unfair practices. Many blacks are, as is Mugabe himself in southern Africa, abusive to other socially marginalized groups. They also reason in their various ideologies that the organizations of inequality to which they are committed have justification. How could they do otherwise since classes that require severe inequality educate them? The powerful educate them in anti-democracy and they must accept the education for their very class existence. For example, Mugabe received international ridicule for his ethnic bias and homophobia. Recall as an instance the role he played in the incarceration of Nkomo, largely based on the consolidation of power for his ethnic class.⁴²

HABITUS AND RACIALIZED FIELDS

Family

Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu distinguished between habitus and field and these concepts help us understand how society sorts blacks into debased roles. According to his logic:

A field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (or capital), while habitus consists of a set of historical relations “deposited” within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and action.⁴³

Black males are positioned in American society where a set of relations are clearly identifiable resulting in a black male worldview, or standpoint—the embodiment of the racialized habitus.⁴⁴ Black family relations represent a primary structure for the field of black male domination. The family transmits many historical relations of the group and family pours its memories into individual black male bodies. This includes group feelings, moods, tastes, and values.

U.S. society produced Black males as a specific racialized group. This production was not merely nor most prominently physical but cultural. Society could not construct Black women in the same way. The society organized their roles in context of severe sexism. For normal males, the role expectation is to provide for a spouse and children; family organization that sociologists refer to as a nuclear family. For black males, the role was to serve as deputy providers. Nuclear family organization is a post World War II conception.⁴⁵ Research has shown that nuclear family organization has been a historically persistent form of organization. This is an important point because for some time many sociologists convincingly argued that the nuclear family appeared in response to industrialization, replacing more extended family forms—the stem family in the case of Western family forms.⁴⁶

In spite of these theoretical conclusions, the black family is unique. This means that black family organization in Africa prior to colonization appears to have not followed the nuclear family form.⁴⁷ When slavers brought Africans to the Americas through the transatlantic slave trade, initially plantation owners organized their families different from free nuclear family.⁴⁸ While many plantations organized families, the families were subsidiary to slavery. After Abraham Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation, increasingly African Americans organized as nuclear families until the 1930s when a modification of family organization began to develop.⁴⁹

The differences in the history of black and white families means black males developed on a different cultural track from white males. Some scholars suggest that black culture is oppositional to the dominant culture and the latter operates to subjugate groups that violate their norms.⁵⁰ A central difference in black family organization distinguishing it from nuclear family organization is that it has typically had more equality between members.⁵¹ Black females and males often played similar roles in the family and labor market relative to white families that typically and ideally held stringent gender role expectations.⁵² In normal nuclear family organization, men expect women to care for the children and home while women expect men to provide money necessary to support the family and take care of needs outside of the house, particularly around yard work and transportation for the family members. Black males are more likely to come from families that stress non-conjugal roles. For example, women are more likely to be employed full time.

State

Dominant groups generally have little patience for challenges from dominated groups.⁵³ According to sociologist Michael Walzer, we might best characterize black males in the specific toleration field of the nation-state.⁵⁴ Walzer distinguishes this field from four others that include consociations, international societies, immigrant societies, and multinational empires. He defines the nation-state in these terms

It means only that a single dominant group organizes the common life in a way that reflects its own history and culture and, if things go as intended, carries the history forward and sustains the culture. It is these intentions that determine the character of public education, the symbols and ceremonies of public life, the state calendar and the holidays it enjoins. Among histories and cultures, the nation-state is not neutral; its political apparatus is an engine for national reproduction. National groups seek statehood precisely in order to control the means of reproduction.⁵⁵

The specific black male experience in the U.S. nation-state meant that they were “not allowed to organize autonomously and exercise legal jurisdiction over their fellows.”⁵⁶ “Any claim to act out minority culture in public is likely to produce anxiety among the majority . . . [and] [t]he politics of language is one key area where this norm is both enforced and challenged.”⁵⁷ In the case of the black male experience, dominant culture overpowered them, as well as black women, leaving them virtually powerless. In order to exercise civic, economic, or political power was in fact a violation against whiteness; whiteness became the “standpoint” of the state resulting in the production of black males as a criminal class.⁵⁸ Walzer suggests that black males, as a dominated minority in a nation-state regime, should organize an oppositional stance when he writes that

Minorities often, in fact do fairly well in enacting and reproducing a common culture precisely because they are under pressure from the national majority. They organize themselves, both socially and psychologically, for resistance, making their families, neighborhoods, churches, and associations into a kind of homeland whose borders they work hard to defend.⁵⁹

Family and State

The black male habitus has pioneering implications. These will become clearer as we move on. However, one alternative of this reading will already suggest to the audience that the black male family has a primarily different meaning from the white male family. The origin of the analytical distinction addresses the construction of the black family field. Sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein wrote:

There seem to be various advantages to the ethnicization of occupational categories. Different kinds of relations of production, we may assume, require different kinds of normal behaviour by the work force. Since this behaviour is not in fact genetically determined, it must be taught. Work forces need to be socialized into reasonably specific sets of attitudes. The ‘culture’ of an ethnic group is precisely the set of rules into which parents belonging to that ethnic group are pressured

to socialize their children. The state or the school system can do this of course. But they usually seek to avoid performing that particularistic function alone or too overtly, since it violates the concept of 'national' equality for them to do so.⁶⁰

Contrasting Wallerstein's view with black male experience reveals a fissure. Under the logic of gender and race hierarchy, the white political class gained control of the state while they simultaneously managed the organization and discipline of labor. The organization of labor had a Manichean structure where binary aspirations of slave society and civic freedom emerged. This development pitted poor white "free labor" against "slave labor." It meant that more and more groups of white immigrants could be included in the civic category—where whiteness became an unstated "ethnicity" that eclipsed Irish-ness, Italian-ness, and the rest. It is likely that Athens developed these technologies at an earlier period in Western cultural history. For example, sociologist Orlando Patterson indicated this in his study of freedom when he discussed the Athenian state policy to render independence to the majority of Greeks. He wrote

Apart from being a brilliant strategy for maintaining peace with the disgruntled and envious free natives, this strategy would certainly have had a second, equally important function, which no one has ever mentioned with respect to Athens but which is immediately apparent to any student of comparative slavery: it was a powerful means of controlling the growing slave population. Encouragement of hostility to the slave, and identification with the slaveholder class in a unified civic community—given powerful symbolic expression in the promotion of Athena—made not only good political but good economic sense, since it greatly reduced the supervisory costs of slavery.⁶¹

How much more effective could such a policy be if an element of the slave class could be used as an exemplar for the other slaves? Perhaps the master would allow such a class to speak more often to him. Moreover, the master might allow the upper-marginal-class to acquire better living accommodations, marry some specified class of dominant-class women, and reap other benefits of being a stratified marginal "man" in his place.

In addition to increasing the social disciplining of black male labor, the historical strategy of social relations with black males contained the additional fact that the white political class gained control of the state and eventually control of the cultural state apparatuses. This allowed their political class to implement much of their policies and control the communication of images, norms, and values. In short, the group gained control over the "democratic" domination of black males through power over field and habitus of social relations; the state reinforced this domination. As such, Wallerstein's analysis certainly does not fit well for the black male experience while it may

have great effectiveness in explaining some experiences of some aggregates. It is not a universal explanation. We should not expect all modern nation-states to progress toward national equality in this way. Encouragement of hostility toward black males made sense in the system of domination where white control of the state evolved. In addition, the state, school, and warder in severe disciplinary rhetoric overtly expressed a set of rules constituting black masculinity. Figure 3.3 graphically represents this viewpoint.

DOMINATION

The Slave Codes and its distinctive features first organized the black male field. However, the culture of gender and race hierarchy cements black male domination. Slavery was merely one form of gender and race hierarchy where the initial domination practices were developed. According to William Goodell, the Slave Codes were state statutes and judicial decisions.⁶² These codes had descended from a long Puritan tradition about which English professor Thomas F. Gossett remarked, “Arnold Toynbee believes . . . the English colonists encouraged the idea of a Chosen People divinely commissioned to exterminate the infidel.”⁶³ This line of thought with its inherent degradation of black male humanity would become the metaphysic (ideology) and practice, or law of whiteness.

Thomas Jefferson gave considerable thought to framing the Manichean philosophy for Puritan understanding of the black male where he first describes his position in Query XIV in the *Notes on the State of Virginia*.⁶⁴ The consideration given by Jefferson of the U.S. slave reveals the mind of a master vis-à-vis the “black infidel.” He speaks from the strategy of possessing the other while chiding their advocates for the emancipation of them.

Many of their advocates, while they wish to vindicate the liberty of human nature, are anxious also to preserve its dignity and beauty. Some of these, embarrassed by the question “What further is to be done with them?” join themselves in opposition with those who are actuated by sordid avarice only. Among the Romans emancipation required but one




Figure 3.3 Hegemonic political class culture and black male domination.

effort. The slave, when made free, might mix with, without staining the blood of his master. But with us a second is necessary, unknown to history. When freed, he is to be removed beyond the reach of mixture.⁶⁵

Andrew Jackson's orders to remove Native Americans contained a similar theme found in Jefferson's decree. These proposals share the feature that their outcomes are likely genocidal toward their targets. To understand the genocidal nature of them it is important to distinguish between the two concepts related to them: legitimate authority and dominance. Under the definition of *authority*, people of a society recognize certain power as acceptable and they approve of its use and routinely agree to its demands. The classical sociologist Max Weber had a great deal to say about the impersonal nature of authority in as much as individuals command others or direct allocation of social resources not on the foundation of personal qualities or achievements but simply because they occupy particular positions. Rights and obligations guide these roles. The rights and obligations might function as informal sanctions, as in the case of social folkways, or as more formally coded sanctions, as in the case of criminal law.

The field of dominance in which black males have been marked is not a case of acquiesce, not a case of willingly making a choice as a group of free agents to assent to the rules and their values. In contrast, dominance structures the black male field. To think of it in terms of intentional conduct would not be accurate or efficient thought. Rather, dominance derives from the possession or control of the society's valued things. Dominance is social power that comes from the sheer possession or control of societal resources. Would it be in the interest of any African American to assent to a social policy of black removal, particularly since the process of removal remains specified and hidden in the dominant groups' political documents? The proposal by Jefferson surely would have suggested that a major proportion of African Americans would die in the removal procedure. It is hard to see African American interest in such an injurious project; the idea is post-rational.

Jefferson's dominance over black females and males is discernible by his position about possession. In his letter to Jared Sparks written from Monticello, February 4, 1824, he calculates the logistics of black removal. "First. The establishment of a colony on the coast of Africa, which may introduce among the aborigines the arts of cultivated life, and the blessings of civilization and science."⁶⁶ The terms of what Jefferson refers to as the colonization of blacks on the west coast of Africa are open for interpretation. For him, colonization is a "blessing" from a magnanimous master, "the colonization society is to be considered as a missionary society, having in view, however objects more humane, more justifiable, and less aggressive on the peace of other nations, than the others of that appellation."⁶⁷ What impact would the imposition have on the territory where he proposed to drop his cargo? Another way of seeing Jefferson's proposal is as a form of imperialism. The population transfer of blacks on West African soil would have impact on

the government of the “colony” of Sierra Leone in imperialistic ways with the U.S. becoming a major player in the region.

Jefferson’s calculations were fairly straightforward:

There are in the United States a million and a half of people of color in slavery. To send off the whole of these at once, nobody conceives to be practicable for us. Or expedient for them. Let us take twenty-five years for its accomplishment, within which time they will be doubled. Their estimated value as property, in the first place, (for actual property has been lawfully vested in that form, and who can lawfully take it from the possessors?) at an average of two hundred dollars each, young and old, would amount to six hundred millions of dollars, which must be paid or lost by somebody.⁶⁸

To get around the problems of cost, Jefferson proposed emancipating slave children and leaving them with their mothers until they are old enough to work. After that time he proposed taking them from their mothers and disciplining their labor while they queued for deportation. He calculated that the newborn would only cost \$12.50 and it would render the project more practicable. This outrageous proposal is historic. Surely, Jefferson was aware of the deaths accumulated in his day resulting from the transatlantic slave trade. Historian C. L. R. James estimated the amount of life lost in the slave population transfer

The mortality rate varied considerably from voyage to voyage and year to year. This is reflected in a list of mortality rates among slaves traded by Nantes shippers between 1715 and 1775. The rate ranged from 5 to 9 percent in sixteen years; 20 to 29 percent in fourteen years; and was 34 percent in 1733. In 1751, the year of the greatest slaving activity on the records, 10,003 Negroes were traded and 2,597 died, giving a mortality rate of 26 percent.⁶⁹

As a slaveholder and major politician in 1824, Jefferson must have been familiar with these numbers. Naturally, these estimates are underrates because deaths from acquired illness during the ordeal that might not have appeared for a time after arrival of the cargo. In addition, a history of revolts on slave ships resulted in sizable black deaths.⁷⁰

The state’s role in organizing black masculinity with reference to family formation is unique. It resulted in a number of unique psychological presentations by the black male group, including speech and posture patterns. The effects are distinctive from the function. The function of the state’s role, as we will see more clearly below, is domination of black males under the logic of gender and race hierarchy. The values of the white racialized formation became the values of the state and thereby any infraction against gender and race hierarchy became an infraction against the state. This development

required time and effort to produce and apply it. David Roediger extended our understanding of whiteness building on several works that attempted to explain white racialized formation.⁷¹ Roediger shows that U.S. citizens of European descent redefined themselves as workers who were of the same stock as their employers. As industrialization moved into full swing during the mid-nineteenth century new definitions of what it meant to be a worker emerged that distanced the working class from the slave class and free people of color. At this period, the society relied on a masculinity requiring males to be breadwinners and family protectors.

According to Roediger, U.S. citizens of European descent gained a benefit that he called the “wages of whiteness,” it gave them an emotional sentiment that assisted them in a rationale for excluding economic, educational, and political privileges from the enslaved and free people of color. The scheme essentially meant that ideologically speaking, black masculinity is an otherness. This is peculiar in the sense that one may suggest that black males are *children*. Paternalists defined black males as perpetual children. Yet, there are problems with proposing this interpretation of the ideology. These men represented a masculine sexual threat to white males. This suggests black males were in fact constructed possessing dual, indeed diametrically opposed, characteristics: feminine and hypermasculine traits. Both characteristics rendered them normatively as childlike, that is, requiring real men to control them. Figure 3.4 graphically displays this deployment.

CULTURAL CAPITAL

The social world that black males occupy is a result of an accumulated history. Thinking of social life without history is a distortion of reality and an unscientific way of approaching things. In history, people had to produce the stuff of social life. This stuff includes things to eat, to wear, and to work with. People also had to produce things to read and hear. Ancestors




Figure 3.4 Hegemonic political class cultural effect on creating black male subservience.

passed this culture on from one generation to another. They also passed along instructions about how to use ideal and material forms of culture. Some representatives and groups of representatives established an excessive advantage with the stuff history accumulated. They have an advantage that results in guaranteeing the likelihood of reproducing advantage for the groups they represent. This accumulation occurs on different dimensions in social life. It is easy, for example, to see how such accumulation passes on in families with estates when it is in the form of money. A father who builds a business earning large profits and then passing those profits on to his chosen heirs is typically how we think about inheritance. On another dimension, profits can build up from social networks that one family or group of families hand down through generations. Social scientists often refer to this kind of capital as social capital. There are different ways to think about social capital. One way is to measure it as a concrete and objective feature of social life.⁷² Another way to think about social capital is as a set of practices and processes that helps individuals earn other forms of capital, including economic and human capital. The concept of social capital is being refined in the scientific literature.⁷³ In spite of differences in the definition of social capital, we can be clear that it is one form of power.

Aside from economic and social capital, cultural capital is social power in the form of education.⁷⁴ Cultural capital is important for understanding how groups pass along survival techniques to successive generations. These techniques assist the generations in maintaining and expanding their economic, political, and social capital in groups organized as classes to do struggle for the allocation of social goods, resources, and services. For this reason, Bourdieu distinguished between three forms of cultural capital: in the (1) embodied state, (2) objectified state, and (3) institutionalized state.⁷⁵ The embodied state refers to long-lasting dispositions of the minds and bodies of group members. The objectified state refers cultural possessions like books, dictionaries, instruments, and machines that map what past generations found to be problems they needed to solve. Therefore, objectified cultural capital reveals realizable group practices and values as problematic circumstances. Theories help resolve these problems. The institutionalized state refers to objectification where group folkways, mores, values, and norms exist under protection with state guarantee. For example, some educational qualification rules effectively exclude, as we will see, the likely admission, matriculation, and graduation rates of black males.

On the point of educational achievement, or achievement in the workplace, the common explanation for failure or success that are patterned for different social groups is to attribute the differences to individuals with different natural aptitudes.⁷⁶ The individual attributes approach does not help us in two ways. First, it fails to help us understand why performance is observable as patterns. Why can we predict class, gender, race, and sexual orientation deficiencies? Second, it fails to account for historical group advantages and disadvantages that correlate with failure and success in

school and workplace. Using cultural capital, we are able to solve both the aggregate performance and historical privilege problems in our explanation of unequal outcomes and treatment. Here we also violate a cardinal principle of those who volunteer the doctrine that U.S. society distributes rewards based on individual merits. This aggravation comes from shifting the explanatory focus of the distribution of social goods and resources, from talk about opportunities to talk about outcomes. When we talk about educational and workplace outcomes for black males, it is possible to identify specific profits from group membership and fractions of membership. For example, membership in the white male group results in significantly different aggregate social positioning than does belonging to the black male aggregate. And what is more in terms of group fractions, membership in the black male and married aggregate results in significantly different cultural, economic, and social capital outcomes than does membership in the black male and single aggregate. The cultural capital view departs from the human capital standpoint whose conclusion is that a value-neutral process distributes coveted social rewards and unbiased instruments measure natural aptitudes.⁷⁷

In talking about cultural capital insofar as black males are concerned, we are not primarily speaking about the accumulation of economic resources. For example, a number of scholars that study masculinity have posed the question if there is an equal monetary payoff for educational investment.⁷⁸ There is clearly a monetary payoff for education.⁷⁹ In addition, there is a payoff for cognitive abilities. It is not clear if men need specific cognitive skills to perform specific jobs that might exclude them.

Moreover, some scholars assume that education is necessary to get jobs although many do not specify the way different classes use the claim to be educated differently in the society. For example, black and white managers might generally apply different standards to black and white male applicants. Racialization is part of the embodied state. It is hard to see how some scholars account for this in some studies. Such studies might omit the relational dimension where conflict happens when a black male needs employment—it obscures how hegemonic masculinity struggles in that situation. This is clearly observable in the cases of black and white males since the range of these two structural positions form binary positions of masculinity. Using these extreme differences helps us to see some of the complexity of gendered domination in U.S. society. For example, if we just think about black and white male prestige within specific occupations, we intuitively know there are structural differences. Researchers often do not make clear such differences.

This all means that the society must invest considerable effort and time in the production of both black and white males. The effects of this labor-intensive effort are culture and cultivation. Labor of assimilation of the cultivated individual into society is the work's goal. When black males become usable for society, they also become morally adequate. Figure 3.5 is a graphic representation of this organization.




Figure 3.5 Gendered and racial culture manufacture of feminized and hypersexualized black males.

POLITICAL CLASS AND BLACK MASCULINITY

The focus on structures of domination and the history of these structures promises a more accurate and reflective understanding of black male social positions. It helps us to better conceptualize the culture of black masculinity. In addition, it will help us understand other forms of gendered domination. At the beginning of this chapter, was discussed the bodily penetration of black males as a form of ritualized domination that was found salient in U.S. history. Now we may suggest that the importance of these penetrations links to symbolic violence toward black males. To explain this symbolic violence requires consideration of the structures of gender and race hierarchy, domination, and cultural capital. Gender and race hierarchy represents a historical process where its ideology and structures comprise the dominant U.S. culture. We could study the ideology of gender and race hierarchy as discourse analysis that might stress the talk about race and the way this talk changes over periods. Such an examination of talk fails to help us understand the obstinate permanence of gendered and racial structures. It also fails to explain how penetrative acts by state representatives come to take on overwhelming symbolic significance; explain how those penetrative acts serve as devices of social control.

What is more disappointing is that from the perspective of the racial formation analysis is its failure to explain the ways that it understands “progress” as identification with the structures of domination. We recognize this standpoint in intellectual projects that seek a chronology of first achievements among structurally dominated groups and in recording group achievements as increases in their numbers in the garden variety of coveted structural positions. For examples, reciting the first black male allowed to be an astronaut or reciting the increase of black mayors, who are usually

male, in the U.S. political machinery and claiming that these *accomplishments* are such and that they represent racial progress. Added to the recitation of first accomplishments is the cult of personality trend that presents individuals as great men and women in history. This refers to the practice of using window-dressing personalities symbolically to infer that things are not as bad as they once were. On the other hand, more deviously framed, as things are better than the oppressed think they are; the idea communicated here is that contesters should be silent and enjoy the ride. In terms of gender, such approaches might count the first woman allowed to perpetuate racist violence as a secretary of state or the first woman allowed to administrate the exclusion of black male students from a major U.S. university.

Another strategy in this intellectual practice is to count increases in the total number of persons of a race, gender, or class category that the dominant group finds attractive and then reason that an increase in the number of members from those groups represents progress. Notice that in doing so, the scholars are looking at physical characteristics of the new members only and not at their commitments to positive change for humanity. This is absurd. Such thinking would treat a black mayor who administrated dropping a bomb on a black neighborhood killing innocent black children, women, and men with an entrapped mayor who was in an extra marital affair while taking a hit or two from a crack cocaine pipe. The fact that the latter mayor eased racialized social conditions in his city is lost in the absurd reading. While researchers from outside the black community might find this way of thinking attractive, I do not think it would reflect the general political understanding of blacks. Racial formation theorists might think that Supreme Court justices Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Thomas are equally representations of racial progress; from some perspectives, they might well be correct.

These approaches represent typical standpoints while they promote structural identification with hegemonic masculinity and gendered patriarchy. Such approaches mask identification with domination because they hide how and why dominated groups come to identify with their dominators.⁸⁰ The election of Barack Obama has received a virtual one-dimensional reception as progress. Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish that Obama is not a descendent of slaves. Furthermore, he is an immigrant and not colonized minority. His progressive policies are likely beyond reproach if we compare them to other presidencies, ones where the color line operated. Saying this is not the same as saying that the Obama administration's policies are progressive for black males.⁸¹

For example, Obama stressed that his mother is white and his grandmother virtually reared him. He did not stress that his mother divorced his father. However, he stressed his father's absence during his presidential campaign. At one point in his campaign, he went on a rant against black fathers complaining they were not behaving responsibly as fathers. In response, Jesse Jackson inadvertently stated he wanted to "cut his nuts out" during a Fox News television interview. Many commentators felt Jackson




Figure 3.6 Duncan Socioeconomic Index of currently employed by gender and race. Source: Author's tabulation of 1% Public Use Metro Census Data (Ruggles and Sobek 1997).

$p < .05$

was jealous; after all, he had run for the presidency in 1984 and 1988 and failed. Jackson responds that he was upset because Obama was “talking down to black people.”⁸²

Just when theorists of racial discourse told us between the 1980s and 1990s about African American social progress, we find convincing empirical evidence of the enduring structures of domination. Figure 3.6 is a graphic representation. It shows 1990 Public Use Census Data of mean scores on the Duncan Socioeconomic Index (SEI) displayed in gender and race categories ($N = 53,676$). The 1950 occupational classification system is the SEI base. It is a measure of occupational status based on the income level and educational attainment associated with each occupation in 1950. The score uses median income and education levels for men in 1950 to predict prestige assessments from a 1947 survey of a select group of occupations.⁸³ Using Duncan's measure, we can see the mean score for occupational status. This indicator shows the subordinate position black males hold in the occupational structure when compared to white males, white females, and black females. We see that black males have the lowest SEI. If we reason that black males were positioned in the patriarchy as white males were we would have expected their SEI mean to exceed black females. In addition, we would not have expected such a dramatic difference between black and white males (10.86 points). The SEI mean difference between white females and males was only 1.21 points while the

difference between black females and males was 3.56 points. If we interpret black male social status as a specific constituted gender category, we would have expected the measures of SEI that we found in Figure 3.6.

If we had focused only on an income analysis of the black male social position we would have seen the pattern where black females earn below black males. One way of seeing this social indicator is by comparing the gender and race groups by Occupational Income Score (OIS) presented in Figure 3.7. OIS assigns each occupation in all years a value representing the median total income (in hundreds of 1950 dollars) of all persons with that particular occupation in 1950. The presented data for those who reported currently being in the labor force at the time of the interview ($N = 26,745$). We see that the subaltern gender groups, white female, black female, and black male OIS scores were significantly different for each group. The difference between white females and males was 3.92 points. The difference between black females and males was 1.62 points. The difference between black and white males was 4.70 points while it was 6.31 between white males and black females. OIS helps us to see how income was distributed based on structural gender and race positions in society but it omits helping us to see the effect of occupational status when we consider symbolic domination. We can see that white females were still socially superior to black males in terms of OIS with only .78 points difference; this could have occurred by chance. Here the OIS of black males was similar to both groups of females but dissimilar to white males. In terms of income, patriarchy feminized black males.




Figure 3.7 Occupational Income Score of currently employed by gender and race. Source: Author's tabulation of 1% Public Use Metro Census Data (Ruggles and Sobek 1997).

$p < .05$

Positions in the sectors of education and work are social indicators of the structure of domination that correspond with historical expectations. The history of the white political class domination would not lead us to expect masculinity would trump gender and race in terms of SEI or OIS. The purpose of this analysis is not to present nuances in the analysis of gender and race. For example, we can suspect that different occupations will result in different comparisons. What is intended to be shown here is that the structure of domination behaves as one would have expected in the aggregate on SEI and OIS given a conceptual concern for gender and race hierarchy, domination, and cultural capital insofar as black males are concerned. Knowing this, perhaps Jackson is not jealous of Obama but another possibility is that Obama was “talking down to black people.” He talked down to descendents of slaves, particularly black males. Certainly, he knows that one of the major realities associated with African American youth pregnancies is the number of females having premarital pregnancies. It is doubtful that black males, particularly descendents of slaves, are having more premarital sex than other males. There is also the possibility that irresponsibility has little to do with these relationships. It could be that many black males have sex and do not make love. This might be true for many black females too. In addition, there is a possibility that many males do not reject their impregnated women; rather, the women reject them.

On the theoretical side of the question, conceiving of race and gender as an effort of continuous and intensive labor appropriately captures the work that goes into reproducing the daily domination of gendered and racial groups. For example, “talking down to black people” is hard work. This work organizes in a way that is coordinated by institutions including the family, educational system, work environment, and state. In addition, this work is political in the sense that it is a political sociology in an exercise of establishing, maintaining, and reproducing power relations. Black masculinity is not outside of the cultural history of white patriarchy nor is it synonymous with white patriarchy. To think in these erroneous ways would be to work in the interests of the structures of domination through a process of mystifying gendered and racial positions in U.S. cultural organization. It would undermine the ability to understand the sexual politics of black masculinity. It would miss the ways that culture produces black males as a separate gender form constitutive of a feminized and hypermasculinized representation in the sociocultural sphere.

I believe the *raison d'être* of the feminized and hypermasculinized representation is the domination of specifically black males and black male domination is the *sine qua non* for the domination of blacks under the logic of *herrenvolk* patriarchy. To accomplish this form of domination the controlling powers must persistently reproduce the controlling image, or more accurately, persistently reproduce the symbolic representation of black males as a subaltern collective who serve as a symbolic appendage to white male sexual satisfaction. Given the theoretical literature on masculinity, there is no doubt that many will respond that their “heterosexuality”—a concept that was invented in the 1890s—makes real men of them.

4 Black Masculinity and Ideologies of Inferiority

Ideological images have as one of their functions the production of a structure that connects the various parts of the way we think about black males. For this reason, it is possible analytically to conceive the studies of black males as sharing an intersection of a central interlocking theme. The interlocking theme is unique to black males in relative comparative terms to other groups like white males, white females, and black females. What differs is the theme of black male pathology that implies black males are disreputable. We could possibly consider the ideology of the disreputable black male from a genetic, functional, or empirical perspective. Nevertheless, on all of these dimensions we see that the purpose of the ideology of the disreputable black male is his domination. In addition, we must note that it would not be possible to manage the domination of black men without requiring that the larger proportion of them internalize the ideology. It is not, then, capture, slavery, Black Codes, Jim Crow, civil rights discrimination, labor market discrimination, the prison industrial complex, or the other systems—past, present, and future—that is the root cause of black male servitude; it is gender and race hierarchy domination and its technologies of servitude that harms blacks. As we will see, this system has potential to harm many classes of whites too.

A racialized political class that has garnered control of the state administers this domination. The control of the state is clearly not control over one building or over one sovereign leader. It is not control over one government, institution, or organization. The state is largely a complex and diffused organization of law. There are three identifiable divisions of this law, administrative, civil, and criminal. These forms organize the diffusion of state law that its various levels of control administer. For example, national, state, district, county, city, municipal, and bureaucratic levels are major players. Insofar as gender and race hierarchy is concerned, values that offend the political class interests of whiteness have generally become violations against the state. State apparatuses code black male antipathy. This system of values is an interlocking one where conviction based on values that agents of whiteness find unpleasant becomes prosecutable at the various levels of the system where specificity allows for it. For example, conviction under administrative law likely lays a foundation for conviction

under civil law. Therefore, power is not per se central in the hegemony of the state. Some theories promote centralized power in the state as the putative rationales for governmental decision-making. For black males' experience, political class power directed against them is its own domain where a specific history exists. The dominant leadership will promote platitudes of unity and examples of success from among the oppressed; of course, "we are all Americans [sic]" and "with hard work, you can do anything." There is also a religious kind of talk often used to encourage black men to overlook inequality. For example, "count your blessings" instead of focusing on what you do not have is a typical mantra. The function of this kind of talk is probably to silence the articulation of inequality and oppression.

Much of this chapter is only concerned with an empirical project of observing what many important studies have told us about black males. These studies will generally adhere to an ideological canon offering reasons for the disreputable black male statuses. They will largely come from the standpoint that black males are a feminine and hypermasculine class. Alternatively, they will be standpoints to refute such disreputable and pathological representations. In addition, while the powerful reason different perspectives differently, they generally all share the central interlocking theme that black males require some form of intervention and reform. The disreputable and pathological message is recognizable in differing "political" orientations and when studying differing substantive areas. For example, liberal orientations emphasize that black males lack education and work ethic socialization.¹ They promote an intervention strategy of providing role models and liberal education for them. Conservatives argue that black males lack a moral creed and should be punished and literally starved through state intervention.²

Likewise, scholars who focus on black male–female relationships argue that black males lack an ability to express their feelings toward their female mates. They add that black males lack the education to make emotional commitments. According to such studies, black males need education about how to make monogamous commitments and expression of deeply felt emotions.³ Studies that focus on African American popular culture often assist in producing an image of the disreputable and pathological black male. In their version, black males produce a popular culture in concert with the dominant culture that is heterosexist and misogynist.⁴ In a similar way, studies that focus on black male political behavior stress that Black Nationalism has a pathological history of homophobia and sexism and this pathology partially explains why mainstream political black male personalities are ineffectual.⁵

BLACK MASCULINITY

If powerful status groups vilify black masculinity in the popular imagination as being disreputable and pathological, powerful status groups also promote such views in the social science about black males. One consequence of this

status is the theme of the vanishing black male. Deborah King considers the social significance of “the vanishing black male” and argues that the number of headlines, studies, programs, and commissions devoted to this one issue leads to ignorance of the multitude of social issues that contemporary black Americans face. She questions the reason for placing emphases on disrepute and pathology among black males. In addition, she questions why mainstream culture highlights competition between black females and males. King believes we must examine why powerful status groups classify black males as a social problem. She argues that we should consider the cultural, sociohistorical, and political-economic dynamics working to produce ideologies. In short, King argues that the study of black males is a critical project that requires study of history and theory.⁶

CONSCIOUSNESS

W. E. B. Du Bois suggested that black Americans experience double consciousness, a longing for both black and white cultural values. A study by Christopher Ellison using a subsample from the 1979–1980 National Survey of Black Americans suggests that institutional socialization affects black male double consciousness. Black males with military backgrounds—particularly combat veterans—express lower levels of racial identification and separatist sentiment than do non-veterans. Veterans, especially combat veterans, are also more likely to engage in high-initiative political activity, but are not likely to participate in low-initiative political activity.⁷

Sociologist William Julius Wilson looked at inner-city black males from several surveys from 1987–1988 in Chicago. He reports that there is a notable influence of the loss of jobs on black males’ state of consciousness. Recent employment changes in Chicago have caused inner-city black males to seek employment in low-wage service-sector and laboring jobs. Wilson explains the difficulty in keeping service-sector jobs by the absence of effective informal job networks, the availability of many illegal activities, and pressures to pursue alternative modes of subsistence, including welfare. There is a pattern of employers choosing other minority group members over blacks. These important factors help explain the attitudes, mindset, and orientation of inner-city black males.⁸

The extension of the disreputable and pathological theme prevails among researchers interested in the “cool pose” aspect of black masculine consciousness. For example, Anthony B. Pinn contends that rap music voices the realities experienced by young black men today. Hip-hop culture presents modeling for manhood including the “gangsta lean,” and such aspects of hip hop should be considered an extension of Richard Majors and Janet Billson’s “cool pose” thesis. The gangsta lean shares common features with the bad-man of the black oral tradition. It also parallels notions of masculinity held by many whites in society. The gangsta lean offers a method of surviving

against the odds in a society that is hostile toward black males. It is also disreputable, self-destructive, pathological, and dangerous, in Pinn's view.⁹

In a more determined assertion about black male disreputable and pathological status, Todd Boyd argues the cultural and political significance of gangsta rap in contemporary Los Angeles. He argues that gangsta rap has popularized a vastly different conception of black masculinity characterized by poverty, violence, and greed. Although originally a peripheral phenomenon, gangsta rap's thematic of defiant, lower class, gang-related, black ultra-masculinity has infiltrated mainstream popular culture. While dominant culture has at least partially accepted the profitability and misogyny of gangsta rap imagery, Boyd suggests that the majority of listeners, both blacks and whites, are unfamiliar with black culture. Boyd argues that gangsta rap is a form of hyper-reality where the lines between fiction and reality are continually blurred and challenged.¹⁰

MEANING

Phillip Brian Harper argued that dominant views of black identity promote positive images, but that identity weakens whenever masculinity is the question. There is a profound anxiety about the status of black masculinity in current discussions about black males. One issue is the authentic status of blackness. The chauvinism and homophobia of the Black Arts movement of the 1960s produces extreme group anxiety when issues like AIDS and its association with television reporter Max Robinson and basketball player Magic Johnson collide. In addition, the crossover identity in popular music represented by Michael Jackson and Diana Ross intensifies identity conflicts. Harper situates anxieties about black masculinity in a wider set of racial and sexual fantasies that are associated with U.S. culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Harper pays particular attention to variations in skin color and its relationship to black masculinity. He also presents a cogent analysis of the criminalization of black males and the importance of that process for television representations. For Harper, the ultimate transformation in black masculinity would be acculturation and assimilation.¹¹

Suzanne Harper was more interested in the manufacturing of black masculinity. She examined the subordination, racialization, and sexualization of masculinities in gender and race hierarchy discourses through content analysis of six white supremacist organizations' publications between 1976 and 1991. The publications construct masculinities with racial and sexual overtones conveyed through representations of male bodies. Tall, erect, white males of obvious power and sexual dominance depict whiteness in clearly marked and delineated spaces. Standing near a boom box, holding a gun in one hand and his crotch in the other is a typical depiction of the black male. A message of bestiality and uncontrolled

sexual libido is apparent. For Harper, the representations clearly subordinate black masculinity to white masculinity.¹²

Black males teach the meaning of masculinity in unconventional ways among themselves. Unlike mainstream socialization, in black culture males teach the meaning of masculinity through institutions like basketball-play settings and barbershops. Lois Williams observes barbershop socialization settings in New Orleans. The barbershop is an important place for male socialization. It also provides a setting for male bonding. The barbershop setting provides a space for both boys and men to learn expected masculine roles. The young absorb the dominant themes, attitudes, experiences, and emotions that older men have acquired. Young males also learn by hearing stories told by elder males, informing younger males what they might expect from their lives.¹³

Andrea Hunter and James Davis use data from interviews with 32 black males of diverse socioeconomic status from central New York to see how they define their masculinity. They argue that perceptions of manhood are important because of the social crisis facing black males. The most significant differences regarding the meaning of manhood are between respondents below 30 and over 30 years of age. Older males talk more comfortably and expansively about their manhood. The males' attitudes relate to their own experiences with racism, economic dislocation, and the legacy of ancestral suffering.¹⁴

DATING, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY

Misogynistic Attitudes

A major issue raised in popular culture is the extent to which black males are misogynist. The rise of hip-hop culture resulted in the intensification of representing them as such in popular culture. This representation contributes to the disreputable and pathological image of black males. Professor of African American Studies T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting contributed an interesting analysis of race, gender, and class in hip-hop culture. Rather than the usual claims that attribute U.S. misogyny to black males, Sharpley-Whiting provides a nuanced interpretation that examines how “[s]exual violence, sexism, beat-downs, sexual dishonesty, anti-lesbianism, and the legacy of color prejudice all hammer [sic] away at self esteem . . .” She attempts to explain where hip-hop culture contributes to such female difficulties.¹⁵

Likewise, social theorist Patricia Hill Collins examined hip hop with a unique interpretation highlighting nationalism and the “new racism.” The new racism is a reference to how despite legislation designed to eliminate unfair racial practices, racialized organization of society remains pervasive. Collins was properly concerned with the political responses to this new racism. She interprets Black Nationalism as a masculinist project

that still affects youth culture, particularly hip-hop aspects of the culture.¹⁶ In some sense, however, both Collins and Sharpley-Whiting repeat the subtextual message of the disreputable and pathological black male in their nuanced ways.

There may be a gap between their empirical status and black male representational status. In one study, Vania Penha-Lopes asked whether race influences men's gender attitudes using National Longitudinal Survey data of the high school class of 1972 and follow-up survey data in 1979. She reported 1,430 responses. Black male responses are significantly different from those of white males and tend to demonstrate less misogynistic attitudes. Using elaboration analysis, cross-tabulation, and gamma associations, she found that black males tend to be significantly more liberal than white males on the issue of women working because more had a mother who worked for pay. White men tend to be more conservative regardless of their mothers' occupational status. When they are single and childless, black males' views are more similar to those of whites. When they become family men, their gender attitudes are more liberal.¹⁷

Dating and Marriage Roles

Society produces the disreputable and pathological image of black males in the context of a world system. For example, Cornwell reported that in South Africa there was a moral panic called "Black Peril." The Peril was the threatened rape of white women by black men that was an important factor in the moral economy underpinning the colonial debate on the "native question" in early twentieth-century South Africa. Cornwell showed how Black Peril panics resurfaced with specific disturbances in the economy or the political system. He reported that white males' fear of sexual competition from black males caused them to rationalize Black Peril. The imagery of purity and contagion, in terms of the endogamous imperative is typical representation in such texts. The textual products suggest that the idea of caste explains the seemingly irrational public hysteria surrounding the Black Peril phenomenon.¹⁸

The mass media also contributes to the systematic portrayal of black males' family roles as disreputable and pathological. Dhyana Ziegler studied myths and stereotypes of black single parenting found on television. Stereotypes distort the public's image of black single parents. The image of the black family is stereotyped as disorganized, lacking morality, and mired by government transfer payments, void of psychological support and abandoned by black men. According to Ziegler, such monolithic portrayals hide diversity among black families.¹⁹

Dating Patterns

Herbert Samuels studied 125 black and white heterosexual males in New York City. He reported that black males begin sexual activity at an earlier

age than do white males. In addition, black males more frequently participate in unconventional sexual behavior. Among black men, socioeconomic status has a direct relationship to participation in conventional and unconventional sex and sexual attitudes. There is no relationship to age at first intercourse. Religiosity and socioeconomic status correlate more with sexual attitudes than race. Socioeconomic status is a more important reason for predicting sexual behaviors of black males than for predicting behaviors of white males.²⁰

Marriage Patterns

A number of studies examined aspects of black male marriage patterns and some of their findings are present in this section. Matthijs Kalmijn examines annual marriage license data for 33 U.S. states from 1958 to 1986 to assess how black and white caste roles in marriage choice changed. Analyses show that black and white intermarriage increased rapidly after the U.S. Supreme Court in *Loving v. Virginia* (1967) removed the legal ban on interracial marriage. The trend appears particularly pronounced among black males. Yet, the status characteristics of interracial marriages remain the tradition.²¹ Belinda Tucker and Claudia Mitchell-Kernan examined patterns of black interracial marriage, drawing on data from married couples with at least one black partner. They include 7,023 black women and 7,328 black men from the 1980 U.S. Census public use data for Los Angeles County. They find that while black males marry interracially more than black females, logistic regression analysis suggests that the structural correlates of out-marriage are the same for both sexes. Black men and women in interracial marriages are younger, more distinct in age from their spouses, and more likely to have been previously married. Those born in northern regions of the U.S. and in foreign countries are more likely to be in interracial marriages.²²

William Darity and Samuel L. Myers reported the impact of a depleting supply of marriageable black men on family structure using data from the 1976 and 1985 Current Population Surveys. They compared various indicators of male availability as predictors of female headship among blacks and whites. They also test the idea that welfare payments and sex ratio explain marital decline. They suggest three policy options of direct short-term benefit: transfer payments and policies designed to elevate the income of the poor; improvement of the health care of poor women and their children; and improvement in the education of the "underclass."²³

Black males experience lower marriage and remarriage rates, higher divorce rates, and higher rates of unmarried childbearing than do white males. Dickson found that economic shifts and trends that allow more black females, but fewer black males, to work is one major factor. In addition, an unequal sex ratio combines with black male incarceration, drug abuse, homicide, and interracial dating patterns to result in a reduced pool

of eligible males for marriage. Lynda Dickson also reported gender stereotyping and differential gender role expectations as factors contributing to marriage patterns.²⁴

It also may be that black females, particularly among the professional and managerial class, prefer careers to marriage under current types of social conditions. Margaret Porter and Arline Bronzaft used a questionnaire to gather data from 70 young, unmarried, black, female college students. Nearly 80 percent planned to study beyond college. Nearly 90 percent hoped for a career. The majority envisioned a future with husbands and children. However, 15 percent indicated they prefer to remain single.²⁵

Divorce Patterns

Erma Jean Lawson and Aaron Thompson observed that the divorce rate among blacks in the north central U.S. has increased significantly in recent years. One consequence is that many black males confront problems associated with adjusting to divorce. They used interview data of 30 middle- and working-class black males. Those black males reported divorce-related stressors including financial strain, non-custodial parenting, child support, and psychological distress. The data also indicated a set of coping strategies like reliance on family and friends, involvement in church-related activities, participation in social activities, and establishment of intimate heterosexual relationships by one year after divorce. There is likely a relationship between work income, prestige, and marriage stability.²⁶

BLACK MALES' EMPLOYMENT, INCOME, AND SES MOBILITY

Figure 4.1 shows that in 2001, when full-time year-round workers aged 25 years and older are compared, black males are disadvantaged when compared to white males when educational attainment is considered. In fact, having higher education appears generally to be a disadvantage for black male incomes with the exception of professional credentials. Earning the Ph.D. rather than a master's degree had gains for white males by \$9,869; for black males, there was a loss of \$1,522 in income. These numbers do not assess lifestyle differences. However, given discrimination, we can suspect that more highly educated black males threaten the organization of things. Therefore, they face more day-to-day harassment.²⁷ The black male status penalty appears to increase between the bachelor's degree and graduate or professional degrees. Ryan Smith used data from 1972–1991 General Social Surveys to examine the relationship among race, income, and job authority for black workers, comparing them to white workers. Regression analysis indicated that even controlling for education, occupation, job authority, location, marital status, and number of children, black men earned \$7,697 less than did their white counterparts in

positions of high authority. In addition, the gap remained essentially constant in the 1990s.²⁸ Douglas Massey and Kumiko Shibuya used data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. They tested the hypotheses that black men's joblessness creates a social environment that isolates them from the world of work, promoting a culture of dependency; the greater the number of jobless men in the community, the lower the odds of marriage for black women. A discrete time event analysis supported both hypotheses.²⁹

One explanation for the fact that higher educated black males appear to have an additional disadvantage is that black males were more threatening to the gender and race hierarchy as they gain professional and managerial credentials.³⁰ Another explanation is that black males lack equal cognitive abilities when compared to white males.³¹ However, the latter explanation does not explain how the extra cognitive requirement relates to specific jobs. It also does not explain when the new cognitive requirements became so important. Did employers originally advertise them in recruiting job descriptions? Did employers write requirements to match advertised job performance needs; or, did they write them to match certain candidacy characteristics? Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres question whether the organization of labor is colorblind and suggest that the ideology of cognitive requirements is a ruse to cover the political use of race.³²

Yet, some scholars stress the amorality of black males. They argue that black males represent an amoral class generating fear and moral panic from white employers.³³ They fail to show the exclusion and discrimination




Figure 4.1 Earnings of black males' share of median white male income for full-time year-round workers 25 years and older by educational attainment, March 2001. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

against black males who do not break the morality standards. They also overlook the tremendous amount of white male amorality, particularly the amorality of some white male hiring practices. One study of racialization in the labor market reports that such behavior was widespread. The researchers sent matched pairs of applicants to job sites. Their study shows whites prefer to hire whites regardless of arrest records or level of education.³⁴ There is a need to do more studies of this type to observe various forms of discrimination. The preliminary evidence shows widespread double standards operating in the U.S. when it comes to black males gaining a balanced share of goods and resources. Black masculinity is an ascribed demerit; this is not associated with ideology per se, but with the willingness of many whites, and perhaps many blacks, to violate discrimination laws and engage in such forms of white-collar crime.

Marjorie Baldwin and William Johnson analyzed data from the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation and estimated wage discrimination in the employment of black and white males. Their results indicated that 62 percent of the difference in offer wages to black and white males and 67 percent of the difference in their observed wages was not an attribute of differences in productivity. Assuming that the unexplained wage differential is attributable entirely to employer discrimination, the disincentive effects of wage discrimination reduces the relative employment rate of black males from 89 percent to 82 percent of white males' employment rate. This means that wage discrimination and its employment effects result in a substantial transfer of resources from blacks to whites in 1984.³⁵

Theodore Davis updated a 1979 study by David Featherman using the Cumulative General Social Science Survey. Davis examined the extent to which opportunities for social mobility (as measured by occupational mobility) for black males had changed since the early 1970s. His results indicated that intergenerational occupational mobility for both black and white males is associated with their fathers' occupational attainment. At the same time, black males experienced greater downward mobility than did whites. Intergenerational occupational persistent-status levels were greater for whites than for blacks. Contrary to claims in those recent years that race played no significant role in occupational distribution, race continued to influence the occupational mobility of black males.³⁶

Black males' experience with gender and race hierarchy relates to the ideological complex that produced an image of them as disreputable and pathological. In a study of what managers generally refer to as "soft" skills, Philip Moss and Chris Tilly report on interviews with 75 managers at 56 firms. They included four industries in the Los Angeles and Detroit metropolitan areas in the study. They were interested in how changes in job skill requirements affect black men's access to entry-level jobs. Managers reported that managers are interested in motivation and ability to interact well with customers and coworkers. Many managers viewed black men as lacking in these soft skills, explaining in part their growing disadvantage

in labor markets. The history of black male exclusion shows variations on the themes of effort and customer and coworker comfort on their ability to get the job done. These rhetorical references likely relate to images of the lazy and uppity black male. In past generations, such images served to keep black males in "their place."³⁷

The cause of the black male penalty when seeking and holding jobs has become increasingly important for interested researchers to explain. For example, some scholars reason that white female employment increases black male non-employment.³⁸ One explanation is that white females are willing to work for less pay than are black males. Others challenge this view that black males have priced themselves out of the job market. They claim that reservation wages, meaning the lowest acceptable wage offers, are measures of self-worth and not willingness or unwillingness to work.³⁹ Many black males who are most affected by the labor market penalty believe that discrimination is most important to their exclusion. For example, Robert Laseter interviewed 18 black males from the ages 16 to 30 who resided on the West Side of Chicago. He found that the effects of discrimination and economic restructuring are significant. Most of the respondents experienced labor market instability. They believe there has been a shift of employment from the inner city to the suburbs. In addition, they believe they had experienced hiring discrimination.⁴⁰

The white political class will make adjustments to guarantee its advantages. For example, the class might well develop schemes to make certain that the educational environment is so hostile and intolerable for black males while they simultaneously simulate innocence and caring for them. In one case, for instance, the state university required students who did not attain certain white-established scores on entrance exams to take remediation courses. Under this scheme, students in remediation courses received no credit for taking the courses. Yet they were required to pay regular tuition and student fees. Many students had to take loans to pay for their remediation. In short, if we were to think of slavery as unpaid labor, the program reduced black students to institutional slaves. State officials organized this. When the community confronted the university leadership about the disparate impact the policy had on black students, particularly black males, since approximately 66% of black freshmen in one academic year required remediation, they responded with indifference and stressed the need to attract *qualified* students. *U.S. News and World Reports* ranked the campus in the fourth tier. This policy and practice is likely a minority one among universities in the U.S. but the point is that such policies placed particularly working-class black males at a disadvantage in the labor market. It is as though they were required to experience a prolonged period of neo-slavery before allowed to compete in the labor market. Many of the black males had trouble passing the required remediation classes and decided to leave school. They likely left with major outstanding student loans. The loans likely placed their credit history in jeopardy for many

years, if not for life. This is important since it is likely that an educational industry manufactures black male occupational failure.⁴¹

BLACK MALES' HEALTH AND WELFARE

Life expectancy is an indicator of the health of a group. Black males are in more trouble than many other social groups. Figure 4.2 displays 2001 black male life expectancy measured by median age as reported by the U.S. Census to be almost 69 years of age; black females 76, white males 74, white females 80.

The major causes of illness and death among black males in 2000 were heart disease (240.4 per 100,000), malignant neoplasm (212.1 per 100,000), and homicide and legal intervention (65.1 per 100,000). Robert Johnson and Paul Leighton argue that poor African American men experience an instance of genocide. They argue that by defining the term “genocide” and applying measures of it to the life experiences of poor black men reveals grossly disproportionate death rates among them. For them, the death rates are associated with the ecology of social deprivation.⁴² Much of black male health inequality relates to risky health behaviors, lack of health care, and living in social space that increases the chance for poor outcomes. This also largely explains much of bad health in developed and industrialized societies.⁴³

RISKY HEALTH BEHAVIORS

Substance Abuse

Risky health behaviors intimately relate to the images and values that a group produces in talking about them. For example, Sharon Moore discussed the




Figure 4.2 Median age of life expectancy for select gender and race identities, 2001. Source: Marchione, 2003.

nature of drug abuse among black male teenagers while using theories of suicide proposed by sociologist Émile Durkheim, capitalism theories proposed by sociologist Karl Marx, and Afrocentric theories proposed by rhetorician Molefi Asante.⁴⁴ She reported that these perspectives help in understanding the behaviors and consequences of drug sales and use among youth. Moore points out that all three of the perspectives are orientated to the prevailing circumstances operating in the environments where sales and using take place. She recommended intervention strategies designed to reduce the harm of destructive behaviors. Her moral claim is that drugs are bad for African Americans. Some may cogently contest this claim. However, it is hard to deny power relations associated with drug use that unevenly target black males for bad consequences when they use drugs.⁴⁵

Produced images of the black male vis-à-vis substance abuse might not be entirely accurate. For example, one study examined 579 high school students from a small U.S. city of 16,000 predominantly working-class residents. Self-report data do not support the consensus among many professionals that provide services to this age group that minority youth are more at risk for drug use than are their white peers. White students are more likely to have had exposure to both legal and illegal drugs when compared to black students. Tobacco use is higher among whites and boys than it is among girls. White females were more likely than the other racial groups to be alcohol users. In addition, black males reported the highest self-esteem and black females the lowest. The self-esteem reports correlate with thoughts of suicide—black males reported the lowest percentage of suicidal thoughts and white females reported the highest.⁴⁶ Despite this, between black females and males, the black male suicidal rates are significantly higher. This caused black suicide expert Sean Joe to write, “Although suicide has been viewed as a problem that affects more whites, the prevalence of suicide among blacks has risen significantly since the mid-1980s . . . with increases in both the rate of suicide completion . . . and nonfatal suicidal behavior, especially among younger black males.”⁴⁷

Denise Herd and Joel Grub used data from a 1984 nationwide general population survey on alcohol use to see the influence of black identity and drinking patterns among black men and women. They reported that involvement in black social networks and black political and social awareness correlates with low levels of heavy drinking. Exposure to black media is associated with heavy drinking. There are also factors associated with black males’ abuse of alcohol and illicit drugs.⁴⁸ Kellie Barr and her colleague applied sociologist William Julius Wilson’s theory of class polarization using interview data from a sample of 88 black and 4,099 white adults in New York. Regression analysis showed the relationship between socioeconomic status and substance abuse is stronger for black males than for any other group. The authors concluded that substance abuse relates to deindustrialization. With deindustrialization came a loss of jobs in urban areas where most black males reside.⁴⁹

Gangs and Violence

For many social scientists, black males and gang-related and violent behaviors have become synonymous. Most approach the subject from the view that black males are disreputable and pathological. In a refreshing study of black male gangs, Jacob U. Gordon investigated the relation of youth gangs to the plight of urban black males, the role of black leadership in the gang movement, the evolving values of gangs, and perceptions of black professionals about black street gangs. Professor Gordon analyzed fieldwork conducted in Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas with 50 black professionals and 35 youths. He reported that there are black leadership styles in gangs. Social scientists and black professionals have ignored gang leadership styles. By acknowledging this resource, Gordon argued that this leadership helps to reverse gang-related trends.⁵⁰

Louis Kontos, David C. Brotherton, and Luis Barrios edited a book about progressive gang work. They persuasively challenge the conservative academic dogma of gang members as incorrigible superthugs. Their work showed, for example, that gangs have political goals to expand the general welfare of their communities. Gang solidarity also expresses spiritual values interrelated with desires to improve the conditions of oppression and exploitation in marginalized neighborhoods.⁵¹ They view gangs as social movements.

LACK OF HEALTH CARE

The race and socioeconomic status of patients and clients in health and clinical settings affect service delivery. Melissa Gregory and Leigh Leslie examined the effects of clients' race and therapists' race and gender on partners' assessment in family and marital therapy. Results indicated a strong effect for race, with black females rating initial sessions more negatively than white females when seeing a white therapist. Yet, black men had a more positive response than white men did in the initial session, regardless of race of the therapist. This kind of finding is not only present in the literature on clinical mental health.⁵² Marlene Weitzel and colleagues explore variations in health beliefs and behaviors among males from black, Hispanic, and white ethnic groups. They look at responses from 1,033 men from the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control and the Health Promoting Lifestyle Profile questionnaires. This results in generating four samples including gay, military, blue collar, and disabled. Patterns suggest that Hispanic and black males' beliefs might be different from those of whites. The authors report that researchers and practitioners that assume these minority groups share similar health-related beliefs as whites should reexamine their practices.⁵³

David Williams and Chiquita Collins reported a relationship between socioeconomic and racial segregation and health in neighborhoods.⁵⁴ Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton show that U.S. neighborhoods

are highly segregated by race.⁵⁵ Ronald Braithwaite and Sandra Jones and Thomas LaVeist have summarized many of the racial and socioeconomic effects on health.⁵⁶

SPATIAL MARGINALIZATION

Michael Greenberg and Dona Schneider asked if violence could be addressed by focusing on black males. They hypothesize that the U.S. political economy creates marginal urban areas of undesirable land usage and unwanted people that breed violence. Their examination of three cities in New Jersey (Camden, Newark, and Trenton) shows that violent death rates from homicides, poisonings, drug abuses, falls, fires, and suicides in these cities are high for all groups, including whites, Hispanics, males, females, and black males. They point out that marginalization results from the processes of concentration, ghettoization, and segregation of unwanted land usage and unwanted people and these need attention to reduce racial violence.⁵⁷

Mindy Fullilove was also concerned with effects of spatial marginalization on quality and quantity of life. She examined the role of place on the psychology of individuals. Developing the concept of the *psychology of place*, she explains how feeling unwelcome in one's place affects one's individuality and one's relationships. In short, marginalization and segregation affect the psychology of individuals.⁵⁸ Likewise, Howard Pinderhughes shows how conflict and violence relate to place. His study of youth in marginalized and segregated neighborhoods in New York City unraveled how turf and youth violence interact. The structures of these neighborhoods support in many ways rhetorical strategies that explain them as essential and natural developments of city life. Much of the rhetoric of black male place in U.S. culture is similar in style to colonial talk of the past.⁵⁹ Such talk frames black males as disreputable and in need of reform.

THE IMPACT OF CRIMINALIZING BLACK MALES

The present-day criminalization of black males is not possible without targeting the communities in which they primarily reside. There have been changes in the black male population and prison policies since Ronald Reagan's administration. At that time, the political ideology informing policy-making changed from a more liberal perspective to one that stressed "getting tough on crime." The ideological complex of getting tough on crime and the war against drugs sustained attacking black males.⁶⁰ It resulted in changes in why blacks got state and local jail and prison time. Drug-related incarceration accounted for most of black male incarceration since 1986 when compared to violent and property crimes incarcerations. This has become the pattern. Almost 7 percent of black men⁶¹ and 12 percent of young black males suffered incarceration on any given day by 1997.⁶²

Two consequences of the black male status condition contribute to the group's criminalization: insufficient control of income and wealth and limited community control of government.

INSUFFICIENT CONTROL OF INCOME AND WEALTH

Black Americans are highly segregated in U.S. society. While there has been an increase in the socioeconomic status of many blacks, there is still considerable distance between black and white income and wealth. A number of factors explain this outcome. Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro presented a careful and comprehensive analysis in their study *Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality*. The white population has greater shares of both income and wealth. Black male arrest records affect the shares of income and wealth too. The criminalization process influences earning power. As Marc Mauer indicated,

Recent economic research has demonstrated that contact with the criminal justice system, even in the form of arrest, has a depressing effect on wages. Jeffrey Grogger's analysis of males aged 18-30 who had committed a property crime found that first-time arrestees suffered a 7% decline in incomes after arrest. Conversely, Grogger found that a 10% drop in wages among disadvantaged youth led to a 6% rise in crime . . . Similarly, Richard Freeman's analysis of the impact of imprisonment on earnings potential concludes that among a sample of youth incarcerated in 1979 there was a 25% reduction in the number of hours worked over the next eight years.⁶³

Experience with arrest has become largely associated with lack of education and poverty. This realization was captured by sociologist Bruce Western:

T. H. Marshall described citizenship as a "basic human equality associated with . . . full membership of a community." . . . [P]ervasive incarceration, unemployment, family instability—shows how mass imprisonment has created a novel social experience for disadvantaged blacks that is wholly outside of the mainstream of social life.⁶⁴

This observation supports a study of marginalized black men conducted by sociologist Alford A. Young, Jr.

For a lot of these men, placement out of the formal labor force was counterbalanced by involvement in illicit activity. These ventures were the closest that some of the men ever came to consistent wage-earning

activity . . . Most of it, they said, was restricted to petty thievery and hustling. The others who were involved in illicit activity sold narcotics.⁶⁵

LIMITED COMMUNITY-CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT

In addition to the high concentration of poverty in the communities where most black males live, there is a lack of civic power for black males to determine the laws and policies governing those communities. Of course, the process of educating and employing African American policy-makers is complicated. There is any number of highly competent African American commentators influencing social policy related to black males. Nevertheless, such commentators are far too few. William Julius Wilson wrote about the dearth of community-based leadership in black neighborhoods. When neighborhoods are tightly knit social organizations, adults are empowered to “super-*vis*e and control” the youth and “improve the quality of neighborhood life.”⁶⁶ Yet we have many examples of the systematic exclusion of black men from control over their communities. Many feel these exclusions are racial.

The criminalization process influences voting behavior and opportunity. In most states, a felony conviction results in a loss of voting rights. Only four states allow inmates to vote during incarceration time. In addition, most states suspend voting rights for those on probation and/or parole. At least 13 states suspend voting rights for life for felons. Mauer wrote:

As a result of increasing numbers of offenders being supervised in the criminal justice system, we estimate that approximately 4.2 million Americans are now either currently or permanently disenfranchised from voting and, of these, 1.4 million are black males. This represents 14 percent, or one in seven, of the 10.4 million black males of voting age.⁶⁷

Lack of community control also extends to other forms of civic life. Super-ordinate classes influence controlling images in ways that marginal classes are unable to do. One example was a national racialized moral panic over the concept and use of Ebonics in the Oakland, California school system. Ebonics refers to the colloquial manner that some black communities use in their speech patterns. A group of black professionals who study language and linguistics recommended the pedagogy of Ebonics. The super-ordinate class used the full force of their political class power to create a national degradation ceremony on the cover of magazines and on talk television and radio. Ultimately, the message was clear. There would be no Ebonics. Whites gave little deference to black professionals and academics that attempted to intervene with specialized knowledge on the subject of black language development. Under the logic of civic domination, subalterns should expect to follow dominant political class instructions. Many believe that super-ordinates with institutional power, individual and committee

decision-making power, most often reward blacks that are overly deferential to white political class interest. If this were true, then the white political class would systematically treat blacks unfairly in this way.⁶⁸

There appears to be an interrelationship between the talk about African American males' "problems" and the ways that the super-ordinate political class reproduces black subordination. One of the best examples is the case of government in Washington D.C. The whites segregate in the virtually all white and wealthy Ward Three and in surrounding suburbs of Washington D.C. Wards Seven and Eight were the major black domestic colonies. Police heavily patrolled and many residents thought they were harassed daily. The whites offered a rationale that Ward Seven and Ward Eight were bad sections of town that were full of criminals and required constant police intervention. Marion Barry won reelection to a third term as mayor of Washington D.C. in November 1986. Many whites were bitter about the fact of Barry's reelection. An elite element of their political class had waged a wanton attack against Barry. All of the major white papers and local media published story after story pointing to Barry's moral deficiencies. The narratives that the political class produced referred to Barry as if he were a child. One example is an article by Julie M. McCarthy who was European editor for National Public Radio. In that article she wrote about Barry, "The U.S. Attorney used the misdemeanor evidence of the sting to pressure a reported 19 people to testify that Barry has used illicit drugs. Barry told grand jurors he never has. If the jury at his trial *concludes he's been lying*, they could convict him of perjury—a felony—which would remove Barry from office and reelection."⁶⁹

An aggressive prosecutor, Joseph E. diGenova, targeted Barry and was unable to bring him down after spending millions of dollars and several years. diGenova held the position of the office of U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia. According to diGenova, Barry was not a credit to his race. According to the black community, Barry was responsible for constructing a new rapid transit system, developing some 50,000 new private sector jobs, reducing crime, and revitalizing downtown Washington D.C. Barry's work did not impress diGenova as he used the power of government to reproduce his political class supremacy. This required the domination of the African Americans who voted for Barry. Joining forces with the FBI, diGenova sought to write a narrative of corruption, as opposed to inefficiency, for every problem the city faced. The elite of the political class assisted with diGenova's strategy to degrade Barry and Washington D.C.'s African American community. "Barry's income tax statements, bank accounts, and credit card receipts have been examined by federal agents."⁷⁰

Eventually the forces of the powerful political class were able to entrap Barry by placing hidden cameras in a hotel room to arrest him for smoking crack cocaine that they supplied to a black female decoy. The decoy was one of Barry's former girlfriends whom diGenova had contacted and flew in for the betrayal. This infuriated members of every socioeconomic

status in the African American community. The political class operatives felt esteemed by their political behavior. They were disillusioned when the African American community reelected Barry after his incarceration. The white political class began a campaign stressing that blacks in Washington D.C. were incapable of self-government. From the white political class perspective, the reelection of Barry was all the needed evidence rationally to conclude that the blacks possessed political and intellectual flaws. Harry S. Jaffe and Tom Sherwood wrote *Dream City: Race, Power and the Decline of Washington*. Jaffe and Sherwood launched an anti-black diatribe portraying Barry as a “clown from Mississippi” who came to fame from opportunism during the civil rights struggles culminating in 1964–1965.⁷¹

Finally, the white political class stripped Barry of virtually all his governmental power and placed Washington D.C. under the financial management of a control board. They appointed a former city manager from Texas, Camille C. Barnett, as the city’s chief management officer and paid her \$155,000 per year. She earned \$65,000 more than Mayor Marion Barry did. Barnett reported directly to the control board, not to Barry or the city council.⁷²

Many thought using crack cocaine to entrap Barry was the kind of racial hoax that whites were increasingly using. Some whites saw blacks as an easy target to blame for crimes they knew blacks had not committed. The image of the black crack cocaine user was pervasive in the popular media. Crack cocaine and membership in the black race had become synonymous in the minds of many Americans. “Cooking” powder cocaine, baking soda, and water over low heat until the water evaporates produces crack cocaine. The remaining “rocks” are potent means when smoked for getting quick intermittent feelings of euphoria. In 1986, University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias was celebrating his National Basketball Association contract. He used cocaine and died from an overdose. Many thought it was crack but learned he had ingested powder cocaine. In the meantime, Congress enacted the federal crack cocaine law.

The law disproportionately affects African American males. As criminologist Katheryn K. Russell stated,

The federal crack statute mandates a five-year prison term for possession of five grams of crack cocaine. Under the same federal law, possession of five hundred grams of powder cocaine is required for a five-year prison term. Prison sentences are mandatory under the federal law. In 1995, 88 percent (12,300) of the people serving sentences under this law were Black. Because the penalty for possession of crack cocaine is one hundred times harsher than the penalty for possession of powder cocaine, the federal law is described as having a “100:1 disparity” . . . the Sentencing Commission found that the federal law was the “primary cause of growing racial disparity between sentences for Black and White federal defendants” . . . Congress voted 332–82 to overrule the

recommendation of the Sentencing Commission. President Bill Clinton upheld the Congressional vote, thus making it the first time a president rejected the recommendations of the Sentencing Commission.⁷³

Leadership from the African American community has persistently opined the federal law is racially motivated. The white leadership refused persuasion. Crack cocaine federal law is a rich example of deference to laws that result in racialized disparities.

In this chapter was demonstration of the relationship between ideologies of inferiority and black masculinity. It showed black masculinity representation in social science in ways that carry ideological meaning. Its claim was to connect knowledge about black males to an overall pattern of domination. This surely contributes to an inability of the black male class to perform patriarch functions in contemporary U.S. society. I do not intend to promote patriarchy. Rather, it is an attempt to distinguish between the actual historical forms that hegemonic masculinity may have taken and the science portrayal of them. That is, it is to contribute to the intellectual accuracy of the history of masculinity. The way this chapter moved forward was to explain this history after considering published social science about black masculinity. The purpose was not to systematically arrange the claims of social scientists. Content analysis and meta-analysis are the tools to that work. In this chapter, social science text evaluates black male relations in the U.S. through a reflexive method.

The chapter examined the black masculinity picture relationally. It found that the chances of producing black patriarchy are slim. Approaching black masculinity differently could change these outcomes. The normal performance of black masculinity is not synonymous with masculinity. Black masculine roles are associated with femininity, on the one hand; on the other hand, the black masculine roles are associated with hypermasculinity. In this sense, under either condition, black masculinity required enhanced domination.

This does not imply that black masculinity was an essence. In this view, masculinity is a social relation. As such, situational performances of black masculinity require a deployment of ideal forms of masculinity that negotiate in the context of situational relations. This means that at times, specific performances of black masculinity establish hegemonic masculinity. At other times, that same performance negotiates as a subaltern masculine performance positioned below other forms of masculinity. The complication with this is that it opens the possibility that subaltern forms of masculinity could likely become hegemonic during given periods of history and it opens the possibility that these new forms of hegemonic masculinity would proceed as a diffusion of innovation on normative masculinity.

We could make this very observation during the anti-Vietnam War period when softer forms of masculinity became hegemonic. In addition, at another period, when Barack Obama ran for the Democratic Party's

nomination for presidential candidacy, he performed different masculinity. This form of masculinity allowed Obama to act ghetto-style cool pose fused with white professoriate mannerisms while he simultaneously promoted a set of rather right-oriented political positions; his support for the individual responsibility dogma and his attempts to avoid defining real social victims as such are examples. In this sense, hegemonic masculinity took a dramatic turn that would undermine claims that normative masculinity is white. Obama's victory for the U.S. presidency was further evidence of a nuanced shift in the deployment of hegemonic masculinity.

As this chapter shows, there is an across-institutional effect resulting from the black masculine social construction. Therefore, whether one examines health of the black male status or examines imprisonment and the black male status, one would find a similar pattern of disadvantage. The talk can then focus on intervention based on the moral degeneracy of the status position. Such interventions focus on correction and reformation of black males. These interventions are symbolic deployments associated with power relations; they are not places or temporal entities. They must negotiate in real time; through negotiations, hegemonic masculinity faces possible rejection, defense, persistence, or reproduction.

THE NEW PATRIARCHY

The new patriarchy is observable vis-à-vis black masculinity. If hegemonic masculinity operates to privilege all males in a meritocracy, we would expect black and white males to have similar personal income if they have college education. Personal income is an indicator of an ability to afford a family under the condition of patriarchal family organization. Usually such men are heads of household. One way to examine this relationship is to compare black and white head of household males by their level of college education. Table 4.1 used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. It is clear that black males earn less than white males when they hold associate, baccalaureate, and master's degrees. These differences in income are statistically significant. In this sample, there are few black males with doctorates, jurist doctorates, or medical doctorates. While there are large differences between black and white earnings in these categories, they are not statistically significant—the observations could have happened by chance. The labor market difference is likely representative of a patriarchy status difference. In addition, it might mean that many black males will view the system differently. They might think their chances for success in it are different.

Another way of observing status vis-à-vis the new patriarchy is to divide personal income categories into quintiles and then compare the average black and white males' earnings. Figure 4.3 is a diagram of this. The most important thing to notice is that there are no differences in personal

Table 4.1 Means of employed black and white male head of household personal income by college education, 2004, PSID (N = 2,497)

Highest Collge Education	Black Mean Income	White Mean Income	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>
Associate Degree	\$30,441 (166)	\$44,847 (309)	5.82***	464
Bachelor Degree	43,551 (266)	76,188 (1,284)	7.99***	1546
Master's Degree	48,964 (38)	68,237 (268)	2.67***	236
Doctorate & Jurist Doctorate	83,775 (4)	112,586 (101)	2.33	103
Medical Doctorate	80,400 (5)	128,035 (56)	1.04	59

****p* < .001 (two-tailed)
 Note: Counts are in parentheses.




Figure 4.3 Means of black and white head of household men's 2004 personal income by five income strata.
 Note: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2005.
 p* < .01. *p* < .001.

income in the middle strata. This suggests that a change over the past 20 years occurred since among the middle classes there had been reported regular significant differences in head of household incomes in the social sciences. Where we find differences in this sample are among men yearly earning greater than \$65,000 or less than \$19,500. What is interesting is that among the poorest, black male head of households earn more than do the whites. Given the great amount of conversation and literature on the underclass and race inequality, we would have expected the bottom tier of the stratification in these status categories to earn differently. However, the picture is likely more complicated given changes in the social organization of U.S. society.⁷⁴ It is also important to keep in mind that these indicators did not consider many other variables associated with stratification, most notably assets and savings.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the purpose of this comparison is to determine if there is evidence to support a view that black males have competitive patriarchy position in personal income as white males do, we see that among the working and middle classes, black males compete relatively favorably. However, in the power roles in the society where hegemonic masculinity is substantive, we find some support for the view that black males are entirely different.

The subordinated status would likely mean that in situational deployment of gender power there would be fewer chances for black males to negotiate the performance, or more accurately, the performative; many black males would routinely find themselves excluded from their claim of equal performers in competition for hegemonic masculinity. Many might imagine they are doing gender just like any other men but because they believe that it is so does not make it so. The ideologies of inferiority overwhelm the imaginary of equality.

5 Black Male Citizenship Trouble

The current contradictions of African American males' social existence have reached a state of profound intensity. Both white and black feminists and media pundits initially criticized the Million Man March as a macho and potentially misogynistic event. Simultaneously, the Fourth United Nations Conference on Women in Beijing and the Non-Governmental Organizations Forum on women in Huirao most considered as major achievements by women. The legal pundits who reported in the mass media on the Simpson trial were likewise committed to constructing black males as a disreputable group of males. The narrative is tortured. American citizens are innocent until proven guilty. The rule does not apply to citizenship, only to judicial proceedings; race is not the significant factor in the Simpson case—money is more significant and it transcends justice; and, in spite of the fact that a jury of *his* peers found Simpson not guilty, it does not mean that he is innocent because *he is guilty*. Of course, Simpson went to prison when he was found guilty of other crimes. The media later attempted to portray presidential candidate Barack Obama as a savior for U.S. international images and domestic economic decline. Nevertheless, the underlying message was the question of trustworthiness; some asked the question in different ways—most notably, “Is he ready?”

Such messages have come to situate black males in the American social fabric. The examples of the language representing the Million Man March and the O. J. Simpson trial are suggestive of the need to examine the intersection between African American male social place, representation, and citizenship. Treating such narratives as social facts allows us to ask if African American males are another order of citizen in the American collective imagination. How should we speak about black males that might accurately reflect their sociopolitical position? What is the significance of properly representing black males for an assessment of the black community's political representation? A relational analysis best assists us in understanding how power relates to black males in the post-Obama election period—the period ushered in by Barack Obama's presidency.

This chapter establishes black males' political subjugation when compared to white males. It uses political class citizenship theory. It will discuss

ways that the two most prominent perspectives on race relations—underclass and racial formation theory—fail to address the fact that black males have been precluded from becoming actual citizens in spite of Obama's presidency. This is to suggest underclass and racial formation theories are insufficient for a relational black masculinity standpoint. Finally, through the concept of political suicide, the chapter will discuss the importance of representing black males as U.S. citizens.

THE SUPER-ORDINATE CITIZEN

U.S. history probably influences African American's beliefs in democratic processes. Racial and gender domination of black bodies, minds, emotions, and spirits has been a major part of the black story.¹ Some political theories rationalize domination. In fact, some of the political theories that do so help the powerful in administration over public and private experiences. At the same time, the theories proclaim effectiveness as protection for all citizens. They also distinguish between the public sphere and private affairs. Activists and intellectuals call the status of citizenship "civil society." Yet it is not clear just how this civil society connects with modern political sociology's interest in relationships between the rational political state and the market economy. Sociology's narrative considers firm boundaries and epistemological partitions between the public and the private, as if historically all groups have been empowered to either influence or control political or market forces. Some of the theories combine matters of the market with matters of the civil. Rational choice theories do so. In addition, theories that stress flexible accumulation do so. The market crash of 2008 was just another example of a distance between theory and practice. The economic crisis once again required political intervention. Many commentators explained the crisis by malfeasance of bankers greedy for profits while issuing home loans. Substantial dutiful theory will help explain race and gender hierarchy among consumers that bought subprime loans or bankers that encouraged them to do so at social peril.

Care is necessary in theoretically discussing citizenship. It is important to acknowledge the need for critical thinking about citizenship. For example, integrationist views among relatively privileged groups within the black community may tend to diminish the importance of race and gender hierarchy in citizenship. Clearly, it is a problem to understand this view without erasing many facts. For example, how could the justices writing the U.S. Supreme Court's *Dred Scott* decision in 1857 assert, "Are blacks citizens? . . . We think they are not, and they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures for citizens of the United States."² Of course, the Court was correct. At the same time, some scholars representing a super-ordinate political class habitus

might rub out their sexualized and racialized itineraries in theory. They might claim that we solved the race problem through the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Immigration Act of 1965.³ It is harder to justify sexualized discrimination. One technique is to collapse sexual orientation questions into male-female gender questions. Then they might claim that women receive better treatment today than in the past.

The standard of U.S. citizenship comes from liberal political theory, most notably that of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.⁴ U.S. liberal political philosophy grew from Locke's seventeenth-century thought. It influenced both sociological theory and liberal political thought. Today, this theory helps political class ideology—a political fiction—about the necessary conditions of popular sovereignty. As the story goes, the greatest and persistent risk to liberty is the public realm of the administrative state. The risk is the possibility of un-freedom constituted by coercion, constraint, and domination maintained by a potential of physical force; it may breed unstable dependence. In Hobbes's way of thinking about the relationship between the individual and the state, society is a war of all against all. For Hobbes, individuals willingly surrendered a portion of their freedom to a "leviathan" political organization.⁵ This thinking was different from Locke's because Locke thought that an organized society can exist that is not identical with or defined by its official political organization. Locke argued that the popular community must establish government through consent of the governed. As such, government becomes the consequence of a pre-political community. The pre-political community before Locke's political organization is a state of nature and the political organization is one way formally to organize that nature. For Locke, this is civil society: Civil society is thought to be the realm of popular freedom because it is claimed to be a separate power from the state. After all, its establishment was before the state. Its operation is natural and self-reliant. Its authority derives from the alleged freedom operating in the balanced state of nature.

Locke and his progeny reasoned that God was behind the manifestation of both the pre-political and political realms. The market controlled society in instances where God was not in direct control. On the gridiron beneath such angelic claims was another requirement. His reasoning required substantial dutiful theory. Namely, there had to be agreement among the citizens about norms. Culture makers had to define and enshrine the norms. Therefore, even if the theology-of-the-market glue broke down, there would still be moral glue that would hold citizens together. For Locke, in pre-political society a spread of trust and public opinion served as the common moral bond. Therefore, informal social control could guarantee social order and freedom. This happens without official political organization. The decline of theological foundations of earlier forms of Western societies developed a new need to control public opinion. This need became one of the most important initial tasks for any dominant political class. In fact, U.S. liberal citizenship theory eventually combined the realms of political

culture and public sphere in society with the market relations in civil society. The combination of the two parts in citizenship theory resulted in the belief that the market was a kind of religion.⁶ Many might think viewing the market as religion is banal materialism; others might sense that this belief is prevalent in society today. As such, administrative, civil, and criminal justice occupations are, at least partially, different forms of commodities with sacred aspects attached to them.

This brief sketch of dominant political class citizenship theory might conclude by reminding us that a shared core of liberal citizenship theory might appear differently to various theorists. For example, Jürgen Habermas's *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* certainly recognizes the contradictions in bourgeois democracies' public realm and its political role.⁷ In addition, in the Critical Legal Studies group, Mark Kelman opens his criticism of liberal laws governing citizenship, pointing to the contradictions inherent in liberal classical philosophy.⁸ In spite of these kinds of minor departures and variations, among others, the base of U.S. citizenship theory has worked well for the racialized organization of citizenship. It remained coherent for three centuries and continues to shape a racialized political sociology to this very day. For a relational perspective, this means that citizenship simultaneously assists in the organization of gender and sexual orientation inequality.

AFRICAN AMERICAN MEN AS CITIZENS

This section is an effort to theorize African American males as citizens: It begins with two caveats generated by reading of literary critics and gender theorists Barbara Christian and Hortense Spillers.⁹ First, for heuristic purposes this section will theorize only black males as citizens. However, this narration partially recognizes the link between black men and women in their U.S. plight. In addition, the section's purpose is to question the racialized organization of masculinity and patriarchy. For example, are double standards inherent in the system of gender and race stratification? Treating such issues with specificity—as Christian indicated we should—is important when reflecting on Alice Walker's novel *The Color Purple*. Christian wrote, "Mister's assessment of Celie's worth emphasizes her nothingness because she exists in realms of powerlessness . . . she knows something as a result of being at the intersection of categories that attempt to camouflage her existence."¹⁰ Theoretically speaking, the lessons of that existence will contribute a distinctive recognition.

Second, Hortense Spillers suggested in "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book" the importance of specificity related to a black feminist epistemology. Spillers wrote, "The African-American male has been touched by the mother, handled by her in ways that he cannot escape—and in ways that the white American male is allowed to

temporize by a fatherly reprieve . . . Legal enslavement removed the African-American male so much from sight as from *mimetic* view as a partner in the prevailing social fiction of the Father's name, the Father's law."¹¹ Similarly, this chapter argues that an African American male theory is inseparable from the history of black men. This will have two consequences: 1) Black males will likely not accept social norms as white males will do and 2) black males will not integrate in U.S. patriarchy without major social transformation.

Given these two reservations, the argument is that it constitutes a form of political suicide for African American men to buy into patriarchy. Political suicide means belief that the political processes are fair, natural, neutral, and pluralistic—these adjectives might not correspond with the facts. Notwithstanding this, powerful social forces teach us to believe in the standard political narrative of equality and justice. It does not reflect the actual history and possibly does not reflect current social relations. The suicidal reference is to the denial of the historical problem that would make black males superfluous to the society—in fact, some have suggested black males have pariah status. This is hard to reconcile with thinking the U.S. has the longest prevailing national constitution in world history because it is the best political system ever realized. Nonetheless, the *system* contains discrimination based on class, gender, race, and sex. This is not to suggest that things do not change; nor does it preclude that some individuals from subordinated groups play powerful roles in society. The Hillary Clinton presidential campaign in 2008 is compelling evidence of the intransigence of gendered power. In the end, the men won again. This is not to suggest that a woman will not eventually serve as president. However, class, gender, race, and sexuality politics are situational deployments in struggle for hegemony. A black male political consciousness that avoids the social relations resulting in the creation of political concepts, organizations, practices, and theories that use a framework of anti-black male logic is what relational theory designates as political suicide.

On the dimension of practice, political suicide obscures the 1) inherent contradiction between citizenship theory and the materialism of its property rights; 2) nature of its anti-black conception; and 3) the history of how racialized organizations used the state as an oppressive tool against blacks. In sum, practical applications of citizenship theory inextricably connect African American males to lower social status. What follows is a brief elaboration of unequal political practice for illustrative purposes. The purpose is to show that African American males occupy a subaltern political class that is variously defined as effeminized and hypersexual in relationship to the modern state. The policy implication of this view is that black males would have to assist in deconstructing both gender and sexual orientation discrimination if they are to deconstruct their subaltern roles. To do so would require nothing less than a major transformation of the society.

LIBERAL CITIZENS AS MATERIALISTS

Locke advanced the foundation of citizenship theory in 1692. His revision of Hobbes's initial conceptions of the state of nature and natural rights is profound for U.S. constitutional documents. For Locke, as it had been for Hobbes, human's original political condition is the "state of nature" where humans enjoy the condition of perfect freedom. In such a state, humans own title to all rights and privileges of the law of nature and can exercise judgment and enforcement of the natural law, where they can fight for and maintain their property. However, because all humans have these rights, war is likely to ensue. To defend them against a state of war, Locke, as did Hobbes, argued that humans join in political society. The political society constitutes laws that govern the power relations in the community. Men give up the rights of self-preservation of property to the state. Locke wrote:

But because no political society can subsist without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offenses of all those of that society, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it . . . [when] men so unite [disallowing] every one of his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there, and there only, is a political, or civil society.¹²

Locke's conception of civil society provides us a vision of the centrality of property rights in his thought. As such, the importance of the community is to keep the individual's property secure. Another conception of political origins might stress the importance of keeping the group secure: Unlike Locke, Africans stressed the importance of group identity against individual identity. For example, Nathan Huggins's studies of traditional African societies reveal:

[A]lone, a person was nobody. The self was defined in relationship to others. One was a son, a daughter, a parent, or a grandparent, and had a place, large or small, in the village. What one was known to be rested on others. One shared the reputations of kin. A wastrel or cowardly brother was one's own shame; a relation who brought glory to himself was one's own . . . Each was thus tied with others, past and present, and each was linked through family to others in the village. The bloodlines and associations that made up the village were a finely spun web, firmly and distinctly linking all together.¹³

Europeans could have introduced liberal citizenship theory to Africans through a civil process of pluralistic persuasion. Liberal citizenship required that Africans transform accepting a worldview that granted privilege to

individual acquisition of material possessions, a position that apparently was diametrically opposed to an African notion of liberal “citizenship.” This is likely the case even if one holds the view that Africans had been in a pre-political stage at the point of contact with European descendents. Is the state of nature universal essence?

STIGMA OF BLACK MALES BASED ON SKIN COLOR

A consistent theme in the history of U.S. citizenship has been the inscription of blackness as a fact to hate. Anti-black sentiment is in classical citizenship documents and it is in modern liberal documents of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), James Mill (1773–1836), and Adam Smith (1723–1790). This section does not trace enmity; rather it highlights the fact to help understand black male citizenship.¹⁴

Locke’s conception of black men is slippery. He rejects slavery or property in other persons as a justifiable condition of civil society. In his *Second Treatise*, Locke specifies under what circumstances he finds slavery to be appropriate. Slavery becomes appropriate for persons who will otherwise face death, for example, in a just war when the captor magnanimously grants a death reprieve and instead enslaves his captive. Locke was a colonizer who was at one time secretary to the Carolina Proprietors, and he played a fundamental role in drafting both the colony’s constitution in 1669 and the instructions to the governor of the Virginia territory. Here we unveil Locke’s gender and race mask: Locke’s documents asserted in South Carolina that citizens had “absolute power” over their “negro slaves”; in the Virginia document Locke asserted that enslavement of the blacks was justifiable because they were prisoners of a just war and had “forfeited [their] own Life . . . by some Act that deserves Death.” The position of Locke’s “morality” is a profoundly serious matter for any thinking person; he fancied slave expeditions of the Royal Africa Company to be just wars from which blacks forfeited their right to life.¹⁵

David Theo Goldberg in *Racist Culture* summarizes the main points of Locke’s narrative:

First, it is a basic implication of Locke’s account that anyone behaving irrationally is to that degree a brute and should be treated as an animal or machine. Hence, rationality is a mark of human subjectivity and so a condition . . . to be extended full moral treatment . . . Locke’s empiricist antiessentialism led him to reject the notion of properties essential to the constitution of any object. Locke substitutes the notion of a ‘nominally essential property’, that is, any contingent property of an object conventionally designated by speakers of a language to be essential, for essences . . . Locke could conclude that in formulating a concept of *man* for himself, an English boy would rationally fail to include Negroes.¹⁶

Black men, then, are not men in this idea of the political system. This would leave them with two fundamental options: Accept this place or transform the political organization of things. Of course, they could choose a third option: Request admission to the patriarchy for a small fraction of their group that could represent as not black, that is, represent themselves as *exceptional*. In short, essence is equivocal; it could mean this, then again, it could mean that—to some extent, the meaning depends on its modifiers.

EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES AS A FUNCTION OF THE WHITE STATE

The founding documents of the U.S. are also part of anti-black male thinking. Civil discourse might have purged much of that black misogyny. A transformation of society would be required to eliminate some of the anti-black male thinking. An essential part of the thinking is that black males do not deserve full citizenship. They deserve different treatment in terms of patriarchy.

An often-ignored piece of legislation from the collective American memory is the Naturalization Act of 1790. Ronald Takaki reminds us:

The Founding Fathers needed to define political membership for the new republic. In Congress, they enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790. In supporting this law, they affirmed their commitment to the “pure principles of Republicanism” and their determination to develop a citizenry of good and “useful” men. Only the “worthy part of mankind” would be encouraged to settle in the new republic and be eligible for citizenship . . . Applicants for naturalized citizenship were required to reside in the United States for two years as well as provide “proof” of good character in court and document their republican fitness. They also had to be “white.”¹⁷ This actual history of citizenship is inscribed with pervasive anti-black male practices and thinking. While it is not practical to fully do justice illustrating this claim, it is possible to provide cursory anecdotal evidence that this is the case. For example, Benjamin Franklin argued consistently for an all-white citizenship. He wrote, “And while we are . . . Scouring our Planet, by clearing America of Woods, and so making this side of our globe reflect a brighter Light to the Eyes of Inhabitants in Mars or Venus, why should we in the sight of Superior Beings, darken its People? Why increase the Sons of Africa, by Planting them in America, where we have so fair an opportunity, by excluding Blacks and Tawneys, of increasing the lovely White?”¹⁸

Likewise, Benjamin Rush, another signer of the Declaration of Independence, thought that blacks were a “blot” on civilization and that they had problems with “big lip,” “flat nose,” “woolly hair,” and “black skin color.”

As a medical doctor, Rush thought that he could cure these problems by prescribing bleeding, purging, and abstinence for blacks.¹⁹ Thomas Jefferson also held many extremely anti-black sentiments and felt blacks should return to Africa since they could never become citizens. Chapter 3 discussed Jefferson's population transfer scheme for blacks that included taking young children from their parents while promoting the death of the black gene pool in America.²⁰

It is remarkable that black adults send their children to schools named after these men. It is remarkable that African Americans celebrate these men as heroes. What could account for this interesting way of thinking and acting on the part of African Americans: the position of embracing men who detested them in the name of citizenship? Is it possible to ignore these facts and fairly manage pluralistic accommodation? How would that management look over time?

DOMESTIC COLONIALISM AND FORMS OF REVOLT

The idea of domestic colonialism developed from an analysis of worldwide imperialism. There was a considerable debate about what constitutes colonialism²¹ and whether it continues to be an important subject to study.²² In the U.S., the idea of colonialism developed as a part of black identity politics from the work of Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton where they conceptualized the idea of institutional racism and drew the connection between classic colonialism and U.S. domestic colonialism:

Under classic colonialism, the colony is a source of cheaply produced raw materials (usually agricultural or mineral) which the "Mother Country" then processes into finished goods and sells at high profit—sometimes back to the colony itself. The black communities in America do not export anything except human labor. But is the differentiation more than a technicality? Essentially, the African colony is selling its labor; the product itself does not belong to the subjects because the land is not theirs. At the same time let us look at the black people in the South; cultivating cotton at \$3.00 for a ten hour day and from buying cotton dresses (and food and other goods) from white manufacturers.²³

Carmichael and Hamilton added a political dimension to the discourse on colonialism by highlighting that subjugation required direct or indirect rule. The purpose of the rule is to gag the legitimate aspirations of the colonized. Here the term "political" refers to social institutions where individuals and groups gain and exercise power. Political sociology begins with society and then asks what constitutes the state.²⁴ Here the use of *political* includes three elements: 1) authority, 2) hierarchy, and 3) power.

We commonly assume that to comprehend politics and power in society we need look only at the events and personalities of government and political parties . . . But politics, and thus power, is part of every realm of social life . . . Political sociology, in contrast, makes few presumptions about power . . . [P]ower takes many forms, some not easily seen and measured.²⁵

In this view, colonialism, the conquest and *direct* control of other people's labor and land is a particular phase of the history of imperialism. Its best understanding is as the globalization of the capitalist mode of production, its invasion of previously non-capitalist regions of the world, and its attempted destruction of pre- and non-capitalist forms of social organization. American blacks experienced direct control through voting rights deprivation, intimidation, formal education exclusion, racially biased criminal justice, gerrymandered electoral districts, co-optation of black politicians and black political culture, and the rest. This suggests black males' subjugation is part of the global system of domination. Therefore, their integration is in a world cultural system of heterosexism, patriarchy, sexism, and gender and race hierarchy. The Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset quote in the previous paragraph suggests that in a political sense the production of a criminal class is its commoditization—that is, there is a great deal of money to be made trading in this commodity. In this sense, gender and sexual orientation are also commodities.

UNDERCLASS AND COLONIALISM

One major response to the colonialism perspective for understanding the political sociology of black masculinity was the underclass perspective. Underclass and colonialism models share a similar theoretical orientation by granting class an important place in their discussion about domination. The two models differ in their political positions. The underclass model assumes an integrationist politic; the colonial model, a transformative one. Integrationist politics assume that the previous racial order has cultural, economic, institutional, moral, and structural merit not requiring substantial reform. For example, integrationist politics agree with merit exams for schooling and workplace statuses. It sees such exams as neutral instruments that sort individuals in institutions. A transformative politic would oppose such a claim pointing out that the exams are historically grounded in class interests and practices. It would ask why we need such exams; why is it necessary to sort individuals for jobs and education in this way? The transformative politic might look for local community-based models to distribute social resources. Ultimately, a transformative politic goal would be to eliminate social sorting, perhaps replacing it with a process of social negotiation to help with assigning career development and employment.

It would likely argue that social sorting serves the interest of ruling social classes and harms those who are marginal in the hierarchy.

The underclass literature developed in three phases. Initially anthropologist Oscar Lewis's *La Vida* (1966), democratic socialist activist Michael Harrington's *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (1962), and urbanologist Edward Banfield's *The Unheavenly City Revisited* (1974) established the culture of poverty period.²⁶ In general, the culture of poverty argued that antisocial attitudes transmit from generation to generation through the mechanism of culture. The culture taught individuals how to approach their daily lives, including dating, marriage, and family behaviors, attitudes, and values. Individuals from similar impoverished cultures tend to copulate, perhaps marry, have children, and reproduce another generation of the *culturally pathological* according to its perspective. The culture of poverty literature characterized black males as hopeless, lonely, and isolated. The literature represents black males as feminized and passive citizens. It simultaneously represents them as hypersexual brutes in need of birth control education.

Despite the differences in emphases among various culture of poverty writers, these writers invariably depict their black male subjects as passive while they simultaneously authoritatively speak for black males. In so doing, the researchers appropriate both agency and voice from black males; these appropriations hide behind objective scientific status. Key to the culture of poverty perspective was the hierarchical placement of black men as those that required reform if they were to serve the order of things. This could be viewed as a major flaw of the underclass perspective: the image that its rhetoric talked down to those in poverty. Some argue this criticism is an oversimplification of the culture of poverty perspective. However, from a relational standpoint, culture of poverty and underclass perspectives are forms of substantial dutiful theory.

The second phase of the underclass perspective attempts empirically to identify the underclass. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) provided longitudinal data on low-income persons and their employment, family, housing, and income statuses.²⁷ The PSID isolated an attitudinally and behaviorally distinct group from the poverty population.²⁸ This group became the new underclass, considered isolated from mainstream American culture. Black males were of major concern for these social scientists.

Douglas Glasgow, Ken Auletta, and William Julius Wilson are the major proponents of the new underclass perspective.²⁹ Glasgow distinguished the underclass from the lower class because he argued the underclass members lack social and economic mobility. The elderly, disabled, working poor, chronic welfare recipients, criminals, hustlers, school dropouts, and drug addicts represented the qualities of the underclass. His study was in Watts, California between 1965 and 1968 with follow-ups in 1975. At that time, Watts was primarily a black community. Like Glasgow, Auletta characterized the underclass as having behavioral and income deficiencies. Auletta

isolated four categories of the underclass: (1) the passive poor that were primarily welfare recipients, (2) belligerent street criminals, (3) persons who work in the domestic labor market like “hustlers,” and (4) the disturbed by narcotics or homelessness. Auletta is a journalist who based his work on literature review and interviews of participants of a demonstration project designed to mainstream social outcasts.

Following in the underclass tradition, William J. Wilson used data collected from Chicago’s inner city in his attempt to explain why there had been a national rise in black poverty. Wilson contended that a large number of blacks entered the labor force at a time when jobs declined. Added to this condition is the fact discriminatory traditions slot some occupations for blacks. Economic downturn affected those jobs. What is more, Wilson argued that many blacks earned middle-class jobs but left the inner city because of their employment successes. This resulted in the decline of black middle-class institutions in the inner city, producing a lack of role models among inner-city residents and contributing to a significant number that form a permanent group of unemployable, unsocialized dregs in the inner city. Wilson’s solution is an expanding economy that provides employment opportunities for inner-city residents, particularly for black males.

Scholars heavily criticized Wilson’s perspective. William Darity and Troy Duster initiated two notable criticisms. William Darity, Samuel Myers, and their colleagues pointed out that Wilson’s model does not “demonstrate either the asocial attitudes or behaviors of what Wilson describes as social isolation . . . or . . . adequately make the case for why Chicago is an appropriate case study site for extrapolating broader explanations for the existence of the underclass.” They continue, “In addition, despite Wilson’s statement about the decline of community-based institutions, he provides no empirical research evidence to support his observations.”³⁰ Troy Duster argued that while it may be arduous to treat the concept of the underclass with scientific specificity, something has changed in the inner city.³¹ Notably, there is now a permanent group of downtrodden black residents given to crime while being victimized by plant closings and stratified labor markets typically offering bad jobs to black males.

The problems raised by the underclass thesis may not have been resolved primarily because of the revisionist-history approach of its proponents. Did the proponents of the underclass argument create a fantasy of a better U.S. day when there were nuclear families, meritocratic institutional administration, fair education and employment practices, and widespread participatory democracy? Many were unable to locate such a U.S. heyday.³² Rather, some have interpreted U.S. history as a form of empire building most notable by structural power relations organized along lines of race.³³ Many underclass proponents embraced an integrationist politic that adhered to a standpoint of an *authentic* U.S. way of life—where citizens share commitment to substantial duties. For this reason, they believed their observations required reform of the *dregs*, thereby *transforming* them into employable

and good citizens. This standpoint runs the risk of appearing arrogant by talking down to the poor. It is far from convincing because the U.S. values associated with citizenship to which they point are notoriously indigent.

RACIAL FORMATION

Michael Omi and Howard Winant first presented their racial formation position in 1983 in *Socialist Review*; later they published *Racial Formation in the United States from the 1960s to the 1980s* and *Racial Formation in the United States from the 1960s to the 1990s*.³⁴ The second edition adds more insight to their racial formation theory, but it retains arguments about the importance of race in U.S. society. They argue that race is an independent variable and “a *fundamental* axis of social organization in the United States.”³⁵

They began their study by probing three race theorizing frameworks, notably, ethnicity, class-based, and nation-based. They point out that ethnicity has become the dominant paradigm that imposes a monolithic immigrant analogy to minorities and ultimately falls prey to the problem of blaming victims for their social statuses. The *ethnicity ideologues* have provided the main theoretical lash against blacks for neoconservative policies that the Ronald Reagan and George Herbert Walker Bush administrations promoted. Omi and Winant castigate the systematic reversal of the civil rights gains of the 1960s and 1970s.

With respect to the class-based paradigm, Omi and Winant distinguished between neoclassical economics’ market relations approach, stratification perspectives like that of William Julius Wilson, and the class conflict approach like theorist Edna Bonacich’s split labor market perspective.³⁶ Omi and Winant point out that taken together, the class-based perspectives lack an explanation of the integrity of racial phenomena, particularly as a predictor of class relationships and identities. They argue that the class formation perspective cannot help because it lacks an appreciation of the racial identification of subjects and actors.

A central concept of Omi and Winant’s work, and one that Winant elaborated independently, is the racial project: “A *racial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines* (italics in the original).”³⁷ This is important because it is in Omi and Winant’s analysis of nation-based theories that we find minor problems when they write:

The Traditional Victimology of Racism Has Become Moribund . . . Today, however the legacy of this achievement continues as victimology: the essentializing attribution of minority misfortunes tout court to victimization by whites. The tenacity of this viewpoint is indicated

by the difficulty minority groups encounter when one of their own strays from the fold, exposing conflicts and inequalities within the community itself. The more heavily committed one is to a view based on the status of one's group as victim, the more difficult it is to accept the possibility that one's group may also contain victimizers.³⁸

Omi and Winant's words might confuse some readers. What should subaltern men who are victims do? One could imagine they should take it like a man. It is a very confusing sentiment. However, like the underclass perspective, racial formation is religious about shared social duties; its theorists own a sense of their groups' *moral* positions. Chapter 4 mentioned that the strategy to silence black male voice is routine and imminent. Chapter 1 commented on Alyson Cole's *The Cult of True Victimhood*. One could cogently argue that a black as victimizer has been widely claimed by some blacks among blacks. One major strain of this work among black intellectuals has been research on black-on-black crimes.³⁹ Other work has to do with Black Nationalist claims that Uncle Toms and Plantation Mammies would intentionally hurt the larger black population.⁴⁰ Later, many blacks promoted a view that unchecked individualism harmed the interest of black groups by attacking other blacks. For example, professor of theology and cultural critic Cornel West has written a great deal about nihilism among African Americans that partially results in black-on-black violence; it is a kind of racial formation perspective.⁴¹ In short, the racial formation view could revisit its interpretation of victimology.

Let us counter-intuitively accept the racial formation claim: Whose interest would it serve? In a world of power/knowledge, it is important to keep this question in the forefront of our minds. If racial formation theorists are correct, it serves the interest of a standpoint that U.S. social values are universal and its laws and system of distributing merit are just. These assumptions would serve the interest of the ruling political class; this means the ruling patriarchy. The innocent powerful classes may always search and destroy, both symbolically and literally, black males who have strayed from the fold and rub black male noses in examples of window-dressed black males who have made it, which only supports the claim that a minority has strayed. Specifically where domestic colonialism is concerned, Omi and Winant deny the existence of internal colonialism through geographic segregation, deny the effectiveness of "the black movement," and claim that blacks have achieved a significant level of progress, particularly in state political apparatuses. However, classical colonialism is not unitary. For example, cultural critic E. San Juan, Jr. appraised Omi and Winant's language:

Ghetto, reservation, and barrio bear affinities with such colonies as Puerto Rico or the Philippines (a neocolony since 1946) in a political-cultural, not geographical, sense. . . . Not only do they [Omi and Winant] ignore the historical matrix of black nationalism that inflected

race as a principle of difference in constructing their collective identity through symbolic (cultural) modes, but they also refuse to specify the structural or imperialist aggression in Africa, Latin America, and Asia in the sixties and seventies, which precipitated the global crisis of U.S. hegemony consonant with the civil rights movement.⁴²

Perhaps racial formation theory engaged in what can be termed, to borrow a concept from Julia Kristeva, abjection.⁴³ “Abjection” means to expel, to cast out or away. In *Totem and Taboo* and *Civilization and its Discontents*, Sigmund Freud suggests that the repudiation of certain pre-oedipal pleasures and incestuous attachments makes room for civilization. Mary Douglas used Freud’s conception in her work on boundary rituals and Kristeva argues force of expulsion constitutes a social being.⁴⁴ According to Kristeva, society cannot fully obliterate the expelled elements; they plague the border of the subject’s identity with the menace of intrusion or even contamination. For example, expelled elements might include excrement, menstrual blood, urine, semen, vomit, and masturbation among others. Kristeva adds:

The abject is everything that the subject seeks to expunge in order to become social; it is also a symptom of the failure of this ambition. As a compromise between “condemnation and yearning,” abjection marks the borders of the self, at the same time, it threatens the self with perpetual danger. Defying sacrosanct borders, abjection testifies to society’s precarious hold over the fluid and unkempt aspects of psyche and body.⁴⁵

The abject is a border where ambiguity is found. The expelled abject is thought to torment the subject as its inner constitutive boundary. The repudiated forms of the self’s internal limit. Under the patriarchal domination that we are considering, certain groups are expelled and obliged to inhabit the impossible edges of modernity: the brothel, colonial bantustan, convent, ghetto, and slum. It is completely reasonable to think of black males in this context. However, many will disagree with such a characterization. They will point to examples of individual black males who have made it as supposed equals to “non-racialized” males. In addition, they will frame their reasoning in the context of progress and positive social change. Others will point out that such claims are ambitious and overstated.⁴⁶ A number of scholars have used the abject term, two of whom are Judith Butler and Iris Marion Young, primarily to refer to the making of sexed subjects.⁴⁷ This is applicable to a cultural interrogation of black male habitus and field as specific forms of gendered subjects—in this case, as feminized and hypersexualized pathologies. It helps us understand racial formation theory because the abject describes the necessary condition of an embodied subject, the incorporating and expelling activity of apertures—whether the hole of the slave ship, the hole of “broken windows,” the hole of Louima’s ass, or other racialized holes—defined by borders, and the dangers to that subject posed by this

active corporeality. For racial formation theory, the black male subject who has “strayed from the fold” is culturally teetering on the brink of a gaping chasm that both attracts their attention and repulses them; these black males require special surveillance and governance. Unfortunately, the numbers are large; they are likely deployable to the prison industrial complex in struggles for hegemonic masculinity. In that relationship, we have the development of underdevelopment in the sense of both material and symbolic interest.⁴⁸ The organization of racialized relations earns far more from the prison industrial complex in terms of quality of life and length of life than do typical black males. In sum, this special population of black males is in a place of potential obliteration that requires they become a *special* kind of citizen. After the dance, this is exactly what Locke told us. Racial formationists, following this tradition, appoint themselves intellectual saviors of these out-of-the-fold blacks who apparently have no one to blame but themselves while at the same time they instruct other black males to shut up.

AFRICAN AMERICAN MALE POLITICAL SUICIDE

An alternative way of viewing black male experience is to consider it as a condition of black male marginalization in the organization of patriarchy. This condition would precede the full development of a dominant culture that functioned to gag the legitimate aspirations of the black internally colonized—the West could not have thought of blacks as patriarchal equals given the function of race in its historical system of norms and roles. For one thing, the black subalterns were educated in self-hate under the logic of white citizenship theory by the dominant political class, the co-opted leadership from among the black masses, as well as privileged stratified fractions of other tormented aggregates that were hierarchically organized in U.S. cultural imperialism. In other words, the organization of imperialism through colonial-like technologies does not develop at a certain phase of black male experience. The colonial-like technologies are, to the contrary, organizationally first in time to assist in the assurance that black males are a “criminal,” or at least a “deviant,” class of “citizen.” The ideologies supporting this organization offer a rationale for treating black males differently. We have seen how some deviant attributions proceed in cases of “penetrating matters.” Relational theory is critical of the historical relationship that developed between the colonial oppressors and black males and it calls for a fundamental transformation of the society. However, the evidence may be compelling; the powerful in the U.S. will not likely yield their oppressive hold over African American males and in fact will intensify their oppression. To move matters in the other direction would require a great deal of work. The former will likely be done while simultaneously seeking and mainstreaming more congenial blacks. For example, it even means facing the reality that a “black”

male is president of the United States while simultaneously intensifying the undemocratic assault against large segments of the black male population, particularly the poor and uneducated segments. Many in super-ordinate groups have significant material and symbolic interest in black male oppression. In fact, they in all probability would extend a colorblind ideology packaged as both conservative and progressive ideology but will share the common thread of blaming the victim while claiming that the system is fair, just, and universal. For this reason, critical race theorist Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw suggested that “the black community must develop and maintain a distinct political consciousness in order to prevail against the co-opting force of legal reform.”⁴⁹ Crenshaw’s conclusion recognizes that “the co-opting force” is in the interest of a super-ordinate political class under late capitalist social organization. Black males might face stereotyping as deviants and criminals, and this stereotyping results in more jobs and better houses for more among super-ordinate classes. They get better educational opportunities, better cars for themselves and their children, so many more opportunities to travel and buy the latest gadgets appreciated by their political class and envied among the subaltern classes. It gives them a greater sense of worth simultaneously to claim they are reforming hypersexualized black males while they claim they are protecting feminized black males—both groups are beneath their class of civility. For many blacks it requires vigilance in developing emancipatory strategies for African Americans. Crenshaw recommends:

[Critical Legal Studies] perspective [addresses] the role of racism, presenting a somewhat altered vision of society, legitimacy, and racial reform. This expanded critique presents race consciousness as a central ideological and political pillar upholding existing social conditions; race consciousness, I contend, must be taken into account to understand hegemony and the politics of racial reform.⁵⁰

There is little doubt that Critical Legal Studies will abandon the Critical Race Theory branch of their organization, and in general, law and society scholars will conclude that Critical Race Theory is dead on arrival. Otherwise, it would not serve the interest of the super-ordinate groups. Citizenship perspectives proposed by classical liberal citizenship theory and the current hegemonic explanations of race relations (underclass and racial formation perspectives) that relate to black male citizenship likely work in tandem with gender and race hierarchy; they recreate an exclusionary patriarchy with the super-ordinate males positioned to oppress lesser-positioned males in the hierarchy. To erase the denial of citizenship rights under the order of such an internally colonized status would require sustained resistance, mobilization, and transformation of the entire social system. Insofar as black males are concerned as a tormented social group, to buy into hegemonic models is to embrace a political suicide that produces ineffective

organization and mobilization strategies that were presumably designed to fight overwhelming gender and race hierarchy functioning in an environment of willful and mean-spirited denial.

In his study of the reconstructive theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., critical legal theorist Anthony E. Cook reminds us of King's alternative vision of citizenship:

The alternative vision begins with a different conception of the self. It implies that liberal theory has mistaken the symptoms of the individual's condition for its causes. . . . The individual is not, by nature, an autonomous and acquisitive being desiring to dominate others and appropriate property. Rather, her alienation and loneliness are socially produced. Individuals long for genuine connection with others, a mutual acknowledgment of their humanity and need for empowerment. However, socially imposed roles temper their desires for connection with fears of rejection.⁵¹

This kind of understanding recognizes that civil society exists in the political state that is distinguishable from the real state. This chapter argued that the political state is a gender and race construction by its political class. In a real democracy, the members of the society would confer rationality on the state through constant participation in deliberations and decision-making activities. Under the rule of gender and race democracy in which we live, citizens lead a merely legal rather than fully human existence. Additionally, African American males are virtually dominated subjects to the rule of gender and race hierarchy. They occupy the social roles of internally colonized subjects. Under this kind of rule, if it is structurally so, the structure separates black males from their humanness.

As humans, black males will achieve real democracy when a social formation is achieved that presents opportunities for individual freedom. Community is the only way to achieve individual freedom; humans are, after all, "an ensemble of social relations." The appointment or election of co-opted leaders from the masses of black males is not the actualization of citizenship and democracy. Domination from controlling groups is not community. It is more likely tokenism designed for the management of substantial duties and they meet great resistance. Anthony Cook reminds us of an alternative view "from the bottom" of citizenship when he writes:

Not simply what oppressors say, but how the oppressed respond to what they say. The view from the bottom may cause us to revise our strategy of struggle. If we knew that coercion, religion, race, gender, or some other reality shaped consensus and legitimated authority, we would devote more energies to understanding and struggling against those phenomena rather than exclusively channeling our energies into a familiar critique of the inherent inconsistencies of liberal theory.⁵²

6 Black Male Homosexual Gender Trouble

For our purpose, then, the important distinction is not that between a “majoritarian” and a “minority” formulation of politics, but that between the powerful, legitimate minorities and the weak, emergent, marginal minorities. Powerful political minority groups, whether hereditary, voluntary, pressure-group, or interest based, share with elites and with organized majorities the right to exercise influence, to organize to further their views, and to dissent: they are understood to act in a “political” manner. Weak, marginal, non-institutionalized, and illegitimate political minorities share with social deviants the definition of their actions in terms of a “social problem” paradigm: they are “explained” within a welfare-state, therapeutic, or psychological framework: their actions are, by definition, “non-political.”

—Stuart Hall¹

In American society, homosexuality is a perplexing problem. For one thing, heterosexuality signals the absence of homosexuality. In addition, many hold the view that any homosexual act at any time in life means the person is homosexual, a status from which they could never fully recover. Yet, it might be the case that homosexual behavior is more prevalent in the society than is acknowledged. This may be problematic for the black male population. For instance, rates of HIV/AIDS, and other sexually transmitted diseases among black males are significantly higher when compared to other racialized identities. The best science reveals that black males are not engaged in more risky sexual behaviors when compared to other statuses. However, we well know that sexually transmitted infections are higher among sexual minorities. For these reasons, some have thought that black males engage in homosexuality and do not disclose their behaviors to all their sexual partners. In addition, some public health scholars argue that a class of black males maintains heterosexual relations where they do not tell heterosexual partners about their homosexual behaviors because they prefer to represent themselves as exclusively heterosexual for social reasons. Added to this, high rates of incarceration among black males have caused some to reason that it increases same-sex relations, causing HIV spread among women. Others insist spread among women is because of their mate selection, drug use, and promiscuity.

This chapter will discuss the contours of socialization into black male homosexuality. It will open the discussion of this socialization by pointing to the specific way that many homosexual roles deploy among many black males. It should be clear that similar to hegemonic masculinity, for many black males hegemonic homosexuality—usually referred to as gay

identity—is a social problematic that is often treated as an essential category. Therefore, it is necessary to compare and contrast social statuses associated with race, gender, and class in relation to those with homosexual identities. The chapter will then gloss an interpretation of marginal black males who engage in some forms of homosexual relations—the view is that groups with power will deploy gendered sexuality in ways to establish and maintain power positions in situations that they think will work for them. This discussion is in context of the deployment of hierarchies among black males engaged in some homosexuality. The chapter ends with a discussion of how these social constructions contribute to the maintenance of the new patriarchy—of hegemonic masculinity—and the evasion of public health and social justice.

HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY AND BLACK MALE HOMOSEXUAL STATUS

To think about homosexuality is necessarily to think about heterosexuality. The first observation that we must make is that these labels are relatively new in the history of language. Cultural historian Jonathan Ned Katz demonstrated that the term “heterosexuality” first assisted in sorting individuals during the Industrial Revolution:

In the twentieth century, creatures called heterosexuals emerged from the dark shadows of the nineteenth-century medical world to become common types acknowledged in the bright light of the modern day. Heterosexuality began this century defensively, as the publicly unsanctioned private practice of the respectable middle class, and as the publicly put-down pleasure-affirming practice of urban working-class youths, southern blacks, and Greenwich Village bohemians. But by the end of the 1920s, heterosexuality had triumphed as dominant, sanctified culture. In the first quarter of the twentieth century the heterosexual came out, a public, self-affirming debut the homosexual would duplicate near the century’s end. The discourse on heterosexuality had a protracted coming out, not completed in American popular culture until the 1920s. In the first years of the twentieth century *heterosexual* and *homosexual* were still obscure medical terms, not yet standard English. In the first 1901 edition of the “H” volume of the comprehensive *Oxford English Dictionary*, *heterosexual* and *homosexual* had not yet made it.²

Understanding the history of the language of heterosexuality provides an opportunity to think about its deployment in context of attempts to establish hegemony in given social situations. The historically recent development of homosexuality should also recognize that homosexuality did not always contain current normative practices and values. For example, before

modern practices of homosexuality associated with the Industrial Revolution and urbanization, there was an understanding that same-sex male relations should more likely occur between boys and men in Western cultures.³ In addition, there were normative practices that were prevalent in antiquity that were considerably different from practices during feudalism. Additionally, the church leadership played a significant role in struggles between their power arrangements related to sexuality and kings during the Middle Ages.⁴

By the 1850s, during the height of the Industrial Revolution, minority sexualities were well on their way to become a permanent feature of the U.S. The constitution of heterosexuality as normative did not occur in the context of one institution. For example, religions and churches were not determinative in producing heterosexuality. In fact, the construction was a political strategy that ultimately became an across-institutional organization; it became a habitus within the fields of sexuality. In this view, at bottom, this was the organization of power. As such, it bears repeating, heterosexuality is not a location or set of locations. Heterosexuality was a deployment of power relations in an amorphous and moving field of organization. In many ways anthropologist Gayle Rubin shares this perspective in her essay "Thinking Sex" when she writes:

The realm of sexuality also has its own internal politics, inequities, and modes of oppression. As with other aspects of human behavior, the concrete institutional forms of sexuality at any given time and place are products of human activity. They are imbued with conflicts of interest and political maneuvering, both deliberate and incidental. In that sense, sex is always political. But there are also historical periods in which sexuality is more sharply contested and more overtly politicized. In such periods, the domain of erotic life is, in effect, renegotiated. . . . In England and the United States, the late nineteenth century was one such time. During that time powerful social movements focused *on* "vices" of all sorts. There were educational and political campaigns to encourage chastity, to eliminate prostitution, and to discourage masturbation, especially among the young. Morality crusaders attacked obscene literature, nude paintings, music halls, abortion, birth control information, and public dancing.⁵

As far as African American males were concerned, the moral panic associated with controlling and oppressing sexuality was not specifically associated with choice vis-à-vis sexuality; a larger discourse on the meaning of masculinity and the oppression of subcultures was associated with the across-institutional disciplining and domination of black masculinity. What this means, for example, was that the appreciation of music and dancing regulated in such a way as to control the subculture of black masculinity. Additionally, there had to be an attendant concern for relations

between black males and white females—the miscegenation standard was likely imposed using standards learned from earlier rules used to control same-sex relations.⁶ The short of the story is that a political class gained control of the state and imposed its vision of morality on the citizenry with penalties written in bureaucratic, civil, and criminal law. To accomplish these political acts, there had to be an initial agreement about meaning. Sociologists Celia Kitzinger and Sue Wilkinson provide an interrogation of this meaning:

Heterosexuality reinscribes male/female divisions by its very definition: “hetero” means other, different; “heterosexuality” means sexual involvement with one who is other, one who is different—man with woman, woman with man. The otherness of the “other” sex, the “differentness” of man from woman, is thereby immediately reinforced. There are, of course, many ways in which human beings differ from each other: “heterosexuality” could mean sex between two people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds (regardless of their sex), or between two people of different religious or political persuasions, or between two people from different socioeconomic groups. Instead, “heterosexuality” marks what is seen, in some sense, as the fundamental “difference”—the male/female division.⁷

The modern form of homosexuality that arose in context of industrialization and urbanization met with laws and moral campaigns like the Comstock Act in 1873 and the Mann Act in 1910, also referred to as the White Slave Traffic Act. According to Rubin, “In the 1950s, in the United States, major shifts in the organization of sexuality took place. Instead of focusing on prostitution or masturbation, the anxieties of the 1950s condensed most specifically around the image of the ‘homosexual menace’ and the dubious specter of the ‘sex offender.’”⁸ By the 1960s, harassment of homosexuals was a national pastime—it continues to be a major pillar in U.S. culture today, particularly with the wanton harassment of youth in high schools and colleges.⁹ These practices, Rubin continues, included “congressional investigations, executive orders, and sensational exposés in the media aimed to root out homosexuals employed by the government.”¹⁰ In addition to these activities of the super-ordinate political class, they also attempted to link sexuality and race. This occurred during the colonial period and was important during the modern period.

MODERN HOMOSEXUAL HOUSEHOLDS

It is difficult to know about homosexual households because of longstanding pretensions that homosexuals do not exist. However, to understand different black masculinities it is important to compare households. This caused Bourdieu to write:

The particular form of symbolic domination suffered by homosexuals, who are marked by a stigma which, unlike skin colour or female gender, can be concealed (or flaunted), is imposed through collective acts of categorization which set up significant negatively marked differences, and so create groups—stigmatized social categories. . . . [T]his symbolic domination takes the form of a denial of public, visible existence. Opposition in the form of “invisibilization” comes through a refusal of legitimate, public existence, i.e. of an existence that is known and recognized, especially by law, and through a stigmatization which never appears more clearly than when the movement claims visibility.¹¹

When it became clear that homosexuals were a reality and that they would agitate for their civil rights, there was still a reluctance to admit their existence. Instead, society used name-calling strategies to degrade most sexual minority groups; jokes often associated homosexuality with foolishness and being immanent as funny. This metonymic rehearsal served as a kind of degradation ceremony.¹² According to Harold Garfinkel, degradation is “communicative work” that is designed to transform “an individual’s total identity into an identity lower in the group’s scheme of social types.” The important aspect to degradation is for the denouncer to get those witnessing to appreciate the target as blameworthy. The denouncer must establish him or herself as representing the group of witnesses—that is, the denouncer must become a popular opinion leader. After doing so, the denouncer is able to define the target as an outsider. Garfinkel wrote:

1. Both event and perpetrator must be removed from the realm of their everyday character and be made to stand as “out of the ordinary.”
2. Both event and perpetrator must be placed within a scheme of preferences that shows the following properties:
 - A. The preferences must not be for event A over event B, but for event of type A over event of type B.
 - B. The same typing must be accomplished for the perpetrator.
 - B. The witnesses must appreciate the characteristics of the typed person and event by referring the type to a dialectical counterpart.¹³

Degradation is largely the group process that homosexuals endure. In addition, one consequence of this type of historical treatment was that homosexuals were virtually unrecognized in civil society for many years. With social agitation, some of these forms of invisibility and social control changed and in 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau created a category to record homosexual households. One interesting fact that we may glean from the data is social status. Occupational esteem, for example, helps us to see social sorting and ranking. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrate differences between sexually gendered race groups in terms of their social statuses. These data are nationally representative; they represent homosexual homes in the U.S.¹⁴

Figure 6.1 is a means plot showing the social status score of employed head of household, gay and lesbian, gendered, and race groups.¹⁵ The mean for white male is 492; for white female, 496; black male, 406; and black female, 411. The mean differences between the blacks and whites in the sample are statistically significant. For example, white lesbians are significantly different from black lesbians and black gay males but not different from white gay males. In short the means plot shows that race seems to make more of a difference than gender in this sample of gay and lesbian citizens. The data do not support the often-repeated policy claim that marriage and family solve racialization problems. Here we see that social status of individuals in the population who are gay and lesbian and organized into families stratify by race. Here the word “family” refers to constituted gay households. Further, this racialized organization of things is an important part of the organization of the new patriarchy; this chapter returns to this interpretation near its end.

Wage and salary income of the heads of gay households distribute differently. To see this distribution the means plot of them is in Figure 6.2. The first thing to notice is black gay males’ wage and salary income is not significantly different from that of white lesbians.¹⁶ Nonetheless, now white lesbians join the black groups, despite their significantly different ability to obtain higher status employment than both black gays and black lesbians.




Figure 6.1 Means plot of stratified random 1 percent sample of employed head of gay and lesbian household occupational status by gender and race identity, U.S. Census 2000.




Figure 6.2 Means plot of stratified random 1 percent sample of employed head of gay and lesbian household wage and salary income by gender and race identity, U.S. Census 2000.

Under the new patriarchy, employers pay them similarly to black gay males. When it came to status, black gays and lesbians were on the bottom in that analysis; however, in terms of wage and salary income there is more distance between them. The average wage and salary income for white gay and employed head of household males in this sample was \$33,765; white lesbians, \$26,453; black gay males, \$27,643, and black lesbians, \$21,764.

COMMUNITY ATTITUDES ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY

Homosexuality will work differently for African American communities than for European American communities. However, the way we understand differences is complicated. One might think that groups work for their self-interest. Homosexuality will primarily determine their interests. For example, black communities have several challenges that white communities do not; one is the disproportionate number of males who are unavailable for dating, marriage, and family as the result of arrests, incarceration, labor-market earning power, morbidity, and mortality. Earlier chapters in this book discussed these differences. From the perspective of group interests, one might reason that black women are in competition with gay males and white females for dateable and marriageable partners.¹⁷

Contrary to claims that black women perceive they are in competition with gay men for black-male sexual companions, one might reason that the structure of masculinity is a powerful incentive for men to display stringent anti-homosexual sentiments. It is more likely their group position results in them holding stronger anti-homosexual attitudes when compared to women.¹⁸ The idea behind the sense of group position is that dominant groups feel what the order of things should be. This helps us to understand two dimensions in the hierarchy of sexual stratification: 1) how groups come to believe they have the right to abuse others that they look down on, and 2) how oppressed groups come to internalize the sense of group positions and begin to accept their oppression as natural and normal. These processes are marked with a major tendency to depart from social ethics and could possibly result in the normalization of perversity. This likely was the case vis-à-vis group racial prejudicing that sociologist Herbert Blumer studied when he wrote about the functions of a sense of group positions.¹⁹ Blumer concluded:

The dominant group is not concerned with the subordinate group as such but it is deeply concerned with its position vis-à-vis the subordinate group. This is epitomized in the key and universal expression that a given race is all right in "its place." The sense of group position is the very heart of the relation of the dominant to the subordinate group. It supplies the dominant group with its framework of perception, its standard of judgment, its patterns of sensitivity, and its emotional proclivities.²⁰

As one might imagine in terms of racial relations and in the terms of sexual orientation relations, the relations are complex, depending on the habitus and field operating in the organization of the order of things. Prominent factors come into play that might organize the symbolic, or communicative, conventions. For example, group history would be important for assessing how attitudes become prominent in a community. This is particularly true in relation to the production of a sense of group positions. Push and pull dynamics would certainly come into play. For some groups, education might have a liberalizing and more democratic influence over the group. For other groups, social subordination might produce a mean-spirited attitude toward segments of the citizenry. Whatever the case, Blumer made it clear that the leadership of a group would communicate the group's values; that is, the sense of social position derives from a collective process:

A basic understanding of race prejudice must be sought in the process by which racial groups form images of themselves and of others. This process, as I hope to show, is fundamentally a collective process. It operates chiefly through the public media in which individuals who are accepted as the spokesmen of a racial group characterize publicly another racial group. To characterize another racial group is, by opposition, to

define one's own group. This is equivalent to placing the two groups in relation to each other, or defining their positions vis-à-vis each other. It is the *sense of social position* emerging from this collective process of characterization which provides the basis of race prejudice.²¹

Throughout this book, the importance of the relational method has been stressed. Insofar as homosexuality and black masculinity are concerned, it is important to take a position that its development is specific to its power relations. Here we see that the image of black masculinity has a prominent narrative. This image of masculinity comes from a history of structured domination. For many black males, led by a mainstream African American political class, becoming a part of the U.S. was the essential goal for the group. Before the end of slavery, they not only sought the franchise, but also sought “manhood” in the sense that the white male founding leaders had socially constructed it. African American women, because of their greater caregiving roles, might display more empathy for the social status of homosexual men. And in fact, I suspect the shortage of a “marriageable pool” of black males might result in black women having greater empathy for homosexual experiences, particularly later in life when, due to a lack of African American men, they might consider same-sex relationships.²² Further, it's possible that African American women with greater family income might feel more independent and might also have less negative sentiments—particularly since they would have greater education and greater education tends to encourage greater empathy for oppressed groups. Younger African American women have generally had less opportunity to know “out of the closet” African American men and could believe they should have greater negative attitudes toward homosexual males. We would not know such relationships between different group images of themselves and others without careful investigation.

If we consider the basic question in this regard—Is there a difference in belief and attitudes among race and gender groups in the U.S. about the right to have homosexual relations?—we might discover the differences displayed in Table 6.1. The distribution of numbers is unlikely to have occurred by chance. The highest percent of any of the groups to feel that homosexual relations were always wrong was among black males (77 percent). Black females (70 percent) followed that percent. In this sample, it is clear the black community has harsher attitudes against homosexuality. As I mentioned earlier, differences are likely to be found among blacks in terms of their social differences, not just gender distinctions.

Alfred Kinsey and his colleagues' research on homosexuality is recognized as authoritative, if controversial.²³ Kinsey reported that sexual orientation spans on a continuum. He devised the “heterosexual-homosexual scale” that ranked men from zero to six in their degree of being classified as one or the other. His results indicated 37 percent of all U.S. males have at least one homosexual experience to orgasm from the beginning of adolescence to old age. About 60 percent of his sample reported they engaged in preadolescent sex

Table 6.1 Percent and number of race and gender groups responding to attitudes about homosexual relations, GSS, 2006 (N = 1, 666)

Attitudes	White males	White females	Black males	Black females
Always wrong	54% (327)	49% (392)	77% (75)	70% (117)
Almost always wrong & sometimes wrong	14 (87)	11 (88)	6 (6)	12 (20)
Not wrong at all	32 (194)	40 (313)	17 (17)	18 (30)
Total	100 (608)	100 (793)	100 (98)	100 (167)

$\chi^2 = 5.6$, $df = 6$, $p < .001$ (two-tailed)

play with another boy. What is more, about 30 percent said they had at least incidental homosexual experience or reactions during a period of at least three years in their life. Another 18 percent reported having had as much sex with males as with females. Added to these complicating facts is while 4 percent indicated they are exclusively homosexual, 8 percent reported being exclusively homosexual for at least a three-year period of their life. Some scholars have argued that Kinsey's numbers are exaggerated, yet they indicate a great deal of flux in sexual object and male sexual desire over the life course.²⁴

The figures on women are much less dramatic. For example in Kinsey's sample, only 13 percent of all U.S. women had at least one homosexual experience to orgasm from the onset of adolescence to old age. It is reasonable to suggest black males have far more experience with gay sexual relations than do black females. Moreover, of course it is far more complicated since "among prisoners what the sexual aggressor does is not considered 'homosexuality' by him, by his partner, or by his fellow prisoners."²⁵ Additionally, in Laud Humphries's studies of "tea room trade" many of the young men who "hustle" homosexuals for money by being their prostitutes did not consider themselves homosexuals.²⁶ Sociologist Thomas Calhoun found similar results in his study of street hustling among men of color in U.S. metropolitan and downtown central cities.²⁷ Different groups define homosexual identity differently; usually intentions and purposes come into play when defining one's self as homosexual *notwithstanding* sexual behaviors. This implies that even conversations with the self about constituting the self—as the symbolic interaction theorists have written about it—are deployments grounded in possibilities of assuming powerful positions in groups that are important to the actor.

BLACK LEADERSHIP AND HOMOSEXUALITY

The idea of leadership has received a great deal of consideration in social and political sciences. In tandem, there has been a great deal of debate about

leadership in community work and whether this work has been effective in modifying personal behaviors or in dealing with the practical work of social control in communities. I had mentioned earlier that one group of sociologists concerned with symbolic interaction viewed leadership as essential to the social construction of group positions—a sense of group position. In general, the black communities' leadership has treated homosexuality in a very dim light. In addition, this leadership may well constitute a system of oppression since differing important institutions would likely make several claims in relation to homosexuality; the design of claims is to control homosexuals and homosexuality. The opening epigraph of this chapter quotes sociologist Stuart Hall in terms of layers of leadership positions. The key issue for Hall, too, is the sense of group position. "Legitimate minority" leadership dismisses marginalized groups like homosexuals. The leadership views them as candidates for clinical treatment from social workers rather than as political subjects. As such, the normative claim is that homosexuals cannot speak for themselves and anyone who speaks for homosexuals must present a ritual performance of establishing that *they are not* homosexual. In other words, the claim functions to silence homosexuals from speaking in a way other political subjects speak. Therefore, normatively speaking, other political subjects would act through their statement; "I am not homosexual but homosexuals are . . ." This is a performative statement containing the agreed-upon degradation of homosexuals and it simultaneously reinforces homosexuals' candidacy for psychiatric intervention.

Added to this strategy of social control is the claim that homosexuals must announce their homosexuality as a requirement in *all* public arenas. Among homosexuals themselves, they are required not only to state their homosexuality but to state their positioning and sexually stratified status in the context of their homosexuality. In heterosexually organized interactions it is not as stringent a requirement to state sexual behavioral status—that is, sexual role. In homosexual social deployments, the latter is stereotypically top or bottom, or, in the case of lesbians, butch or fem.²⁸ These biosocial images communicate perverse status for their targets and they communicate social honor for the perpetrators who, notwithstanding social conventions, discuss bedroom behaviors of other political subjects that are often strangers to the perpetrators. This is done with a sense of entitlement to control intimacy and privacy of homosexuals in much the same way that some still feel it is necessary to control the intimacy and privacy of certain racial and ethnic minorities—or, the control of women's reproductive functions, for that matter.²⁹

It is in this context that black leadership has framed homosexuality, largely as stigmatized populations. This is not to suggest that among heterosexuals who talk about heterosexuality there are not requirements to discuss bio-power positioning; they must—it is particularly true in establishing the authenticity of hypermasculinity. Homosexuality is a mark of degraded identity among many black leaders.³⁰ If we partially conceive

deviance as constituted by one or both of two elements—1) the violation of legal and health norms or 2) stigma resulting in devalued and discredited identities—then black leadership is confronted with a principal rational challenge in two ways.

In the first instance, federal, state, and administrative statutes prohibit discrimination. *Black's Law Dictionary* refers to discrimination as “[u]nfair treatment or denial of normal privileges to persons because of their race, age, sex, nationality, or religion. A failure to treat all persons equally where no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored is reprehensible.”³¹ There are any number of federal statutes that prohibit discrimination that are supplemented by court decisions, connected with Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the due process clause as it is embodied in the Fifth Amendment, and its application under the Fourteenth Amendment.³² Acting on homophobic attitudes would violate civil norms as codified under law. The idea of “acting on” is slippery because the act could be unfair gestural degradation, marginalizing, and shunning an individual based on sexual orientation. Such behavior would avoid prosecution but might be acts that “constitute unfair treatment”—such acts are “fighting words” which are also *not* protected notwithstanding the right of “free speech.”³³

Equally disturbing for black communities' leadership on homosexuality is what we know about community public health and homophobia. According to the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)*, there should be a distinction made between Social Phobia and Specific Phobia.³⁴ In the case of Specific Phobia, an object triggers excessive or unreasonable fear. Thinking about the object provokes immediate anxiety. The person recognizes the fear is excessive or unreasonable and he or she tries to avoid the object. Interaction with the object disrupts the individual's daily routine.³⁵

On the other hand, Social Phobia is a fear of one or more social performances. A person fears exposure to unfamiliar people or to the possible scrutiny by others. The individual fears he or she will act in a way that will stigmatize them.³⁶ African American leaders' attitudes toward gay men that are excessively negative violate mental health norms when they present either social or specific dimensions of homophobia.

Stigma is recognizable on three dimensions: bodily, moral, and tribal. It often functions to reproduce unequal social relations.³⁷ Stigma associated with homosexuality helps us think about unique characteristics of black masculinity. For one thing, black masculinity is a stigmatized status.³⁸ This means that gay black males' spoiled identities suffer triply: as black males, as gay males, and as traumatized males who may have internalized some of the wanton violations of civil rights. At each level of domination, such men would ultimately be placed in the position of tertiary marginalization—in symbolic interaction terms, to be normal they must come to see themselves as degraded and worthy of their degradation.³⁹

In Black Nationalist consciousness, a competing political interest group challenging the field of social inequality and injustice was homosexuals. The language of Black Nationalism resulted from a struggle against group population transfer, genocidal political practices, and the solidification of gender and race hierarchy through the various state and federal governments. The competing political interest in homosexuality arose in the mid-nineteenth century when a Hungarian doctor named Karl Maria Benkert coined the term and published it under the pseudonym K. M. Kertbeny.⁴⁰ In the U.S., the modern lesbian and gay movement mobilized alongside the rise of Black Nationalism. Grass-roots organizations formed in the 1950s including Mattachine Society, Daughters of Bilitis, Veterans Benevolent Association, and Knights of the Clock. In June 1969, the contemporary gay and lesbian movement began with three days of rioting at Stonewall Bar in the Village's Sheridan Square section of New York City. Many of the rioters were drag queens, people of color, and street people.⁴¹ These individuals were plagued by multiple stigmas, and the fact that most of them were black and Latino male youths is no small factor in the trajectory of the movement that resulted in the director of the National Black Gay & Lesbian Leadership Forum saying,

The social exclusion of blacks is the most obvious and most common form of gay racism practiced by the white community. White lesbian and gay nightclubs have been notorious either for requiring multiple forms of identification for blacks to be admitted or for not admitting them altogether. . . . The dirty little secret about the homosexual population is that white gay people are just as white supremacist as white straight people.⁴²

By the 1970s, the multiple layers of deviancy emerged where the field of blackness would stand for the spoiled identities excluded as a measure of structural social control—in the main, this did not include homosexuals. Black Nationalist leadership divided on the issue. According to political scientists Charles E. Jones and Judson L. Jeffries, Black Panther Party leaders placed gay rights on the 1970s agenda during workshops of the Party's Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention. This distinguished the Panthers among other Black Nationalist organizations.⁴³ Its leader, Huey P. Newton, warned the organization about using derogatory terms and other rhetorical strategies that dehumanize homosexuals.⁴⁴ However, not all in the Black Nationalist movement were interested in homosexual rights. Another of the Black Panther's leaders, Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information for the organization, took a more masculinist position. He emphasized the *pathology* of homosexuality throughout his book *Soul on Ice*.⁴⁵ Concepts like homophobia and heterosexism had not yet become a part of the U.S. inequality lexicon during the heyday of the Black Panther Party.

As the gay, lesbian, and modern Black Nationalist movements developed on separate tracks in tandem, white gays and lesbians formed positions toward Black Nationalists as Black Nationalists formed positions related to gays and lesbians. At the same time, the larger society formed positions related to both. Each of these positions was deployment of power in social relationships; they allowed for discursive power in marking whole populations with disrespectability. The concept of homophobia emerged from these records and came to mean “prejudice often leading to acts of discrimination, sometimes abusive and violent.” Heterosexism is “the belief that heterosexuality is or should be the only acceptable sexual orientation and fear and hatred of those who love and sexually desire those of the same sex.”⁴⁶

Black Nationalist leaders waged an aggressive assault against homosexuality in the modern period of Black Nationalism. Simultaneously, a new class of black intellectuals emerged in predominately white academic institutions that waged a counter-attack against the observed homophobia by Black Nationalist leaders. They called themselves black public intellectuals.⁴⁷ In short, there was “a cultural construction of rhetorical devices, which in turn, helps members of specified symbolic-moral universes to make sense out of what otherwise may seem senseless.”⁴⁸ Black public intellectuals sought to place homosexual oppression on the front burner of public debate. It became axiomatic for them that cultural identities come from somewhere and have histories. What is more, public intellectual Henry Louis Gates quoted Stuart Hall when he wrote, “such identities are names we give to different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves in, narratives of the past.”⁴⁹ The “narratives of the past” language is a shorthand code for designating Black Nationalist rhetoric that excoriated homosexuality while making its rhetoric open for the claim it is an instance of homophobic deviance. A public intellectual stationed at Columbia University, Manning Marable, attacked the Black Nationalist position on homosexuality in *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America*.⁵⁰ Cornel West, another black public intellectual associated with Harvard and Princeton universities, placed sexual orientation at the center of the specificity of black oppression and argued the “straightjacketed Black Nation Thesis” participated in it.⁵¹ These discourses were only but a small part of an often-repeated refrain against Black Nationalist alleged homophobia.⁵²

Black Nationalists tend to view homosexuality in the black community as an outgrowth of white racism, or resulting from the breakdown of the black family. Molefi Kete Asante was an early Black Nationalist to write on the subject in his introduction to the concept of Afrocentricity:

Homosexuality is a deviation from Afrocentric thought because it makes the person evaluate his own physical needs above the teachings of national consciousness. An outburst of homosexuality among black men, fed by the prison breeding system, threatens to distort the relationship between friends. While we must be sensitive to the

human complexity of the problem as Haki Madhubuti counsels in *Enemies: The Clash of Races*, we must demonstrate a real antagonism toward those gays who are as unconscious as other people. . . . An Afrocentric perspective recognizes its existence but homosexuality cannot be condoned or accepted as good for the national development of a strong people. It can be and must be tolerated until such time as our families and schools are engaged in Afrocentric instructions for males.⁵³

The strategy of stigmatizing homosexuality while apologizing for it appears to have become typical among most Black Nationalist leaders. Clinical psychologist and sociologist Nathan Hare and family educator Julia Hare drew on a similar strategy, arguing that white supremacist commitment results in undermining black family organization. According to them, white supremacist social forces produce policies to “unisexualize” black families. The Hares saw these policies as genocidal and they offer their explanation, “So we need not engage in endless debates about the pros and cons of homosexuality. We know that homosexuality does not promote black family stability and that it historically has been a product largely of the Europeanized society.”⁵⁴

Another significant figure of the Black Nationalist movement is psychiatrist Frances Cress Welsing who conceived of homosexuality as an effect of oppression. For Welsing, homosexuality is logically predictable from the organization of gender and race hierarchy where “[b]lack and white male anuses are tried.”⁵⁵ Welsing continues:

Black male homosexuality and bisexuality are only the long-run by-products of males submitting in fear to other males in the social arena; they fail to resist because death is the result of resistance. . . . Black psychiatrists must understand that whites may condone homosexuality for themselves, but we as Blacks, must see it as a strategy for destroying Black people that must be countered. Homosexuals or bisexuals should neither be condemned nor degraded, as they did not decide that they would be so programmed in childhood. The white supremacist system should be held responsible.⁵⁶

By 1995, Black Nationalists pitched down rhetoric that was susceptible to the homophobic label and the issue earned discussion in plenary sessions at National Council for Black Studies meetings in the mid and late 1990s. For whatever anthropological and historical merit the claim warrants, many Black Nationalists might or might not agree with Black Studies professor Marimba Ani (Dona Richards). She declared, “Homosexuality is not associated with African civilization since African cultural values place priority on female-male conjugal relationships as the basis for the ‘extended’ family and for the procreation of children.”⁵⁷

The question of black male homosexuality is a significant one for understanding all black males. The struggle for heterosexuality contains struggles for power. Black males compete for social position in organizations vis-à-vis claims about sexuality. It is not new as a discourse. Those who benefit from the social organization of heterosexism, patriarchy, racism, and sexism count on homophobia. Because black males historically assembled in the social organization with stereotyped attributes of femininity and hypersexuality, the black male homosexual was socially marked with the super-stigma of black homosexual identity. Above triple marginalization is the reference to this position. In this way, groups of black males who hoped to behave in ways to prove themselves worthy of a place at the table of heterosexist patriarchy alongside white males, acted out their marginal power position against black homosexual males who threatened their efforts to present an acceptable image to white males.

The contradiction here, however, may be that many white males with power do not view homosexuals in the same way that black males do; certainly not in the same way that the Black Nationalist leadership had. And now, under the new patriarchy—as more black males attended elite predominantly white colleges and universities—a new mode of anti-homophobic sentiment has been injected into black culture through the leadership of black public intellectuals. If Black Nationalism is to survive, it may be required to reevaluate its position, apologize, and move on. In general, homophobia likely harms not only homosexuals; even bisexuals and heterosexuals experience wanton debasement of innocent political subjects.

The Black Nationalist leadership likely reflected and cultivated an attitude in the populace; it is associated with a widespread anti-homosexual attitude among African Americans. Of course, the anti-homosexual attitude was not only in African Americans. The black aggregate expresses more anti-homosexual feeling. In 2006, for example, the General Social Surveys questioned a sample about their feelings that homosexual relations are wrong always, nearly always, sometimes, or not wrong. The analysis created two categories from those data using those responses: 1) It is wrong and 2) it is not wrong. I then used the typical explanations for characteristics that might influence that attitude and tested whether five predictors of the attitude—age, church attendance, race, rural residence, and socioeconomic status—could make a significant difference in predicting the attitude that homosexuality is wrong. Table 6.2 presents the results of that analysis.⁵⁸

The analysis conducted a logistic regression to determine if the five-predictor variables predicted whether a respondent held the attitude that homosexual relations were wrong or not wrong. When all five predictor variables are considered together, they significantly predict whether or not a respondent believed homosexual relations were wrong, $\chi^2 = 172.26$, $df = 5$, $N = 1022$, $p < .001$. Table 6.2 presents the odds ratios, which suggest that the odds for thinking homosexual relations are wrong or not wrong; age, church attendance, race, and rural residence are indirect relationships

to thinking homosexual relations are not wrong. So, the more race (i.e., black) the more negative attitudes about homosexual relations; the older the respondents, the more negative attitudes; the more church attendance, the more negative attitudes; and the more rural residence, the more negative attitudes. However, as socioeconomic status scores increase, the more the attitude that homosexual relations are not wrong increases; the odds for feeling homosexual relations are not wrong increased by 1.02 for each unit increase in socioeconomic status.

This finding is in line with the view that education and occupational status are associated with increased tolerance and acceptance of diversity. I am suggesting this because occupational status includes the dimension of education along with its dimension of a job's level of social esteem.

The relationship between predictors and attitudes about homosexual relations becomes more intricate if the examination is from a lens of race and gender intersection. To compare race and gender aggregates it would be necessary to remove race as a predictor from our previous analysis. The results are in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3 presents a logistic regression to assess if the four predictor variables—age, church attendance, rural residence, and socioeconomic status—predicted whether or not a gender and race group respondent expressed an attitude that homosexual relations were wrong or not wrong.⁵⁹ When the model includes all four of the predictor variables together for an analysis of each group, the results were uneven. The four-predictor variables significantly predict for all of the aggregate groups with the exception of black male aggregate.⁶⁰ Table 6.3 presents the odds ratios for each variable within each aggregate. Nothing seemed to matter for predicting the black male attitude. However, among white males, age and church attendance had a negative relationship with the attitude that homosexual relations are not wrong; socioeconomic status among them significantly predicted a direct relationship—the odds for homosexual relations being not wrong increased by 1.02 for each unit increase in socioeconomic status. Finally, white females were the only aggregate where all four of the

Table 6.2 Logistic regression predicting the view homosexual relations are not wrong on selected variables, GSS, 2006 (N = 1,022)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>Odds ratio</i>	<i>p</i>
Age	-.10	.01	.982	.001
Church attendance	-.25	.03	.78	.001
Race	-.36	.12	.70	.003
Rural residence	-.08	.03	.93	.003
Socioeconomic status	.02	.00	1.02	.001

Note: Wrong = 0 and Not wrong = 1.

variables significantly predicted the homosexual relations dichotomy; age, church attendance, and rural residence had a negative relationship with the homosexual relations score and, as in the case with the white male aggregate, socioeconomic status had a positive relationship.⁶¹

From this, it is possible to see black males as entirely different from the other race and gender identities. As is argued throughout this book, black males are socially produced as both feminized and hypermasculine in U.S. society. In addition, within the context of homosexuality as it operates in U.S. culture, it is clear to see that—notwithstanding the endless grind to

Table 6.3 Logistic regression predicting who will view homosexual relations as not wrong on selected variables comparing white male, white female, black male, and black female, GSS, 2006 (N = 925)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>Odds ratio</i>	<i>p</i>
White male				
Age	-.13	.01	.98	.001
Church attendance	-.31	.05	.74	.001
Rural residence	-.08	.04	.93	.086
Socioeconomic status	.02	.01	1.02	.002
White female				
Age	-.02	.01	.98	.014
Church attendance	-.25	.04	.78	.001
Rural residence	-.09	.04	.92	.023
Socioeconomic status	.03	.01	1.03	.001
Black male				
Age	-.01	.03	.99	.867
Church attendance	-.08	.16	.93	.631
Rural residence	.01	.15	1.01	.926
Socioeconomic status	.024	.02	1.02	.269
Black female				
Age	.01	.02	1.01	.770
Church attendance	-.37	.12	.69	.002
Rural residence	-.04	.11	.96	.708
Socioeconomic status	.02	.02	1.02	.275

Note: Wrong = 0 and Not wrong = 1. For the white male, $\chi^2 = 70.36$, $df = 4$, $N = 368$, $p < .001$; for white female, $\chi^2 = 76.54$, $df = 4$, $N = 420$, $p < .001$; for black male, $\chi^2 = 1.76$, $df = 4$, $N = 60$, $p < .781$; and for black female, $\chi^2 = 12.25$, $df = 4$, $N = 77$, $p < .05$.

produce feminized gay males and masculinized lesbians in our cultural tropes—under the rule of the new patriarchy, we find an enduring racialized pattern. Even gay black males experience feminized statuses when it comes to income and socioeconomic statuses. They hold positions comparable to white females or black females on these measures. Yet, black males hold the most hypermasculine and virulent bravado vis-à-vis homosexual relations. It is likely that one explanation is the threat that homosexuals present for heterosexually identified black males to imagine the domination of women as their major key to manhood status—it is the way that things should be; although, it might not be in their interest for things to be ordered in this way. This perspective arouses contest and should do so if it is in error. However, it will be hard to counter the fact that black gay males hold the most feminized statuses among gays—where masculinity is the provider role. Of course, in the realm of fantasy it is possible to imagine that black males are hypermasculine thugs who have animalistic sexual drives. Unfortunately, for such a narrative, U.S. society does not share such values. Here men are breadwinners with occupational statuses—sexual performance is not determinative of the occupational status of most white citizens. Although, it is likely true that imagined sexual performance could have a payoff in the labor market.

Professor of Women's Studies Maggie Montesinos Sale aptly stated the black masculine ideology that she argues first developed on slave ships during the transatlantic slave trade:

African American men often figured their exclusion from political and economic arenas as an incorrect or unjust application of the discourse of national identity. They frequently charged the U.S. government with being contradictory and argued that the Declaration of Independence's assertion of the equal and natural rights of "all men" should apply to them as well. This rhetorical strategy based their right to inclusion on the assertion of a common masculinity, which they figured as innate and which they sought to demonstrate, despite the fact that they were largely excluded from the means through which normative masculinity was constructed, such as service in the militia, bearing of firearms, duty as jurists and casting ballots.⁶²

Black masculinity surely has developed as a "racialized discourse of national identity" that did not contain a "unified vision of the United States, but rather provided the terrain upon which rival forces struggled for authority."⁶³ However, the elements of patriarchy are various in various situations; ultimately, gender positioning is about the deployment of power—domination of the "other" in situational space. However, some space is play space—or more accurately, more play space than other play space—and other space is where the serious business of life takes place. The latter answers questions about living and dying, being well or being sick, being in

civil society or imprisoned, eating well or eating poorly, and the rest of the needs for a propitious standard of living and quality of life. In U.S. society, such positive statuses as we see listed in the first terms of the list in the previous sentence tie to employment, income, and socioeconomic statuses. In these sectors, we have seen problems throughout this book—problems that do not seem to be fully answered by education, church, employment, racialized genders, or sexual orientations. Professor Sale is correct, guns and courts make a difference; however, social status and jobs might help us put away some of the gun touting and juridical dependencies that have developed largely as a part of our system of inequality—or, as some have suggested it, our “system of oppression.”⁶⁴

Nevertheless, some groups in society will have the bona fides to deploy masculinity in various situations in society. For example, in gay male circumstances, hegemonic masculinity can emerge vis-à-vis other gay men. However, the power relationships are largely playful activities that might be best referred to as the performative, if not simulacra. The performative aspect is the language as the act. Therefore, for black males the language that is synonymous with the act might be “I am a real man; I am heterosexual.” However, in many social situations this talk is not acceptable. The simulacra dimension of the roles has to do with imitating imagined performances that never existed in the first place. That is, the original ideas of the performances were imaginary and actors come to imagine that they perform some authentic, essential, and real quality; however, the quality was, in fact, an imagined quality. In this sense, the “man” and the “heterosexual” are truly imaginary and never accomplished roles; so similar to the hegemony performed in those marginalized playful geographies are the playful hegemonic masculinities whose consequences have to do with life and death circumstances. In short, play can be extremely serious business.

As a powerful majority–minority force, black males could perpetuate the ideology of heterosexism in ways that are impractical for black females and for black males themselves. For the most part, the majority of them could also stigmatize anti-integrationist forces such as Black Nationalists in the hopes of one day achieving full hegemonic masculine nationality; that could manifest as some variation on whiteness and masculinity. For example, whiteness might come to mean something different in ways that would entitle other social characteristics. Likewise, it could be the case, notwithstanding Bourdieu’s late claims about “the strength of the structure,” that gender could also become recognized differently where “female masculinity” could become a competing masculinity—for the time being (in the *meantime*) it is merely science fiction.⁶⁵ On the other hand, it could, like homosexual relations, be relegated to the social workers’ and clinical psychologists’ domains for applied social control. However, the contours of such natural law are subject to social disequilibria that are power-structural relations and not merely individual behaviors and choices. Therefore,

for the long run it is likely that these realms of play are indeed historical inventions. In addition, Bourdieu wrote:

Sexuality as we understand it is indeed a historical invention, but one which has developed progressively as the various fields and their specific logics became differentiated. . . . The schemes of the sexually characterized habitus are not ‘fundamental structuring alternatives’, as Goffman would have it, but historical and highly differentiated structures, arising from a social space that is itself highly differentiated, which reproduce themselves through learning processes linked to the experience that agents have of the structures of those spaces.⁶⁶

Looking at this learning as deployment makes sense to determine in perversely playful areas the serious business of doing sex—performances that are utterly gendered—provides an opportunity to contrast hegemonic masculinities at *work*. Thus, if Bourdieu recognized the homology between the organization of different fields of gender vis-à-vis “the fundamental distinction between male and female” as dichotomous oppositions like “strong/weak, big/small, heavy/light, fat/thin, tense/relaxed, hard/soft,” we can similarly see these oppositions operating in spaces where “men” engage in “active-penetrating/passive-penetration” among men. Many of the men are on some occasions the penetrated and at other times the penetrators—the deployment of penetration disrupts the definition of hegemonic masculinity since such deployments are virtually always situated.⁶⁷

POWER AND MALES DOING POSITIONS

Homosexual relations arouse thoughts of disgust and secrecy for many. Some homosexually identified males find pleasure in using traditional homosexual dating spaces to meet others. At times, these encounters take place in public; the state has an interest in preventing such encounters.⁶⁸ After all, the men are having sex in public venues and these behaviors are against the municipal health codes and civil laws. These problems are major ones in many cities. For example, I did a LexisNexis legal search of “indecent exposure & public sex” and it returned more than 3,000 results. These results correspond to my experiences in the interdisciplinary field of HIV prevention intervention studies. Men are often targets and arrested for seeking same-sex relations in public venues. For example, one case that appears to be typical happened in 2003 in California.⁶⁹ A few dirty details about the case would help us understand some of the problems with homosexual relations. In considering the case, keep in mind that there is little to allow homosexuals opportunity to *learn* “civilized” dating conventions; this is different from heterosexuals. For example, young homosexuals do not attend dances organized by their churches or schools where they could

learn dating etiquette and manners, as is the case with heterosexuals. In short, homosexuals learn that their desires are shameful and must be satisfied in secret and in remote locations in manners that are more typical of the shamed. This was the context for *Brown v. County of San Joaquin*.

In 2003, Stanislaus River Parks' administration was having concerns about men congregating around the restrooms and trails of the McHenry Avenue Park. The men would go to the park to meet other men for sex. The park administration viewed this as "soliciting sexual behavior." Stanislaus River Parks operates by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers but at that time they entered an interagency agreement with the County of San Joaquin Sheriff's Department to patrol the park—in fact, the Corps paid the Sheriff's Department for this work.

Administrators at McHenry Avenue Park had complaints from park staff, the public, park visitors, and others that men were publicly engaging in sexual relations in the park. For example, one staff member had seen men having sex with each other in areas of the park where the public could see them. In September 2003, the administration asked the Sheriff's Department to increase its patrol of the park to reduce sexual activity. In this regard, they reasoned that if the men knew of the patrols they would become increasingly evasive; therefore, they asked for an "undercover operation" to work as a disincentive for homosexual men who would think it was allowable to come to the park seeking sex. The authorities viewed the behavior as "lewd" activity. Deputy Richard Dunsing had an assignment to organize the undercover operation; three other officers joined him and on October 8, 2003, they were engaged in undercover work.

Around 2:00 p.m., Robert T. Brown drove to McHenry Avenue Park and parked near one of the restroom facilities. He got out of his car but waited a few minutes before going into the restroom. He said he was smoking a cigarette and said there was a sign on the restroom door banning smoking; for this reason he claimed to have stood in front of the restroom while he finished his cigarette.

When Brown entered the restroom, Dunsing did so within a few minutes and he was dressed in plain clothes. Dunsing saw Brown standing at the urinal with his penis in his hand. Therefore, Dunsing stayed in the restroom and began to walk back and forth behind Brown. He left the restroom once and came back in after a few minutes. Dunsing said that for the entire time he was in the restroom, Brown stood at the urinal with his penis in his hand but did not urinate during the entire time Dunsing observed him. Dunsing said, in fact, that he believed Brown was masturbating. Brown said that he was not masturbating; he said he could not urinate because he was uncomfortable. When Brown left the restroom, Dunsing arrested him without incident on charges of lewd conduct and indecent exposure.

Whether arrests are made in park restrooms, the bushes of parks, adult theaters, peep shows, "all-male buddy rooms," or other public geographies where male same-sex behaviors are allegedly in violation of the law, the

Brown v. Joaquin County (Stockton, California) scene is typical. Often, sex has not occurred but alleged attempts that solicit same-sex relations are crimes; authorities call it lewd conduct.

What is interesting for a conversation about hegemonic masculinity is that many black males do not consider their same-sex behaviors to be synonymous with homosexuality. This means that for them, forming a sexual politic would be meaningless. Many black men engaged in same-sex relations also have girlfriends or wives; some advertise this to increase their social status among men. Thereby, they establish their hegemony under certain conditions in certain situations. Some black men identify as homosexuals but there are many types of homosexual men.⁷⁰

THE NEW PATRIARCHY, HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY, AND BLACK MALE GENDERED SEX TROUBLE

In the gloss of observations I presented about same-sex behaviors among some black males, it is clear that hegemonies are situated, not entirely in geographies that tend to be highly segregated but also in terms of typical structures of homosexuality among black males. For example, hegemonic men in such settings might become those who are flamboyant diva queens or those who are butch males engaged in a fisting performance for voyeuristically charged onlookers. A hypersexual male could enter such space announcing that it is his intention to ravish all the men in the setting and take charge by penetrating most of the men in his reach; the participants and onlookers might agree upon this as a moment of hegemonic masculinity. In this sense, such hegemony is not a location but a situational condition. Anyone who takes the time to look at different kinds of masculine performances can observe it. However, the implication is that such diversity of hegemonic masculinity is *deployable* in many typical situations. In addition, in this sense, the deployment is not associated with individuals and their personal characteristics but rather in the organization of structures and the way individuals negotiate them. In this sense, from my viewpoint, gender performances are a matter of power relations in much the same way that race and sexual orientation relate to the performances of power.

From this, we have seen that the enduring organization of race, gender, and class is consistent under the new patriarchy. The new patriarchy claims equality as evenly distributed in the society, but as we have seen throughout this book in the search for equality of outcomes associated with black males, the empirical demonstration of equality and the rhetorical claims of it remain contradictory. We can see this, for example, if we compare employed head of household incomes based on sexual orientation and gender and race identification. Frankly, we expect that sexual orientation differences would not be so dramatic; this would allow us to reason that perhaps blacks are merely intellectually inferior or have deficiencies associated

with learning environments. However, these explanations need rethinking. Perhaps heterosexuality and white male gender status are entitled to these outcomes. Table 6.4 presents the comparisons. The first thing to notice is that heterosexual white male earnings surpass all other aggregates. These differences are statistically significant in every case with the exception of the difference between white female heads and black male heads among the homosexual households.⁷¹ White gay male heads of household earned 76 percent of white heterosexual male heads of household. Within sexual orientation categories, white lesbians were closer to white gay males than white heterosexual females were closer to white heterosexual males. Both black gay and black heterosexual males are beneath white heterosexual males. However, black gay males had earnings similar to those of white lesbians; heterosexual black males had more earnings than did white heterosexual head of household females.

It is surprising that heterosexual black males would have had such strong negative reactions to homosexual black males. Class interest cannot fully explain these attitudes. In the terms of job status or income, it is clear that homosexual black males are not a threat to any of the groups. If this had been the case, they would have presented the most threat to black and white lesbians. Thinking about these differences in terms of Sigmund

Table 6.4 Heterosexual and homosexual employed head of household shares of total wage and salary earnings, U.S. Census, 2000 (N = 291,483)

Heterosexual households			Homosexual households		
Head of household	Mean dollars	Percent of white male earnings	Head of household	Mean dollars	Percent of white male earnings
White male	\$46,311	100%	White male	\$35,074	100%
White female	28,056	61	White female	26,942	77
Black male	33,577	73	Black male	27,653	79
Black female	24,400	53	Black female	21,764	62
Gay and lesbian head of household percent share of heterosexual head of household total wage and salary earnings					
White gay male			76%		
White lesbian			96		
Black gay male			82		
Black lesbian			89		

Note: The heterosexual sample was N = 256,675, $F(3) = 2674.17$, $p < .001$. The homosexual sample was N = 34,808, $F(3) = 214.53$, $p < .001$. The analysis conducted Games-Howell post hoc tests to compare levels of gender and race identifications.

Freud's analysis of homosexuality—that heterosexuals would be jealous of homosexuals—does not help us explain the black attitude about homosexual relations. For one thing, it would be in the interest of heterosexual black males for homosexual males not to show an interest in heterosexual females; this would leave more opportunities for them to attract their sexual targets. The best explanation for the black attitude is the sense of group position; homosexuals threaten *the way things should be* in the minds of black heterosexuals. In addition, in their minds, homosexuals should be beneath them. Black homosexual employed head of household males earn 82 percent of the earnings of their heterosexual cohorts; if anyone were to be jealous based on class, we would likely have expected it to be black homosexual males. Yet, in terms of head of household earnings, which aggregate is hegemonic and from whose social position is it so?

7 Feminizing and Hypermasculinizing Black Male Socialization

Rehabilitating Black Masculine Heterosexuality

Reproductive values resulting in out-of-wedlock pregnancies and high rates of sexually transmitted infections among black males are a major social problem. Yet, we have limited conceptual understanding of the imitation of these ways of life. Many studies completely or partially address black male sexual attitudes and behaviors and they offer extensive common sense about premarital sex and teenage pregnancies. The various approaches are not orderly theorization and this has led to differing, controversial viewpoints about African American culture and their “families.” The purpose for this chapter is to present research that examines attitudes and behaviors among African American males. The interest is in knowledge about the relationship between these facts and the new patriarchy. The ways that black males learn their masculinity is a matter of culture. In this view, normal culture is part of social conditions and new ways of doing culture become reality; the new ways of behaving spread among the population through learning—new ways of behaving often become institutions. The chapter first considers the viewpoint that black males are hypersexual by comparing their sexual behaviors to the dominant gendered-racial social aggregates. Next, the chapter asks if this story about black male hypersexuality pays off in the labor market. Finally, the chapter revisits two important theories—James B. Stewart and Joseph W. Scott’s and Elijah Anderson’s viewpoints—about black male sexuality; both theories take account of the larger social forces. The chapter compares and contrasts what is different about the new patriarchy relational perspective for explaining contemporary black male sexual stratification.

This book argues that the U.S. cultural organization of gender and race represents black males as both feminine and hypermasculine. A great deal of intellectual energy has gone into denying this possibility in Feminist Studies and Black Male Studies—the latter are sometimes boldly claimed to be “Black Men” Studies. In addition, some of these studies desire to construct a template in their minds for what the “black man” should be and in such a rush to theory, they launch into prescriptions that they refer to as “intellectual” work. Reservations about such scholarly tactics are expressed in Chapter 8. This chapter will empirically test some typical claims made by some of the unnamed discourses this paragraph mentioned.

COMPARING SEXUAL RELATIONS

The General Social Surveys asked a question of respondents between the years 2000 and 2006 about number of sexual partners since their 18th birthday. In the surveys, the question asked about sexual partners in two questions; one asked number of male partners and the other asked number of female partners. I took these responses seriously and first looked at their frequencies and the statistical display of them.¹ After doing so and thinking about the data, I decided to present them in a couple of ways. In keeping with the comparative and relational approach, first is a presentation of gender and race comparisons. In the condition of having sex, age of the respondent at the time of an interview would be an important condition since sexual norms, what it means to be gendered, and what it means to belong to a racial category might change over the life course—sexual norms might change and the number of sexual partners would likely increase.

Some think black males engage in promiscuity. Table 7.1 considers this notion. Notice that in the 18- to 30-year-old aggregate, black males reported the lowest percentage (9 percent) of having just one partner, for black females, that percentage was 18 percent. Therefore, in the 18- to 30-year-old cohort, 91 percent of black males reported more sexual partners since age 18, black females, 82 percent; white males, 79 percent; and white females, 73 percent. In the 31- to 49-year-old cohort, black males follow this pattern reporting the greatest proportion having 11 or more sexual partners, 49 percent. Moreover, there is a similar report among the 50 years and older cohort, 47 percent of the sample reported having 11 or more sexual partners since their 18th birthday. These data indicate that black males have more sexual partners than the other gendered raced aggregates but it is highly unlikely that these differences are so great as to have not happened by chance. This supposed hypersexuality might represent an overstatement or theorists deny its prevalence in some theoretical work. Why would it be the case that many scholars quickly blame this assumed hypersexuality on black males themselves? This may be so because many scholars treat the number of sexual partners as one indicator of a bad sexual character or as making bad individual choices.

To the first question posed in the preceding paragraph, addressing the overstatement of black male hypersexuality, earlier in this book the answer was suggested. The answer was that it is overstated. The overstatement stems from historical remnants of the republican ideology that underwrites much of U.S. political culture. The ideology's foundation is asceticism, the denial of bodily pleasure. For blacks who came to the U.S., it must have been extremely difficult to purge African values that celebrated bodily pleasures and replace that culture with the severe requirements of the ascetic political ideology. By the nineteenth century, this ideology had become synonymous with science. One of the most prominent foundational ideas of this science was the evolution of humankind. In this sense, there were

Table 7.1 Percent of reported sexual partners since 18th birthday by gender, race and age categories, GSS 2000–2006 (N = 7,373)

Number sexual partners	White male	White female	Black male	Black female
18-30 years old				
1 partner	21%	27%	9%	18%
2-10 partners	53	61	54	68
11+ partners	26	12	37	14
Total	100 (638)	100 (683)	100 (91)	100 (176)
31-49 years old				
1 partner	12	22	2	18
2-10 partners	50	64	49	73
11+ partners	38	14	49	9
Total	100 (1160)	100 (1391)	100 (168)	100 (294)
50+ years old				
1 partner	19	42	8	29
2-10 partners	49	49	45	62
11+ partners	32	9	47	9
Total	100 (1088)	100 (1425)	100 (100)	100 (159)

18-31 years, $\chi^2 = 75.05$, $df = 6$, $p < .001$; 31-49 years, $\chi^2 = 3.07$, $df = 7$, $p < .001$; 50+ years, $\chi^2 = 3.29$, $df = 6$, $p < .001$

primitive parts of the species and the more evolved civilized parts—the civilized sectors were in fact, given the Naturalization Law of 1790, the only ones eligible for U.S. citizenship. The marker of citizenship according to the earlier Law was skin color—the Law was, in effect, the first legislation that segregated the population based on race. In the social sciences, Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) led among the theorists of Social Darwinism. He viewed segregation as justified by natural law; skin color was a marker of natural selection—the Social Darwinists viewed the “lovely white” as the most evolved form of humanity. The majority of U.S. social scientists did not view this idea as reprehensible.

It was not just that *hypersexuality* had to apply to black males; it had to apply to black females as well. For black males, this may have been a terrible burden. For one thing, by the mid-nineteenth century, white females represented the virtue of true womanhood and manhood meant protector of true womanhood.² This was essentially the ideology that the upper social ranks of the black population would clamor to imitate; they had learned these values from the dominant myths about proper gendered

sexual behaviors. In many senses, it was a horrible image to desire to represent; its insanity was in the *denial* of fact that human beings occupy human bodies. Nevertheless, this biological denial became and remained an important mental image to distinguish civilized from uncivilized. As white males stood in striking relief from white females, Europe stood in striking relief from Africa vis-à-vis the mental image of the privileged mark of the civilized.

Spencer, for example, launched his impressive career with a diatribe about the differences between the races. He distinguished 1) the importance of monogamy in the more developed races, 2) differences between the civilized and the savage mind, and 3) the child-like nature of the savage (blacks). In his view, the savages possessed a “vanity about clothes . . . little sense of justice . . . [and are always consumed with] one another’s toys.”³ In short, for black males to accomplish manhood rights they had to perform, or more accurately, feign performance, of the dominant *ideology* and they were required to represent authority over *their* women by equally masking their true cultural expression of sexuality with the posed expression of virtuous *republican* sexuality. For them, the image in their minds was transferred to a cultural politic of the way sexuality should be—ascetic, monogamous, and procreative.

To my second question, why did some scholars initially blame black males themselves and ignore the larger social forces for their *alleged* distance from normative practices of sexuality? One answer to this question might be requirements in the scholarly labor market; employers might have selected for scholars that used individualistic, personal responsibility and black blameworthy explanations when blacks were the objects of study. If we use this explanation, it would need empirical demonstration. Since there has not been, I will push it aside. Another answer might be that many scholars would feel that black males are indeed doing something that other aggregates do not and they deserve condemnation for their attitudes and behaviors. This would mean that black males engage in more crimes, abuse of black women and children, and abuse of other black males as a matter of choice. They are considerably more homophobic and misogynistic than other aggregates. It was shown earlier in this book that vis-à-vis homosexuality, black females are equally homophobic. However, perhaps in the population we might see that black males are more irresponsible in their sexuality when compared to the other gendered and raced aggregates. To help answer the question, Table 7.1 returns to the General Social Surveys data. Table 7.1 is the cross-classified analysis that asked if the gendered raced identities are independent of sexual partners; the number of sexual partners would indicate adherence to or divergence from monogamy. We found that the variables were dependent in the cross-classified model—we could not say whether this is true in the population. Figure 7.1 presents the means plots for the three variables of age, gendered race identity, and number of sexual partners since 18th birthday.

Figure 7.1 shows that there was not a significant interaction between the effects of gendered race identity and age on the number of sexual partners since 18th birthday, $F(6,7688) = 1.33, p = .241$.⁴ The post hoc tests showed that several mean differences were significant. For example, the white male mean was 34.33 sexual partners; the white female mean was 19.24; this difference was significant ($p < .001$). The black male mean was 19.97 and it was significantly different from the white female mean ($p < .001$). We can conclude from the analysis of this sample that black males are not behaving in a more hypersexual way when the indicator of the concept hypersexual is number of sexual partners since the respondent's 18th birthday. They are behaving similarly to black females. However, we noted the spike in the mean for black females in the 18 to 30 age aggregate. The spike is not statistically significant. In fact the significant differences in the age categories mean was between the 50+ years old aggregate (34.20) and both the 18- to 30-year-old (19.65) and 31- to 49-year-old (22.95) cohorts means.

The black male misbehavior that many are speaking and writing about might be more in the minds of the speakers and writers than in the behaviors of black males. If this is so, then their minds may be reflecting the way they believe things should be rather than the way things are.




Figure 7.1 Means plots for number of sexual partners by gendered race identity and age, GSS 2000–2006 (N = 7,700).

HYPERSEXUALITY AND THE LABOR MARKET

There is no reason to believe that hypersexuality does not pay off in the labor market. For one thing, we saw in the previous chapter a payoff for sexual orientation, notwithstanding racialization. The General Social Surveys provide enough data to investigate if the 2006 sample has evidence of a relationship between hypersexuality and personal pay.⁵ Here, as in the observations made earlier, hypersexuality conceptualization is as the number of reported sexual partners since one's 18th birthday. To make certain that the respondents are independent and comparable, only currently employed and heads of household at the time of the General Social Surveys interview were included in this analysis. The head of household status is important because under the rule of patriarchy, it would be reasonable to expect the head of the house to earn the lion's share of income. In addition, the organization of families has become more complex over the last 40 years. Given this, the head of household status would give us a sense whether gender and race make a difference. Table 7.2 displays the average personal salary, wages, and compares the gendered racial groups. It shows that white male heads of household earn more money than black and white females. Black males do not earn more or less than white males; also, they do not earn more or less than black and white females.

The distribution of income data supports the view that black males' social representation is both feminine and hypermasculine. Their income is like white male income and at the same time like the income of women. Since personal earning power is associated with the patriarchal masculine role in society, black males represent a buffer class between women and white males when it comes to head of household income.

Table 7.3 presents a multiple regression to determine the best linear combination of typical demographic variables for the analysis of income; unusual variables that included gendered race identification and number of sexual partners since age 18 are also part of the analysis. The combination

Table 7.2 Full time employed head of household annual personal salary and wages, GSS 2006 (N = 1,327)

	Mean	Mean difference		
		White female	Black male	Black female
White male	\$40,000-49,999 (595)	2.23*	1.50	2.74*
White female	\$25,000-29,999 (511)	—	-.72	.54
Black male	\$30,000-34,999 (85)		—	1.24
Black female	\$25,000-29,999 (136)			—

$F(3,1323) = 20.57, p < .001$

* $p < .05$

of variables significantly predicted personal income of the employed head of household, $F(910,22) = 42.01, p < .001$. White female, black female, age, married at time of interview, weeks worked last year, suburban residence, and number of sexual partners since age 18 are the variables that significantly contributed to the model. The adjusted R^2 value was .23. This indicates that the model explained 23 percent of the variance in income. This effect is small, according to Cohen.⁶ The beta weights presented in Table 7.3 suggest that age and weeks worked the previous year contribute most to predicting income; there is a strong relationship between white female identity and decreased earnings. More sexual partners since age 18 was associated with increased income.

STEWART AND SCOTT

One of the enduring questions that sociologists have struggled with is black male social status. In the 1970s, for example, two scholars, James B. Stewart and Joseph W. Scott, addressed this question.⁷ The 1970s was a period of significant racial strife in the U.S. It seemed for many that black males were

Table 7.3 Simultaneous multiple regression analysis on demographic, gendered race, and number of sexual partners since age 18 for employed head of household predicting personal salary and wage 2006 income (N = 1669)

Variable	B	SEB	β
White male	—	—	—
White female	-1.53	.26	-.14***
Black female	-1.30	.42	-.07**
Black male	-.40	.51	-.02
Age	.09	.01	.22***
Married at interview	.47	.24	.04*
Weekly hours worked	.06	.09	.01
Weeks worked last year	.12	.01	.22***
Urban	.24	.35	.01
Suburban	.74	.32	.05*
Rural	.49	.37	.03
Country	—	—	—
Number sexual partners	.53	.18	.07**
Constant	-3.37	3.70	

$R^2 = .233$; Adjusted $R^2 = .228$; $F(910,22) = 42.01, p < .001$
 * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

not doing their duty by committing to patriarchal roles. Like today, many scholars attempted to find the cause for black male social status to be part of their psychological makeup. Stewart and Scott were more interested in the social structural causes of black male social status. According to them, they were encouraged to provide this analysis because of a call advanced by sociologist Jacqueline Jackson in 1971.⁸ Jackson asked this because of the dismal ratio of black males to females. Answering the question “Where are the men?” proved to be disturbing for Stewart and Scott when they found, “American society . . . systematically remove Black males from the civilian population.”⁹ Stewart and Scott refer to this systematic population transfer of black males as institutional decimation. While speaking in such ways was normal in the 1970s, I am not certain it is allowable in 2010. According to the authors, the main social function of the decimation process is to contain black resistance against an illegitimate racialized socioeconomic order. In addition, the decimation process assists in managing the population ratio between black and white males. This latter function serves the control of higher probable fertility among black females. Finally, on the subject of the functions of institutional decimation the authors assert that it contributes to community instability. For them, “instability is a control mechanism which draws attention away from the forces shaping patterns of oppression in predominantly Black communities.”¹⁰

The main institution frustrating black male quality of life is the labor market. The unemployment rate has consistently had a negative impact on black males. In addition, young black males experience the highest unemployment and wage discrimination when compared to middle-age and elderly black males. These conditions are knowable throughout black history.¹¹ However, in the formation of the new patriarchy, many reframe the narrative about this inequality; they explain it as incidental or epiphenomenal to the black experience.¹² The causes of such disparities are complex and some scholars have found it more convenient to exclude an analysis of black males from their research altogether.¹³ Black males also experience more unemployment than the black population as a whole. Most black males live in urban areas where the unemployment rate among them is substantial.¹⁴ Aside from the unemployment rates, black males have greater experience with unemployment events in a specific time. This is largely because they are disproportionately over-represented in the secondary labor market where there are greater dead-end, seasonal, part-time, no benefits, and lacking-career-lines jobs.¹⁵ In addition, black males are disproportionately over-concentrated in particular low-status occupations in spite of the fact that there have been shifts resulting in explicit labor market segmentation for recent immigrants—as well as mobility that frequently facilitates black males to move from bad to mediocre jobs over the life course.¹⁶ In Chapter 4, the book showed that salary and wage income was now equivalent for black and white males in the head of household sector with the exception of differences found among the lowest and highest wage and

salary categories. Yet, we have seen that black males' pay is not equivalent based on their education. This certainly would become frustrating among the middle-class group. However, it would also become frustrating among the working-class aggregate.

In a recent study of this inequality, for example, Devah Pager observed rampant discrimination in her matched-pair tests of job applicants. Essentially, she hired a team of researchers to pose as applicants and instructed them to apply for advertised job positions while she manipulated the applications: one with a criminal record and the other without, only the race of the person being different in some cases of the matched pairs. The short of it was that "equally qualified black and white job seekers" presented to possible employers. She reported:

Consequently, even blacks with no history of criminal involvement are likely to suffer some of the same penalties as do ex-offenders of any race. Despite the lack of official conviction record, their job candidacy is nevertheless suspect by virtue of membership in a group with high incarceration rates and pervasive images of criminality . . . blacks if anything suffer a larger penalty for a criminal record than whites. What this research suggests, by contrast is that even without an official marker of criminality, blacks are viewed as high-risk employees.¹⁷

The idea here is that hegemonic masculinity will change its contours based on these social facts. What are the facts? The fact in this instance of the deployment of masculinity is its entanglement in multiple normative structures. It is not a place, a territory, or type. It is the deployment of power. In the venues that Pager investigated, for example, power was largely in the hands of white males. This is largely because managers and high-level administrators tend to be white males—and prominent business administration instructors in the colleges and universities tend to be white males. Business, despite some window dressing here and there, tends to be where the deployment of white male hegemony is favorable.

Now, if we change territory, things might not look so orderly for white hegemonic masculinity. For example, a study by sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh reveals that at "4040 South Lake Park" in one of the poorest sections of Chicago, Illinois—the Southside section of the city—hegemonic masculinity became another matter. When he met his major gatekeeper, the pseudonym J.T. was his given name, one exchange went like this when Venkatesh asked the men how it felt to be African American:

I read him [J.T.] the same question that I had read the others . . . *How does it feel to be black and poor?* "I'm not *black*," he answered. "Well then, how does it feel to be *African American* and poor?" I tried to sound apologetic, worried that I had offended him. "I'm not African American either, I'm a nigger." . . . "Niggers are the ones who live in

this building,” he said at last. “*African Americans* live in the suburbs. African Americans wear ties to work. Niggers can’t find no work.”¹⁸

This excerpt not only represents class distinctions among black males; it indicates masculinity deployment in various settings. Before the end of Venkatesh’s chapter, we know “who is the man” around apartments 610 and 703; we also know that nobody lives there! This is a unique manhood indeed. In the very dangerous situation that Venkatesh’s ethnography encountered, hegemonic masculinity is a changing deployment of symbolism; essentially, masculinity codes require great competence to perform. Therefore, in such instances in Venkatesh’s book, we find black male labor market frustration is not just the lack of jobs or the lack of authority on a job; it is also the transformation and diffusion of an alternative sense of the order of things. In this sense, poor black males should be a certain kind of male—whether it is in fact or not; or, how it is in fact.

In Venkatesh’s study, there is a meeting of the minds between the two groups of men. Each group has imagined something about themselves and each group imagined something about the other men in their general environmental sphere. The men in the formal labor market imagined themselves to be rational and black males to be criminal; the black men imagined themselves to be fighting brothers—they used the term “niggers” (i.e., black thugs)—and they imagined the managers to be oppressors. However, what was most striking is that the black males also imagined that Venkatesh and the professors he worked with were just like them; the community reasoned that they all were hustlers and by the end of his chapter “The Hustler and the Hustled,” he came to recognize his hustle. One of his informants had already explained it to him when Ms. Bailey said, “Okay, well, you want to act like a saint, then you go ahead,” and she continued, “Of course you are learning! But you are also hustling. And we’re all hustlers. So when we see another one of us, we gravitate toward them. Because we need other hustlers to survive.”¹⁹

Scott and Stewart miss this symbolic interaction when they apply a heavily economic lens over their view of black male decimation. It was true at the time of their study and it is still true that some employers paid different salaries and wages to some for doing similar work as others. We should distinguish two modes of exclusion in the labor market for black males: on the one hand, they met exclusion from certain jobs and on the other hand, they earned lower wages when they got some jobs. Added to this, on the symbolic side of jobs, black males held jobs with much less prestige than black females and white males. This is likely to have been most debilitating to the black male spirit and to have provoked the most anger in them.

However, Stewart and Scott pointed to what was probably the most significant aspect of black male subordination: structural discrimination. We learned from their work, it is black male exclusion and marginalization in the labor market that the educational, juvenile detention, jail, and prison systems accomplished.

Many scholars may desire to parse this structural discrimination history too finely. Behind labor market discrimination, we would likely find its perpetuation and maintenance by the stigma of slavery, politicolegal competition grounded in power threat, and a desire to maintain blacks in a subordinated position. This would provide an opportunity whimsically to exploit their labor. While these concepts and their empiric references may covary as predictors of subordination, it is clear from applying historical accounts that each was necessary to accomplish black subordination to white patriarchy. In the historical accounts, we have the long history of lynching as an example of an extralegal technique to control black bodies and consciousness.²⁰ The ultimate purpose of such extralegal practices was the preservation of white hegemony; or, more specifically, of white hegemonic masculinity. But each of the factors I have mentioned was entangled in a social system resulting in a similar across-institutional organization showing the decisive outcome of inequality and reaction to this inequality—I will provide an example of this with findings from a study of getting jobs as a black blue-collar worker.

Sociologist Deidre A. Royster demonstrated in her study of matched-pairs of men that exclusion of black males from blue-collar jobs is structural, pervasive, and the processes work across social institutions.²¹ While this process is a constant reenactment, there is an ideological dimension to the similar across-institutional organization of exclusion practices. It, like the new patriarchy, relies on an imaginary about the black males and their individual qualities. The ideology identifies with a sense that black males must be of a certain nature. Therefore, Royster interrogates this imaginary:

Claims of meritocratic sorting in the blue-collar sector are simply false; equally false are claims that young black men are inadequately educated, inherently hostile, or too uninterested in hard work or skill mastery to be desirable workers. These sorts of claims seek to locate working-class black men's employment difficulties in the men's alleged deficits—bad attitudes, shiftlessness, poor skills—rather than in the structures and procedures of worker selection that are typically under the direct control of older white men whose preferences, by custom, do not reflect meritocratic criteria.²²

Like Royster's work that appeared some 25 years after Stewart and Scott's, Stewart and Scott interrogated the relational entanglements between white and black males; they pointed out that black male institutional decimation is structured in the labor market and it impacts dating and family organization. The most obvious impact is that more persons must work in black households and it would result in less money in black households, notwithstanding transfer benefits. In addition, marriage would typically occur later in life for blacks than for whites. One consequence is substantially more black

households headed by women when compared to whites. This fact might be of interest when thinking about female masculinities or hegemonic femininity. For one thing, black females could deploy power vis-à-vis white male power and against black male power in ways that white females could not do against white males. Even white females would come to understand that they could bring false claims against black males that would render them defenseless. The latter happened often enough, but in the struggle for politico-legal equality in the U.S. a major often-repeated claim was that a black male border crossing had occurred where he travelled into the privileged territory of white female sexuality; in other words, he had attempted an act of pseudo-miscegenation.²³ These issues were life-and-death matters for many black males. Not simply in the terms that many black males died in context of lynching practices; but there is an association between black marriage and family and higher longevity—in short, less sickness and longer life.²⁴

There is little attention to the black female and male strife; anyone doing research on black male gender relations has some experience with stories about this strife. I am not going empirically to demonstrate that such gender strife exists where males often lose. For one reason, the claim is too contentious and it would require life histories to address it. African American literature often contains images of it. I am in reference to attempts at domination of one gender over another within the context of relationships. If we think in terms of relational entanglements, it is reasonable to think about entanglements between the structural and individual levels of analysis. To demonstrate this idea, I suggest that we apply a concept of borders as an analogy. Sociologist Mary Pattillo offered an interesting account of borders, how they work in black communities, in her study titled *Black on the Block: The Politics of Race and Class in the City*.²⁵ She recalls W. E. B. Du Bois's concept of double consciousness. However, she modifies the concept to create not just the two identities *African* and *American*; she adds the notion of a third identity—the identity on the boundary. She writes, "I am arguing that the complementary notions of double and middle (or liminal, or on the boundary) have distinct utility in characterizing the black experience."²⁶ This concept helps us to recognize how major conflicts within the black aggregate could develop along gender lines—specifically in the deployment of power.

I would have to modify Pattillo's notion of boundary. Since we might make the error to think of a boundary—a border, the liminal—as a place rather than a situation. Moreover, in fact, Pattillo has done this when she writes:

The black middleman occupies a classic liminal position. Much of life is lived on the border rather than fully in the worlds on either side: in the car between a predominantly white workplace and a predominantly black neighborhood, in a sentence that uses "ain't" but crisply pronounces all of the "-ing" endings, walking across the stage to receive

a bachelor's degree to give to mom, who dropped out of high school. Straddling these two worlds, black middlemen take up new positions within the black community and vis-à-vis the man.²⁷

I am suggesting that boundaries are associated with deployments of power in given situations. Hegemony is never closure and is always susceptible to transformations. In addition, I might add a by-the-way comment to this viewpoint. While there has been a tendency increasingly to respect longitudinal studies, it does not help us with "tipping points" when rapid and unexpected change occurs. Such tipping points are often a matter of situational confluence, opening new possibilities for the organization of things. Our indicators are just that, *indicators*, notwithstanding the language of "predictor" that we use to talk about our models. An indication of this and an indication of that do not replace the situational deployment of symbolic structures and the contestation and resistance that are in the context of such deployments. Now, when Pattillo asserts that "roles and actions available to middlemen rests on three concessions": 1) least and greater powerful groups; 2) micro settings having unique status hierarchies that may differ from macro settings; 3) and people being stratified based on their own resources or talents notwithstanding macro structures, each category must be interpreted in terms of entangled situational deployment.²⁸

Here I raised a distinction about the reciprocal lens of observation. While it is true that there must be groups with different amounts of power, or more accurately, aggregates with greater or least power; power is not essential to any aggregate. Power is fluid and fleeting as aggregates engage group formations.²⁹ Nevertheless, I have stressed the importance of a sense of group position in the definition of groups. In this way, a group reflects how its members' imaginations come to inform their sense of their group's position. Such groups are composed of individuals with criteria for membership, and that possess a shared ideology that specifies a goal to establish a group position in a social situation. Therefore, different amounts of power invariably negotiate in establishing group formations. Group formations are likely contested and collective activity.

All group formations have unique setting hierarchies. Macro and micro organizations have knowledge of patterned ways that they may be organized. Organization is never closed; even the most rigid organizations, like prisons, have space for power struggles. What is more, in the entanglement of reciprocal relationships there are likely to be micro and macro features operating at all times in power deployments. For example, contraband in prisons is likely a micro economic organization and the management of contraband has a macro organization. Both dimensions must operate simultaneously as a similar across-institutionally organized entanglement to accomplish the power relationships in the management of prison contraband. For one thing, the formal rules must be established and prosecuted at the macro level; the subversive contesting of those rules must simultaneously

occur at the micro level. In addition, it is in this entanglement of activity that we find the outcome: the production of contraband. The outcome is a situational power relationship.

Finally, on this point, stratification in these situations is the result of deployments that work. There are few ways to determine if a deployment for power will become effective. Truly, the proof is in the pudding. For example, it is possible to conceive of a poor performance that will establish situational hegemony. It is also possible to conceive of an excellent performance that will fail situational hegemony. Additionally, it is possible to observe deployments where initially expected group formations will have the greatest access to resources, but the access to resources fails to produce situational hegemony. The view that people stratify based on their resources and talents is comforting; however, another way to look at such stratification is to imagine that people stratify based on their ability to accomplish a situational deployment of power. Their talent may be to bring some symbolic privilege—for example, their brand or imagined identity, to the deployment situation—that is justified or not to the social situation.

Respectability and disreputability become roles but only in the sense of the situational deployment. It is awkward that Pattillo would see the tension between respectability and disreputability as a micro process associated with the highly moralistic works of sociologists Elijah Anderson and Mitchell Duneier. To see their subjects as “little men” because they do not control the government or formal work organization sites is not synonymous with micro organization. Nevertheless, to recognize, as she did, that their encoded products were deployments that resulted in their transformation from little men to “the man” is an admirable observation. However, I see such transformations as both micro and macro processes. In fact, leading scholars in the subfield of gang studies have conceptualized the organization of gangs as a macro organization.³⁰ It is also hard to see how such micro processes are not entanglements with macro processes in groups defined by race and ethnicity given, for example, Black Atlantic Studies. In such studies, we find black resistance music in Accra, Brixton, Kingston, New York City, and San Salvador. In short, this world musical communication of contestation is an important macro formation of black resistance based on international goodwill.³¹

The black middle class may claim that it “ain’t misbehaving” and it is “acting white” for the greater goal of race reclamation and progress, but such claims would have judgment based on objective criteria. By this I mean that acceptance of such claims should be accomplished from evidence-based procedures, not merely political proclamation in processes of the deployment of decency. It is not necessary to list the names and instances of national figures from the Talented Tenth that have fallen woefully short in terms of the “politics of respectability.” Moreover, some could view using the excuse of expedience to accomplish race progress by presenting feigned images of self as reprehensible.³²

Given the observable similar across-institutional organization of power, Stewart and Scott pointed to three major channels ensuring black male institutional decimation: military service, jails and prisons, and premature mortality. Blacks systematically fail military entry at significantly higher rates than whites do. The military intelligence exams account for much of this failure. Those blacks that entered the military did so for the most part to initiate self-advancement. At the same time, the military separated black males from the civilian population. In the military, black males over-represented “combat and service work and underrepresented in technical occupations.” Here the hypermasculine/feminine theme encodes the structural production: Combat requires hypermasculine performance—to kill is the highest form of hypermasculine performance; serving others is the feminine form—for example, serving food to hungry men is a feminine role.³³ The consequence of channeling black males into the military was to increase the need for public assistance among the black population. Stewart and Scott also pointed out that many of the skills black males acquired in their hypermasculine and feminine roles in the military render them unemployable in the primary labor market after military service.

In the military and out of it, black males would face higher odds of criminal trial and incarceration. Incarceration in the military lengthens military stay. Likewise, among the civilian population, blacks received longer sentences than whites for the same or similar offenses did. Arrest, incarceration, probation, and parole separated the black male population from the black community. It increased dependence on public assistance. In addition, it reduced the employability and future income of black males. Moreover, it degraded black male citizenship and voting rights. These harms had less to do with individual choices than with social organization and social control. Added to these social conditions, Stewart and Scott pointed out that inequality in health care delivery was a major source of black male morbidity and mortality. Black males were systematically in inferior clinics that did not use the most recent diagnostics and treatments. As we have seen, black males have less life expectancy than black females, white males, or white females.

Taken all together, Stewart and Scott concluded:

Until the decimation process can be effectively thwarted, the central focus of individual and collective activities of blacks will continue to be survival and reaction, as opposed to development and innovation. If the decimation process continues to go unchecked, then the Black male will not survive, let alone be in a situation to serve as an anchor in the development process. If the institutional decimation of the Black male is not halted, we can expect to witness the progressive genocide of Black culture and community.³⁴

I mentioned an entanglement associated with protest against subordination. One might have thought that I was referring to social ecology where

reputable citizens engage in their deployments of hegemonic masculinity. I did not have this in mind, given Pattillo's excellent discussion of the "politics of respectability." I would like, rather, to suggest that we look at an instance where the *disreputable* organize their hegemonic masculinities. Now, one may ask if this organization is micro; or, is it macro. On the other hand, one might suggest that it is both. To be more accurate, I am suggesting a third category for consideration: it is both in the sense that it is entangled and relational—in brief, to understand its elements would require that we search for cross-institutional organization in sign, meaning, and function at micro and macro levels of analysis. An example of this was an analysis of the organization of disreputable hegemonic masculinity presented by Philippe Bourgois and Jeff Schonberg in their study of homeless heroin injectors in San Francisco.³⁵ First, I will describe their report, then suggest that there are micro and macro dimensions to their situational deployments of status—statuses that were tenuous and fleeting at best. These micro and macro dimensions that they recognized in their observations led them to conclude their paper by asserting, "Intimate apartheid on the street operates at the capillary level, manifesting itself in the devastating practices that fuel dramatic ethnic disparities at the macro-level . . . intimate apartheid untangles the symbolic violence that blames victims and hides power."³⁶

After lengthy observations of homeless injection heroin users that were in their late middle ages, Bourgois and Schonberg presented a photo essay that characterized the mostly male subjects. Their most important finding was that race and ethnicity was the frame for behaviors among the heroin users. Their observations of distinctions in habitus communication allowed them to link "social structural power relations to intimate ways of being at the level of individual interactions to show how everyday practices and preconscious patterns of thought generate and reproduce social inequality."³⁷ In short, the authors found that blacks and whites do heroin differently in style and the styles have meaning beyond doing drugs; the meaning connects to cultural repertoires that also connect to larger sociocultural structures. Therefore, for instance, they observed "distinct body postures, scarring patterns, disease infection rates, clothing style preferences . . . relationships to sexuality . . ." all that contributed to communicating a standpoint that was ultimately related to "material power relations and the economic field" where income-producing activity occurs.³⁸

The men received different treatment when they were able to get just in time, odd and off-the-books jobs. They also stole differently; they organized unloading their stolen property differently—black males were more likely to "professionalize" their thievery. They also created different strategies for concealing stolen goods in their possession. In distinction to white males, black males relied on their families more and interacted with them more often. White males generally reported not knowing where their family lived or not knowing their phone numbers. Moreover, blacks had different socialization into their drug using.

Despite growing up in the same neighborhoods as the whites in our network, all the African Americans spent crucial parts of their adolescence in juvenile correctional facilities due to gang fighting before they began using drugs. In contrast, the whites for the most part were not members of adolescent youth gangs. . . . African Americans as adults identify themselves in a celebratory manner as successful outlaws. They also receive respect from youth on the street for being what is known in street parlance as ‘OGs’, that is, original gangsters. In other words, being a street-based outlaw can be a rewarding construction of masculinity for African Americans.³⁹

White males have no such habitus to draw on for feelings that they are winners in the shooting-up experience. They wear rags while the blacks are proud and attempt to stay clean even when wearing work clothes. Blacks will spend more time finding a vein for injections while whites will often forget the pleasure of hitting a vein and inject directly into intramuscular or subcutaneous areas of the body—in fact, would often inject right through their clothing. While whites would nod and clearly not enjoy getting high, “African Americans . . . [sometimes] moan loudly with pleasure and drape their bodies in relaxed pose . . . [c]onsidering themselves . . . triumphant, resistant and effective outlaws.”⁴⁰

While hegemonic masculinity appears clear-cut, it is not so clear-cut on the streets. Certainly, Bourgois and Schonberg are correct in pointing out how the structural effects of oppression are entangled and relational with the intimate apartheid-like structures. They, in fact, are keenly perceptive vis-à-vis barriers for black men to transform their lives even when the men verbally express commitment to such transformation. What we are missing from their analysis is *action* beyond speech and presentation, what these men do to disrupt the order and tear down the system. Surely, they are not just passive resisters in the belly of intense symbolic and actual violence. Even on drugs, one would suspect that they engage in some form of the very violence that the political class that is committed to the “politics of respectability” has in mind that they might perform when they marginalized them. In the work of Elijah Anderson, we are able to glean some of the unstated violence in the work of Bourgois and Schonberg; notwithstanding that for Anderson to do so, he must have engaged in symbolic violence against many of the black males he observed. Bourgois and Schonberg avoided this trap by their sensitivity to trafficking in pedestrian stereotypes. Anderson mediated it by creating decent and street categories to classify different rules for behavior. Yet, as Pattillo found in some of her observations in Chicago, the decent and street “neighborhoods” often collide in social relations among black urban environments.⁴¹ To maneuver this inconvenient fact, Anderson allowed for “code switching” in his analysis. Nonetheless, I am largely interested in highlighting his work on gendered sexuality and I will primarily rely on an article he published in 1989 when he outlined sex codes among inner-city youths in what follows.⁴²

ANDERSON

Anderson was particularly concerned with sex codes and reproductive behaviors among poor inner-city youths. This implies that he privileged class over race and gender inequality in his qualitative analysis. In addition, he focused on the peer groups that unwed parents identified with as significant reference groups and primary groups, largely consisting of members from their family of procreation. Anderson posited, "The lack of family sustaining jobs or job prospects denies young men the possibility of forming economically self-reliant families, the traditional American mark of manhood."⁴³ For Anderson, a "sexual game" developed where boys lure girls into sex by promising untenable relationships. Such promises excite and dupe the girls. They desire middle-class marriage and family organization and feel that they must trap the boys into accepting the middle-class family values. The girls think in terms of establishing their own households. In many cases, the boys see an opportunity to exploit the girls' desires by getting free shelter from them. Girls often feel that if they become pregnant the boys will "settle down" and accept the middle-class family organization.

Sex becomes a part of the culture of poverty for inner-city boys. For many boys, sex becomes a symbol of social status. Anderson continues, "Status goes to the winner, and sex becomes prized not so much as a testament of love but as testimony of control of another human being. Sex is the prize and sexual conquests are a game, the object of which is to make a fool of the other person, particularly the young woman."⁴⁴ It then becomes important for young males to make the most attractive presentation to maintain conquest over any number of girls. Anderson identified this as the game where "getting over" and "looking fine" requires exaggerated grooming. Boys must also have a competitive conversation that relays a message of self-confidence and control over the mating situation. In short, the boys value the ornate rather than the prosaic in a wider culture where the ornate is associated with femininity and the prosaic with masculinity. The boy wants sex:

. . . and after he gets what he wants, he may cast down [an "upstanding young man"] . . . part of his presentation and reveal something of his true self, as he reverts to those actions and behavior more characteristic of his everyday life, those centered around his peer group.⁴⁵

Anderson argues that the girls are hoping against hope that their boyfriends will somehow be different. This protects the duplicity of the boys. The tricks the boys use include breaking the girls' spirit. The more exploitative the boys are toward the girls, the more social status they gain. Much of this status is peer-group status. Any boy who challenges the values of the institution of the sex codes is weak and lacking in true black manhood.

When it comes to pregnancy, Anderson argued that the peer group ethic could sum up in the phrase “hit and run.” It is important for the boys to subordinate girls without becoming committed to them. It is social suicide to take care of someone. When girls become pregnant, the boys must deny that they are responsible for the pregnancy. In order to rationalize this aspect of the game, the boys promote an ideology that the female cannot be trusted and is valueless.

Another important attitude of the male peer group is that most girls are whores: “If she was fucking you, then she was fucking everybody else.” Whether there is truth to this with respect to a particular case, a common working conception says it is true about young women in general. It is a view with which so many young men approach females, relegating them to a situation of social and moral deficit. The proverbial double standard is at work, and for any amount of sexual activity, the women are more easily discredited than the men [are].⁴⁶

The pregnancy relationship is one of structured ambivalence. On the one hand, the boys may want to admit paternity and fairly treat the girls. Their peer groups will of course treat this emotion negatively. On the other hand, if the boys admit paternity they will become financially responsible for the support of a family. Anderson argues that the mixed message results in the boys distancing themselves from the expectant mothers. They will become less close to the mothers after a pregnancy. While some young men will attempt to accede to the young women’s middle-class expectations, they will have trouble sustaining the trauma of youthful pregnancy without gainful employment. Without such support, young men will come to feel trapped and tricked by the young women.

Another irony that Anderson presented was that fathering is clearly a symbol of heterosexuality and masculinity for the young men. It is an important part of the ritual for generalized others to convince boys to accept fatherhood and become *honest men*. Mothers, grandmothers, and aunts are not the only ones to do this. The girls’ fathers also defend their daughters in the premarital pregnancy situation. What is more, uncles, cousins, and friends of the family often exercise influence through performing the ritual of becoming *honest men* before the young males. Boys will have to manage their relationships with some care since the extended kin of cousins, aunts, uncles, grandparents, nieces, and nephews can represent a formidable force against a youth facing teenage pregnancy. This affects the young women too. Anderson continues, “the prospect of a regular welfare check can seem like an improvement”:

Hence, among many young poor ghetto women, babies have become a sought-after symbol of status, of passage to adulthood, of being a “grown” woman. In such circumstances, babies can become valued emblems of womanhood.⁴⁷

Anderson wrote, “Young men without job prospects cling to support offered by their peer groups and their mothers and shy away from lasting relationships with girlfriends.”⁴⁸ In addition, he recognized that the culturally reproduced relationships among inner-city youths are likely to be similar to ones that we see among youths under other social conditions—living in rural or suburban situations with different class backgrounds. However, the economic, personal, and social consequence of the inner-city classes significantly differs from other classes of youths. In addition to economic, personal, and social differences is the difference in level of education among the urban poor. For Anderson, inner-city girls demonstrate “ignorance” about their bodies. They do not understand birth control and their elders are reticent to discuss sex with them. What is more, the “fundamentalist religious orientation” that is highly prevalent in inner-city communities shuns talk about sex and abortion. In fact, such religions view children as “a gift.” All and all, the inner-city reproductive situation is one of hot and excited boys and fertile but misinformed girls; both lack education and are incapable of attaining and maintaining decent jobs in labor markets that do not value them. One has an impression that all the *urban* youths can expect is the exploitation of each other and acting out their hot animal passions.

I had mentioned that Anderson’s standpoint was problematic in terms of a relational approach to the study of black masculinity. The first problem with Anderson’s method is that he masks the group he is speaking about; he is speaking about an aggregate without specificity and it is not always clear when his subjects are speaking. It is proper to advance interpretations from ethnographic work or to use published work to glean perspectives of the subjects. It is important to make clear how the interpretation emerged. In this sense, I imagine that Anderson is largely writing about black youths. However, there is a possibility that he is writing about *any* urban youths. I also imagine they are from the core central city as opposed to the metropolitan area. It is hard to know what the word urban means and it is likely that such background characteristics would affect the outcomes. For this reason, prominent researchers on marriage patterns among the urban poor Kathryn Edin, Maria J. Kefalas, and Joanna M. Reed wrote:

First, documenting changes in cohabitation and marriage for whole societies, though vital, often masks the substantial variations within societies by race/ethnicity and immigration status, social class, or other factors such as region or sexual orientation.⁴⁹

On balance, Anderson’s interpretations are consistent with social science that preceded his on black males. There are no major departures in the interpretation of the data. For this reason, I am not addressing concerns about “speaking for others” or the necessity of distinguishing the analytical categories, even when we know prominent subcultural issues in the aggregates that he considers.

However, this section considers two problems. The first has to do with the relational aspects of the strata positions he examines. The other has to do with stereotyping black males.

The first problem I am concerned with in Anderson's ethnographic work on sex codes is that while Anderson refers to the relational aspect of the males' quotidian routines, he often omits how the routines fit together with other social positions. One macro example is that he never questions the institution of marriage, why we should believe that it is an enduring singular form, and why we make a commitment to a one-size-fits-all family. In fact, the classic sociologist Émile Durkheim pointed to problems with using family as the prominent organization for ethical and moral social control when societies become increasingly complex. Durkheim made the case that corporate organization would become more prominent and the occupational group would serve as a better instrument for controlling morality in groups. He wrote:

We like to believe that in blood kinship there exists an extraordinarily powerful reason for moral identification with others. But, as we have often had occasion to show, blood kinship has in no way the extraordinary effectiveness attributed to it. The proof of this is that in a large number of societies relations not linked by the blood tie are very numerous in a family. Thus so-called artificial kinship is entered into very readily and has all the effects of natural kinship.⁵⁰

In earlier work on black males and family organization by Ulf Hannerz, we find careful attention paid to role routines and the "macrostructural" relations between structural positions. Hannerz demonstrates knowledge of three facts that are important for any analysis of black family life: 1) it is unclear how cultural survivals from Africa might have played into U.S. black cultural practices; 2) it is unclear how organized plantation slavery impacted the organization of contemporary family; and 3) it is unclear how notions of the family corresponded to actual family organization across the world or specifically in U.S. history—it is clear that there have been many forms of family organization in world history.⁵¹

In brief, Hannerz concluded:

Thus ghetto dwellers living under ghetto-specific conditions do not have the cultural autonomy to negotiate their family structure only according to environmental structural constraints. There is a continuous conflict between the particularizing premises of the socioeconomic structure and the generalizing demands of the mainstream cultural apparatus, and the relationship between the sexes in the ghetto may be strongly although ambiguously influenced by these two external influences.⁵²

Hannerz excludes telling us that the black family should follow a model of family organization that would be preferential; we find this kind of

underlying moral prescription in many prominent works on the black family.⁵³ However, Hannerz recognized that any attempt to get black gender roles to reproduce the mainstream model would be futile when he wrote:

It is certainly not likely that black people in America have adapted to circumstances as boxed-in individuals or couples. With a structurally segregated and rather uniformly depressed group such as this, it seems more likely that there has been a hothouse atmosphere for new collective adaptations. This means that there is good reason to look out for internal cultural developments in the ghetto community, as well as for those social processes inside it which work in conjunction with the external constraints to shape ghetto dwellers' lives.⁵⁴

To Hannerz's latter point, we might modify it in terms of the new patriarchy by suggesting that the dominant groups in U.S. culture have not been able to reconcile the moribund status of traditional nuclear family life and to recognize possibilities for other less patriarchal or non-patriarchal organizations as a matter of democratic transformation. Such transformation is daunting to Edin, Kefalas, and Reed when they must empirically admit, "Marriage is down, cohabitation is up, and the divorce rate remains high in the United States."⁵⁵ In spite of this, they, like Anderson, are apparently unable to recognize the limitations of substantial dutiful theory and *their place in respectable society*.

The second problem I would like to highlight in Anderson's interpretation vis-à-vis the relational approach addresses why he found so many faults in black males and appeared to have placed a greater burden on them to correct social ills instead of shifting that responsibility to more powerful groups in society or to black females. In a sense, Edin, Kefalas, and their colleagues in their feminist research follow this same strategy on poor unmarried partners; the Edin and Kefalas team is not as severe in their pejorative characterizations of the males. It is clear that some questions Edin and Kefalas asked in their attitudinal analyses demonstrate that they share mainstream biases—a bias for traditional nuclear family organization. Yet, none of these orientations stresses the likelihood that the nuclear family would serve specific economic class interests. It might also serve symbolic class interests. Castigating males who do not reproduce beliefs and values associated with those nuclear norms is probably non-instrumental interaction. Added to this, it is also likely that the major reason we find an association between socially positive outcomes and positive marital status is the major fact that the married, and those with a commitment to its ideology, have historically controlled *most* social and family policies for the entirety of U.S. existence. In brief, marriage was a strategy for confronting economic necessity; its adherents' political class implemented their worldview for such a lengthy period and this helps us to understand

why marriage would result in better health, longer life, and more income. Nevertheless, it does not convince us that it is the best way for humans to realize their pursuit of happiness. This is probably one reason that gender theorist Heidi Hartmann wrote:

How people meet their sexual needs, how they reproduce, how they inculcate social norms in new generations, how they learn gender, how it feels to be a man or a woman—all occur in the realm Rubin labels the sex/gender system. Rubin emphasizes the influence of kinship (which tells you with whom you can satisfy sexual needs) and the development of gender specific personalities via childrearing and the “oedipal machine.” In addition, however, we can use the concept of the sex/gender system to examine all other social institutions for the roles they play in defining and reinforcing gender hierarchies. . . . We choose to label our present sex/gender system patriarchy, because it appropriately captures the notion of hierarchy and male dominance which we see as central to the present system.⁵⁶

On this latter point about the pursuit of happiness, it is necessary to point to longstanding departures from the nuclear form. One way to theoretically understand this notion is with the concept of subterranean values. Economist Thorstein Veblen explored this concept and sociologists David Matza and Gresham M. Sykes put it to use. This viewpoint holds that deviance is not entirely a matter of emotional conflicts or personality disturbances. Not average persons that become disturbed by social environments where they learn to appreciate rule breaking. For Matza and Sykes, “Rather than standing in opposition to conventional ideas of good conduct, the delinquent is likely to adhere to the dominant norms in belief but render them ineffective in practice by holding various attitudes and perceptions which serve to neutralize the norms as checks on behavior.”⁵⁷ The techniques of neutralization refer to attitudes that promote “denial of responsibility” like the feeling that everyone does the same thing or the person that was hurt deserved it because of their prior actions. The techniques of neutralization have the effect of freeing the individual from social control.

Therefore, the values behind the deviance of dating and marriage patterns, when viewed from the perspective of subterranean values, are far less deviant than we often think. Describing dating and marriage among blacks as extremely out of the norm, is an oversimplification of the norm—the norm for Matza and Sykes was the “middle-class value system.” Of course, many who live in poverty in urban areas seek thrills during the day to mediate the utter boredom of poverty. In addition, dominant political classes would likely have a reaction to such thrill seeking and would likely sanction both the search for excitement and acts fulfilling the desire for excitement. One thing that the poor would likely do would be to find ways to make money off the needs of others who might have a few dollars to spend on

satisfying their thrill seeking. Taken all together, the state might come to see an interest in curtailing, for one reason or another, such thrill seeking and actualization of stimulation among the poor.

Excitement and emotional stimulation would subvert more pedestrian values like those expected of the employed and leftovers from the republican ideology. The republican ideology was the creed among individuals that founded the nation. For example, Benjamin Franklin warned U.S. citizens to go to bed early and to wake early, to save every penny because wasting money on sense pleasures was culpable. Having occupational goals would fly in the face of seeking excitement and major urban areas could serve as space for stimulating pleasure. Urban areas could also serve as a place to adapt normal goals like building a proper occupational career into a life of ease and risk—for example, employing women to earn money through prostitution, con games, and other forms of hustle. In spite of such adaptations, these moral transgressions and violations of law would share underlying values with the mainstream. In this case, for example, taking risk and living on the edge are normal masculine roles in middle-class society. Moreover, in fact, any number of roles considered as transgressions among the urban poor is normal behavior for males in the middle class:

Yet when we examine these values a bit more closely, we must be struck by their similarity to the components of the code of the “gentleman of leisure” depicted by Thorstein Veblen. The emphasis on daring and adventure; the rejection of the prosaic discipline of work; the taste for luxury and conspicuous consumption; and the respect paid to manhood demonstrated through force—all find a prototype in that sardonic picture of a leisured elite. . . . When “daring” turns out to be acts of daring by adolescents directed against adult figures of accepted authority, for example, we are apt to see only the flaunting of authority and not the courage that may be involved . . . as is the case, let us say, in the deviance of prisoners of war or resistance fighters rebelling against the rules of their oppressors . . . ⁵⁸

When the concept of subterranean values applies to a reading that *urban* youths are deviant, it is possible to see the kind of limited analysis we acquire by avoiding the relational comparisons—in this case, how masculinity standards are different for subordinated or deviant masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity has privileges not enjoyed by subordinated masculinity. By doing so, the analyst would, perhaps unwittingly, engage in the symbolic justification of the status quo—the organization of inequality—rather than engage in a rigorous science of gender. In other words, the analyst would deploy masculinity in ways that the men under observation would not be able to do. The men under observation by the social scientist do not have prestigious university appointments, social science research grants from the government and foundations, and research teams to send to

the field. Therefore, social science itself is a power deployment, produced in situations where one sector is capable of bringing the symbols and materials necessary to establish its masculine hegemony.

In the context of the subterranean values, I comment on the framing of females in this discourse on dating, marriage, and family. It is likely that females are not as benevolent and innocent as some of the literature suggests. Often women are powerless victims and seldom do researchers explore ferocious acts of some women toward men and other women. Seldom do we come to understand how some women deploy power through using the criminal justice system against black males. Nor do we come to understand how some women put black males out on the streets for not following rules in their residences. Earlier work on household relations between men and women may have been more sensitive to these concerns.⁵⁹

There has been an ideological shift in the policy literature that simultaneously castigates black males. It could be that the strategy of castigating black males is important; social scientists and policy wonks wear it as a badge of honor since black men are socially disreputable. In addition, certain black males suffer omission from recent black male studies. The politics of this “scientific” practice is curious. Where are the homosexual men, for example, in many of such studies? In fact, we have no account of homosexual relations in the “sex codes”; one wonders how it was omitted in accounts among the sample. More obvious is how the role of substance abuse is hidden in “sex codes” since illicit substances and sex are often related in urban environments—both among males and females. Hannerz in his studies did not follow this practice when he wrote:

Very casual observations in the ghetto also lead one to believe that male homosexuality is not particularly infrequent in the community. Small ghetto boys are well aware of what a “faggot” is (but also of what a “bulldagger”—lesbian—is); there are obviously sociopsychological forces propelling toward female homosexuality as well. . . . males from matrifocal families of orientation come to embrace a very conspicuously male role definition . . . there is a male model vacuum.⁶⁰

Exclusion is homosexual bigotry during the time Hannerz wrote—and many bigots still enforce such practices. Nonetheless, the idea that homosexuality was associated with male role model confusion remained in the theories of many of the prominent urban researchers, notwithstanding the fact that they might have left out of consideration explicitly associating deficit role models with claims about homosexuality. In these patriarchal discourses, men went to work and brought “home the bacon”—their roles were instrumental. It had become a longstanding practice in popular culture, social sciences, and social policy literature to associate black masculine lifestyle with effeminacy. Usually this referred to the amount of care and time black males, particularly poor black males, spent on dressing

and grooming. Yet, another element of the effeminacy name-calling had to do with the unwillingness of many black males to obtain and hold *bad* jobs that degrade, humiliate, and pay them unfairly. Often, the racialized humiliation was not discussed in the early literature since it was often felt that black males should know their place—and black scholars should also know their place—and such claims should not be brought against the status quo. Added to this convention was the view that black males would have to prove themselves to white males and by-and-by white males would treat them more humanly once they prove their common sense and loyalty. However, it is impossible to prove common sense and loyalty.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s more attention had to be paid to issues of sexual orientation, particularly in context of the explosion of males who began to die in the mid-1980s associated with the AIDS epidemic. Many more stakeholders entered the policy field and many new constituency groups became institutionalized in city, state, and the national governments. One set of groups was those that represented and lobbied for sexual minorities' rights. One of the leaders of black male homosexual rights, for example, was Keith Boykin.⁶¹ It is now very hard to write serious social science about black male communities without treating homosexual relations. Likewise, the crack epidemic increased awareness of the role of substance abuse in black communities. Approaches that are more sensitive became widespread by the 1980s. Some scholars like Benjamin Bowser, Robert and Mindy Fullilove, and Robert Staples began to address the relationship between AIDS and illicit substances.⁶² In addition, it was necessary to consider the multiple impacts that substance use had on black males. In fact, this kind of sensitivity to illicit drug use resulted in more humane harm reduction approaches to drug-using populations.⁶³

In the end, we find in the language of the social scientist a kind of transactional speech—where speech is categorized as Parent, Adult, and Child—and the researcher takes on the speech role of the paternal Parent.⁶⁴ Many social scientists promote a form of patriarchal chivalry. In this sense, the researcher becomes the protector who is protecting the *urban* female from the clutches of the *bad* urban male who desires to spoil her. Fortunately for the female, the gallant social scientist is a mounted-man-of-arms prepared to expose the intentions of the sordid kind in her midst; the social scientist is doing so for the good of womankind, no doubt.⁶⁵ Yet, should we interpret my claim as an act of neutralization to point out that the man of leisure, the social scientist—this person with fancy speech—shares many of the values of the urban male youths? In the Freudian sense of the terms, does the Father desire to horde the women? Is this a deeply embedded structural code operating in this fight for moral ground over sex codes? To ask this differently, are we witnessing a deployment of hegemonic masculinity or are we witnessing the production of science?

I would argue that some intrigue is going on around the decent/street concerns that do not portray themselves as rational and scientific. And even if

the subterranean notion leads to an unrecognized *tu quoque*—you do the same too—trap that implicates scholars, we must ask: What could be more harmful to families than to systematically treat representatives of certain ones differently in the labor market? One wonders where the moral outrage is for this kind of widespread uncivil, occasionally criminal, line of behavior. Another ethical issue that debates about families raise: Why are certain segments of the population using their political muscle to force other segments of the franchise to organize families just as they do? This kind of strong-arm tactic is an infringement on a free people. It is particularly alarming as a strategy when the classes that promote the strong-arm tactics also engage in sexual practices that often are little different from the urban poor. It has become *virtually* impossible for even some of the most respected political and religious leaders from getting *caught* doing some of the very behaviors that they attempt to control with legislative and symbolic strong-arm tactics.

It is a wonder why family policy advocates refuse to delink sexual relations between parents with care for children. One might suggest that it represents a strange form of immaturity. In my view, this is similar to the immaturity associated with two individuals engaging in the act of sex and referring to it as “making love.” For me, what sex has intrinsically to do with love is not a philosophical question; it is an empirical one. However, if some minority of the population believes that their sex acts constitute love or some superior form of love, I do not see any reason to oppose that political position. However, in my view, it does not follow that their sex is somehow, therefore, superior—that it should be recognized as the hegemonic form of sexuality that all other sexuality must be, through use of state power, measured against and citizens should be strong-armed into guaranteed assent. This is as absurd as thinking that sexual routines of parents are associated with the care of children. There are far too many extremely poor households when it comes to the care of the children and very rich when it comes to parents engaging in regular monogamous heterosexual relations to believe that parents having sex is associated with providing superior childcare. However, we would require empirical verification of this distinction. Therefore, my comments are tentative.

In the literature on black families, the discussion of family organization vis-à-vis children virtually always devolves into a discussion about how women and men get along; getting along usually means doing what the female thinks the male should do. Females usually bring ideology of the nuclear family and their religions—some of the religious organizations are tenuous at best—to their claims to deploy power over subaltern men. Nonetheless, these proclamations typically rule the order of social science. It should not be surprising that Edin and Kefalas in their study of mothers and marriage would write:

While fathers often drift in and out of their children’s lives, Dominique Watkins and her peers believe that for a mother to do so violates the

natural order of things. “A woman can’t help but love a child,” declares Carol, a forty-year-old white mother with three children, ages twenty-one, nineteen, and seven. When we ask Dominique, Carol, and other mothers—across the eight neighborhoods—to describe their views of what constitutes good parenting, almost all speak about the importance of being there, a philosophy that, by definition, morally condemns many of the neighborhoods fathers, who tend eventually to become absent and uninvolved.⁶⁶

The message here is dishonest at best. We could dismantle this argument through asking any number of questions. For example, using the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, one might ask how many “baby daddies” are we typically talking about that are associated with each of the mothers? Could we draw any other conclusions about the behavior of the mothers that might not make the best examples of positive parenting? How many of the mothers are sleeping around, for example? How many of these mothers physically abuse their children? How many neglect their children’s education by not spending time with their homework or having ongoing relations with their schools? How many routinely curse their children or subject them to other prolonged forms of emotional abuse? We could also ask questions about the behaviors of many of the fathers; for example, how many of the fathers in the homes are custodial dads taking care of children that the women have birthed with other men? This question alone, which *is* answerable with data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, might provide some startling information: Could it be that only a few black males are the biological fathers in these very poor households and neighborhoods and most poor married men in these neighborhoods play a custodial non-biological fathering role? It might be that the high rates of custodial father role seeps into other black social classes. If this is so, *could it be* that the women are more in reference to their desire to have a regular male for *their* sexual needs than being in reference to enhanced childcare?

At some point in time, we will likely develop more accurate portrayals of family life and discontinue the desire to stereotype and marginalize subaltern groups that are weak vis-à-vis more powerful groups within and without of the subaltern categories. It is a wonder that the Edin and Kefalas study could write this paragraph:

American children suffer from more family disruption than children anywhere else in the industrialized world. Though some European countries have similarly high rates of nonmarital childbearing, unmarried European parents usually cohabit and tend to stay together for decades, whereas their U.S. counterparts typically break up within a couple of years. U.S. divorce rates among couples with children, while lower than for couples without, are also much higher than those of other Western industrialized countries. The fragility of both marriage

and cohabitation means that by age fifteen, only half of American children live with both biological parents, whereas roughly two-thirds of Swedish, Austrian, German, and French children do so, as do nearly nine in ten children in Spain and Italy.⁶⁷

For me, given the relational approach, this paragraph may mean that we will have to think differently about the function of families. Durkheim found that families are not necessarily where individuals find support. Other institutions can perform those functions. In the case of many children, for example, up to this point, families have not, been helpful for developing self-esteem and social support. There are other examples where families have not been helpful for different segments of the populace. At any rate, notwithstanding the pedestrian approaches in much of the literature on family policy, we continue to admire research that plays to our imaginations about what should be. These images that we hold very dear often in no way correspond to realities and we are quick to call for punishment of vulnerable groups—often in the name of mother’s love—to shame and mortify difference into compliance. One of the leading sociologists in the world, William Julius Wilson, was quoted on the paperback cover of Edin and Kefalas’s book as saying, “This is the most important study ever written on motherhood and marriage among low-income urban women.”⁶⁸ Edin and Kefalas conclude, “*the point is that living apart from either biological parent at any point during childhood is what seems to hurt children* (italics in the original).”⁶⁹ Therefore, I understood them to say that the reconstitution of traditional patriarchy is necessary and we must do it for the sake of the children.

DEEPER INEQUALITIES NECESSITATING BLACK MASCULINE DEGRADATION

Many scholars overlook deeper inequalities embedded in the organization of gender when they study family, motherhood, and hegemonic masculinity. Of course, the society would be committed to substantial dutiful performances from men acting as fathers. However, many of the necessities that functioned as part of the reason for organizing in nuclear family units may not still be compelling. Yet, the organization of family has not progressed as quickly as many changes in society. We can get an idea of this by looking at data provided in the 2005 release of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.⁷⁰ One way to see this is to examine the cross-tabulation of head of household marital statuses by gendered race identities. Table 7.4 presents the percentages reported by respondents. The most striking observation is that women remain subjugated by the organization of household. When women ascend to head of household status, it is at the expense of being married. This indicates that in households, subordination overwhelms women.

Table 7.4 Head of household percent marital statuses by gender and race identity, PSID 2006 (N = 7552)

	White male	White female	Black male	Black female
18-30 years old				
Married	83%	.2%	70%	1%
Never married	9	30	17	50
Widowed	1	27	2	12
Divorced	6	35	7	25
Separated	1	8	4	12
Total	100 (3833)	100 (1052)	100 (1405)	100 (1262)

$\chi^2 = 4.56, df = 12, p < .001$ (two-tailed)

However, when men ascend to the status of head of household, marriage is highly likely for them. Nevertheless, this is more likely for white males than for black males. Beyond procreation, marriage controls sexual relations. It is logical to think that men still have the privilege of selecting their sexual relations in ways that women do not have. Only 9 percent of white males who were heads had the status of never having been married, 17 percent of black males, 30 percent of white females, and 50 percent of black females. Women have the greatest amount of divorce status when compared to men, but notice that black females report separation at a much higher percentage point than the other gendered race identities.

One conclusion that we might reach from these data is that in order to decrease the negative effects of the lack of parental involvement in the life of children we would need to eliminate the gender inequality in household formation. To do so, we must empower women where they can normally accomplish their sexual needs without becoming beholden to the paternalistic generosity of men. By doing this, we would assist in freeing black males from their status *underneath* white males. As long as the organization of households represents patriarchal privilege vis-à-vis sex, women, children, and racial minorities will experience harm. In similar but different ways when contrasted to other indicators, we found in the cross-tabulated distribution of marital statuses that black males were hypermasculinized in the social science imaginary and feminized in the empirical reality.

8 Expectations for Black Male Futures

Contemporary white sociology often operates under a similar patriarchal bias when its rhetoric inclines toward the assertion that the “matriarchal” (e.g. matrifocal) aspect of black society and the “castration” of the black male are the most deplorable symptoms of black oppression in white racist society, with the implication that racial inequity is capable of solution by a restoration of masculine authority. Whatever the facts of the matter may be, it can also be suggested that analysis of this kind presupposes patriarchal values without questioning them, and tends to obscure both the true character of and the responsibility for racist injustice toward black humanity of both sexes. —Kate Millett ¹

Predicting the future is no easy task. This chapter is not going to predict the future. However, it will present some indicators of the future. One way to think about what may happen is to look at what has happened and what is happening in terms of black male incomes. First will be the presentation of some data about black male head of household incomes. What is the difference between black and white male incomes over time? Thinking of black male heads of household that have made it by earning higher salaries, how much income do they earn compared to the three other identities: white males, white females, and black females? The thinking is that these income distributions would suggest what other black males that have not accomplished high earnings would have to look forward to as they compete to establish their masculine hegemonies—perhaps establishing themselves in terms of head of household high-income statuses. However, it might be that many will choose not to compete in terms of normal values since they might think the payoff is too meager for the social costs. Finally, would it be possible to predict income by a set of typical characteristics that might set the black male population apart from other populations? Therefore, a discussion of the future for black males with respect to education and occupation is necessary. After showing the likely status for black males in the future, the chapter discusses what we could do from a relational theory standpoint. This standpoint would consider why things did not change in the past. In addition, it will suggest the need for transformation of enduring gendered structures organized on both macro and micro levels of practice.

Figure 8.1 displays the estimated individual income averages of all black and white male heads of household that reported to the General Social Surveys between 1974 and 2006. The incomes are in intervals. For example, \$3,000–\$3,999 = 3 and \$25,000 and over = 12. In the trend line, we

see a major closing of the gap between 1974 and 1975; another between 1882 and 1983; and there is a minor closing of the gap between 2000 and 2002. In general, it is necessary to conclude that while individuals earned more over the years, race interacted with increased time and earnings.² Despite these overall advances, as we saw earlier, among the wealthiest earners in the U.S. the obstinate inequality still prevailed. While it is true that education is one way to see a decline in the relationship between racialized time and income, education does not pay off equally for black males. In fact, not only was it observed that education resulted in fewer labor market rewards for black males—discrimination against them runs amok largely perpetuated by a class of men structured to deploy hegemonic masculinity in hiring situations—it was also observed that marriage had a different payoff for black men when they are compared to white men. In brief, there is less of a social incentive for schooling and marriage for black males.

Figure 8.2 displays the means plots for total income of employed heads of household earning between \$50,000 and \$150,000 reporting to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 2005 release.³ Notice that when it comes to income, black males earned the lowest amount with an average of \$89,481.⁴ The Games-Howell post hoc tests show that there is a




Figure 8.1 Means trend of estimated individual income of full-time employed head of household black and white males from 1974 through 2006, GSS (N = 11,432).

difference between white male (\$102,642) and black male incomes but not between white female (\$89,813) and black female (\$89,169) incomes. White female and black male incomes are different from white male incomes. However, white male and black female incomes do not significantly differ among this income stratum. In this sense, black females are representing a buffer stratum between black males and white females that is closer to that of white males. This relationship is in the context of patriarchy. After all, black males on the bottom show that something more *pernicious*—injurious—is likely operating in terms of the labor market and households—or, *families*, if you like. This is the case despite whose fault it is. This is suggested since some will rush to judgment that black males have no one to blame for their statuses other than themselves. After all, the reasoning goes, if they would stop engaging in crime, go to school, and “act white” like a Barack Obama does, they would be as successful as he is. These incomes are, nonetheless, the distribution among the elite; or, *Talented Tenth*, if you prefer.

Substantial dutiful theory is hegemonic in U.S. social science. It argues that people are clear about the duties they perform related to roles they play. In large measure, the attachment to substantial duties comes from the civil religious dimension of U.S. political history. This history was initially a racial masculine one if only based on the observation that one had to be




Figure 8.2 Wages and salaries means plot of employed head of household earning between \$50,000 and \$150,000 in 2004, PSID (N = 798).

white and male—not to mention of financial means—to become a citizen of the U.S. The reason to raise this point is the importance of recalling that U.S. political culture organized for men and the definition of being a man did not include black males. Robert N. Bellah reminded us of the importance of civil religion in America, even if he forgot to tell us the importance of being white and male.⁵ Bellah first published his viewpoint in 1967 and he indicated that Jean-Jacques Rousseau had labeled his civil religion idea; Bellah wrote, “The phrase *civil religion* is, of course, Rousseau’s. In Chapter 8, Book 4, of *The Social Contract*, he outlines the simple dogmas of the civil religion . . .”⁶ Civil religion refers to “the obligation, both collective and individual, to carry out God’s will on earth.”⁷ Yet, Bellah makes it clear that the term “God” has many meanings when he writes, “It is often asserted that the God of nature is specifically not the God of the Bible. That raises problems of the relation of natural religion to biblical religion in eighteenth-century thought . . .”⁸

The Declaration of Independence opens with the claim that God is above the law; the phrase is “the laws of nature and of nature’s God.” This opening phrase is then followed by the sentence, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”⁹ The Declaration of Independence then instructs us that legitimating of rule comes from the “consent of the governed.” The history of the idea of civil religion is discursive and it is not the intention to articulate it here; I am raising it as an important dimension of U.S. political life to assert that civil religion is a strategy that allows for the deployment of hegemonic masculinity specifically, and gender claims more generally. It provides the perfect mask for the imposition of the disciplinary language of the unacceptable and the allowably excludable in the moral universe of gendered sex discourse. To see how these moralisms might function, Bellah reminded us about corruption and the duty of citizens to protect one another.

Corruption, again using eighteenth-century vocabulary, is to be found in luxury, dependence, and ignorance. Luxury is that pursuit of material things that diverts us from concern for the public good, that leads us to exclusive concern for our own good, or what we would today call “consumerism.”¹⁰

Of course, Bellah’s reading is extremely conservative; one that we might have expected from a Ford Professor of Sociology and Comparative Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Another way to think about *luxury* is as the joining together of individuals to form a group whose purpose was to institute ways for systematically degrading other citizens to cause its group to have more resources to compete against other groups in situational circumstances; the social condition would ensure the

likelihood of its members realizing situational hegemony. In spite of hegemonic group formation, it is still possible for individuals to be unaware of the function of their group formation or to reason it in other ways. Of course, the moral claim was that “republicans” were more qualified to take care of Providence’s blessings—recognized republicans were likely Congregationalists who were white and male; the fact that they were a group establishing privilege was an essential part of their deployment of power for the extension of their privilege. Since many of these men were also creating inventions counters any claim that they were not interested in supplying products for an international market, they desired to *build a better mousetrap* so consumers would *beat a path to their doors*. These days we would refer to such systemic deployments as entitlement and privilege—not consumerism—these concepts identify the functions of such a system of oppression communicated by the notion of luxury—the contradiction is that the more one saves to distribute for the public good, the more the risk of becoming corrupted by material goods. This definition departs greatly from Bellah’s. The former view would likely be borne out by the empirical evidence rather than by an imaginary belief—which means the *sense* of what is right or the *sense* of one’s group position.¹¹ This way of thinking is necessary to open a discussion about social construction of duty, justice, and responsibility that is so prevalent in the gender and sexual studies literatures.

One example of a substantial dutiful strategy that is masked in recent sexual politics studies is the perspective that sociologist Patricia Hill Collins took in her award-winning text *Black Sexual Politics*.¹² In her study, Collins borrows a conceptual distinction from political scientist Cathy J. Cohen—it is a binary and Collins refers to it as a “schema”—where on the one hand there are consensus issues and, on the other, crosscutting political issues. Collins continues:

Consensus issues affect all identifiable group members, in this case, all who claim or are assigned a Black identity. Consensus issues may affect all group members, but they may not take the same form for all group members. In contrast, crosscutting issues disproportionately and directly affect only certain segments of a group. Cohen suggests that current African American politics treat race as a consensus issue while assigning gender and sexuality secondary status as crosscutting issues.¹³

This consensus/crosscutting binary assists Collins in her *theoretical* conception of honest bodies that appears later in her study. The idea of an honest body is a coalition issue for Collins; nonetheless, a controlling *issue* that gave rise to her need to theorize honest bodies was homosexuality—more specifically, it was the underlying fear that black men were spreading HIV to vulnerable black women. The women were vulnerable because the mass media often portrayed them as hoochie mamas—hypersexual,

irresponsible, and promiscuous citizens—while the men’s socialization came from the prison industrial complex that taught them to rape one another.¹⁴ Collins suggests the binary honest/dishonest bodies are the lens to examine these health disparities. She writes:

Such a politics might emphasize three core themes: first, a body politics grounded in the concept of the “honest body” that would enable individuals to reclaim agency lost to oppression; second, an ethic of honesty and personal accountability within all relationships that involve sexual contact; and third, increased importance placed on questions of gender and sexuality within African American politics.¹⁵

Therefore, popular culture assists in informing us, “A black gender ideology that encourages Black people to view themselves and others as bitches, hoers, thugs, pimps, sidekicks, sissies, and modern mummies signals a dishonest body politics.”¹⁶

Linking images in the popular media to behaviors is a complex subject. It is possible to bracket that empirical literature and just remark that it is far from conclusive. Yet, there are two concerns with Collins’s interpretations—more generally, with what could be interpreted to be a tendency of substantial dutiful theory—1) like Anderson and other substantial dutiful theorists, Collins fails to recognize the relational dimensions of black sexual politics; this prevents her from recognizing that blacks cannot unilaterally change the organization of oppression. Moreover, 2) substantial dutiful theory reproduces hierarchy and in this instance the theory misrecognized that there is no substantive distinction between consensus and crosscutting issues. The important issue has to do with the oppression of targeted citizens; in the sense of a science, oppression is on its own terms within a framework of equality.

In fact, Kate Millett’s *Sexual Politics* is the conceptual framework to examine sexual politics.¹⁷ In her interdisciplinary criticism, Millett showed that major authors in the Western world routinely degraded women in their literary products. If Millett leads us, she shows that not only are black women degraded; rather, all are degraded in the U.S., in Western societies, and in all known civilizations.

However muted its present appearance may be, sexual dominion obtains nevertheless as perhaps the most pervasive ideology of our culture and provides its most fundamental concept of power. . . . This is so because our society, like all other historical civilizations, is a patriarchy. . . . While patriarchy as an institution is a social constant so deeply entrenched as to run through all other political, social, or economic forms, whether of caste or class, feudality or bureaucracy, just as it pervades all major religions, it also exhibits great variety in history and locale.¹⁸

In the sense of Millett's latter conclusion, one would be interested in knowing how black women are different from other women; it may be that they more intensely represent degraded political subjects. How would this knowledge assist us? According to Millett, this degradation is present throughout history; it is particularly observable in the organization of Western myth and religion—the two most important for Millett are Pandora's Box and the Biblical story of the Fall. In the case of Pandora, she is a temptress with “‘the mind of a bitch and a thievish nature,’ full of ‘the cruelty of desire and longings that wear out the body,’ ‘lies and cunning words and a deceitful soul,’ a snare sent by Zeus to be ‘the ruin of men.’”¹⁹ Despite the dated nature of these sentiments and their origin in Mediterranean culture taken from Hesiod's *Theogony*, the representation is substantively similar to those Collins presents of current representations of black women. Likewise, in the story of the Fall is a similar belittling of women that could easily be compared to the ways women are degraded that Collins documents in her studies. Millett continues, “Accordingly, in her inferiority and vulnerability the woman takes and eats, simple carnal thing that she is, affected by flattery even in a reptile. Only after this does the male fall, and with him humanity . . .”²⁰ In a general sense, then, the debasement of black women is the debasement of all women and all *things* defined as associated with feminine bodies.

How are we to read Millett given Collins's claim that some issues are consensus ones and some are crosscutting ones? It would seem to me that the response is that misogynistic attitudes, values, and behaviors hurt all black people; but more profoundly is that it *hurts all people*. As I will demonstrate later, these inequalities are more universal than contemporary interest and/or identity groups can unilaterally intervene upon. The relational perspective understands that gender ideology, personally internalizing ideological values, and acting behaviors that are informed by those values are planted deeply and broadly in social organizations—where across-institutional arrangements are synchronized to agree with the dominant gender ideology in ways that they are normally expected to be practiced. For this reason, the *moral* order of societies is not likely to change as a matter of personal choice or a collective of personal choices. The conflicts are likely to be too intensive for expedient answers to our problems that are associated with forms of injustice. In fact, it might not be the most helpful policy to instruct one segment of a group to view themselves as more moral than another segment. Such practice runs the risk of encouraging political subjects to make and respect hierarchies. It might also encourage them to engage in name-calling and other forms of strong-arm symbolic violence to bring the other citizens into compliance; even when such moral imaginaries are rooted in dominant religion, civil religion, or sociological religion. Yet, if these latter forces exist in cross-institutional organization, it is the responsibility of social scientists concerned with relational operations of society to point them out. Those who identify as black would likely have

difficulty unilaterally changing gendered sexual relations in society even if a segment of that black group imagines that their bodies are honest.

The second point I would like to highlight in the analysis of the new patriarchy and the claims of Collins has to do with how substantial dutiful theory reproduces hierarchy by misrecognizing relational aspects of socially imposed morals. One way to see this connection is to gloss some relationships between two forms of homosexual expression: 1) *top* and *bottom* social positioning and 2) misogyny. The top/bottom dichotomy is an ideal type; it is likely that there is considerable discordance between claims of one status or the other and actual sexual performance.²¹ For example, sex role researchers Domonick Wegesin and Heino Meyer-Bahlburg wrote:

Within the gay community, labeling oneself as a “top” or as a “bottom” communicates preferences for insertative or receptive sexual practices, most notably in anal sex . . . Hooker (1965) wrote “few individuals prefer and predominantly engage in modes of sexual gratification for which any term defining a typical “sex role” can be assigned. Variability, interchangeability, and interpartner accommodations seem to preclude role categorization for the majority. Several studies have reported that the majority of gay men tend to change roles as insertor and insertee in sexual relations . . . However, other authors have argued that the diffusion of role differentiation is characteristic only of upper- and middle-class White North American males. Carrier (1995) reported that in other countries . . . and in lower socio-economic strata in the United States the insertor/insertee distinction is more definitive.”²²

However, the top claim is a deployment to hegemonic masculinity among many homosexual males in the United States, particularly among black males.²³ An interesting feature about the bottom sex role is how it is associated with feminine gendered sex roles. For many, being penetrated transforms a male into a female. In many ways, this idea is inconsistent with knowledge about transvestites and transgendered individuals. The former might appreciate female ways of dressing, might or might not be homosexual, and might or might not identify as the female gender. The American Psychiatric Association distinguished transvestic fetishism from the colloquial way of talking about cross-dressing in day-to-day conversations. The description provides insight into dimensions of that way of life:

The paraphiliac focus of Transvestic Fetishism involves cross-dressing. Usually the male with Transvestic Fetishism keeps a collection of female clothes that he intermittently uses to cross-dress. While cross-dressed, he usually masturbates, imagining himself to be both the male subject and the female object of his sexual fantasy. This disorder has been described only in heterosexual males . . . Some males wear a single item of women’s apparel (e.g., underwear or hosiery) under their masculine

attire. Other males with Transvestic Fetishism dress entirely as females and wear makeup. The degree to which the cross-dressed individual successfully appears to be a female varies, depending on mannerisms, body habitus, and cross-dressing skill. When not cross-dressed, the male with Transvestic Fetishism is usually unremarkably masculine.²⁴

While there are differences among transvestites, they are typically heterosexual; “he tends to have few sexual partners and may have engaged in occasional homosexual acts.”²⁵

Transsexual identity should not be understood as the same or similar identity as homosexual or transvestite identities. These identities share oppression from hegemonic forms of gendered sexualities. Often we use abbreviations and acronyms to refer to these tortured groups, for example, GLBTQ, but these labels are essentially lazy shortcuts to communicate sexual minority status. In another way, they also communicate that the groups are not important enough to enunciate all of the syllables when referring to them. For example, imagine if a reference AAHAAANA was to some racial minority groups to stand for Asian American, Hispanic American, African American, and Native American. For some reason, this acronym never took off. Despite this, many scholars studying racial and ethnic diversity have concluded that these racial groups suffer oppression and each group merits study of the specificity of its history. To understand all of these groups, it is likely necessary to study each category on its own terms and eventually approach each by using a relational method to see shares of power among the various groups. This would provide a systematic understanding about aspects of social ranking. More importantly, it would provide us with more accurate science vis-à-vis different political subjects.

The American Psychiatric Association distinguishes transsexual identification from Gender Identity Disorder. According to the *diagnostic* definition, there are two components of gender disorder. Each condition must be present for a diagnosis.

There must be evidence of a strong and persistent cross-gender identification, which is the desire to be, or the insistence that one is, of the other sex (Criterion A). This cross-gender identification must not merely be a desire for any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex. There must also be evidence of persistent discomfort about one’s assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex (Criterion B) . . . To make the diagnosis, there must be evidence of clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning . . .²⁶

It is not necessary for transsexual identity to become a clinical matter. However, where there is an interest in surgical gender reassignment, the discomfort associated with the condition would likely become a clinical matter. In

addition, age and male or female transsexual identity complicate clinical definitions. Many have become concerned with male-to-female gender identification because of its association with HIV, particularly among African American male-to-female transsexuals.²⁷ In a relational sense, there are both national and international cultural relationships to consider when thinking about transsexual identity.²⁸ The sexual politics of the transgender identities is an understudied subject; transgendered political subjects are underserved and their social welfare is in a disgraceful state of affairs.²⁹

Variation in gendered sexuality may appear on the surface to be a cross-cutting issue among racialized communities but by the nature of its broad diversity and the symbolic system, the debasement of sexual minorities harms most in the society. It hurts in terms of witnessing the debasement of citizens; such symbolic debasements surely must result in trauma for many who witness routine violence. It also hurts in the terms of what English professor Kathryn Bond Stockton has called *switchpoints*. This concept would help to think about the top/bottom iconography and sex roles among some sexual minority groups. A switchpoint helps us understand relational aspects of minority status across groups. In addition, it helps us see how switchpoints become a central part of a group's needs. This perception is possible even among groups trained to think that the needs of specific groups are crosscutting. For example, it may be very hard to think that all transgendered citizens, as all oppressed citizens, are a central concern of all citizens. Just writing the sentence arouses the suspicion in me that many will laugh at me and call me absurd. I would run the risk of others shunning me. Nonetheless, I hope to make this argument.

Stockton used the idea of switchpoints as a way "to explore how seemingly definitive associations attached to each, 'black' and 'queer,' might be taken up, or crossed through, by the other."³⁰ In addition, Stockton continues by referring to critical legal theory:

Critical legal theorist Janet Halley has brilliantly assessed the conceptual problems surrounding certain instances of "like race" argumentation undertaken by gay and lesbian legal advocates. Stressing the "analytic incommensurability" between key concepts in these arguments, Halley notes the tendency, among well-meaning gay-affirmative advocates, on the one hand, and sometimes by anti-affirmative action advocates, on the other, to smooth over quickly conceptual dilemmas in their analogies. "The danger" of these arguments, Halley writes, "arises not because blacks and gays are alike or different, but because they can be flashed as signs of each other in a discourse [sometimes conservative, sometimes liberal] that operates so smoothly it can remain virtually silent."³¹

While Stockton's notion of relationship in these symbols is referred to as switchpoints, Halley's as flashpoints, and mine as relational points, the

point is that these concepts point to how debasement representations seep into other closely aligned categories that are essentially different. Often this happens through a metonymic repeating, often when a stigmatizing discourse is traveling on one track—with one referent—it is convenient to make the *switch* associating the referent with another debased category in the struggle to establish situational hegemony.³²

One such switchpoint is where three symbols clash—black male, black male-queer, and black male-queer-bottom. To arrive at this tripartite juncture it was necessary to arrive at the two root cultural representations: Homosexual males are feminine, and the further distinction, bottom gay males are more feminine. What these layers share are the communication of debasement. In order to assert the debasement it is necessary to affirm the base root: The debased is feminine. The structure of the communication is clear. Many communities switch the degradation, including communities of women and communities of feminists. Chapter 1 discussed how debasing language is deployable when speaking about the conditions of 9/11 where commentators called some men “pussies” because of their approach to nationalist violence. The omitted question is “What’s wrong with pussies?” In this deployment of hegemonic masculinity, *pussy* is debased.

In a related sense, Stockton shows how the *black* and *queer* communities represent symbols of debasement, degradation, and in short, these statuses come to contain shameful effects. Yet, in her analysis, the shame becomes embraced by the distinctive communities and used as weapons for liberation—liberation being the rejection of the values of substantial dutiful theory; this implies the rejection of patriarchy. For example, her study of “where ‘Black’ Meets ‘Queer’” stressed the specific ways that black homosexuals and lesbians are constructed as diffused bottoms, with the contingent representation for the individual that admits to be a bottom. Stockton also included lesbians in her analysis since a butch/fem sex role distinction operates in lesbian subculture. In the introduction of her book *Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame*, is an analysis of how blacks embrace shame in the context of the culturally spread misogyny that I referred to earlier as the *base root*. In many ways, the deployment of the layered misogyny is like preparing a film or editing a text where the editor cuts portions of the product. To do so, the editor must establish cut points. (Quantitative analysts do it too; particularly when they transform a continuous variable into a discrete one, they must conceptualize the cut points.) In her text she quoted a *gay* male who played in the cut, “Gays are the faggots who dress, talk and act like girls. That’s not me, one man explains.”³³ Here we must follow this switchpoint and ask, “And, what is wrong with girls?” If there were something wrong with girls, we would need to explain what it is. Why would someone need not to be a girl, a sister, a sissy, or a “faggot”? Whatever the answer is for Collins, I doubt that it is crosscutting—even heterosexual fathers of daughters and sons know that they do not want their daughters, not to mention their homosexual sons, *debased* with these

kinds of *bad* and *fighting* words. I am certain that modern social theorists would concede or stipulate this point as a consensus issue.

Stockton presents a careful reading of how black males experience systematic debasement in the realm of cultural representation. This leads to her examination of the way that fiction, history, and socialization intersect to result in three important encoded production moments: the rape of Marsellus in Quentin Tarantino's screenplay *Pulp Fiction*, the cavern that opened in James Baldwin's account of sex with Joey in his novel *Giovanni's Room*, and Sethe's pissing in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*. Each sex-involved-organ action results in stigma and shame that may not be detached from the condition of being black. Stockton quotes from the three encoded products; however, this section only discusses Tarantino's *Pulp*.

Butch cuts across traffic and dashes into a business with a sign that reads: MASON-DIXON PAWNSHOP . . . Miserable, violated and looking like a rag doll, [black druglord] Marsellus [Wallace], red ball gag still in his mouth, opens his watery eyes to see Butch coming behind [the redneck who just raped Marsellus].

—Quentin Tarantino, screenplay, *Pulp Fiction*³⁴

This is the “rape” of the character Marsellus Wallace in Tarantino's *Pulp*. For this analysis, the reader will recall Chapter 3 where I raised questions about “the shocking news” of the “penetrating matter” concerning Abner Louima. Now I would like to return to this matter and other *bottom matters* partially to connect these representations to the labor market deployments and situational positioning of black masculinity on the bottom in service of the various deployments of the new patriarchy and situational hegemonic masculinities. The labor market outcomes are important throughout this book. Recall that in Chapter 6, the analysis of the intersection of race, gender, and sexual orientation resulted in showing racialization of incomes among homosexual households and racialization of incomes among heterosexual households. There were also chapters showing the maintenance of black males in bottom position generally and in the examination of all the patriarch-related categories. And just as *shocking* as Louima's penetrated bottom, to discover in Figure 8.2 that well-to-do black male heads of household were on the bottom of the earning distribution even when they were compared to “*girls*.” They are there below *girls*! When it came to occupational status, black males could not beat *girls*; now it appears that in the higher income aggregate, black males bottomed out.

IN THE BOTTOM

One of the main characters in *Pulp Fiction* is Marsellus. The film is set in Los Angeles and it is a story about two minor gangsters, Jules Winnfield

and Vincent Vega, who are on an assignment to recover a stolen suitcase taken from their black mob boss, Marsellus Wallace. Marsellus has to go out of town on business; he also assigns Vincent the duty to entertain his young, attractive, and white wife, Mia. Butch Coolidge is a white and aging male boxer that Marsellus asked to throw his next fight. When Butch inadvertently kills the other boxer, he runs and hides from Marsellus. As fate would have it, Marsellus and Butch meet on the street and ends with a chase that finds them both in the Mason-Dixon Pawnshop. A hillbilly who has two friends—one called the Gimp who is dressed in all black leather—owns the pawnshop and all three have an interest in raping both Butch and Marsellus.

The screenplay has unusual cuts. However, I would mention that before Jules harmed (which means kills) anyone he recited Ezekiel 25:17 that he memorized from the *Bible*. For some, this signaled that *Pulp* was about redemption. He recited these words:

The path of the righteous man is beset on all sides by the iniquities of the selfish and the tyranny of evil men. Blessed is he, who in the name of charity and good will, shepherds the weak through the valley of darkness, for he is truly his brother's keeper and the finder of lost children. And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger those who would attempt to poison and destroy my brothers. And you will know my name is the Lord when I lay my vengeance upon thee.

Stockton refers to the questioning of redemption in the screenplay when she notes the importance of the “dirty details” in the film—the dirty details of the penetrations that are presented throughout the film. The climax of penetrations is when one of the hillbillies penetrates Marsellus in the basement of the Mason-Dixon Pawnshop. “He’s [Marsellus] a God,” Stockton writes, “that is, until he suddenly becomes the butt of Tarantino’s ‘nigger joke’ . . . and is ‘tucked’ in the bottom, one could say—pierced and poked . . .”³⁵ These dirty details are similar to the dirty details of the accounts of the Louima sodomy. Are they redemptive? “These penetrations are themselves quite bizarrely tied up with the continuous questions of redemption running through the text—can dirty details have redeeming value? Can dirty details themselves be redeemed?”³⁶

In the screenplay, Butch comes to the aid of Marsellus when he pulls a big sword that is handily hanging on the wall and he penetrates the penetrator. After Butch removes the red ball gag from Marsellus’s mouth, he makes two requests as he dismisses Butch: that Butch does not tell anyone what happened and that Butch allows him to complete the punishment of the rapist. Naturally, Butch agrees and *runs to meet his woman* while Marsellus attends to vengeance in the basement. For Stockton, and perhaps for all of us who witnessed and experienced trauma by the news of Louima,

as well as for myself in revealing the status of black males under the rule of the new patriarchy in this book, there is little redeeming value in these texts. The texts themselves realized, as Stockton writes, “the history some Americans wish they could forget (and sometimes do): the Jim Crow history—with its historical pulp fictions, we might say—of murderous white violence against black Americans, which includes, through lynchings and rape, a murderous desire to sexually possess them.”³⁷

DIRTY THINGS AMERICANS WISH TO FORGET AND THE NEW PATRIARCHY

The new patriarchy is a moment of misrecognition caused by a slip of memory. It happens all the time, particularly in cultures where communication is highly controlled, but there is at the same time most of the citizenry pretending that communication is free. The control over communication is never completely contained in such societies and the lack of closure is what Howson described in his book *Challenging Hegemonic Masculinity* as always containing room for possible resistance, concession, and realignment.³⁸ The old patriarchy is in a moment of crisis; its rule in many ways bottomed out with the sexual revolution and the revised patterns of marriage and family life in the U.S. The progressive nature of these developments were disrupted with attacks from sexually transmitted infections that now include not only HIV and genital herpes but also strains of hepatitis and human papillomavirus. These conditions affected the way many responded to the possibilities of a sexual revolution that might have rearranged gendered sexuality and the expansion of social justice. Added to such sexually transmitted infections was a destabilizing political environment that carried the U.S. into one conflict after another, culminating in 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq with the possibility of more warring conditions with Iran and “completing the job” in Afghanistan. It was comforting for many to reclaim patriarchy as the answer to an uncertain world. After all, the culture raised many baby boomers on the phrase “father knows best.” Nonetheless, the old order of white heterosexual privilege had taken it on the chin and had to make concessions that many identified with its ideology regretted. Frankly, it had become virtually impossible absolutely to reproduce the earlier order of tightly knitted nuclear families. Many long for those earlier days and their longing appeared in *science* that had devolved into a recitation of outdated moralisms that I penned as substantial dutiful theory.

Nonetheless, the status classes that experienced undue debasement by the older order have not been able to generate the necessary force and practice adequately to meet the conditions for transformation. If it had been able to do so, it would have broadened the categories that allowed for more spread of patriarchal privileges. This would require a breakdown

in many gender norms that lock individuals into absurd binaries. At the bottom of these binaries are black males with their own special gifts to bring to the disruption of these sociopolitical organizations. Central to the sociopolitical norms are the sexual politics that result in micro attempts at domination through the deployment of hegemonic masculinities. This book stresses that the past is not the cause of the status of black masculinity. It is the unwillingness and incapability of the present that produces black masculine status. From a relational perspective—where ongoing conflict is real—one would have to say that the reproduction of black male status is often unchecked criminal behavior. This would be the case from the vantage point of several dimensions of law. These might include bureaucratic, civil, constitutional, criminal, and international law. To gloss this idea, I would take the case of Devah Pager's findings in her labor market studies that earlier chapters discussed.

In Pager's studies, she found that black males were the victims of widespread discrimination when they applied for jobs. Recall that she sent matched pairs of applicants to apply for jobs where she randomly manipulated their résumés on specific characteristics, such as criminal records. In this way, she could compare differences in treatment by race and criminal record. She found that potential employers treated black males more like former criminals even when they did not have a criminal record. She also found that employers in her samples preferred white males with a criminal record to black males who had no criminal records.³⁹

We could consider the treatment of black males in the labor force legally actionable in many cases, particularly if disparate treatment is demonstrable in the public sector of the labor market. This may not necessarily be as realizable in the private sector. However, matters of discrimination and bringing claims of it are complex. In many ways, these matters are associated with contracts and civil rights. For example, U.S. Code Section 1981 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, refers to civil rights generally; it reads:

(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined. For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment. The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.⁴⁰

The last paragraph, labeled (c), is strict. According to *Black's Law Dictionary*, to impair is “To weaken, to make worse, to lessen in power, diminish, or relax, or otherwise affect in an injurious manner. To diminish in quality, value, excellence or strength, and not every change that affects contract constitutes an impairment.”⁴¹ This law follows a long history of constitutional rights associated with it under the First Amendment, which became law in 1791 and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified in 1868. There is a sociology associated with even talking about violations of laws and norms; talking about discrimination is allowable for some without cost while allowable for others with severe penalties. This appears to occur in terms of the different kinds of law: so bureaucratic law would provide examples, as would civil and other categories of law.

BOTTOM TALK, BOTTOM JOBS, AND BOTTOM WAGES: UNEQUAL CHOICE IN SPEECH?

Terry Smith, a professor of law at Fordham University, wrote an interesting law review article that addressed the issue of speaking about discrimination and how different identities are differently charged for doing so.⁴² In the terms of substantial dutiful theory it would become clear that if commitment to norms rewarded differently, individuals might make a decision—often without openly verbalizing it—not to commit to discriminating practices. Where discrimination systematically occurs, some political subjects might see it as a duty to change, subvert, or “throw off” such governments. Such were likely the conditions under which the Declaration of Independence, was signed in Congress, July 4, 1776. The pertinent passages are:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, —That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves

by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.⁴³

It is not at all clear that inequality in wages or bottom positions for black males provides a condition of absolute rule “designed to reduce them under absolute Despotism.” To come to such a conclusion would likely emerge from the oppressed and we certainly have not seen this to be the case since the Civil War. It is unlikely to occur in the future because of the organization of the checks and balances system of U.S. government and the opportunities for various forms of redress in the face of systematic debasement. Added to this is the internalization of debasement that would likely undermine any sense among oppressed black males that it is their “right” or “duty” to engage in subversion or outright revolt.

In his law review article, Smith discussed how the politics of talk about discrimination could become exceedingly personal in the context of First Amendment protection, particularly given the condition that the First Amendment grants *individual* rights. Smith writes, “Identity politics in the workplace coexists uneasily with a legal regime of non-discrimination, for its practice may render a worker of color more susceptible to discrimination.”⁴⁴ In this sense, as Pager has demonstrated, widespread racial profiling exists in the labor market that is apparently under-prosecuted while much of it is at the same time in violation of constitutional rights. The racial profiling associated with the deployment of hegemonic masculinity, in this sense of establishing patriarchal status, would require careful reasoning. A group would have first to ask if the reproduction of patriarchy is in its interest. Imagine that the answer is negative. This would not resolve the problem for black masculinity because it might become necessary to struggle for patriarchal rights while at the same time oppose patriarchy as a legitimate form of social organization. It is not only black males caught in this contradiction; feminists too would share similar contradictions. Nonetheless, when addressing subjects that refer to their social debasement in the public sphere, minorities silencing would happen in ways that dominant identities would not experience. Smith continues:

Whether intended as an act of identity politics or not, such expressions collide with the dominant social norms of the White workplace. These norms, which are both implicit and explicit in character, are imported from external society into the workplace and reflect majoritarian hegemony. The stigmatization engendered by such speech reflects an economy which the conduct at issue is raced. I do not invoke the term economy to mean bartering of any sort but rather to describe a structure by which the liabilities of racialization are meted out . . . race

is often more threatening to Whites when it talks back to them than when it merely exists among them.⁴⁵

Smith used several cases to show how speech itself becomes the act of talking back to power. Another way of saying this is to say that text performs identity; here I mean to suggest text as an encoded production. One of his examples is the case of the Black Studies professor E. Leonard Jeffries. Prior to the problem that Jeffries had at the City University of New York, the United States Supreme Court had found in *Garcetti v. Ceballos* that “public sector employees do not forfeit free speech rights by virtue of their government employment, ‘when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.’”⁴⁶ The *Garcetti v. Ceballos* decision was made based on the precedence of *Pikering v. Board of Education* (1968) and *Connick v. Myers* (1983) that held a “balancing test” where courts would use intermediate scrutiny when considering employee free speech claims. The balance would question whether the speech was highly disruptive and could account for not getting the job done where the initiated speech was in the public employees’ interest. Making a public comment needs balance against the State’s interest in promoting the efficiency of its employees’ public services.

Smith pointed out that the accusation against Jeffries was that he is a racist for remarks he made about racism; these remarks placed his employment status in jeopardy:

Leonard Jeffries is a “racist.” He is not a racist because he denied people jobs or other opportunities based on their race. Nor did he gain this disrepute by committing an act of racial violence. Instead, he is a racist because of the way he discussed racism . . . He referred to various state and federal officials as an “ultimate, supreme, sophisticated, debonair racist” and a “sophisticated, Texas Jew.” He accused “rich Jews” of having financed the slave trade. He also opined that Jews and “Mafia figures” in the media conspired to negatively portray and thereby destroy blacks.⁴⁷

Smith reasoned that Jeffries had violated a “meta-principle” in U.S. race relations and this would directly relate to the deployment of hegemonic masculinity on the job. Here it might be reasonable to distinguish between applying for a job and denial of continued employment based on gendered raced status; it is alleged Jeffries’s discrimination occurred after employment for many years. In his position as a professor, the expectation was that he comment on issues of public concern; society routinely considers this as a part of a professor’s job. “[R]ace talk in the United States,” Smith continues, “is framed in a hierarchy, an ordering that is influenced by the race

of the speaker, the object or subject of his speech, and the political power of those who are insulted by the speech.” The result is that whites who make accusations of racism can deploy “an arsenal of rhetorical devices to blunt the charge while reinforcing the accuser’s social inequality.”⁴⁸ At the beginning of this book, I defined the status of being a *brother* as a relationship between shared oppression and the *brother* identity. In other words, brother-status is performative of resisting oppression in the context of patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity. This might operate in other statuses in *systems of oppression*. In fact, many black organizations’ foundation is fictive kinship. Such fictive kinships serve to organize struggles against domination. Moreover, it is a practice to establish such fictive kin networks in prisons, which we might view as total institutions with persistent competing claims to hegemonic masculinity. These claims occur in relationships between prisoners and guards; they also are apparent among guards per se and among prisoners per se.

Black masculinity degradation included an arsenal of strategies to guarantee subordination of a class of men. In this sense, talking about that debase-ment performs that identity. In the workplace, on the street, in the police station, and in the prisons, black masculinity *requires* dissent from the main-stream. If there was no dissent, the inequality would not exist and society would have deconstructed gendered racialization. This is not to say that subordination always and everywhere produces dissent. It is to say, however, that protest against subordination is nonsense if one has not experienced subordination. Jefferies lost his position at the bottom of the melting pot by the rules against his uppity speech. The question is not whether his speech was correct or not; most would agree that his speech was misguided. The point is that speaking about an imposed condition of subordination in ways that demonstrated the subordinated position in relation to other more powerful groups resulted in his sanction for being a *racist*.

Black males may continue to be a problem for U.S. society. Historically they have been so. There should be little question about this; in an edited book by Elijah Anderson, *Against the Wall: Poor, Young, Black, and Male*, many of the contributing authors recited a similar theme about the unexpected lack of assimilation of African Americans; specifically, black males.⁴⁹ In short, as Douglas S. Massey wrote, “Over time, immigrants moved steadily up the socioeconomic ladder while African Americans did not.”⁵⁰ Moreover, it would not be surprising to find that black males have more anger or express support for more subversive activities than other gendered racialized groups in the U.S. In this chapter, the literature prompted questions that I would like to consider. The first asks if black males express support for more subversive activities. The second asks whether subversive mindsets among black males help to explain personal income differences among them.

The General Social Surveys asked three questions in 2006 that would help to compare differences between the four gendered racial groups that I have compared throughout the book: white male, white female, black male,

black female. The question is, “There are many ways people or organizations can protest against a government action they strongly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed by circling a number after each question: organizing public meetings to protest against the government; organizing protest marches and demonstrations; organizing a nationwide strike of all workers against the government.” Each item had four possible responses that included definitely allow, probably allow, probably do not allow, and definitely do not allow. I combined these three variables ($N = 1472$; Cronbach’s Alpha = .55). The results are in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1 shows that black males (87 percent) are more supportive of protest when compared to black females (81 percent). Males indicated more support than females; for example, white males (84 percent) expressed more support for protest activity than white females (78 percent). These data show that black males express more support for protest activities when compared to the other gendered racial groups.

The text in this chapter might imply that black male commitment to patriarchy would be more intense than other gendered racial groups since black males have found the labor market so obstinate in treating them unfairly. The opinion about the oppression of women in the labor market would be one way to examine black males’ attitudes about women generally. Two questions in the General Social Surveys asked in 2006 allow an examination of opinion about equality for women in the labor market: “Some people say that because of past discrimination, women should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of women is wrong because it discriminates against men. What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of women?”; “Now I’m going to read several statements. As I read each one, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, neither

Table 8.1 Cross-tabulated percent gendered race identity attitude about allowing protest activity, GSS, 2006 ($N = 1288$)

	White male	White female	Black male	Black female
Definitely allowed	39.6%	30.1%	50.0%	49.6%
Probably allowed	44.0	48.1	36.9	31.3
Probably not allowed	11.8	12.1	7.1	11.5
Definitely not allowed	4.6	9.7	6.0	7.6
Total	(518) 100	(555) 100	(84) 100	(131) 100

Note: Counts are in parentheses.
 $\chi^2 = 36.8$, $df = 9$, $p < .001$ (two-tailed)

agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree. For example, here is the statement: "Because of past discrimination, employers should make special efforts to hire and promote qualified women." I combined these two variables coding them in order from strongly disagree to strongly agree (Cronbach's Alpha = .68). The collapsed cross-tabulated results are in Table 8.2.

Table 8.2 shows that black females (82.4 percent) and males (66.3 percent) reported the highest expressed support for labor market equality for women. White males (50 percent) supported the opinion of greater equality for women in the labor market and white females (63 percent) more closely aligned with black males. These data are remarkably close to what we would have theoretically expected. They reflect the feminization of black male thought aligning more or less with white female opinion. Black female opinion was the most strong in opposition to the organization of female subordination in the labor market while white males were strong in their opinion that things should remain the same. The idea that black males were more protest oriented in their social policy positions would have to undergo modification. They appear to be most stringently opposed to structural inequality when it affects their claim for higher status in the organization of patriarchy. The likelihood of black males transforming their continued regimentation into bottom positions is a long shot.

To examine the question about the relationship between more protest-oriented attitudes and income among black males, the analysis used the General Social Surveys questions that this chapter discussed earlier. The variable referring to protest activity came from three questions in the survey that asked about organizing protest meetings against the government, organizing protest marches, and organizing a national strike. Because schooling, marital status, and work status appeared in the chapter's narrative as factors that might influence income, variables that would indicate these conditions were constructed. The model is in Table 8.3.

Table 8.3 presents the summary of the simultaneous multiple regression analysis to determine the best linear combination of black male highest year of schooling completed, marital status, work status, and attitudes about

Table 8.2 Percent of gendered racial groups supporting or not supporting equality for women on the job, GSS, 2006 (N = 1589)

	White male	White female	Black male	Black female
Disagree	50%	37%	34%	18%
Agree	50	63	66	82
Total	(594) 100	(724) 100	(95) 100	(176) 100

Note: Counts are in parentheses.
 $\chi^2 = 66.9, df = 3, p < .001$ (two-tailed)

protest activity for predicting personal income in 2006. For black males the combination of variables significantly predicted personal income, $F(4,52) = 3.2$, $p < .05$ with only education contributing significantly to the model. The adjusted R^2 value was .13. This indicates that the model explained 13 percent of the variance in personal income. This is a small effect. For white males the combination of variables significantly predicted personal income, $F(4,398) = 14.80$, $p < .001$ with schooling, marital status, and work status contributing significantly to the model. The adjusted R^2 value was .12. This indicates that the model explained 12 percent of the variance in personal income; this is a small effect. The beta weights in Table 8.3 indicate that for white males, schooling and marital status are the strongest predictors of personal income. Given other analyses in the book, this outcome should not be surprising. Compared to white males, education did not have as strong a positive effect for black males notwithstanding that it makes a significant positive difference among them. Protest and revolutionary attitudes do not seem to matter when it comes to personal pay for either sample of men. In brief, males who played the patriarchal game of higher education, marriage, and working hard earned rewards. Black men toil in school for less of a payoff in the labor market. The other factors associated with traditional patriarchy do not matter in their population. Presumably, those who are able to portray a heterosexual patriarch image—one of schooling, marriage, and hard-working men—are *not* able to deploy hegemonic masculinity among the black bottom. Since schooling works differently among black men when compared to white men, some black men would likely be able to claim that men who pursued schooling are, in fact, fools. If this is the case, it is not a laughing matter.

Before leaving the deployments of hegemonic masculinity that reproduced a black male bottom, there is one other disturbing aspect about the symbolic positioning of black males as potential bottom candidates. I had mentioned that Pager has done an outstanding job with her audit studies; she would send testers to apply for jobs and manipulate criminal records and use of control groups to see the effects of being a black male or black male with a criminal record. On callbacks, I had indicated earlier in the book that in one of her Milwaukee studies black males with a criminal record were called back in 5 percent of the applications; black males without a criminal record, 14 percent; white males with a criminal record, 17 percent; and white males without a criminal record, 34 percent.⁵¹ Pager also provides evidence of replications of her Milwaukee study in several cities in the U.S. and the results show that gendered racialized hiring criminality is a national pastime. Pager suggested that media representations fuel the reproduction of discriminatory practices that would include unwarranted—by which I mean likely criminal—police stops for “driving while black.” I would take a minor exception with Pager’s interpretation here; it is far too narrow. I would view the ideology of black male inferiority as a deep structure that actors evoke in struggles for hegemonic masculinity. The media are not engaged in humiliating black males, they are engaged in establishing the hegemonic masculinity of their

Table 8.3 Simultaneous multiple regression analysis summary on black and white male highest year of school completed, marital status scale, work status scale, and protest activity predicting personal income, GSS 2006 (N = 463)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SEB</i>	β
Black Males (N = 60)			
Highest year of school completed	6.0	.30	.26*
Marital status scale	1.11	.87	.16
Work status scale	1.07	.76	.19
Protest activity	-1.31	1.12	-.15
Constant	6.4	4.85	
White Males (N = 403)			
Highest year of school completed	.39	.09	.20***
Marital status scale	1.56	.35	.21***
Work status scale	1.10	.36	.15**
Protest activity	-.12	.42	-.02
Constant	6.79	1.78	

Black male sample: $R^2 = .20$; Adjusted $R^2 = .13$; $F(4,52) = 3.2, p < .05$;
 White male sample: $R^2 = .13$; Adjusted $R^2 = .12$; $F(4,398) = 14.80, p < .001$
 * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

group—given their social learning of the deep structure—and this requires that in the media production situation, as opposed to the field, it is important to establish what group is the boss. In such situations, black males’ assignment is to the bottom role, that is to say, the role of the feminine in terms of the rules of patriarchy.

A commitment to hierarchical structures of oppression—a system of gendered oppression—where we find the reproduction of the inequalities that I have tried to elaborate in this book, we will find racialized masculinist hierarchy. We should also find this dominator/dominated—top/bottom—sex roles playing out in often-unprosecuted sex crimes. For example, though seldom mentioned in the gender studies literature, black males are more likely victims of forced sexual relations compared to other males in the society. Therefore, as many women are victims of forced sex, and often that forced sex does not constitute rape, this condition also exists among black males. The U.S. Census reports this condition in a table titled “Number of men 18–44 years of age and percentage ever forced to have sexual intercourse by a female and percentage ever forced to have sex by a male, by

selected characteristics: United States, 2002.” The percentage of forced by a female for Hispanic males of any race was 7.9; for white males, it was 3.4, and for black males, 15.1. Ever forced by a male showed similar relative indications where for Hispanic males of any race it was 2.0; white males, 1.8; and black males, 2.8.⁵² Yes, females force black males to have sex more than other males force black males to have sex. In Chapter 2, I raised the issue about the commoditization of body parts and the social production of the black male as a sexual gratifier—particularly the black male penis as the commodity of the traffic in phallus pleasure. Given the facts presented in this book, there is some specific sexual role performances found patterned in the black male social role. As shown, black male prostitution roles would need additional study. It might be helpful cross-culturally to study the organization of male prostitution comparing race, class, nationality, and male prostitution. As it stands, we have some evidence that black males are experiencing sexual roles differently from other male groups in the U.S.

TOWARD POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

One reason that sex/gender theorists are often attracted to thinking in binary ways is that there are very deep structures working across social institutions. From these structures are derived communications. The institutions speak to the populace in this sense of the use of the word “communication.” It is hard to see this organization of “text.” As this book attempted to make clear earlier, text is an encoded production; encoded products are ones that share meaning in interaction situations. Deeply organized binaries are essentially the way that individuals engage in most communication. It is hard to imagine rapid change of deeply structured binaries. This is probably one reason that gender theorist Pierre Bourdieu took exception with Erving Goffman’s idea that sexual habitus was “fundamental structuring alternatives.”⁵³ In Bourdieu’s view, sexual habitus is “historical and highly differentiated structures, arising from a social space that is itself highly differentiated, which reproduce themselves through learning processes linked to the experience that agents have of the structures of these spaces.”⁵⁴ Since this “space” is not a location—a place; in the relational perspective it is the travel of power, it can insert itself into different locations or places, and it can operate at intersections, or switchpoints, where it can flash power as locations attempt to establish situational hegemony. When terms are spoken singularly, the binary has been learned for shared communication “strong/weak, big/small, heavy/light, fat/thin, tense/relaxed, hard/soft” . . . and it is clear that the first term in each of these binaries refers to the male and the second to the female.⁵⁵ If one were to say, “He is a real man,” the not-real image simultaneously has meaning.

Just as we see these distinctions operating in the field of sexuality, they similarly operate in other fields, such as politics, religion, scholarship, or science. Thus, there are differences between the “hard” and “soft” sciences—hard scientists earn more money! Their rules are more rigid and they tend to discipline the student more. When we think about roles of fathers in families and when some social scientists inform their audience of the need to have fathers in families to rear children, especially boys—particularly black boys—they are communicating the importance and dominance of masculinity and patriarchy from a father who takes no prisoners. Do it his way, or hit the highway. Mothers are ideally relational, more open to diversity of thought and situation. This is not so because it has been imagined to be so. It is not so because a social theorist like Parsons elaborated a distinction between the instrumental and relational functions; it is so because of the history of the language and the fact of the deep structure. So, Bourdieu concluded:

These specific oppositions channel the mind, in a more or less insidious way, without ever allowing themselves to be seen in their unity and for what they are, namely, so many facets of one and the same structure of relations of sexual domination.⁵⁶

Speaking of change for the future would have to take a relational approach. Figure 8.3 is a diagram of the approach that I suggest for the development of policy that might chip away at some of the deep structures in systems of oppression. A positive way of expressing this idea is to speak of thinking about how to accomplish social justice. At bottom, an assessment of hegemonic masculinity and patriarchy is concerned with social justice. How is it possible that, for so many years in the U.S. and other parts of the world, dominated groups have been treated so poorly while good-intentioned citizens engaged in contributing through not speaking back to power or through actively routinely humiliating the subordinated in their debasement too? This is why it is urgently necessary to stop and think about debasement and humiliation. We should carefully think about marginalization of citizens that appears to be group-oriented; it is necessary to develop a strong program where each culturally oppressed group’s study is in relation to other groups in the society. This procedure produces the relative standing of groups in patterned and typical relational interactions.

Chapter 6 glossed Herbert Blumer’s theory of group position. According to the theory, prejudice is a matter of what individuals imagine their group positions to be. For Blumer, “prejudice exists basically in a sense of group position rather than in a set of feelings which members of one . . . group have toward the members of another . . . group.”⁵⁷ Blumer’s purpose for making this observation was to promote a more “realistic . . . understanding” of prejudice. To accomplish this, he suggested the importance of identifying group attitudes about the social position of certain kinds of

individuals and determining where one's group identity fit in that perception. He also noted that identification with a group was not "spontaneous or inevitable but a result of experience."⁵⁸ He acknowledged that the views a group forms about its social position *and* the social positions of other groups in relation to its group position are the result of social learning—learning that he referred to as experience.

Because Blumer thought that experience was related to views a group forms about its and others' social positions, he reasoned that the viewpoints about group positions were variable. Despite this, there were patterns of group relations in the group position model since the process of imagining one's group was "a collective process." The main way for the production of a group's image, according to Blumer, is in the way that group leaders represented the group through the various media. Such leaders became key opinion leaders; they are spokespersons that would characterize publicly their group as well as characterize other social groups that they subject to condescension. As such, gendered racial and sexual prejudice would occur in social relations only where a definition has been produced resulting in upward and downward comparison. The result of the social comparison would be the sense of social position, a feeling of an entitlement and right to condescend toward another group. From the relational perspective, perception and/or cognition of the relative rankings would provide an opportunity to deploy hegemony across institutions and situations. Yet, the structures that communicate through such symbolic deployments remain social constructs; in fact, deep structures that are socially interrelated forms of oppression. This has been the view that would lead to suggesting in Figure 8.3 that macro strategies develop to promote gendered justice. Notice in the latter term I moved from speaking specifically about hegemonic masculinity, the new patriarchy, or gendered racialized hierarchies. The assumption is that all of these forms of gendered inequalities are subjected to simultaneous sustained struggle. The reason for this is that deep structures operate with switchpoints and implications for deployment of hegemony by the cross-institutional deployment of debasement and stigma.

Simultaneously there would be a need to address the micro level internalizations by also applying a strong program. For example, why was it that white females did not support government or employer interventions to ensure that their group would experience equitable treatment in the labor market? Why was their attitude so different from the attitude of black females? Earlier in the book, I mentioned Angela Y. Davis's explanation that pointed to greater black female independence in the labor market when compared to white female experiences. Black females would typically have fewer social supports from relatives and husbands than would white females. If their experiences had been equal, we would need to explain why so many black women since Sojourner Truth have also uttered the words "Ain't I a woman?" To take these differences seriously is to take a strong program seriously.

This is to suggest that there is not a need to take shortcuts in our work on gendered inequality or to make broad claims in a rush to theory. It seems to me that it would be more prudent to think in terms of overall oppression and think about the ways that one manifestation of oppression assists in the cultural reproduction of similarly related oppressions in spite of the fact that oppressive specificity is the requirement of any social science of inequality.

To decrease the amount of inequality among black males would likely require decreasing inequality among all excluded groups in the U.S. It would likely require breaking down the way gender assembles. The trouble with this is that many groups that experienced historical exclusion from gender privilege built oppositional conventions to fight back. By fighting back, the groups typically did not mean dismantling injustice; rather, they understood their historical mission as getting a piece of the pie. In this history, in many ways this became another way of asking to play subordination beneath the more powerful groups in the society. When gender makes up part of the inequality equation, things became less simple. Some women, for example, had social support that other women could never imagine in their statuses. Over the years, the privileged women instituted practices and organizations that guaranteed the reproduction of their class as a superior one. They developed strategies that gave them relative freedom when they compared themselves to women that were required to become members of lower statuses. Only an insignificant few of the working-class background women could ever hope to cultivate the luxury granted by the ability to deploy hegemonic femininity.

Despite this, many working-class women feigned another class of womanhood. They imagined the moral organization of society with its attendant debasement as a desirable and achievable goal. They, for example, wrote music about it where they cried and moaned about the failure of their men to satisfy their need for hegemonic femininity. The femininity that they clamored to attain would be utterly impossible to find in history. It is largely an imaginary routinely simulated as a possible performance. Many men and women dedicated their life to accomplish the normal image. Among working women, they rehearsed the dream in their churches, their




Figure 8.3 Relational approaches to policy recommendations for gendered race concerns.

juke joints, in the schools that they could control, and in their social societies. Eventually, after they gained freedom to write books and magazine stories, they began an all-out castigation of their *weaker* gender. This was in name of their religion.

The relatively powerful women that had little experience with the need to struggle for gender dominance among their men looked at some of the struggles of these workers and felt a need to emulate them. For one thing, not all of the women from the privilege classes were equally equipped to compete with other women of their class. Some thought the women were too intellectual. Others considered them to lack the feminine beauty that would allow for their deployment of hegemonic femininity. It was in the interest of this gender fraction to disrupt the conventions by promoting the gender studies industry. In order to do so, these women saw an opportunity to join with their working “sisters” to fight patriarchy. The modern origin of this movement was largely concerned with body issues. One of the most important issues had to do with sexual pleasures. In a larger sense, the concerns were about the body. For example, the women questioned socialization to wear the brassiere and corset; other women questioned why they were required to wear high-heeled shoes or dresses and skirts when pants were more appropriate for the work they had to do. Many women were concerned about sexual orgasm. They challenged why primarily male sexologists had locked them into a discourse about the function of their vaginas. Yet, most of their newly found “sisters” did not come to see the world in the way that many in their penned *second-wave feminism* saw things; and the “sisters” rejected their newly constituted deployment of the modern woman.

Many women joined a masculinist strategy claiming that the new *sisters* were highly represented by lesbians. Many women joined a chorus decrying and at the same time debasing lesbian women. This strategy was largely effective. Many black males emulated this strategy. As many black women began to seriously castigate black males for their feminine ways, many relatively powerful black men responded by claiming their detractors were *all* lesbians. All in the gender studies industry began to purge the lesbians since some in the leadership thought it would be better to present a more *decent* image to get a piece of the pie. Much of this happened before gay and black men began to die at high rates from the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

WHEN AND WHERE THE BROTHERS ENTERED

During this period that I am recalling, a few things developed beyond the castigation of many black males by black females and later white females. It was in the interest of white feminists to portray all males as the enemies of feminine social justice. They did not think that through very carefully because it was also clear from every sign of the civil rights movement that black men were not, in the social sense of the term, real men. To argue

that the white feminist leadership did not figure that one out would be to claim that the leadership was unlettered. Nothing could be further from the truth; those women were extremely intelligent and in fact, their intelligence was one of the major reasons why they experienced derision. In a real sense, those women were punished for not being “dumb” and in large measure they were considered unusable for patriarchy’s uses based on their intelligence—not to mention their unwillingness to mandatorily wear brassieres, corsets, and girdles—after all, real women do not challenge their men. In many ways, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, a former U.S. senator, and major challenger for the Democratic Party nomination for the presidency, would have been part of this latter faction. Many of these women were glued to their television sets watching black men routinely manhandled by whites with power in southern towns as hegemonic forces attempted to reinstitute black male servitude and subordination. They saw the 1965 riot events in Los Angeles.

By the 1970s black male subordination had become widespread not just in the South but in many northern cities where the technologies of social control had, from many of their perspectives, become intolerable. This gave rise to a number of groups that formed around issues like economic exploitation, social subordination, and police brutality. In short, these men were claiming a larger share of the patriarchal pie. The feminists had to have read Eldridge Cleaver’s account of black masculinity, had to have seen with their own eyes the virtual feminization of black males in the streets of the cities: the beat downs, penetrations, and state-induced deaths. In addition, the modern incarceration industry was developing at the same time and it would have been impossible for any group of women, not to mention men, of any social or economic class to have missed the dynamics associated with black male subordination.

In this history, it is important to recall the role of substance abuse. Many scholars have lately been writing about different groups and individual men during the second-wave period but unfortunately, they often leave out the important factor of substance use. Many of the men were clinically alcoholics and substance abusers. They heavily used cocaine or marijuana; many suffered comorbid conditions. This is important; to write a book taking up the life and image of Huey P. Newton, without a mention of this fact, is irresponsible. In addition, everyone had to have known this about even such crossover artists as James Baldwin. When thinking about these men and their perceptions, this dimension of their reality—or rather, their inability to endure their life without “trips to Fantasy Island”—is an important factor. These conditions surely colored and often distorted their perceptions of the possible; notwithstanding that, many had decided to “die for the people.” Moreover, urban policies that emerged from the Ronald Reagan administration often assisted them in accomplishing the latter goal. Reagan’s administration decided to lock the black men down at prison rates that had been unheard of in U.S. history. His administration was aware of

widespread need for substances in urban communities, particularly among the men, so his administration encouraged tainting marijuana with the highly toxic paraquat herbicide just at the time of the rise of HIV and the introduction of designer drugs into black cities. One form of the new drugs was crack cocaine. Marijuana had become in low supply and some in the cities had begun to experiment with “Lovely Sherman” and other chemical-based quick-and-cheap illicit drugs. In fact, revolutionary thought and drug use became highly associated during this period. I do not know the extent to which second-wave feminists recognized this; nor do I know the amount of knowledge that so-called queer theorists have accumulated about these practical life conditions—before attempting to lecture subordinated communities on the moral organization of *their* communities, one would think they would spend some time in the library looking into these determinative issues. If you think these policies do not border on the genocidal, think again. One of the troubles with substantial dutiful theory is its proclivity for assuming that everyone naturally believes in its interpretation of the moral order. It is a major flaw in this kind of *intelligence*.

To avoid such immaturities like suggesting the essential in the moral, perhaps it might be more productive to think in the terms of conversations about injustice from a relational perspective. The relational assumes conflict associated with the deployment of gender roles, and by extension, in terms of sexual roles—when using the term “sexual roles,” I am referring to assumed conventions about hierarchical positioning related to sex: top/bottom, aggressor/passive, initiator/seducer, and so on. As a first step in the discussion of this struggle to transform gender into a more equalitarian organization, I would suggest a conversation about commitment to patriarchy. In my view, this conversation has never been out in the open. Many groups could speak to this including, for example, some black homosexual males who desire to reproduce patriarchy in their relations and join the cult of marriage to solidify their piece of the patriarchal pie. Nevertheless, they are not the only group. For example, some Black Nationalists might want to chime in and explain why even women in their movement sign onto the on-its-last-leg conventional patriarchy and its deification of the phallus; how is this African? Perhaps both groups could engage us by telling why they both agree that patriarchy is of such great value.

I would think that we might expand such a conversation into one that thinks globally. Since much of the culture in the U.S. successfully exports to other countries—the U.S. often dumps its culture on developing cultures—in other parts of the world, it would be of great interest to discover if from a black diaspora lens there would also be an interest in unflinching commitment to patriarchy. Ultimately, the idea of patriarchal social organization would undergo clarification and individuals would come to understand the limits of patriarchy as an ethical arrangement of power in an equalitarian society. In this sense, when science on gender issues, on hegemonic masculinity, and hegemonic femininity is broached, the scientists might want

to state their axiom and the reason for it; for example, they could say, “I believe that patriarchy is important to control the unqualified from participating as full democratic citizens.” Stating such politics upfront would be very helpful.

If patriarchy is determined to be important for humankind, the new patriarchy—its state of patriarchal crisis—should control attention and we should work to invest all of our resources for the immediate reclamation of the patriarchy. Since it is possible for different groups in a democratic society to hold different views, I would call on black men to clarify their commitment to patriarchy. Despite running a biracial black male for the presidency and some other window dressing, the black male position under the rule of conventional patriarchy is clear, about as clear as the disturbing desire to play the patriarch.

Notes

NOTES TO THE PREFACE

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

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2. For example, media representations increased visual imagery in popular culture. These include representations of African Americans, A. Nama, "More Symbol Than Substance: African American Representation in Network Television Dramas," *Race & Society* 6, no. 1 (2003). Laborers are treated by Glenn Sheldon, "What's on Their Plates or Feeding the Hungry Mouths: Laborers, Families, and Food in the Late Twentieth Century," *Journal of Popular Culture* 38, no. 3 (2005). Politics is treated by John Street, "Celebrity Politicians: Popular Culture and Political Representation," *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 6, no. 4 (2004), Joan L. Connors, "Visual Representations of the 2004 Presidential Campaign: Political Cartoons and Popular Culture References," *American Behavioral Scientist* 49, no. 3 (2005); tragedy studies, Daniel B. German, "A Review of Media Representations of September 11," *Journal of Criminal Justice & Popular Culture* 13, no. 1 (2006); and urban life studies, Michael Ian Borer, "The Location of Culture: The Urban Culturalist Perspective," *City & Community* 5, no. 2 (2006).
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- Hall, 1963), *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behaviour* (London: Allen Lane, 1972).
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 33. *Ibid.*, 11.
 34. Winthrop D. Jordan, *White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968), 579.
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 41. Here is where the conception was that the subjugation of women was instrumental in all social structures. This being the case, different institutions might operate under different forms of leadership but the arrangements vis-à-vis women was thought to be isomorphic in the sense that domination of women was a central feature of all social organization. In fact, the claim is that women in all cultures suffer subordination. Therefore, the subordination of women is universal.
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49. Susan J. Hekman, *Gender and Knowledge: Elements of Postmodern Feminism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990).
50. Takaki, *Iron Cages: Race and Culture in 19th-Century America*, 13.
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52. Yanek Mieczkowski, *Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), 96.
53. *Ibid.*
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 67. Cited in R. Bleier, *Science and Gender: A Critique of Biology and Its Theories on Women* (New York: Pergamon, 1984), 49.
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 69. Robert Park, “The Conflict and Fusion of Cultures with Special Reference to the Negro,” *The Journal of Negro History* 4, no. 2 (1919).
 70. For example, see Eric W. Hickey, *Sex Crimes and Paraphilia* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2006).
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78. For example, see work by Carnoy on this issue. One strategy might be to eliminate black males from a study. In the 1970s and 1980s, it had become strategic to exclude African Americans from study because of their difference. Black females have become increasingly favorable for inclusion. However, in order to do so, researchers must overlook the significant differences in payoff for education in the labor market. They must overlook job prestige. Added to this, in order to proclaim progress, they must exclude black males from the studies. See, for example, Attewell and Lavin. Martin Carnoy, *Faded Dreams: The Politics and Economics of Race in America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Paul A. Attewell and David E. Lavin, *Passing the Torch: Does Higher Education for the Disadvantaged Pay Off across the Generations?* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007).
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85. Robert Cornell makes this analysis of the straight/gay binary and I am proposing it in terms of racialized social constructions. See, Robert W. Connell, "A Very Straight Gay: Masculinity, Homosexual Experience, and the Dynamics of Gender," *American Sociological Review* 57, no. 6 (1992).
86. I am using the term "oppositional culture" because of its currency in the literature. However, it might be more accurate to refer to this subculture as "homological culture." The subculture that I have in mind is one that is in convergence with dominant and normal male values and practices. However, excluded from the expression of masculinity, the subculture enters into a subversive mode acquiring what becomes perceived as a birthright of masculinity—that is, patriarchy. In this sense, the oppositional culture is subterranean because it desires masculinist power and alpha-male status. This conceptual framework follows Albert Cohen's idea of oppositional culture. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang*. However, it highlights the subterranean convergence that David Matza, and later John Hagan, stressed. David Matza, *Delinquency and Drift* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990), John Hagan, "Destiny and Drift: Subcultural Preferences, Status Attainments, and the Risks and Rewards of Youth," *American Sociological Review* 56, no. 5 (1991).
87. Angela Y. Davis, *Women, Race & Class* (New York: Vintage, 1981), 231.
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97. Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
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102. Ogbu, "Collective Identity and the Burden of Acting White in Black History, Community, and Education," 11.

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105. Ibid.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. DuBois, *The Souls of Black Folk*, 12.
2. See, Lisa Bowleg, "Love, Sex, and Masculinity in Sociocultural Context," *Men & Masculinities* 7, no. 2 (2004), J. D. Champion et al., "Risk and Protective Behaviours of Bisexual Minority Women: A Qualitative Analysis," *International Nursing Review* 52, no. 2 (2005), K. W. Elifson et al., "HIV Seroprevalence and Risk Factors among Clients of Female and Male Prostitutes," *Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes and Human Retrovirology* 20, no. 2 (1999), Daniel T. Halperin, "Heterosexual Anal Intercourse: Prevalence, Cultural Factors, and HIV Infection and Other Health," *AIDS Patient Care & STDs* 13, no. 12 (1999), Diane K. Lewis, John K. Watters, and Patricia Case, "The Prevalence of High-Risk Sexual Behavior in Male Intravenous Drug Users with Steady Female Partners," *American Journal of Public Health* 80, no. 4 (1990), Richard M. Selik, Kenneth G. Castro, and Marguerite Pappaioanou, "Racial/Ethnic Differences in the Risk of AIDS in the United States," *American Journal of Public Health* 78, no. 12 (1988), Bruce Voeller, "AIDS and Heterosexual Anal Intercourse," *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 20, no. 3 (1991).
3. The forced penetration of a male is not rape in U.S. jurisprudence. However, some statutes may include intercourse between men. See, Black's Law Dictionary, H.C. Black, *Black's Law Dictionary* (St Paul: West Publishing Company, 1991), 870.
4. This book uses the term white to designate a socially constructed identity. White is different from Caucasian and European. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, a German naturalist in 1795, introduced the term Caucasian. Apparently, he used it because he believed whites who lived in the Caucasus Mountains were the most beautiful of people (Gould 1994). Caucasian is not associated with scientific racism in this book. In addition, the book uses the term whiteness to designate a racialized order where norms of white superiority prevail (Jacobson 1998). The book uses the term European American but avoids it since many whites do not descend from Europe. However, it uses Eurocentric to designate a world system ideology of gender and race hierarchy.
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10. Revolutionary Worker. "The Abner Louima Trial." *Revolutionary Worker* May 23, no. 1007 (1999), <http://revcom.us/a/v21/1005-009/1007/louima.htm> (10 August 2009).
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 46. Alphonso Pinkney, *The Myth of Black Progress* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), Stephen Steinberg, *The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), *Turning Back: The Retreat from Racial Justice in American Thought and Policy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), Steinberg, *Race Relations: A Critique*.
 47. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
 48. See, for instance, Manning Marable, Ian Steinberg, and Keesha Middlemass, *Racializing Justice, Disenfranchising Lives: The Racism, Criminal Justice, and Law Reader* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
 49. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimizing in Antidiscrimination Law," *Harvard Law Review* 103 (1998): 1366.
 50. *Ibid.*, 1355.
 51. Anthony E. Cook, "Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.," *Harvard Law Review* 103 (1990): 1070.
 52. *Ibid.*, 1011.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Stuart Hall, "Deviance, Politics and the Media," in *The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader*, ed. Henry Abelove, M. A. Barale, and D. M. Halperin (New York: Routledge, 1993), 66.
2. Jonathan Katz, *The Invention of Heterosexuality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 83–100.
3. Michel Foucault, "The Battle for Chastity," in *Western Sexuality: Practice and Precept in Past and Present Times*, ed. Philippe Aries and Andre Bejin (New York: Blackwell, 1985).
4. David F. Greenberg, *The Construction of Homosexuality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

5. Gayle S. Rubin, "Thinking Sex," in *The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader*, ed. H. Ablove, M. A. Barale, and D. M. Halperin (New York: Routledge, 1993), 4.
6. For example, the Mann Act linked to disciplining black male gender roles. "Federal statute . . . making it a crime to transport a woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose." Black, *Black's Law Dictionary*, 664.
7. Celia Kitinger and Sue Wilkinson, "Virgins and Queers: Rehabilitating Heterosexuality?," *Gender & Society* 8, no. 3 (1994): 444–45.
8. Rubin, "Thinking Sex," 5.
9. For examples see, C. J. Pascoe, "'Dude, You're a Fag': Adolescent Masculinity and the Fag Discourse," *Sexualities* 8, no. 3 (2005).
10. Rubin, "Thinking Sex."
11. Pierre Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 118–19.
12. Harold Garfinkel, "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies," *American Journal of Sociology* 61, no. 5 (1956).
13. *Ibid.*, 422.
14. To show the differences, I drilled down to generate sample characteristics that would not violate mean comparison assumptions; namely, I was concerned about independence of the observations, the homogeneity of variance, and the curve normality of the sample vis-à-vis the four populations. All group sample sizes were equal; $N = 2105$; they were stratified through random sample selection from a 1 percent IPUMS data set.
15. This is a measure of the Nam–Powers–Boyd Occupational Status Scale. It indicates that there is a difference between the means of the employed gendered race groups, Welch $F(3,4647) = 83.6$, $p < .001$. The analysis used the Games-Howell (equal variances not assumed) for the post hoc multiple comparisons.
16. The analysis used post hoc Games-Howell comparisons that we can also see in the plot. The Welch F test was significant; $F(3,4561) = 70.4$, $p < .001$.
17. Frederick Ernst et al., "Condemnation of Homosexuality in the Black Community: A Gender-Specific Phenomenon?" *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 20, no. 6 (1991).
18. Herbert Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," *Pacific Sociological Review* 1, no. 1 (1958).
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*, 4.
21. *Ibid.*, 3–4.
22. G. E. Wyatt et al., "Sociocultural Factors Affecting Sexual Risk-Taking in African American Men and Women Results from Two Empirical Studies," in *The Black Family Essays and Studies*, ed. Robert Staples (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1999), William A. Darity, Jr. and Samuel L. Myers, Jr., "Does Welfare Dependency Cause Female Headship? The Case of the Black Family," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 46, no. 4 (1984), William Julius Wilson and Kathryn M. Neckerman, "Poverty and Family Structure: The Widening Gap between Evidence and Public Policy Issues," in *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't*, ed. S. Danziger and D. Weinberg (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
23. Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell Baxter Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1948).
24. Janice M. Irvine, *Disorders of Desire: Sex and Gender in Modern American Sexology* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 40–44.

25. Erich Goode, *Deviant Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984), 181.
26. Laud Humphreys, *Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970). Also see, Peter Aggleton, "Men Who Sell Sex International Perspectives on Male Prostitution and AIDS," UCL Press, Loïc Wacquant, "Inside the Zone: The Social Art of the Hustler in the Black American Ghetto," *Theory, Culture & Society* 15, no. 2 (1998).
27. Thomas C. Calhoun, "Male Street Hustling: Introduction Processes and Stigma Containment," *Sociological Spectrum* 12, no. 1 (1992).
28. For examples of these cultural conventions see, Edelman, *Homographesis: Essays in Gay Literary and Cultural Theory*. For ways such code words are used among black males see, Vickie M. Mays et al., "The Language of Black Gay Men's Sexual Behavior: Implications for AIDS Risk Reduction," *Journal of Sex Research* 29, no. 3 (1992). For the symbolic violence of such language see, Nicole Asquith, "In Terrorem: 'With Their Tanks and Their Bombs, and Their Bombs and Their Guns, in Your Head,'" *Journal of Sociology* 40, no. 4 (2004).
29. The public and private distinctions in public policies are nuance. One study that is an introduction to some of the concerns is Ronald Bayer, *Private Acts, Social Consequences: AIDS and the Politics of Public Health* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1991).
30. Larry D. Icard, "Black Gay Men and Conflicting Social Identities: Sexual Orientation Versus Racial Identity," *Journal of Social Work & Human Sexuality* 4, no. 1 (1985).
31. Black, *Black's Law Dictionary*, 323–24.
32. Evan Gerstmann, *The Constitutional Underclass: Gays, Lesbians, and the Failure of Class-Based Equal Protection* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
33. For an excellent analysis see, Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York: Routledge, 1997).
34. DSM-IV, "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV" (Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1999), 411–17.
35. *Ibid.*, 410.
36. *Ibid.*, 416.
37. Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*.
38. Hutchinson, *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*.
39. This is what George Herbert Mead meant when he argued that the individual would have to make an object of the self, must turn toward the self and communicate with the self given the collective representations. See, Herbert Blumer, "Comments On 'George Herbert Mead and the Chicago Tradition of Sociology'" *Symbolic Interaction* 2, no. 2 (1979), Herbert Blumer, Talcott Parsons, and Jonathan H. Turner, "Exchange on Turner, 'Parsons as a Symbolic Interactionist,'" Vol. 44, No. 4," *Sociological Inquiry* 45, no. 1 (1975).
40. Leslie J. Moran, *The Homosexual(ity) of Law* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 3.
41. Irvine, *Disorders of Desire: Sex and Gender in Modern American Sexology*, 139.
42. Keith Boykin, *One More River to Cross: Black and Gay in America* (New York: Anchor, 1996), 34, 215.
43. Charles E. Jones, *The Black Panther Party (Reconsidered)* (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1998), 35.
44. Huey P. Newton, *To Die for the People* (New York: Writers and Readers Publishing, 1995), 153.

45. Eldridge Cleaver, *Soul on Ice* (New York: Dell, 1968). Newton claimed that Cleaver was hypocritical on this issue because of an alleged homosexual exchange between Cleaver and James Baldwin. See, Huey P. Newton, "On Eldridge Cleaver: He Is No James Baldwin," in *Black Men on Race, Gender, and Sexuality: A Critical Reader*, ed. Devon W. Carbado (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 312–16.
46. Warren J. Blumenfeld, *Homophobia: How We All Pay the Price* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), 15.
47. Baker, "Critical Memory and the Black Public Sphere," 7–37.
48. Nachman Ben-Yehuda, "Criminalization and Deviantization as Properties of the Social Order," *The Sociological Review* 40, no. 1 (1992): 80.
49. Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Cinematic Representation," *Framework* 36 (1989), Henry Louis Gates, "The Black Man's Burden," in *Black Popular Culture*, ed. Gina Dent (Seattle: Bay Press, 1992), 77.
50. Marable, *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems in Race, Political Economy and Society*.
51. Cornel West, "Marxist Theory and the Specificity of Afro-American Oppression," in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 17–33.
52. Delroy Constantine-Simms, *The Greatest Taboo: Homosexuality in Black Communities*, (Los Angeles: Alyson Books, 2001), Joseph P. Stokes and John L. Peterson, "Homophobia, Self-Esteem, and Risk for HIV among African American Men Who Have Sex with Men," *AIDS Education and Prevention* 10, no. 3 (1998).
53. Molefi Kete Asante, *Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change* (Buffalo, NY: Amulefi Publishing Company, 1980), 64–65.
54. Nathan Hare and Julia Hare, *The Endangered Black Family: Coping with the Unisexualization and Coming Extinction of the Black Race*, A Black Male/Female Relationships Book (San Francisco: Black Think Tank, 1984), 65.
55. Frances Cress Welsing, *The Isis Papers: The Keys to the Colors* (Chicago: Third World Press, 1991), 90. Note that Welsing offered this reasoning before the HIV/AIDS death totals were calculated where we learned that sexual desire—sometimes love—exchanged for death among many black males.
56. *Ibid.*, 91.
57. Marimba Ani, *Yurugu: An African-Centered Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1994), 438.
58. James A. Davis, Tom W. Smith, and Peter V. Marsden, "General Social Surveys" (National Opinion Research Center, 1972–2006). The assumptions of the observations being independent and independent variables being linearly related to the logit were checked and met.
59. This logistic regression used the General Social Surveys 2006 data. The assumptions that observations are independent and that independent variables are linearly related to the logit was checked and met; see note 60.
60. For the white male, $\chi^2 = 70.36$, $df = 4$, $N = 368$, $p < .001$; for white female, $\chi^2 = 76.54$, $df = 4$, $N = 420$, $p < .001$; for black male, $\chi^2 = 1.76$, $df = 4$, $N = 60$, $p < .781$; and for black female, $\chi^2 = 12.25$, $df = 4$, $N = 77$, $p < .05$.
61. The tolerance for black male logistic regression for some variables was below its (1- R^2) value (.959) indicating a multicollinearity problem for age, rural residence, and socioeconomic status. Conceptually the problem is minimal given the robust nature of logistic regression—I checked multicollinearity with linear regression; results were read with caution.

62. Sale, *The Slumbering Volcano: American Slave Ship Revolts and the Production of Rebellious Masculinity*, 48.
63. *Ibid.*, 57.
64. Visilikie Demos, Anthony J. Lemelle, and Solomon Gashaw, "Systems of Oppression: Ten Principles," in *Intersections of Gender, Race, and Class: Readings for a Changing Landscape*, ed. Marcia Texler Segal and Theresa A. Martinez (Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2006).
65. Mimi Schippers, "Recovering the Feminine Other: Masculinity, Femininity, and Gender Hegemony," *Theory & Society* 36, no. 1 (2007), Judith Halberstam, *Female Masculinity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).
66. Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, 104.
67. *Ibid.*, 104–05. In a footnote, Bourdieu refers to Foucault's *The Uses of Pleasure* where Foucault pointed out the relation between the schema of penetration and male domination. In the space of the gay bathhouse, doing the bathhouse is in essence another form of male domination that disrupts this schema.
68. Evelyn Hooker, "A Preliminary Analysis of Group Behavior of Homosexuals," *Journal of Psychology* 42 (1956), David Gottlieb, *The Gay Tapes: A Candid Discussion about Male Homosexuality* (New York: Stein & Day, 1977).
69. *Brown v. County of San Joaquin*, (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, 2006).
70. For example, the top/bottom sexual position myth is a tired and used convention still simulated by many black gay males. See, Kathryn Bond Stockton, *Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame: Where "Black" Meets "Queer"* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). In addition, researchers presented a study of men who reported suspecting contracting a sexually transmitted infection from another man in California. The findings showed that a significant proportion of men's sexual claims did not correspond to their sexual behaviors—among African Americans, for example, men were more likely than other racial groups to claim to be heterosexual when they in fact reported considerable homosexual sex. See, R. McCandless et al., "Sexual Identity, Ethnicity, and Sexual and Drug Use Comparisons among Men Who Have Sex with Men in California" (paper presented at the National HIV Prevention Conference, Atlanta, GA, June 2005).
71. The heterosexual sample was $N = 256,675$, $F(3) = 2674.17$, $p < .001$. The homosexual sample was $N = 34,808$, $F(3) = 214.53$, $p < .001$. The analysis conducted Games-Howell post hoc tests to compare levels of gender and race identifications.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. I examined the normality of distribution, homogeneity of variances, and linearity as part of the process of interpreting the data. For example, see Nancy L. Leech, Karen Caplovitz Barrett, and George A. Morgan, *SPSS for Intermediate Statistics: Use and Interpretation*, 3rd ed. (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2008).
2. Barbara Welter, "The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860," *American Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (1966).
3. Herbert Spencer, *Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1878), 426–27.

4. The assumptions of independent observations, homogeneity of variances, and normal distributions of the dependent variable for each group were checked. The Games-Howell post hoc comparisons were used since the assumption of the homogeneity of variances was violated.
5. Davis, Smith, and Marsden, "General Social Surveys."
6. Jacob Cohen et al., *Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences*, 3rd ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003). I checked and met assumptions of linearity, normally distributed errors, and uncorrelated errors. The dummy variables' references appear in the table. I recoded number of sexual partners into four categories: 0 = none; 1 = 1; 2 = 2–10; and 3 = 11+.
7. James B. Stewart and Joseph W. Scott, "The Institutional Decimation of Black American Males," *Western Journal of Black Studies* 2, no. 2 (1978).
8. Jacqueline J. Jackson, "But Where Are the Men?" *The Black Scholar* 3, no. 4 (1971).
9. Stewart and Scott, "The Institutional Decimation of Black American Males," 82.
10. *Ibid.*, 84.
11. Pinkney, *The Myth of Black Progress*.
12. Some scholars, for instance, attempted to shift the discussion to performance while in school. Their logic was that black males, in particular, did not perform well in college and graduate schools despite the fact that they earned their credentials. This, according to them, would account for salary disparities. See, for example, Abigail M. Thernstrom and Stephan Thernstrom, *Beyond the Color Line: New Perspectives on Race and Ethnicity in America* (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2002), Stephan Thernstrom and Abigail M. Thernstrom, *America in Black and White: One Nation Indivisible* (New York: Touchstone, 1999). These arguments are not very convincing because they fail to explain why statistically significant differences between black males and black females are not empirically demonstrable on these variables. Further, the salary and wage differences between white males and females appears, in some research, to be less; see, Richard Lynn, "Why Do Black American Males Earn Less than Black American Women? An Examination of Four Hypotheses," *Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies* 27, no. 3 (2002). For more balanced debates see, Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), Carnoy, *Faded Dreams: The Politics and Economics of Race in America*.
13. Attwell and Lavin, *Passing the Torch: Does Higher Education for the Disadvantaged Pay Off across the Generations?*
14. Major G. Coleman, "Job Skill and Black Male Wage Discrimination," *Social Science Quarterly* 84, no. 4 (2003).
15. Steinberg, *Race Relations: A Critique*.
16. Kenneth Hudson, "The New Labor Market Segmentation: Labor Market Dualism in the New Economy," *Social Science Research* 36, no. 1 (2007).
17. Devah Pager, *Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 95–96.
18. Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, *Gang Leader for a Day: A Rogue Sociologist Takes to the Streets* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 16.
19. *Ibid.*, 188.
20. An excellent empirical study and overview of explanations of the causes of lynching may be found in Gregory N. Price, William A. Darity, Jr., and Alvin E. Headen, Jr., "Does the Stigma of Slavery Explain the Maltreatment of Blacks by Whites: The Case of Lynchings," *Journal of Socio-Economics* 37, no. 1 (2008).

21. Deirdre A. Royster, *Race and the Invisible Hand: How White Networks Exclude Black Men from Blue-Collar Jobs* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
22. *Ibid.*, 184.
23. When looking at the history of white-initiated racial strife, it was largely always associated with the purity of the white female. An excellent history of this is Mary F. Berry, *Black Resistance, White Law: A History of Constitutional Racism in America* (New York: Penguin, 1994).
24. Julianne Holt-Lunstad, Wendy Birmingham, and Brandon Q. Jones, "Is There Something Unique about Marriage? The Relative Impact of Marital Status, Relationship Quality, and Network Social Support on Ambulatory Blood Pressure and Mental Health," *Annals of Behavioral Medicine* 35, no. 2 (2008).
25. Mary E. Pattillo, *Black on the Block: The Politics of Race and Class in the City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
26. *Ibid.*, 116.
27. *Ibid.*, 117.
28. Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference* (Boston: Little, Brown, 2000), Pattillo, *Black on the Block: The Politics of Race and Class in the City*, 117–18.
29. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*.
30. David Brotherton and Michael Flynn, *Globalizing the Streets: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Youth, Social Control, and Empowerment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), David Brotherton and Philip Kretsedemas, *Keeping out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), John Hagedorn, *Gangs in the Global City: Alternatives to Traditional Criminology* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), Maureen P. Duffy and Scott Edward Gillig, *Teen Gangs: A Global View* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004).
31. Gilroy, *Small Acts: Thoughts on the Politics of Black Cultures*, Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation* (London: Routledge, 2002).
32. Pattillo discussed Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham's notion of the "politics of respectability" as the "rejection of 'gaudy' colors in dress, snuff dipping, baseball games on Sunday, and other forms of 'improper' decorum" Pattillo, *Black on the Block: The Politics of Race and Class in the City*, 105.
33. Stewart and Scott, "The Institutional Decimation of Black American Males," 88.
34. *Ibid.*, 91.
35. Philippe Bourgois and Jeff Schonberg, "Intimate Apartheid Ethnic Dimensions of Habitus among Homeless Heroin Injectors," *Ethnography* 8, no. 1 (2007).
36. *Ibid.*, 29.
37. *Ibid.*, 9.
38. *Ibid.*, 9, 12.
39. *Ibid.*, 24.
40. *Ibid.*, 27.
41. Mary E. Pattillo, "Sweet Mothers and Gangbangers: Managing Crime in a Black Middle-Class Neighborhood," *Social Forces* 76, no. 3 (1998).
42. Elijah Anderson, "Sex Codes and Family Life among Poor Inner-City Youths," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 501 (1989).
43. *Ibid.*, 59.

44. *Ibid.*, 61.
45. *Ibid.*, 62.
46. *Ibid.*, 66.
47. *Ibid.*, 69.
48. *Ibid.*, 76.
49. Edin, Kefalas, and Reed, "A Peek Inside the Black Box: What Marriage Means for Poor Unmarried Parents."
50. Émile Durkheim, "The Division of Labor in Society," in *Inequality: Classic Readings in Race, Class, and Gender*, ed. David B. Grusky and Szonja Szelenyi (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2006), 59.
51. Ulf Hannerz, *Soulside: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 70–75; 118–20.
52. *Ibid.*, 77.
53. For example, this viewpoint was the underlying argument made by Daniel Patrick Moynihan that opened much of the debate about modern black family policies. See, Daniel Moynihan, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965). In addition, many black family scholars who were themselves black followed this moral prescription; for example see, Harriette Pipes McAdoo, *Black Families*, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007), Harriette Pipes McAdoo and John L. McAdoo, "The Dynamics of African American Fathers' Family Roles," in *Black Children: Social, Educational & Parental Environments* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), John L. McAdoo, "A Black Perspective on the Father's Role in Child Development," *Marriage & Family Review* 9, no. 3 (1985). And others have tied conservative family policies to the virtual elimination of welfare in the U.S. and the global transformation of marriage patterns; see, Elijah Anderson, *Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), Edin and Kefalas, *Promises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Motherhood before Marriage*.
54. Hannerz, *Soulside: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community*, 77.
55. Edin, Kefalas, and Reed, "A Peek Inside the Black Box: What Marriage Means for Poor Unmarried Parents."
56. Heidi Hartmann, "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union," in *Inequality: Classic Readings in Race, Class, and Gender*, ed. David B. Grusky and Szonja Szelenyi (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2006), 181–82.
57. David Matza and Gresham M. Sykes, "Juvenile Delinquency and Subterranean Values," *American Sociological Review* 26, no. 5 (1961): 712–13.
58. *Ibid.*, 715.
59. For example, compare Carol B. Stack, *All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). Also see, Gail Garfield, *Knowing What We Know: African American Women's Experiences of Violence and Violation* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005), Gail Garfield and Community Service Society of New York., *Congregate Care for Babies: An Alternative Care Arrangement or an Old System of Care?* (New York: Community Service Society of New York, 1987), Sharon Hays, *The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), *Flat Broke with Children: Women in the Age of Welfare Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). For work on black women in poor and severely distressed households, see Eloise Dunlap, Andrew Golub, and Bruce D. Johnson, "The Severely-Distressed African American Family in the Crack Era: Empowerment Is Not Enough," *Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare* 33, no. 1 (2006), "Girls' Sexual Development

- in the Inner City: From Compelled Childhood Sexual Contact to Sex-for-Things Exchanges,” *Journal of Child Sexual Abuse* 12, no. 2 (2003), Eloise Dunlap et al., “Intergenerational Transmission of Conduct Norms for Drugs, Sexual Exploitation and Violence: A Case Study,” *British Journal of Criminology* 42, no. 1 (2002).
60. Hannerz, *Soulside: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community*, 119.
 61. Boykin, *One More River to Cross: Black and Gay in America*.
 62. Benjamin P. Bowser, Mindy Thompson Fullilove, and Robert E. Fullilove, “African-American Youth and AIDS High-Risk Behavior: The Social Context and Barriers to Prevention,” *Youth and Society* 22, no. 1 (1990), Robert Staples, “Black Male Genocide: A Final Solution to the Race Problem in America,” in *Black Male Adolescents: Parenting and Education in Community Context*, ed. Benjamin Bowser (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991).
 63. Laura E. Huggins, *Drug War Deadlock: The Policy Battle Continues*, Hoover Institution Press Publication No. 539 (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2005).
 64. Ian Stewart, *Transactional Analysis Counseling in Action* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989).
 65. This dimension of critique differs from the critique that Wacquant brought to Anderson’s work. It is not merely that Anderson bought into the stereotyping of ghetto residents; he also deployed much more deeply embedded symbols of power when he tapped into the raced gender codes communicating the black male as disreputable. See, Loïc Wacquant, “Scrutinizing the Street: Poverty, Morality, and the Pitfalls of Urban Ethnography,” *American Journal of Sociology* 107, no. 6 (2002).
 66. Edin and Kefalas, *Promises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Motherhood before Marriage*, 140–41.
 67. *Ibid.*, 213.
 68. *Ibid.*, 215.
 69. *Ibid.*
 70. Institute for Social Research, “Panel Study of Income Dynamics,” (University of Michigan, 1968–2007).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. Kate Millett, *Sexual Politics* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), 39.
2. The between-subjects effects for interaction year by race was significant, $F(23,11384) = 2.05, p < .001, \eta^2 = .004$. For year $F(23,1) = 49.1, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09$. For race $F(1,23) = 129.90, p < .001, \eta^2 = .01$. The data did not meet the equality of variances assumption; therefore, it makes little sense to present post hoc comparisons and researchers should read parameter results with caution. The trend line used the General Social Surveys, Davis, Smith, and Marsden, “General Social Surveys.”
3. The analysis recoded outliers beyond three standard deviations. The analysis considered means, medians, and log conversions. This distribution was considered the most straightforward to present these data in context of the assumptions of one-way ANOVA. Institute for Social Research, “Panel Study of Income Dynamics.”
4. The model indicates that there are differences between these means; $F(3,785) = 8.16, p < .001$.
5. Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” *Daedalus* 134, no. 4 (2005).

6. *Ibid.*, 43.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Bellah, "Religion and Legitimation in the American Republic," *Society* 35, no. 2 (1998): 196.
9. Quoted by Bellah, *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, 200.
11. Here I am using the term "sense" as did Herbert Blumer in his analysis of prejudice as a sense of group position. The sense refers to the imagination about how things should be. For example, according to Blumer, a sufficient number of whites in the 1950s imagined that blacks should be beneath them in the social hierarchy. See Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position."
12. Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism* (New York: Routledge, 2004).
13. *Ibid.*, 47.
14. Here Professor Collins might have been unaware that black male-initiated prison rapes usually target white males. See, HRW, *No Escape: Male Rapes in Prison*, Christopher Hensley, Mary Koscheski, and Richard Tewksbury, "Examining the Characteristics of Male Sexual Assault Targets in a Southern Maximum-Security Prison," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 20, no. 6 (2005).
15. Collins, *Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism*, 282.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Millett, *Sexual Politics*.
18. *Ibid.*, 25.
19. *Ibid.*, 51.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Domonick J. Wegesin and F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg Heino, "Top/Bottom Self-Label, Anal Sex Practices, HIV Risk and Gender Role Identity in Gay Men in New York City," *Journal of Psychology & Human Sexuality* 12, no. 3 (2000).
22. *Ibid.*, 44.
23. A. J. Lemelle et al., "Men Who Have Sex with Men: Sexual Behavior and Identification: A Call for Special Research in HIV Prevention" (paper presented at the American Foundation for AIDS Research 17th National HIV/AIDS Update Conference, Oakland, CA, 2005).
24. DSM-IV, "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV," 530–31.
25. *Ibid.*, 531.
26. *Ibid.*, 533.
27. Jordan W. Edwards, Dennis G. Fisher, and Grace L. Reynolds, "Male-to-Female Transgender and Transsexual Clients of HIV Service Programs in Los Angeles County, California," *American Journal of Public Health* 97, no. 6 (2007).
28. Melinda Jones, "Adolescent Gender Identity and the Courts," *International Journal of Children's Rights* 13, no. 1–2 (2005), Robert M. Kaplan, "Treatment of Homosexuality during Apartheid," *British Medical Journal* 329, no. 7480 (2004).
29. Riki Wilchins, *Queer Theory, Gender Theory* (Los Angeles: Alyson Books, 2004).
30. Stockton, *Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame: Where "Black" Meets "Queer"*, 32.
31. *Ibid.*

32. Here, as throughout this book, I use the term “discourse” to refer to the political aspects of the communication. My usage agrees with Terry Eagleton who quoted John B. Thompson, “‘To study ideology’, writes John B. Thompson, ‘ . . . is to study the ways in which meaning (or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination’” (p. 5). Now, as we have seen, the term “discourse” has become popular, particularly given Foucault’s use of the word. Therefore, Eagleton stressed, “A way of putting this point is to suggest that ideology is a matter of ‘discourse’ rather than ‘language’. It concerns the actual uses of language between particular human subjects for the production of specific effects” (p. 9). See, Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (New York: Verso, 2007).
33. Stockton, *Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame: Where “Black” Meets “Queer”*.
34. *Ibid.*, 6.
35. *Ibid.*, 108–09.
36. *Ibid.*, 108.
37. *Ibid.*, 115.
38. Howson, *Challenging Hegemonic Masculinity*, 25.
39. Pager, “The Mark of a Criminal Record.”, *Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration*, Devah Pager and Lincoln Quillian, “Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus What They Do,” *American Sociological Review* 70, no. 3 (2005), Pager and Western, “Discrimination in Low-Wage Labor Markets: Evidence from an Experimental Audit Study in New York City.”
40. “*Equal Rights under the Law*” 42 US Code 110–296, (July 30, 2008).
41. Black, *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 516.
42. Terry Smith, “Speaking against Norms: Public Discourse and the Economy of Racialization in the Workplace,” *American University Law Review* 57 (2008).
43. Richard G. Stevens, ed., *Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America: The Texts* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995).
44. Smith, “Speaking against Norms: Public Discourse and the Economy of Racialization in the Workplace,” 524–25.
45. *Ibid.*, 526–27.
46. *Ibid.*, 538.
47. *Ibid.*, 558.
48. *Ibid.*, 560.
49. Elijah Anderson, *Against the Wall: Poor, Young, Black, and Male* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
50. Douglas S. Massey, “Immigration and Equal Opportunity,” in *Against the Wall: Poor, Young, Black, and Male*, ed. Elijah Anderson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 102.
51. Devah Pager, “Blacklisted: Hiring Discrimination in an Era of Mass Incarceration,” in *Against the Wall: Poor, Young, Black, and Male*, ed. Elijah Anderson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 77.
52. U.S. Census Bureau, “Table 17. Number of Men 18–44 Years of Age and Percentage Ever Forced to Have Sexual Intercourse by a Female and Percentage Ever Forced to Have Sex by a Male, by Selected Characteristics: United States, 2002,” Series 23 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002).
53. Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, 104.
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ibid.*

56. *Ibid.*, 106.

57. Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," 3.

58. *Ibid.*

Glossary

abject: Occupying a low or debased social position of servility and suffering.

analysis of variance: A statistical procedure that uses the *F*-ratio to test the overall fit of a linear model. It tests whether the group means differ. It is often written as ANOVA.

chi-square test: Tests whether two categorical variables forming a contingency table are associated.

colorblind ideology: It is an abstract principle that does not hold true in practice, particularly in the practice of marriage and intimacy. The colorblind ideology asserts that color is not important and should not be the basis for social judgments. It is a racial agenda in the discussion of political matters that avoids direct racial references.

crostabulation: A way researchers arrange frequency data in a table with rows as conditions of one variable and columns as conditions of another variable. More variables can be added as layers or panels.

cultural hegemony: A concept referring to understanding a certain way of life as the only way of life. A virtual totalitarian condition where dominant classes rule over others. Therefore, cultural hegemony produces severe inequality.

deployment: To use symbolic codes and signs to gain power in social situations.

emphasized femininity: Hyperfemininity designed to reinforce hegemonic masculinity. In societies highly ranked by race and class, emphasized femininity is deployed by using representations sanctioned by the dominant class of men. Therefore, subordinated race, class, and sexual orientation classes experience abjectness.

female (feminine) masculinity: A specific gender with its own cultural history rather than a derivative of male masculinity. A non-relational and fanciful claim that brackets relational and conflict realities. A dominant cultural fad.

F-ratio: A test statistic with a known probability distribution. It is the ratio of the average variability in the data that a given model can explain divided by the variability that a given model cannot explain.

habitus: A set of dispositions which generate practices and perceptions stemming from a habitual or typical condition. A state or appearance that becomes embodied by social actors. For example, the condition of white upper class male has its habitus.

hegemonic masculinity: A conflict activity that individuals and groups in situations engage in to position their group in a social hierarchy. In order to produce hegemony, actors must use powerful encoded communication, that is, text, in situations to win dominance. Therefore, actors cannot produce hegemonic masculinity without symbolic interaction. The outcome is patriarchy where some men systematically subordinate other classes of citizens. In addition, some women gain privilege by their relationships to hegemonic men, which allow them to subordinate other citizens too.

hegemony: Preponderant influence or authority over others.

herrenvolk: A racial dictatorship that includes a denial of basic democratic rights to racially defined minorities and women. Before World War II the herrenvolk organization was explicit. After World War II, some of the race and gender inequality necessarily transformed.

heterosexism: An ideology and practice that heterosexuality is superior to other forms of sexuality.

hypothesis: A predicted relationship between variables. For example, “As marriage increases, length of life increases.”

ideology: A group of ideas that reasons the interests of status groups. For example, sexism is an ideology that reasons the subordination of women and sexual minorities.

independent t-test: A test with two experimental conditions and different participants are used in each condition. It uses the *t*-statistic to determine if the means differ significantly.

interaction: An interaction indicates the effect of one factor is not the same at each condition of another factor. For example, if we found that black males have less sex than black females between 18–23 but more sex than black females at all other age categories, then there is an interaction of “amount of gendered sex” and “age.”

isomorphic: Being of identical or similar form, shape, or substance. In the study of organizations, they are isomorphic when they share similar values, beliefs, and practices despite the fact that one organization might be the institution of education while the other might be the institution of the family.

mean: A measure of the average score of a data set. To calculate the mean, add all the scores and divide by the number of scores.

median: The point where half the scores are above and half are below when we order them from lowest to highest scores.

negrophobia: An irrational fear of blacks.

new patriarchy: A moment of crisis. The old order of white heterosexual male privilege has been disturbed and has become incapable of entirely reproducing its order; yet, the dominated forces of revised masculinity ushering in an end to patriarchy has been unable to imagine and bring into practice new ways of organizing social life.

oppositional culture: When conquered and subordinated groups behave the way conquering and dominant groups communicate expectations for their behavior.

***p* values:** The probability of a test statistic. If this value is small then we reject the null hypothesis that the samples come from the same population. We claim a significant effect if the *p* value is smaller than a conventional significance level, typically 0.05.

performative: An expression that generates a communication of a deployment. For example, I am a man, generates identification with hegemonic masculinity. It does not guarantee the social acceptance of the utterance. For example, an effeminate body might modify the claim. Therefore, disrupt the deployment. Or, audience knowledge of something that diminishes the claim might undermine its communicative power. For example, a constative question, is he a real man?

political class: A political class is a power group that tends to organize for conflict. Members join based on commitment to the political class ideology. The political class goal is control of the state.

population: A complete set of items or events. For example, in statistics this often refers to a complete set of subjects or scores that we are interested in studying.

post hoc tests: When there are more than two conditions of an independent variable (for example, race that includes the five conditions black, white, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American), a statistical test may show a significant difference but not the source of the difference. Post hoc tests determine which conditions account for the significant differences.

regression: The prediction of scores on one variable by their scores on a second variable. The larger the correlation, the stronger is the prediction. Multiple regression predicts the scores on one variable from the scores on a number of predictor variables. When the outcome variable, sometimes called the criterion, has two values, for example, ever married and never married, then regression techniques are available. For example, a researcher might use logistic regression.

relational theory: A group of propositions concerned with symbolic relationships. Rules for tying a set of facts together to reveal the way they work together. For example, how black male identities are related to white male

identities, that are in turn related to white female and black female identities. Relational analysis exceeds intersectional analysis. Intersectional analysis recognizes identities are mutually constructing parts of social organization. Relational analysis looks at how those parts conflict to deploy power.

social class: Social class is a concept. It conceptually refers to the position of an individual in the hierarchy of prestige in a society at large. It also refers to a conceptual position in the labor market. Finally, it conceptually refers to a set of social relationships that result from class position.

social inequality: Unequal opportunities or rewards for different individuals within a group or groups in a society.

status class: A form of social ranking in which groups rank and organize by legal, political, and cultural criteria.

substantial dutiful theory: Reasons that people are clear about their duties to society. When it comes to social roles, like being a parent, father, or mother, the roles are well defined and performing them becomes a matter of doing ones duty.

switchpoints: In communication, symbolic reference may refer to a spoiled identity and a communicator might attempt to link the symbol to another debased identity as a strategy to communicate the reference's utter inhumanity. For example, while talking about men who have sex with men, a communicator could switch and start a discussion of child molesters as if child molesters and men who have sex with men are the same.

systems of oppression: A form of social analysis that examines how the powerful subordinate groups simultaneously and systematically in societies.

two-tailed test: A prediction that two samples come from different populations, but without stating which population has the higher mean value.

underclass: A status group under conditions of virtual social immobility. Researchers characterize underclass status groups by the permanence of their statuses. In addition, a status class could be a high stratum with an underclass located in it. For example, among a very rich stratum, women might form an underclass.

vocabularies of motive: The language by which people describe their motivations and account for their conduct. It does not refer to a psychology of motivations like inner drives or subconscious thoughts. Rather, how people describe their conduct in social situations. Motivated talk is usually connected to a wider ideology. Therefore, motivational claims are relative and they are negotiated depending on the communicator's audience or "significant others."

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