

The Palestinians and British Perfidy

The Tragic Aftermath
of the Balfour
Declaration of 1917

C. W. R. LONG



The Palestinians and British Perfidy

DEDICATION

To Jan, who has been unstinting in her
support for this labour of love.

The Palestinians and British Perfidy

**The Tragic Aftermath
of the Balfour
Declaration of 1917**

C. W. R. LONG

sussex
ACADEMIC
PRESS

Brighton • Portland • Toronto

Copyright © C. W. R. Long 2018.

The right of C. W. R. Long to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

ISBN 9781845198961 (Cloth)
ISBN 9781782845133 (PDF)

First published in 2018 in Great Britain by
SUSSEX ACADEMIC PRESS
PO Box 139
Eastbourne BN24 9BP

Distributed in North America by
SUSSEX ACADEMIC PRESS
ISBS Publisher Services
920 NE 58th Ave #300, Portland, OR 97213, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of
criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the
prior permission of the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Long, Richard (Charles William Richard), author.
Title: The Palestinians and British perfidy : the tragic aftermath of the Balfour
Declaration of 1917 / Richard Long.
Description: Brighton ; Portland ; Toronto : Sussex Academic Press, [2018] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017035708 | ISBN 9781845198961 (hbk : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Balfour Declaration. | Palestine—History—20th century. |
Zionism—Great Britain—History—20th century. | Palestinian Arabs—
Attitudes. | Great Britain—Foreign relations—Middle East. | Middle East—
Foreign relations—Great Britain.
Classification: LCC DS125.5 .L66 2018 | DDC 956.94/04—dc23
LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2017035708>



Typeset & designed by Sussex Academic Press, Brighton & Eastbourne.
Printed by Tj International, Padstow, Cornwall.

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	vi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	viii
<i>Illustrations</i>	ix
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xii
Introduction	1
Part One MACHINATION	
1 Zionism Emerges	9
2 The UK Promotes a Jewish Palestine	18
Part Two JUSTIFICATION	
3 Palestine's Doom is Documented	25
Part Three OCCUPATION	
4 The UK Conquers Palestine and the Sharif is Hoodwinked	57
5 Faysal Fails to Fight for Palestine	69
Part Four CAPITULATION	
6 'Mr. Lloyd George's Madness' Crowns the Zionist March into Palestine	83
7 Herbert Samuel Lays the Groundwork of the Jewish State	102
8 Balfour Savours his Handiwork	132
Part Five VACILLATION	
9 A White Paper and a Black Letter	147
10 Zionism Resurgent	166
11 The Sorceror Prepares to be Overthrown by the Apprentice	186
Part Six HUMILIATION	
12 Israel is 'Born in Sin'	203
<i>Notes, Bibliography, Index</i>	227–307

Preface

‘There can be no doubt about what was in the minds of the chief architects of the Balfour Declaration. The evidence is incontrovertible. All envisaged, in the fulness of time, the emergence of a Jewish state.’
(Norman Rose)¹

This book is roughly a companion to my *British Pro-Consuls in Egypt, 1914–1929. The Challenge of Nationalism* and *The Immense Failure. British Rulers of Iraq, 1914–33* in that it discusses British involvement in another segment of the post-World War I Middle East, in this case Palestine. But in contrast to its predecessors, which were purely academic in character, this one has a secondary purpose. In another of my titles,² I complained that ‘Cambridge and McGill somehow managed to expose me to the language, literature and history of the Arabs, and to Islam, without letting slip . . . the grievous wronging of the Palestinians in particular, and the Arabs in general, by my own country’. The present volume is thus in part an attempt to make better known the forcible transformation of the ownership of Palestine via the absolute and ruthless determination of the United Kingdom (until things got difficult) and the even more unshakeable insistence of the Zionists, to whom it is hard to believe that God would have promised Palestine if He had known how they were going to behave there.

I wish to make five points in explanation of my text. Firstly, I have throughout called the Jewish population of Palestine ‘Jews’, ‘Zionists’, ‘the Yishuv’ or ‘Israelis’ as seemed contextually appropriate and – in order to avoid endlessly using the terms ‘Arab Palestinians’ or ‘Palestinian Arabs’ – the Arab inhabitants of the territory ‘Palestinians’. Secondly, my transliteration from the Arabic script to our own is irregular. There are no capital letters in Arabic, but I have equipped Arabic names here with initial ones. There are no hyphens in Arabic, but I have followed the common practice of making use of them in order to avoid such monstrosities as ‘ashshimal’ or ‘asSury’ by the less daunting ‘ashshimal’ and ‘as-Sury’. I believe that this arrangement would allow readers (and even newsreaders at the BBC, which studiously ignores the distinction between sun and moon letters) to make the nearest possible

approach to pronouncing Arabic words and names correctly. Thirdly, in an attempt to limit the number of my references, I have as often as possible made the assumption that readers will not need my guidance in locating the obvious sources in the bibliography. Fourthly, I have not scarred my text, as I have done before, by highlighting the many occasions when the terms England and English have, in quoted passages, been wrongly used for UK/Britain and British. And last, it might be helpful to know that £1 sterling to-day is the equivalent of £106 in 1914 and £41 in 1948.

RICHARD LONG
Bromsberrow Heath, August 2017

Acknowledgements

I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the King's Own Royal (Lancaster) Regiment, in which, before it lost its identity through amalgamation, I did my National Service. The path of my life was set when I flew with it to Libya and encountered the Arabic script for the first time. In consequence, going up to Cambridge six months later, I switched from the subject for which St. Catharine's College had accepted me to Arabic and Persian.

After graduation, a diplomat in the British Embassy in Baghdad, I came up against the question of Palestine. It is not an exaggeration to claim that, if I have not devoted my life to it, the theme of my country's callous First World War intervention in its affairs has never been absent from my thoughts. Despite multiple attempts to write about it, however, I have not had the opportunity to do so until now. Unlike other publishers I have approached, who deemed the very idea of criticising Israel unthinkable, Anthony Grahame at Sussex Academic Press has an openminded and unprejudiced view of the question which is unfortunately extremely uncommon. It is thanks to him that I am at last now able to broach the subject in print.

In researching this book, I have been privileged to enjoy the facilities of the British Library, the Public Record Office at Kew, Rhodes House and St Antony's College, Oxford, the Sudan Archive, Durham University and the University Library of my alma mater, Cambridge. I am also indebted to Mr. R.D. Chancellor for allowing me to quote from the papers of his grandfather.

Illustrations

Cover illustrations

David Lloyd George, ca. 1919. Photograph. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2004672079/>. (Accessed July 24, 2017).

Arthur James Balfour, copyright © National Portrait Gallery, London. Balfour stamp. “Anniversary of the Balfour Declaration” stamp, 1967. Designed by Oswald Adler. Reproduced courtesy of the Israel Philatelic Service, Israel Postal Company.

Picture section (overleaf)

Sir Henry McMahon by John Collier. Reproduced with permission from Art Collection 2 / Alamy Stock Photo.

Sharif Husayn. Reproduced with permission from World History Archive / Alamy Stock Photo.

Chaim Weizmann. Reproduced with permission from World History Archive / Alamy Stock Photo.

Amir Faysal. Reproduced with permission from Mrs. Jan Long, MBE. Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayny, Mufti of Jerusalem. Reproduced with permission from World History Archive / Alamy Stock Photo.


Musa Kadhim al-Husayny. Reproduced with permission from PASSIA. www.passia.org

David Ben-Gurion. © Robert Capa © International Center of Photography/Magnum Photos. Reproduced with permission.




Sir Henry McMahon,

who made no comment in their Correspondence on Sharif Husayn of Mecca's wish for Palestine to be included in an independent post-Ottoman Arab Middle East.



Sharif Husayn,

who misinterpreted McMahon's 'pledge' and mounted his Arab Revolt without any guarantee of postwar British support for his territorial demands.



Chaim Weizmann,


who turned Lloyd George's call for the Cabinet to consider 'the ultimate destiny of Palestine' into enthusiastic British support for the Zionist aim of a Jewish state there.



Amir Faysal,
who led the Arab Revolt and spoke for Palestine ineffectually at the Peace Conference before, as King of Syria, being unseated by Lloyd George and the French.



Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni,
who was a favourite of UK High Commissioners until the British expelled him, robbing Palestine of its only, though inadequate, leader.



David Ben-Gurion,
who brought Israel to independence. His declaration that 'I am for compulsory transfer; I see nothing immoral in it' led to the expulsion of a million Palestinians from their homeland.



Musa Kadhim al-Husayni,
who, though the doyen of Palestinian nationalists, was treated with contempt by the British when he led delegations to London from which they withheld recognition.

Abbreviations

AEC	Arab Executive Committee
AHC	Arab Higher Committee
APO	Assistant Political Officer
AUS	Assistant Under-Secretary
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DMI	Director of Military Intelligence
DP	Displaced Person
EAC	economic absorptive capacity
EEF	Egyptian Expeditionary Force
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HMG	His Majesty's Government
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IMS	Indian Military Ship
KBE	Knight of the Order of the British Empire
KCMG	Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George
MCA	Muslim Christian Association
OETA	Occupied Enemy Territory Administration
PMC	Permanent Mandates' Commission
PUS	Permanent Under-Secretary
RFC	Royal Flying Corps
SMC	Supreme Muslim Council
S.o S.	Secretary of State
TFF	Transjordan Frontier Force
UNRWA	United Nations' Relief and Works' Agency
ZPC	Zionist Political Committee.

‘Cambon [French ambassador] had reminded (Balfour) that, according to prophecies, the end of the world would follow the return of the Jews to Palestine. “That is just the point”, rejoined Balfour; “Think how interesting it will be for us all to see it!”’

(Lt. Col. Repington)

In Palestine ‘we are dealing not with the wishes of an existing community but are consciously seeking to re-constitute a new community and definitely building for a numerical majority in the future’.

(Balfour)

‘If this splendid country is ever to be properly developed and still more if it is ever to be British, it is only the Zionists who can accomplish these two aims.’

(Ormsby-Gore)

‘In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country. Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.’

(Balfour)

Introduction

‘The Balfour Declaration was “a calculated move to further imperialistic goals” . . . ’ (Judah Magnes)¹

‘The Jewish community was established in Palestine in sufficient strength only by twenty years of British bayonets (C. Ernest Dawn),² an injustice which no other consideration could condone.’ (Freya Stark)³

In 1915–16, through its Consul-General in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon, Britain persuaded Husayn, the Sharif of Mecca, that, if he would mount a revolt against the Ottoman Empire, it would make a reward to him about the nature of which there is still debate to-day. A myth, stubbornly repeated by the BBC, is that the UK promised him that it would support the independence of the Arabs in the whole of the Middle East, as he had asked, once the Ottomans, who had occupied it for four centuries, had been expelled during the course of the First World War. In fact, McMahon attempted, with little success, to make it clear to Husayn that Lebanon, Iraq (temporarily at least), the Arab shore of the Gulf and anywhere in which France was interested would be withheld. The Sharif turned a blind eye to these exclusions and, in the upshot, irrespective of the benefits his revolt might bring the UK, little or nothing of the Middle East was going to be available to the Arabs after the war. How much exactly was to depend on the interpretation of Husayn’s Correspondence with the Consul-General.

All those who contributed to McMahon’s responses to the Sharif, and apologists for him up to 1937, maintained that it had been their intention all along that Palestine – even though it was not mentioned in the exchange of letters – should not be among the territories whose postwar independence Britain would support. They did so in the face of common sense and the evidence of geography, cartography and nomenclature. Whether or not they were being truthful in their asseverations, the Sykes–Picot Agreement which followed rapidly upon the Correspondence dashed all Arab hopes of an independent Arab Palestine by decreeing that after the war the territory would be internationally administered by the UK, France and Russia. The Balfour Declaration eighteen months later took a further giant revisory step and awarded it instead to the Jews.

Husayn had no doubt that Palestine should have come to him because it had not been excluded in terms by McMahon. Many observers since have felt the same. Not only did he not in the event obtain it, however, but as its door was shut in his face he came to be treated by London as a simpleton. Despite the majority British view that his Arab Revolt had been both successful and valuable in helping to remove the Ottomans from the Middle East during the war, his desires and aspirations became of no account. The question never arose among UK ministers and civil servants of entrusting to the inspirers and leaders of the revolt, or to the Palestinians themselves, the task of ruling a Palestine emptied of Ottomans. The British base to be constructed there to act as back-up to the Egyptian gateway protecting the British Suez Canal route to India was to be put in the charge of trustworthy and co-operative Jews.⁴ The need for them to take on this role, while keeping the French out, was the unadmitted excuse for the Balfour Declaration.

Palestine had never been a nation state when, before the end of the war, Allenby, with Faysal (the third son of the Sharif) and Lawrence on his right flank east of the R. Jordan, expelled the Turks from 'la Syrie intégrale' of which it was regarded by the Arabs until July 1920 to be part. When its Ottoman rulers were ousted and Syria as we know it today was earmarked for France, Palestine should have remained without a foreign overlord. At the end of October 1914, however, Lloyd George had initiated the process which ended in the obliteration of its people when he urged the Cabinet to consider 'the ultimate destiny of Palestine'. There was therefore no suggestion, by anyone, at the termination of hostilities that the UK would allow it for the first time to attain independent status under the rule of its own people. Feeling no need to consult them, London snatched it away and handed it to the Jews, who deceived many of their backers and supporters with the beguiling claim that the territory – whose population of some 600,000 at the time was 93% Arab and only 7% Jewish – was 'a land without people' which should be made available 'for a people without land'.⁵

The success of the Zionists in raising the Jewish population from the 7% so as completely to take over the territory in 1948, when its proportion was 33%, was a remarkable feat. But the process, shared in at the end by Husayn's second son, 'Abd Allah, King of Transjordan, deprived the Palestinian Arabs of their land, forced many of them (as until to-day) to spend the whole of their lives in refugee camps, and almost a century later continues to threaten the peace of the world. The third quarter of the Balfour Declaration ('it being clearly understood') should have prevented this from happening, but the two parties to it (Britain and the Zionists) had no interest, despite fine words on many subsequent occa-

sions, in adhering to it. When, in the words of Arthur Koestler, ‘one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third’, the establishment of a National Home for the Jews there (in a land directly and intimately linked with our monarch’s title of Defender of the Faith) was bad enough without the abandonment of the safeguards the clause contained.

The determination of the Zionists to take Palestine over – while denying more often than not, in line with their ‘penchant for misnomers’,⁶ that this was their intention – was unshakeable throughout. Although the Balfour Declaration’s call for an undefined National Home sought to disguise the aim, the UK’s purpose in issuing it was to turn Palestine into a Jewish state. It gave freely to the Zionists enormous political and military help which enabled this to happen. In the twenty years before the dream of ‘Jerusalem tomorrow’ was fulfilled, nevertheless, Britain twice displayed marked irresolution in relation to its original plans for Palestine and, blowing hot and cold, was prepared to allow it to become instead an Arab state. (On both occasions, of which the divided and bewildered Palestinians were unable to take advantage, it thought better or was forced by violent Zionist reactions to do so.) In the periods when it was fully behind the Zionist cause, however, it fostered the development of a Jewish military machine to make use of, and of its terrorist affiliates, in its battles. With Britain’s active connivance, Hagana attained a condition of professionalism during World War II which the politically, militarily and geographically divided Arabs, let alone the Palestinians themselves, could not begin to match. In the later stages leading up to 1948, Britain kept the Palestinians defenceless while arming the native Jewish community, the Yishuv. The outcome was a Jewish walkover brought about by UK favouritism and, ultimately, total loss of mandatory control, aided by Palestinian ineptitude and lack of purpose and leadership.

Only the most casual attempts were made to define the Jewish National Home, its location or possible constitution. As it was, however, Britain should have discussed with the Palestinians what it could be like, and (while there was no compulsion for the latter to bargain in order to keep their country from the clutches of outsiders) should have negotiated with them about the dimensions of, and arrangements for, a national home which they might have been able to accept. After all, even when they had a fair idea of the Balfour Declaration’s implications for them, they (like Husayn and Faysal) were quite willing until 1930 to co-operate to a regulated extent in the project. Proposals they might then have put forward, if backed by British firmness, might have found favour, at least in the short term, with the Zionists.

But the failure of Palestine's leading Al-Husayny and An-Nashashiby political families to combine stood in the way of the launching of any such initiative, as of all else that could have been productive. (John Marlowe was certainly right in his judgement that the Al-Husayny 'insistence on the priority of domestic rivalry over national preparedness was to condemn most of their compatriots to exile'.) It is extremely doubtful, nonetheless, that national unity among the Palestinians would have diverted the Zionists from their unrelenting purpose, even had feasible alternative arrangements been on offer. By far the best ideas, if London had actually planned for the Jewish National Home to be anything other than a Jewish state, were those of Musa al-'Alamy and a US Military Attaché in Cairo. The former proposed to Ben-Gurion and Moshe Shertok in 1934 and 1936 a Palestine made up of an autonomous Jewish canton around Tel Aviv, constituting a National Home within an independent Arab country under UK suzerainty.⁷ The latter said, more bluntly, in 1942, 'You British should give the Jews a kind of Vatican City which would solve the whole goddam problem'. (The 1882 manifestation by an Istanbul BILU group – 'House of Jacob, come ye and let us go', from Isaiah 2:5) – had outlined a similar solution – 'A home in (Palestine) and, if it be impossible to obtain this, . . . a state within a larger state . . .'⁸ – and Weizmann himself remarked in December 1914 (with questionable sincerity), 'If the Jews had at present a place where they formed an important part of the population, and led a life of their own, however small this place might be, something like Monaco, . . . nobody would doubt the existence of the Jewish nation, all the fatal misunderstandings would disappear'.⁹ An alternative could have been some form of confederation, for which Faysal, Herbert Samuel, Judah Magnes and others continually argued, which might have linked an Arab Palestine containing a Jewish National Home with the surrounding Arab world.

The reputations of some of the leading figures involved in the Israel project emerge a little less starkly here. Even Balfour, regarded habitually as the villain of the piece, appears not as the initiator of the plot but as the participant who ran the most strongly with a ball set rolling by Lloyd George and at once given extra propulsion by Samuel. The attitudes of the latter, and Deedes, fervent Zionists generally labelled diehard and uncompromising promoters of the Balfour Declaration, were in fact sharply revised by the May Day rising of 1921. Samuel in particular (a cousin of Edwin Montagu, Zionism's chief opponent, and the proconsular contemporary of Allenby in Egypt and Arnold Wilson in Iraq) had been one of the most determined workers for the National Home but as a consequence uninhibitedly modified his ideas. He ends

up as a far less enthusiastic – and, indeed, the least dishonourable – activist in the shameful scheme. The Mufty of Jerusalem, likewise, is a much less black and white figure than he is usually painted. On the principle ‘They hate you, because they have robbed you’,¹⁰ British officials and commentators who had considered him an ally until 1937 mostly came to regard him with loathing after he was ruined by a *Chargé d’Affaires* in that year. But even his subsequent actions, which have conveniently been allowed to blot out collaborative overtures to the Nazis by Shamir and other Zionists and have been exaggerated to an absurd degree by Israeli leaders,¹¹ must surely be examined in the light of the facts that his country was being taken away from him and his people, that he had little reason to be loyal to the British, and that to the Palestinians, who considered ‘Zionism, not Nazism, . . . the greatest evil in the world [,] . . . a German victory [in World War II] could not bring anything more hideous than the Allied Victory in the last war.’ He wrote in his memoirs,

‘I was certain that a German victory would completely save our country from imperialism and Zionism . . . I did not cooperate with Germany for the sake of Germany, nor because of a belief in Nazism. I do not accept its principles, and this never crossed my mind. None the less, I was, and continue to be, convinced that had Germany and the Axis been victorious, then no remnant of Zionism would have remained in Palestine or the Arab states.’¹²

It is difficult to see how he can be blamed for not co-operating with the UK in its handover of Palestine to others, who have displayed no gratitude, but only contempt,¹³ towards their benefactors.

PART ONE
MACHINATION

CHAPTER

1

Zionism Emerges

‘Hopeless is your state in the West; the Star of your future is gleaming in the East. We want a home in our country’, possessed ‘at least as a state within a larger state . . . given us by the mercy of God . . . our land Zion is our one hope.’ (The First Manifestation of the BILU to ‘our brothers and sisters in Exile’)

In the first half of the nineteenth century the question of a Jewish settlement in Palestine was frequently debated. In 1799, after invading the territory, Napoleon had offered the Jews of the world ‘the patrimony of Israel’. Many people believed that Christians should be helping them to emigrate there. For over two decades, Palmerston was a leading advocate of that policy. In 1817, as UK War Secretary, he in vain pressured the Ottoman government to allow large-scale Jewish settlement in Palestine. (Like British motives throughout the duration of the Palestine question, his were devoid of altruism: in theory, a positive answer to his approach would increase the resources of the Ottoman Sultan’s dominions, thereby expanding the market for British goods in the territory.)

In 1838, the question became more narrowly focused when, as Foreign Secretary, Palmerston established a British consulate in Jerusalem. In 1840, anticipating that Palestine would be relinquished the following year by Muhammad ‘Aly, its Egyptian occupier, and ‘influenced by strong contemporary evangelical faith in the concept of the Return’,¹ he again attempted, once more without success, to persuade the Porte to allow Jewish immigrants to settle. Between 1845 and 1863, however, British Consul in Jerusalem James Finn – believing that (an early Mark Sykes) he was thus reliving the Crusades – helped Jews to settle in their ‘ancestral land’.² Around the middle of the century, *La Nouvelle Question d’Orient*, a treatise by Napoleon III’s private secretary Ernest Laharanne, a Gentile, suggested that it would be both practical and easy for the Jews to establish a kingdom extending from Suez to Smyrna. In 1856, the Sultan authorised the British Jew, Sir Moses Montefiore, to buy land in Palestine for Jewish settlement and roving ambassador Laurence Oliphant and others began to advocate UK

protection for Jewish resettlement, ‘with the ultimate, though only vaguely formulated, idea of a Jewish state’.³ In 1876 George Eliot’s *Daniel Deronda* concluded with the eponymous hero preparing to go to Jerusalem: ‘The idea that I am possessed with is that of restoring a political existence to my people, making them a nation again, giving them a national centre.’ In 1878, Oliphant devised a scheme, scuppered by Ottoman lethargy, to persuade the Sultan to reform his Empire by establishing a colony of Jewish landed proprietors and agriculturalists in derelict tracts of Gilead, east of the Jordan.⁴

Jewish Initiatives

These largely Western initiatives dovetailed with the rise of modern Zionism, whose first precursor was a Bosnian rabbi, Yehuda Alkalai. In 1837 he suggested that the time had come for the occupation of the Promised Land to commence and produced a scheme for a Jewish return there. In 1862, Prussian Rabbi Zvi Hersh Kalisher, who said in his *Drishath Tsiyón* [The Quest for Zion] that the Jews had the right and duty to return to Palestine without waiting for the coming of the Messiah; in the same year, the German Jewish political philosopher Moses Hess’s *Rome and Jerusalem* argued that to contribute to the development of world history the Jews needed to be free, and in Palestine.

Zionism as a concept began to take shape when in 1879 a pamphlet by Eliezer Ben-Yehuda urged the Jews to Return to Zion as a Hebrew-speaking nation, and the first Jewish agricultural settlement, Petach Tikvah, was founded. Persecution of the Jews in Russia drove the movement onwards. Between 1881 and 1884 an influx of Zionists followed the assassination of Tsar Alexander II and a consequent outbreak of pogroms in Russia led to the deaths of hundreds of Jews (blamed by his son for the murder) and the ruin of thousands. As a much larger emigration, of hundreds of thousands, arrived in the USA, 7,000 refugees reached the Promised Land and founded 22 settlements among the Yishuv. This First *Aliyah* brought to the country Hebrew-speaking nationalist Jews who lived in *kibbutzim*. Hibbáth Tsiyón, which sought a state in Palestine founded on Jewish agriculture and labour and on winning political recognition through practical deeds, took on the role of guardian of Jewish Hebrew culture. Since it appeared that the assimilation of Jews in the countries in which they resided had become virtually unthinkable, it saw emigration to Palestine as the only answer to a problem which had suddenly acquired great urgency.

Many consider that Zionism proper arose in 1882.⁵ The year was marked by the publication of the ‘Zionists’ Manifesto’, the *Auto-Emancipation* of Dr. Yehuda Pinsker. A Polish physician who practised in Odessa and was a member of Hibbáth Tsiyón (and its leader from 1883), he deplored the fact that ‘The Jews . . . are everywhere aliens’ and, like Moses Hess, urged ‘the creation of a Jewish nationality’ in a Jewish state. (Though seeking potential sites generally for Jewish emancipation, until his death in 1891 Pinsker led Hibbáth Tsiyón’s attempt to reclaim Palestine for the Jewish people via self-help and small scale agricultural settlement.) The BILU responded to his call, succeeding in settling 228 Romanian agricultural colonists south of Haifa, most of whom however soon reemigrated; those who did not, including the father of future Israeli Prime Minister Shertok, were only rescued from penury by the ‘irksome and petty tyranny’ of Baron Edmond de Rothschild. Finally establishing themselves in Gederah from December, 1884, many of them were given warm Arab welcomes.⁶ As early as the following year, the leader of religious Zionism in Germany, the rabbi of Memel, gave voice to what was to become a central Zionist theme: advocating the expulsion of Palestine’s inhabitants via what was characteristically termed ‘population transfer’ by later Zionists in order to make it sound harmless, the Arabs could ‘move a little’, he declared. If they would not, ‘we’ll hit them on the head and make them move’.⁷ Thus precociously and unabashedly did Zionism reveal its ethnic-cleansing intentions – intentions which Norman Rose, against an unanswerable amount of evidence, denies were anything more than a by-product of the fog of the Israeli war of independence.⁸

The Politicising of Zionism

The perfecter of Zionist theory was Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian writer in his early thirties who in 1891 was appointed Paris correspondent of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*. In 1894 he reported on the Dreyfus trial. The anti-Semitism displayed at it, bringing the Jews fresh hatred in Europe, convinced him – though he himself was ‘wholly secularised’ and ‘deeply assimilated’⁹ – that assimilation was no longer possible. He also believed that more was needed than piecemeal emigration, diplomatic approaches to anti-Jewish governments and well-intentioned philanthropy. Although Nahum Sokolow (Polish future President of both the Zionist Organisation and the Jewish Agency) was enthusiastic about the last of these, Herzl regarded as futile the large-scale paternalism of the De Rothschilds, who had financed and maintained the few colonies

established by the Russian pioneers with the help of cheap Arab labour. He was convinced that the De Rothschild habits of bailing settlers out when they made losses and insisting on them concentrating on wine-production undermined their resolution. They had become a 'planter class' without initiative, and hardly anything in the way of a Jewish peasantry was built up actually to work the land.

Failing to persuade the Ottoman Sultan to sell him Palestine 'for billions'¹⁰ or to throw the territory open to the Jews, instead of unstructured emigration Herzl began to advocate a national effort for national independence and mass immigration within a political framework which would recognise that the Jews were returning to Palestine as of right. The ultimate aim, he maintained, should be the absorption of European Jewry into a state, one which would confine rabbis to their synagogues.¹¹ Influenced by the ideas of Cecil Rhodes, whose approval for his project he sought,¹² he anticipated that its development would proceed under a charter underwritten by 'one of the powers'. In another early reference to 'population transfer', juxtaposed with one to *avodah ivrit* (the monopoly by Jews of work on Jewish projects), he added, 'We shall endeavour to expel the poor population across the border unnoticed, procuring employment for it in the transit countries, but denying it any employment in our own country'.¹³ In a pamphlet called *Der Judenstaat* [The Jewish State], published in Vienna in February 1896 and making no mention of Palestinians, he declared that Zionism without Palestine had no meaning. He introduced a strategic argument to buttress his proposed creation of a Jewish national territory. In a mode of thinking which became typically Zionist, he wrote that it would be a good thing if, as did not seem remotely likely at the time, the British were forced to leave Egypt (they had occupied it in 1882) and lost the Suez Canal. In the event of their consequently being obliged to seek an alternative route to India, 'a modern Jewish Palestine' – with a railway from Jaffa to the Persian Gulf – 'would resolve their difficulty'. He proclaimed the Jews 'part of a wall of defence for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilisation against barbarism'. Zionism's exile in Europe, he believed, could be ended 'by going to the heart of the colonial hinterland of Europe, the East, not to become part of that East but in order to become representatives of the West "over there"'.¹⁴

In 1897, 'like Moses returned to his people',¹⁵ Herzl founded Zionism as a political movement and inspired 'the political Zionists who were hell-bent on conquering Palestine'.¹⁶ In August he summoned a conference at Basle where he established a World Zionist Organization and (he told his diary) 'founded the Jewish state'. Led by him, the principal decisions ('the Basle Programme') of this first annual Zionist

Congress¹⁷ made redundant an earlier Zionist proposal to the Colonial Office to allow Jews to occupy land in Cyprus ‘on a national scale’ and Baron De Hirsch’s call to the Jews of Russia to take advantage of philanthropic funding from his Jewish Colonisation Association in order to emigrate to Argentina. The Jews were instead to create a permanent, elective executive body called the Zionist Organisation, charged with uniting all Jews in the cause of Zion and adopting for Zionism the goal of creating a Heimstätte [homestead] in Palestine, a state for the Jewish people ‘secured by public law’. Reinforcing the reputation of Zionism as ‘from the beginning a movement of questionable straightness’ with regard to what it really was seeking in Palestine,¹⁸ the state would be referred to only as a National Home. Herzl deliberately presented his plan in innocuous terms and was vague (except in his diaries) about the fate of the Palestinians and about whether the new state would be exclusively Jewish or not.¹⁹ (At the Congress, ‘solitary amid his friends, like a mourner at a wedding-feast’, was Ahad Ha-Am [One of the People], the Hebrew writer and exponent of cultural Zionism who had become known in 1889 through an article on Hibbáth Tsiyón. In almost total disagreement with Herzl, he called for Palestine to incorporate cultural centres in which the Jewish spirit could be preserved and revived. In 1920, long after Herzl’s death, he denounced his aim of a Jewish state as completely absurd.)

Herzl visited Palestine only once, and for less than ten days, in October/November 1898. There, he and his associates completely ignored the existence of the country’s large Arab population, causing Ahad Ha-Am to protest against the Zionists’ wilful or casual exclusion of the Palestinians, whom it was folly to treat as wild men of the desert who could not see what was going on around them. ‘From the very beginning we have always ignored the Arab people’, he said. At the 3rd. Zionist Congress in 1899, Herzl brushed aside a warning that the Zionist programme was not feasible since Palestine was overwhelmingly inhabited by Arabs. Voicing what became another well-worn but never borne-out theme, he claimed that the material benefits the Zionists would bring to the territory would silence Palestinian political opposition.

The pace of realisation of Herzl’s vision was rapid. By the end of the year, the Zionist Organisation had launched its own bank (the Anglo-Palestine Corporation) and the Jews had established a network of agricultural outposts throughout the territory’s coastal plain, as well as in Judea and Galilee. In 1901, Chaim (Hayim) Weizmann, a naturalised Russian Jew of 27 from Pinsk and a Zionist follower (but only so far) of Ahad Ha-Am, founded the Jewish National Fund (*Keren Kayemeth*)

to purchase land. The creation of Israel was to owe much to him. 'Alert, dynamic, full of temperament', he 'created an atmosphere of bustle and excitement around him. He was smart, well dressed, tall, and with fire in his eyes. He had great personal charm, and was popular with everyone'.²⁰ In 1904 he became a member of staff of Manchester University, teaching chemistry.

In 1902 Herzl published a Zionist Utopia, *Altneuland* [Old New Land]. His picture of the progress of Jewish mass emigration to Palestine and of life in the cosmopolitan Jewish state of the future, in which most of the world's Jews had settled and as a result brought anti-Semitism to an end, inspired the Jews, especially of Russia, and created 'a force in the politics of the world'.²¹ To Ahad Ha-Am, its portrayal of Zionism as co-operating with the Palestinians and bringing benefit to their lives was seriously deficient. He criticised its lack of Jewishness and of Hebrew (in whose revival Herzl took no interest) as characteristic of the mentality of what he called the Assimilationist School. Nothing daunted, in the same year Herzl moved on to practicalities. With advice from Lloyd George's legal firm, he proposed to Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain a charter for a homeland for 100,000 settlers in Cyprus, Sinai and Al-'Arish on the Egypt/Palestine border from which Muslims and Greeks would be encouraged to move away. Although the Foreign Office did not oppose the idea and a technical commission of enquiry was despatched to look into it, the Sinai/Al-'Arish location, on an imperfectly demarcated border between the Ottoman Empire and British-occupied Egypt, was sensitive: Lord Cromer, UK Consul-General and Resident in Cairo, firmly vetoed the proposal. (Lloyd George resubmitted it in 1906 but then it was rejected by Foreign Secretary Edward Grey.)

Palestine or nowhere

After Lloyd George's firm had next drafted a charter for Jewish autonomy, Chamberlain – who like Palmerston wished to tap the financial power of the Jews for the British Empire – expressed interest in improving their lot. In April 1903 he offered a National Home as a potential autonomous Jewish state for about 120,000 settlers in 6,000 square miles of Kenya and Uganda. At the sixth Zionist Congress in Basle in the August, Herzl, who had been unable to win international support for the idea of a Jewish state,²² explained in vain that (like the much nearer Al-'Arish) this would only be a 'way-station and refuge along the road to the Promised Land,' a *Nachtasyl* [night-shelter]. Most

of Palestine's resident Jews, the Yishuv, were fanatically in favour of the offer, which would have allowed them to continue living undisturbed. After being accepted by the congress, however, it was declined in 1905, Weizmann's being the determining voice in the rejection of this last Zionist attempt to find an alternative to Palestine.²³ When Herzl died the following year, the Zionist Congress in August reiterated the fundamental principle that 'Palestine and the adjacent lands' would alone be acceptable for a national home.²⁴

Between 1904 and 1914 a Second *Aliyah* left Russia after another round of pogroms, notably at Kishinev in 1903, and brought 33,000 settler socialists, seeking an egalitarian society, to join the Yishuv.²⁵ In 1908, Dr. Arthur Ruppin, an economist and agronomist who was to become 'the master architect of Zionist colonisation' and active in calling for the 'transfer' of the Palestinians,²⁶ set up the first Palestine office of the World Zionist Organisation and embarked on a programme of land purchase. Since the Porte had suspended all transfers of land to Jews in the Vilayet of Beirut and the Sancaq of Jerusalem, it admittedly had slender results.

The guessing game about whether or not the Zionists were aiming at a state continued to be played, with denials predominating. In 1910, following the convulsion in the Ottoman Empire caused by the Young Turk revolution, the Zionist Organisation declared that it had never contemplated one. In August 1911 the President of the 10th. Zionist Congress at Basle stated that 'The aim of Zionism is the erection for the Jewish people of a publicly recognised, legally secured home in Palestine'. Contradicting Herzl's *Heimstätte*, he continued, 'Not a Jewish state, but a home in the ancient land of our forefathers, where we can live a Jewish life without oppression and persecution.' The 1913 congress, too, dismissed the thought that the aim was to create a state. In contrast, however, in his closing speech the President referred to 'die Heimstätte in unserem Lande, in Erets Yisrael' [the homestead in our country, the Land of Israel], in which – according to Sokolow, Weizmann's most important colleague and fellow Ahad Ha-Am disciple, – by 1914 *Kerem Kayemeth* had invested some £150,000 and the Yishuv had nearly doubled in size.

Palestinian Fears and Counteractions

The Palestinians believed from a remarkably early date that the territory in which they numbered 93% of the population was in serious danger of a Jewish takeover. In 1891, in response to the arrival of Russian

Jewish refugees, and following pressure from Muslim and Christian notables in Jerusalem who already saw that Jewish immigration and land-purchase could lead to the removal of the Palestinians and the establishment of a Jewish state, Ottoman Sultan Abdül Hamid II passed a law banning Jewish immigration to the country. In 1897 a Palestinian commission, headed by the Mufty of Jerusalem Tahir al-Husayny II, succeeded in halting the sale of land to Jews for a number of years. At his instance, in 1901 the Porte passed a law limiting to three months visits to Palestine by foreign Jews, who had to show a religious purpose for their travel. In 1905, in reaction to Herzl's inauguration of political Zionism, Sa'id al-Husayny organised a conference to raise opposition to Jewish immigration and land purchase. He and Salim al-Husayny urged the Sultan to take stronger action against the Zionists.

Palestinian fear of the intentions of the Jews continued to grow. The Lebanese Najib 'Azury's *Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe dans l'Asie Turque* drew attention to 'the latent efforts of the Jews to reestablish, on an extremely large scale, the ancient Kingdom of Israel'.²⁷ Anti-Zionist articles appeared in such newspapers as *Al-Karmil* of Haifa and *Falastin* of Jaffa, and hostility to Zionism led to outbreaks of violence between settlers and peasants and to land disputes in Galilee. At the end of 1910, Najib Nassar, the Protestant editor of *Al-Karmil*, set up a Christian-Muslim Association which became active in the north of Palestine. Its aims were to persuade the Porte to prohibit the sale of land to Jews, to mount an economic boycott against them and to outlaw renting them property. In the following year Nassar brought out his *As-Sahyuniyyah: Ta'rikhuba, gharadhuba, ahammiyatuba* [Zionism, its history, aim and importance.] In it, he called on the Palestinians not to wait for a lead from Istanbul but to resist Zionism, which – in a view mirrored in more recent times²⁸ – he portrayed as composed of 'a set of independent, quasi-military institutions'. Simultaneously, a Patriotic Ottoman Party (Al-Hizb al-Watany al-'Uthmany) was set up in Jaffa; one of its members wrote that 'the country is in danger and . . . a flood threatens to engulf it . . . that threat is the Zionist Organisation'.²⁹ During the 1908–12 Young Turk parliament, the District of Jerusalem delegates (Acre and Nablus sent one each), Ruhy al-Khalidy and Sa'id al-Husayny, a prominent member of a group of Arab parliamentarians who formed an all-Arab anti-Zionist lobby, wrote forcefully in Ottoman and Egyptian newspapers against the continuance of Zionist immigration and claimed that the Jews were planning to create a state to include Palestine, Syria and Iraq.

Before elections to the 1914 parliament, Al-Husayny again

denounced Zionism in the Palestinian and Egyptian press, highlighting the challenge posed by the Yishuv, who had raised the Zionist flag and set up their own civil courts³⁰ and educational network and were buying up the lands of the fallahin. In the parliament itself, Raghib an-Nashashiby, the Jerusalem District Engineer who now held one of the Jerusalem seats, pledged all his strength to the destruction of the Zionists and Zionism. A Lebanese landowner's sale to Jews of parts of Marj Ibn 'Amar, the Jezreel Valley south of Nazareth, caused outrage. Jamil al-Husayny, a pioneer of the Palestinian resistance movement, spoke of the need to fight the Zionists. Their land purchases, he said, were being facilitated by government officials and might lead to the expulsion of the Palestinians.

In 1914, too, Sa'id al-Husayny found himself being urged by Zionist leaders to persuade his co-nationals to give up Palestine, move voluntarily to surrounding Arab lands and seek self-determination as Arabs rather than Palestinians within the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayny, the future Grand Mufti, was studying at Al-Azhar under Shaykh Rashid Ridha. The latter, a prominent Syrian theologian and striver for Muslim and Arab revival, had warned in the Cairo paper *Al-Manar* in 1902 that Jews coming to Palestine were aiming for national sovereignty. He stressed to Al-Hajj Amin the duty of fighting the Zionists, whom he regarded as an element of a western takeover of the Middle East. He forecast, presciently, that if the Zionists succeeded in occupying Palestine they would leave no Christians or Muslims in it. With a Christian friend in Cairo, Al-Hajj Amin planned an anti-Zionist and pro-Palestinian association and recruited Muslims and Christians as evangelists charged with enlightening fellow-students about the dangers of the Zionist threat.

Within three or four months of the fall of Jerusalem in December 1917, Arab associations began to be established in the Jaffa-Ramlah area, and quickly to spread to Jerusalem, to thwart the Zionist aims which were clearly well on the way to fulfilment.

CHAPTER

2

The United Kingdom Promotes a Jewish Palestine

‘The British entered Palestine to defeat the Turks; they stayed there to keep it from the French; and they gave it to the Zionists because they loved “the Jews” even as they loathed them.’ (Avi Shlaim)¹

Two members of Asquith’s 1908–16 government now staked a claim in the matter which – a cloud no bigger than a man’s hand – was to lead to the installation of the Israelis in a land which should have been passed to its people by its First World War conquerors. Lloyd George, nonconformist Chancellor of the Exchequer, had had many dealings with Jews and Zionists over the years and – without having looked closely at the history of Palestine or having been in contact with Christian or Muslim Arabs there – had always, in a rather sentimental way, ‘supported the idea of reuniting the Jewish people with the land of their forefathers’.² Less than a fortnight after he had at the end of October 1914 urged the Cabinet to consider ‘the ultimate destiny of Palestine’, Herbert Samuel, President of the Local Government Board, also in the Cabinet and himself a Jew, wrote a letter headed ‘The Future of Palestine’ to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey. The Porte having joined the world war as an ally of Germany, he observed that the prospect existed of a change in the status of Palestine at the end of it, not to become an independent Arab state but a restored Jewish one. If founded with British and US help after the defeat of the Ottomans, taking an *Ahad Ha-Am* line he said that it ‘might become the centre of a new culture’ contributing to the UK’s role as ‘the civiliser of the backward countries’. Strategically, its position close to Egypt and the Suez Canal gateway to India would ‘render its goodwill to England a matter of importance to the British Empire.’ Though (mis)calculating that Arabs made up five sixths of its 600,000 population, he observed that ‘An appeal to the Jewish communities throughout the world would certainly provide sufficient funds to . . . lay the foundations of the state’. Grey was on the one hand attracted by his colleague’s idea. On the other, he saw reasons for caution. He

knew of the false prospects with which Kitchener and Cairo were in the process of dazzling Sharif Husayn of Mecca, he considered the idea of a Jewish state annexed to the Empire ridiculous and he feared that it might offend the French, whose plans (or those of others) for Syria could not be tampered with.

Israel's Manchester Cradle

On 11 November, Lloyd George and Samuel discussed the future of Palestine, the latter enthusing once more over the idea of the establishment of a Jewish state there. In the same month occurred the first meeting between Weizmann and C.P. Scott, the former Liberal MP now editor of *The Manchester Guardian*. In December, in the second of his important contributions to the process which ended in the Palestinians losing their country, Scott introduced Lloyd George, a friend, and Samuel to Weizmann, who on the occasion made the falsely minimalist remark that, 'If the Jews had at present a place where they formed an important part of the population, and led a life of their own, however small this place might be, something like Monaco, . . . nobody would doubt the existence of the Jewish nation, all the fatal misunderstandings would disappear'. (He did not add that he intended that the Palestinians also would). About this and later meetings, Lloyd George announced that 'The Zionists gave us a definite promise that if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied Cause'.³

Weizmann was astonished and gratified by the attitude of Samuel, who thought that the Temple could perhaps be rebuilt to symbolise Jewish unity. On Christmas Day he received him and Dr. Moses Gaster, Romania-born Chief Rabbi of the Sephardic congregations of Britain and a former president of the English Zionist Federation, at his home. They were in agreement that Palestine should become a British Protectorate, which Grey had told Samuel was out of the question. When the latter wrote to Asquith in January 1915 to advocate it, the Prime Minister in his diary called his letter an 'almost lyrical outburst' and a 'dithyrambic document': 'He thinks we might plant in this not very promising territory about three or four million European Jews . . . It reads almost like a new edition of *Tancred* brought up to date'.

Although in further talks with him Grey had indicated his preference for Palestine to be internationally administered after the war, Samuel felt in February and March that the British Protectorate idea was gathering

support. He had come to realise that a Jewish state was impracticable while, in a land he had persuaded himself 'was now almost derelict',⁴ the majority population was Arab. 'To impose a Jewish minority government would be in flat contradiction to one of the main purposes for which it had been declared that the Allies were fighting.' At the same time it was not necessary to accept the position that the allegedly sparse existing population should have the right to bar the door to the return of a people whose connection with the country, he maintained, long antedated its own. Curzon did not agree: 'I do not myself recognize that the connection of the Jews with Palestine, which terminated 1,200 years ago, gives them any claim whatsoever'.⁵ (Many modern Jewish and non-Jewish commentators share his view.⁶ Whereas Yitzhak Shamir said in 1991 that the justification for a resurrected Israel rested on such truths as that 'We are the only people who have lived in the Land of Israel without interruption for 4,000 years',⁷ even the country's current Prime Minister has sounded unconfident on the subject.)⁸

A crucial development now occurred. When they had met for the first time in January 1905, Weizmann had 'converted Balfour to Zionism in the middle of the East Manchester election',⁹ lost by the politician who had held the seat since 1885. He had informed him that 'we had Jerusalem when London was a marsh'.¹⁰ He met him again in December of the same year, in January 1906 and December 1914. It was in March 1915 and the autumn of the following year¹¹ that he renewed his acquaintance substantively with the man who was to be his most vocal supporter.

In the March, in a revised version of his letter of four months earlier,¹² now addressed to the Cabinet, Samuel called for the abandonment of the idea of an internationally administered Palestine such as Grey, Mark Sykes and Georges-Picot were contemplating. Given the status of a British protectorate, he claimed that it would safeguard Egypt and that Haifa had the potential to be a good naval base. While it was 'probable' that its government should include one or more Muslims, he hoped that facilities would be given to Jewish organisations to purchase land, found colonies, establish educational and religious institutions, and take part in the economic development of the territory. Given the enormous disparity in size between Palestine's Arab and Jewish communities, it was remarkably ambitious – and arrogant – of him to add the hope, when the population of the latter amounted to no more than 42,000, that 'Jewish immigration, carefully regulated, would be given preference, so that in course of time the (Jewish inhabitants), grown into a majority and settled in the land' – where he claimed that there was room for 3 million people – 'may be conceded such degree of self-government

as the conditions of that day might justify'. Thus they might recapture the time when 'For fifteen centuries' Jewish Palestine had produced 'a constant succession of great men – statesmen and prophets, judges and soldiers'. He admitted that a Jewish state could not be founded immediately. Given the lack of a Jewish majority, forcing the pace might mean that the renewal of 'The dream of a Jewish state, prosperous, progressive, and the home of a brilliant civilisation, might vanish in a series of squalid conflicts with the Arab population . . . and have to be postponed for centuries.'¹³ Asquith, commenting further on this idea of 'Jewish irredentism', understandably described it as 'fantastic' and 'outside all practical policy'. He claimed that Lloyd George was the only other partisan of the proposal and that he, 'I need not say, does not care a damn for the Jews or their past or their future'. Sykes, who had had a poor view of Zionism, Jews and especially Armenians ('even Jews have their good points, but Armenians have none'), in 1914 had come to believe that Zionism would show 'the capacity of the Jews to produce a virtuous and simple agrarian population'.¹⁴

Early in the year, *The Manchester Guardian* had begun to advocate the acquisition of Palestine for the defence of the Suez Canal and as a Mediterranean outlet for Iraq, which Britain was in the process of occupying from India. Scott and Lloyd George, now Minister of Munitions in the Asquith Coalition Government, both believed that this would be to the UK's advantage. On 26 November, Herbert Sidebotham, an influential political journalist who had been inspired by Weizmann to co-found a British Palestine Committee, urged the creation of a UK-protected Jewish buffer state in the territory. He added that on Egypt's defence being provided by a Palestine inhabited 'by an intensely patriotic race' depended 'the whole future of the British Empire as a Sea Empire'.

This astonishing assertion was by now far from outlandish. A recommendation in the 30 June report of an interdepartmental committee under Sir Maurice de Bunsen of the Foreign Office did not mention Zionism but seconded Lloyd George's view that 'Palestine must be recognised as a country whose destiny must be the subject of special negotiations.' By the beginning of 1916, it was seen as the strategic linchpin of Britain's postwar Empire, its potential importance recognised in every major Imperial General Staff assessment as a buffer between the French in Syria and the Suez Canal. In case Egypt had to be evacuated, it was now recognised as the point of departure of a fallback Route to India.

On 16 April, Sykes held a meeting with Samuel (Home Secretary since January), Weizmann, Sokolow and Gaster. His unauthorised suggestion of a British–French condominium over Palestine, complete with Arab

prince and Zionist charter company, was rejected by the Zionist leaders, who insisted that their objectives required the establishment of a British protectorate over the country. Six months later, the Zionist Organisation presented to the Cabinet proposals that a Jewish company should be enabled 'to acquire for its own use all or any concessions which may at any time be granted by the suzerain Government or Governments', and that equal facilities for developing the resources of the country should be withheld from 'persons or bodies who may be actuated by other motives'.¹⁵ Although they fell on deaf ears, the aims of Zionism were now firmly shared by most of those who occupied the pinnacles of the British establishment.

PART TWO

JUSTIFICATION

CHAPTER

3

Palestine's Doom is Documented

'The moment the Arabs feel confident that, when the time comes for the conclusion of peace in Europe, Great Britain and her allies will not leave them in the lurch face to face with Turkey and Germany, but that they intend to help them and advocate their case effectively in the peace negotiations, from that moment will Arab participation in the War undoubtedly serve the general Arab interest.' (Sharif Husayn to McMahan)

'The administratively absurd and morally lamentable Sykes-Picot Agreement'. (S.H. Longrigg)¹

'Does anybody really think that the original meaning of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, and indeed that of the millenarian yearning of the Jewish people was not that of establishing a Jewish state in the whole of Eretz Israel?' (Ben-Gurion)²

Nothing would have come of the Zionist desire to establish a state in Palestine without the efforts of Sir Henry McMahon, Sykes and Balfour (building on the initiatives of Lloyd George and Samuel) in planning the postwar future of the Middle East, including Palestine. Nor in all probability would the plan have even started out on the road to fulfilment if, soon after the First World War began, Istanbul – which had ruled the whole of the Middle East, except Aden, for 400 years and for more than a century been supported by Britain as the chief guardian of its gateways to India – had not implemented its earlier decision to side in the conflict with Germany and against the UK. Anticipating the defeat of the Ottomans in the war, London had an almost completely free hand in the matter of the disposal of Istanbul's Arab possessions in the region. With the Indian Army available for Mesopotamia, and the British-sponsored Arab Revolt and the Egyptian Army for Syria and Palestine respectively, it had a three-pronged mechanism with which to rebuild the Middle East as it wished. It was underpinned by the justificatory, if completely inconsistent, Husayn/McMahon Correspondence, Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration.

McMahon Excludes Palestine, Or Does He?

Foremost among the Arabs who were simultaneously thinking about the future of the Ottoman Empire was the Sharif Husayn, Amir of Mecca in the Ottoman Vilayet of the Hijaz. He was at this period in danger of being ousted by his Ottoman overlords and, as a result, under pressure from his second son, 'Abd Allah, who was deputy for Mecca in the Istanbul Parliament. Convinced of the desirability of his family's leading the Arabs to independence, he was actively urging his father to seize the initiative in the matter. He was not alone. In line with the belief of 'Abd al-Hamid az-Zahrawy, President of the anti-British Decentralisation Party (formed in 1912 by Syrian immigrants in Cairo) that 'the true Arabs of the Peninsula', rather than Iraqis or Syrians, 'are the people to accomplish what we seek,'³ Arab deputies in the Ottoman Parliament had urged Husayn to lead their people in throwing off Istanbul's yoke.

In February 1914, 'Abd Allah visited Cairo and called on Kitchener, a successor to Cromer as UK Consul-General. Taking the first fateful step towards the Arab loss of Palestine, he enquired as to London's attitude towards his father's ambition to make the Hijaz independent of the Ottomans. He asked whether or not the UK would support the Arabs when they fought, as they would, against attempts by Istanbul to unseat him. Although in reply Kitchener stated that it could not interfere in the internal affairs of its ally (as the Porte still was), in about August 1914 'Abd Allah felt able to ask him if Britain would provide his father with up to a dozen machine guns for use against the Ottomans. This paltry request also was declined: the UK's only interest in Arabia was the safety and comfort of Indian pilgrims undertaking the haj. At the same time, (Ahmet) Cemal Paşa, francophile 'virtual dictator' in Damascus as Ottoman Governor and Commander of the 4th. Army, was carrying out executions of Arab nationalists.

With an Ottoman change of sides looking likely, on 24 September Kitchener, now Asquith's War Secretary, instructed the Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo, Milne Cheetham, to enquire from 'Abd Allah 'whether he and his father and the Arabs of the Hijaz would be with us or against us' if it came to war with the Ottoman Empire. A response from Husayn arrived on 30 October. It said that the Sharif would not willingly continue to support his masters in Istanbul and hinted that the Hijaz might be prepared to rebel under his leadership, though not immediately, so long as the UK would guarantee to protect its rights and independence and support it against Ottoman and foreign aggression.

'No intention of possessing any Arab country'

After Asquith had in the first half of November told King George V that his government was finally abandoning the formula of "Ottoman integrity" and now aimed to break the Porte's empire up after defeating it in the war, a reply from Kitchener reached Husayn. It gave the guarantees requested and greatly widened the scope of the debate by taking up the suggestion of Col. Bertie Clayton, DMI in Cairo and one of the most influential British figures in the Middle East during the first quarter of the Twentieth Century, that, if the Ottoman Sultan were to be replaced, Husayn would be a leading candidate for the position of Caliph which the Sultan also held.⁴ The War Secretary now whetted Husayn's appetite by remarking, 'It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina.'⁵ On 10 December 'Abd Allah committed his father to a policy of unavowed alliance with London but asked for time: he could not break immediately with the Caliph he now hoped to replace.

Taking advantage of these developments, on 4 December the Cairo Consulate-General issued a proclamation 'to the Natives of Arabia and the Arab Provinces' (Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia.) It declared that if the Arabs drove out the Turks and announced their independence, the UK and its allies would recognise them and 'give up these places to them at once'. London, which was now already well into its Indian Army invasion of Iraq, had no intention of possessing any Arab country, it added, 'neither in the form of conquest . . . , of protection or occupation . . . The Government of Great Britain . . . promises you help if you help yourselves and take steps to establish an empire for the caliphate to administer your vast countries'.⁶

The Nationalist Organisations and the Damascus Protocol

Two Arab nationalist organisations based in Damascus now became involved. Most of the members of Al-'Ahd (the Covenant) were Iraqi Ottoman Army officers, those of Al-Fatat (Al-Jam'iyyah Al-'Arabiyyah al-Fatat – the Arab Youth Society) were civilians. In January 1915, the two sent a representative, Fawzy al-Bakry, with a supportive message to Mecca. This promised that if Husayn would lead a bid for Arab independence, the Arab officers (the great majority) in Ottoman Army units in Mesopotamia and Damascus would launch a mutiny which would be supported by civilians in Syria and Palestine, where there was much Arab discontent. In response, the Sharif sent his third son,

Faysal, a deputy for Jiddah in the Istanbul Parliament, to hold secret talks in March and April with the leaders and members of the nationalist organisations. He was told that three regular Arab Ottoman divisions were poised to revolt. After going on to Istanbul to complain about the Porte's pressure on his father and to hold bet-hedging talks with German diplomats,⁷ he returned to Damascus on 23 May and found that in his absence Al-'Ahd and Al-Fatat had drawn up a blueprint for action. In their Damascus Protocol,⁸ Palestine became explicitly mentioned for the first time as a target of their independence aspirations. It provided for London to recognise the Middle East as 'the future independent Arab state', comprising Arabia (excluding Aden, which had been British since 1839), Palestine, Syria and Iraq. In return for this, it made the unimpressive-sounding offer that Husayn – who had little in the way of armed forces – would offer military co-operation against the Ottomans, a defensive alliance and economic privileges. The societies themselves would undertake to raise a revolt in Syria and recognise Husayn as king of the Arabs.

In early June a second McMahon Proclamation to the People of Arabia was delivered in bulk throughout Egypt and the Sudan, smuggled into Syria and air-dropped over the Red Sea coast of Arabia. It hinted that London would welcome the restoration of the Caliphate to the Arabs and gave assurance that neither it nor its allies would annex 'one foot of your land'.

Husayn's First Letter

On 30 June 1915, De Bunsen, foreseeing an outcome to the war in which the Middle East would be cleared of its Ottoman occupiers, recommended the redistribution of their empire. Taking account of Sykes's eccentric wish that no part of Crusader-occupied Syria, of which the Arabs then considered Palestine part, should be described as 'purely Arab', and of London's repeated acceptance of France's claims in the area,⁹ Syria, Palestine and Iraq were to be shared between the two powers. With Palestine, the UK would in addition receive what would in 1921 become the Kingdom of Transjordan. Needed for political and strategic reasons as a buffer against its French allies in Syria proper and as the western terminus of a railway from Baghdad and Mosul to Haifa, Palestine was to be recognised as 'a country whose destiny must be the subject of special negotiations, in which both belligerents and neutrals are interested'. The report recommended, 'generally, maintenance of the assurances given to the Sharif of Mecca and the Arabs'.¹⁰ These had

amounted to date to no more than the early contacts between 'Abd Allah and the Consulate-General in Cairo.

De Bunsen had a profound effect on the fatal and fascinating Husayn/McMahon Correspondence which – following Palestine's identification by it and Lloyd George, in identical terms, as a territory with a future above the ordinary – was the first milepost on the road which eventually led to the British-led removal of it from its Arab inhabitants. The Correspondence, aptly described as 'a monument of ambiguity',¹¹ began with a note which reached Cairo on 19 August. In it, 'Abd Allah said 'that you need have no anxiety about the intentions of our people, for they realise how closely their interests are bound to those of your Government'. On the strength of the confidence the nationalist societies had vested in him, in the undated and unsigned letter to the Consul-General, containing 'our proposals and conditions', which the note enclosed, Husayn asked for Arab independence throughout the area outlined in the Damascus Protocol. In return, he undertook to 'grant Great Britain preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries'.

Particular urgency had been given to Husayn's *démarche* by developments in the Syrian capital. There, in June, Cemal was instructed by Enver Paşa, the dominant member of the Young Turk triumvirate ruling the Ottoman Empire since the overthrow of Sultan Abdülhamid in 1908, to release troops of his 4th. Army for Gallipoli. This had resulted in the despatch there of the entirely Arab 25th. Division, one of the units on which Al-'Ahd had been basing its plans for rebellion. The Sharif's communication was shown to have been well-timed when, on 21 August, Cemal carried out more executions, this time of 11 leading Syrian and Lebanese citizens who had had links with the nationalist societies. In addition he sentenced 45 to death *in absentia* and exiled hundreds of others.

In his reply of 30 August, McMahon described negotiations about boundary questions as 'premature and a waste of time . . . at this stage, with the War in progress and the Turks in effective occupation of the greater part of those regions'.

Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo

In his second note, dated 9 September, the Sharif complained of McMahon's 'lukewarmth and hesitancy' on the question of frontiers and boundaries, which 'they have decided to discuss . . . , in the first resort, with that Power in whom they place their greatest confidence and

reliance, and whom they regard as the pivot of justice, namely Great Britain’.

McMahon’s response was largely based on advice from one of the influential mystery men with whom Islamic history abounds. Lt. Sharif b. Muhammad al-Faruqy, who helped Cairo officials with their reading of the note, was a 24 year old Ottoman staff officer from Mosul who had been ADC to Cemal’s deputy before becoming a POW at Gallipoli. An Al-‘Ahd member, such old Middle East hands as Clayton and General Maxwell, GOC Egypt, believed his false claims to be the accredited spokesman of one or both of the nationalist organisations and Husayn’s representative and appear to have appointed him their natural interlocutor as, unauthorised, he took the lead in the negotiations with Cairo.¹²

Al-Faruqy had warned that, if the UK wanted the two nationalist organisations to lead a revolt but did not quickly commit itself to guaranteeing the Sharif the independence of the Arab Middle East, they would redirect their hopes towards Germany and the Porte, which had already, he claimed, promised them complete fulfilment of their demands.¹³ Clayton believed him, and in a 15 October minute quoted his informant as saying that the Arabs would accept ‘autonomous governments, under British control’ in Palestine and Iraq and would ‘no doubt’ seek Britain’s good offices ‘to settle matters in Syria in as favourable a manner to them as possible’. Introducing a famous concept, Al-Faruqy – alluding to modern Lebanon – informed McMahon ‘that the Syrians would probably accept the exclusion from the area of independence of the area lying between the line Damascus–Aleppo and the Mediterranean’ but ‘will, I think, insist on Homs, Aleppo, Hama and Damascus being in their sphere’. He notified McMahon that the Arabs would oppose by force of arms any occupation by France of (*pace* Sykes) these four ‘purely Arab’ Syrian towns.¹⁴

McMahon and Maxwell, whom, with his long experience of Egypt and the Sudan, the High Commissioner most trusted on Middle Eastern matters, did not demur. The general went so far at this early stage as to call for an urgent understanding with the Arabs because their assistance was essential to Britain and of ‘the greatest value in Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Palestine’.¹⁵

McMahon’s Negligent Second Letter

After he had forwarded Husayn’s letter to London, on 20 October a telegram reached McMahon from the Foreign Secretary, whom the famous

Cambridge Orientalist Professor E.G. Browne (who had taught Sykes, Cairo Oriental Secretary Ronald Storrs and, of a later generation, Sir Reader Bullard) described as 'so ignorant that he hardly knew the Persian Gulf from the Red Sea'. Rather bearing out Browne's scorn, despite all the UK diplomatic experience and reporting available to them, Grey and Kitchener, the telegram said, were 'none too clear what areas could be regarded as "Arab", how much influence or authority Husain commanded amongst these "Arabs", whether some other claimant to primacy might not come forward, and to what extent the Arabs were imbued with Nationalist sentiments'.

Nonetheless, warning him to exercise caution in relation to Syria, 'more especially for north western boundaries' (whatever that might have meant), the Foreign Secretary encouraged McMahan to 'give cordial assurance [to the Sharif] on the lines . . . proposed by you.' Since he did not refer to Palestine, which was in the process of being reserved for Zionism by the UK, McMahan had the choice either of admitting that the territory was not available to Husayn or of not mentioning it at all. He opted for the latter course.

His reply of 24 October, despatched just as Gallipoli was approaching its humiliating conclusion, responded to the Sharif's concern for geographical exactitude. One of the most slapdash documents of the many issued about the Middle East by Britain during the war, in doing so it introduced by omission the most important, and most damaging, feature of the whole Correspondence. In 1912, the UK had confirmed to France that it had no designs on Syria. Accordingly, with regard to 'the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France', McMahan told Husayn that he was authorised to say that his government was 'prepared to recognise and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca', with a crushing list of exceptions. These were the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, where the imperial force sent from Bombay in November 1914 was in the process of seeking with some difficulty to consolidate its occupation; the 'portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts [sic] of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo', which 'cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be exempted from the proposed delimitation'; the 'district' of Alexandretta in the Vilayet of Aleppo; and the Gulf, which was covered by 'the treaties concluded [in the previous century] between us and certain Arab chiefs'. His exclusions left only Arabia (including the Sharif's own Hijaz), east Syria and the future Transjordan to meet the hopes of Husayn and the nationalists.

If McMahon's aim was, as some have thought, to confuse, the many varying interpretations of his 'pledge' suggest that he succeeded. If anybody should have known the truth of the matter it was Grey, who seems to have believed at this time that the government of which he was a leading member had granted Husayn all that he had asked for. Elie Kedourie's assertion that McMahon's "promises" in this second letter 'amount, in the end, to much the same thing as what Al-Faruqi asked for in his conversations with McMahon and claimed to be the irreducible minimum of Arab demands, namely the districts of Hama, Homs, Aleppo and Damascus,'¹⁶ is close to the mark. (As we have seen, while insisting that the Arabs should hold the four towns, the intermediary had ceded 'the area lying between the line Damascus–Aleppo and the Mediterranean'). The most extreme interpretation, David Fromkin's, that McMahon 'deliberately used phrases so devious as to commit himself to nothing at all',¹⁷ is endorsed by the cynical conviction of the contemporary Cairo staff that 'By process of elimination . . . Britain did not bind herself to support Husayn's claims anywhere at all' and by a statement by Clayton, 'architect of the British pledges to Hussein,'¹⁸ that 'we have been very careful indeed to commit ourselves to nothing whatsoever'. In relation to 'Abd Allah's belief that 'the autonomy of the Arabs was assured by the promises of Great Britain to his father', Lawrence (at this time in the Arab Bureau)¹⁹ 'longed to tell ('Abd Allah) that the half-witted old man [Husayn] had obtained from us no concrete or unqualified undertaking of any sort.' His assumption that the UK, in committing itself 'to support the establishment of native governments in parts of Syria . . . , saving the interests of our ally, France', was approving Husayn's claim to east Syria and the future Jordan is perhaps the most accurate interpretation of what had been offered to the Sharif.

Was Palestine Excluded?

Advised at various times by Clayton, Storrs, Lawrence and others,²⁰ McMahon told Grey in a 26 October despatch that, 'While recognizing the towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo as being within the circle of Arab countries,' he had 'been definite' (which he had not yet been) 'in excluding those districts on the *northern* coast of Syria, which cannot be said to be Arab and where I understand that French interests have been recognized.' (Lawrence, who had travelled widely there before the war, shared his belief that they were not Arab.)²¹ McMahon's exclusion of these 'districts', however defined, but roughly equating to Lebanon, 'the key of Syria',²² was not accompanied by any statement

about the rest of Syria and led directly to the question whether or not – in ‘that letter . . . which was for ever afterwards to make the Arabs feel sure that they had been promised Palestine as a reward for fighting the Turks, and the English feel sure that they had not’ –²³ the unmentioned Palestine was thereby also to be withheld from the Arabs. If it was, it is both noteworthy that this was against the earlier views of Clayton and Maxwell and suspicious in that, unlike in the cases of the Syrian towns and Iraq, no reason was adduced for its exclusion. (McMahon was apparently reserving it – as perhaps Kitchener and Storrs also were – for takeover by Egypt after the war.) For what it is worth, all the British contributors to McMahon’s letter (including Clayton) stated later that, through the agency of ‘portions of Syria’, they had intended to leave Palestine out of the area in which Arab independence was agreed to.²⁴ If this was indeed so, however, they had been guilty of a lack of geopolitical grasp incomprehensible in such Middle East experts or of ludicrously careless map-reading: Palestine was ‘not to the west of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo or their districts’²⁵ (whether called towns, districts or – incorrectly except in the case of Aleppo – vilayetler), as a glance at the map shows, and the terms of McMahon’s letter quite clearly have no relevance to it. It would have been perfectly simple to exclude it if such had been the intention: ‘Had it been desired to keep Palestine available as a present to world-Jewry . . . , some point of reference more southerly than Damascus, the Turkish Sanjak of Jerusalem, for instance – might usefully have been selected’.²⁶ Nonetheless, it was not this oversight that lost the Arabs Palestine. Nothing in the end would have stopped the Zionists from taking it over while London looked approvingly and impotently on.

What was certainly lost was any claim by the UK to honesty or credibility over the question. The best that it could do in the effort to conceal its tracks afterwards was to issue in 1921 a feeble Churchill statement to the first Palestinian Arab delegation which had to be further juggled, in a vain attempt to salve British consciences, in the 1922 White Paper. Both were ludicrous and neither made any sense.

The sloppiness of McMahon’s second note was perhaps a by-product of the Cairo staff’s general lack of seriousness in their dealings with the Sharif. Their encouragement to Husayn to revolt and throw in his lot with Britain while they planned to give him almost nothing in return is shameful. He had seized the initiative in the matter himself, despite the revolutionary talk coming out of Syria and Iraq (it was to remain no more than talk) the fragile autonomy he enjoyed from Istanbul and Damascus made him a better bet for London than other Arab rulers might have been,²⁷ and he had been taken up as its Arab ally because no

other had emerged. Sir Reginald (Rex) Wingate, Governor-General of the Sudan, was sure that there was nothing to worry about: ‘if the Arab State becomes a reality, we have quite sufficient safeguards to control it and . . . I think it is within our power to erect such barriers as would effectively prevent its becoming a menace.’²⁸ Prompting Lord (Charles) Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, to complain that he did not like pledges given when there was no intention of fulfilling them, Grey said that Cairo’s offers to Husayn, whatever they were, should cause no concern because ‘the whole thing was a castle in the air which would never materialise’.²⁹ Even the frequently frivolous ‘Abd Allah had considered, according to Storrs, that the ‘reservations contained in the written message should not be taken too seriously’. Sir John Shuckburgh of the India Office offered the weak and inconsistent excuse later, which he presumably would not have adduced in relation to the Balfour Declaration, that the ‘pledge’ was made in ‘the stress and strain’ of war, and nobody in the Cabinet thought ‘we should have to meet these promises’.³⁰ McMahon himself maintained that the Correspondence with Husayn was ‘intended’ to give the UK everything short of ‘open annexation’ and to make the Arab state ‘subject to our creation, direction and control’ – a remark which was in egregious contrast to his second letter, in which he had told the Sharif that ‘this declaration will convince you, beyond all doubt, of Great Britain’s sympathy with the aspirations of her friends the Arabs; and that it will result in a lasting and solid alliance with them, of which one of the immediate consequences will be the liberation of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which has weighed on them all these long years’.

How could the author of those words claim that he had excluded Palestine?

Husayn’s Third Letter

In his reply of 5 November, Husayn expressed the hope that the Arabs might feel confident that after the war Britain intended ‘to help them and advocate their case effectively in the peace negotiations’. He changed the terms of the debate, however, enlarging the area of the ‘portions of Syria’ so that it covered both northern Syria and northern Palestine and insisting on the inclusion of ‘the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut and their western maritime coasts’ in the deal on account of which he was now willing to commit himself to march against the Ottomans. He firmly maintained that ‘these are purely Arab provinces.’ (This revised definition of his requirements suggested that he, too, was vague

about the geography. In addition to the Vilayet of Aleppo and the northern section of the Vilayet of Beirut, he should also have named the Sanjaq of Lebanon which, too, was to the west of the line of the four towns, specifically of Damascus, but he did not do so.)

The Sharif's inflation of his requests led the might of the Foreign Office, at Grey's urging, to seek an interview with Al-Faruqy, its enigmatic informant. During his consequent call, Sykes put him down, making it clear that Palestine and north Syria were in the French sphere of influence, about the dimensions of which Husayn had not enquired, but did not say anything about the actual future ownership of Palestine. Al-Faruqy asserted that 'Under no circumstances could they abandon a span of soil in Syria and that I was unaware of a non-Arab country west of the Damascus-Aleppo line as they claimed'. Nonetheless, McMahon and Clayton seem to have pressed him so hard that he finally agreed to Arab rule being limited in Palestine, which was to come under UK tutelage.

On 13 December, McMahon replied to Husayn. He assured him that he could have every confidence that Britain had no intention of making a peace which did not stipulate the freedom of the Arab peoples and their liberation from Turkish domination. He acknowledged that the question of 'the two vilayets of Aleppo and Bairut' called for 'careful consideration. We shall communicate again with you on this subject, at the appropriate time'. (He never did.) Unaware, according to Lawrence, that the Sykes-Picot Agreement, like De Bunsen, was in the process of awarding France a half share of the Arab Middle East north of 'Aqaba, he now claimed, confirming his earlier caution, that his excuse for withholding 'the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France', was not that they were 'not purely Arab' but that 'the interests of our ally France are involved' in them.

The only realistic conclusion to be drawn from McMahon's end of the Correspondence to this point, by when its substantive content had been fully presented, is that he withheld his support from an independent Palestine neither when he omitted to mention the country in his second letter nor when he failed to return to the subject of the Vilayetler of Aleppo and Beirut after his third.

The Sharif Deceived

Husayn was far from satisfied with McMahon's responses as reported by Al-Faruqy. Nor was he certain that the situation in Syria was yet

favourable for a revolt. The transfer by Cemal to Anatolia of Al-‘Ahd members serving in Arab divisions of the Ottoman Army and prominent civilians in their hundreds, as well as his repression of Al-Fatat and arrests of nationalists, made an immediate rising there unfeasible since only a few second rank Arab leaders remained in Syria out of whom a revolt could be constructed. It was this state of limbo, perhaps, which led Husayn to continue both to work on the details of his agreement with Cairo and to negotiate with, and receive money from, Cemal.

His fourth note to McMahon, dated 1 January 1916, stressed ‘the confidence we repose in (Britain), both in word and deed, in the spirit as well as the letter’ and praised ‘her wisdom and sense of fair play’. It reiterated that ‘any concession designed to give (France) or any other power possession of a single square foot of territory in those parts is quite out of the question. In proclaiming this, I place all my reliance on the declarations which concluded your note’. Despite this and other points of disagreement with McMahon, he committed himself to rebelling against his Ottoman masters. ‘We are only waiting for an opportunity’, he said.

In his reply of 30 January, McMahon added little to the Correspondence. Very much in passing, he remarked that ‘You will doubtless inform us . . . of the ways in which we can help you. You may rest assured that all your requests will always be carefully considered and most expeditiously dealt with’. Husayn took him at his word. He had been thoroughly duped, and his gullibility and irresolution had enabled London to take the first, effortless step towards the betrayal of the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular.

In February, a preliminary version of the Sykes–Picot Agreement was signed. If he had known about it at this time, the Sharif’s confidence in his British connection might – despite his habit of persuading himself of the good faith of the ally which was preparing his doom – perhaps, at last, have been shaken.³¹

Events in Damascus hastened the Arab Revolt. At the end of April, co-ordinating with a German mission,³² 3,500 Ottoman troops (sufficient to overthrow Husayn) arrived in Medina en route to the Yemen. A week later, on 6 May, 22 Syrian professional men³³ were executed for allegedly seeking to bring about the independence of Syria, Palestine and Iraq from the Ottoman Sultanate; harsh measures were taken against the civilian population, and notables and their families were exiled to Anatolia. These developments forced Husayn’s hand and impelled him into action. After issuing a proclamation condemning the Porte for the steps he said it had taken ‘to sap the foundation of the Caliphate’, he began the Revolt on 5 June, on which day Cemal indulged in further

executions, as on the 9th. It was on the basis of false British assurances that he went to war. It was perhaps, however, an indication of his less than total confidence in the bargain he thought he had made that, hedging his bets to the end, he continued to discuss with Istanbul the possibility of the Ottoman Empire offering him, an Ottoman Amir, more power and autonomy than London might be willing to concede him.

Sykes Does Exclude Palestine

In March 1915, France asked Russia to agree with its wish to rule Syria and Palestine after a successful war, but St. Petersburg – its rival as a protector of Christians in the two territories – declined to do so. London's view was identical. Indeed, in July, Grey obtained the support of the Cabinet for Palestine to be internationally administered.

Although Kitchener and Cairo would have preferred the total exclusion of France from the Middle East, they recognised that snubbing their Entente Cordiale partner was not sensible. To justify McMahon's utilisation of its claims in the area in order to deny Lebanon (disguised as the Syrian portions/districts/vilayetler to the west of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo) to Husayn, it had to be left with something. Franco-British negotiations with the aim of deciding what began in October. France's delegate was the pompous, exceptionally tall and heavily outranked First Secretary of the French Embassy in London, François Georges-Picot. At the talks, after the terms of the still unconcluded Husayn/McMahon Correspondence had shocked him because they appeared to point to the handover of Syria to the Arabs, it was confirmed that France should have direct authority over the Syrian littoral from north of Acre on the Palestine–Lebanon border to Alexandretta and that, as in Husayn/McMahon, Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo would be 'included in the Arab dominions to be administered by the Arabs', but now 'under French influence'.³⁴

On 21 December, however, Georges-Picot raised the stakes. He informed Sir Arthur Nicolson – Foreign Office PUS and chief UK negotiator – that, while it might concede a Palestinian port as a British Mediterranean terminal from Mesopotamia in exchange for French control of Mosul, his country 'would take nothing less than all of Syria and Palestine', from Egypt to Mersin, 'except for the Holy Places'.³⁵ Appealing to France's traditional claims in the region, he ignored the fact that it was the UK which had conquered the Levant coast. He received a chilly response and the talks ended in inconclusive and fruitless, if not quarrelsome, deadlock.

On Sykes's return from his tour promoting the De Bunsen Committee report that month, he was asked by Nicholson to take over from him responsibility for establishing the UK's Syria policy. To be based on the report, it was to make it certain that Palestine was to be lost to the Arabs. A minute by Sykes dashed France's hopes and marked a major success for Britain. It notified Georges-Picot that – in the 'Arab state to be divided into spheres of commercial and administrative interest' between Britain and France – the latter was to have no foothold in Palestine: indeed, the southernmost point on the Mediterranean littoral where it had been awarded authority was to be pushed back slightly north from Palestine, to Beirut. In Palestine itself, 'Jerusalem was to form an enclave' and Haifa and Acre were to be reserved as termini for the putative British railway line. (This plan was out of step with the view of Kitchener that Palestine was strategically negligible. The War Minister favoured a swap with France of Palestine for Alexandretta, which he regarded as militarily vital to the UK, but given how the Arab-betraying arrangements were proceeding this was out of the question because of France's determination to monopolise Syria.)³⁶

The Sykes–Picot Agreement

Just having excluded France from Palestine, on 5 January 1916 Sykes in a joint memorandum with Georges-Picot registered the latter's no doubt eager agreement to the determination of Grey and the Cabinet that Palestine should be internationalised within a confederation to be created from it, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Syria. Recognised, upheld and protected by Britain and France, as desired (the authors claimed) by the leaders of the Arab national movement, it would come under the 'suzerainty' of an Arab chief, perhaps Husayn, even though he had shown little interest in Palestine as such. (Reginald 'Blinker' Hall, Head of Naval Intelligence, 'a fearsome interrogator of prisoners and a devious runner of agents and spies',³⁷ described these arrangements as 'dividing the bear's skin while the bear is alive'.)

The memorandum was signed in early February. Contradicting his recent expression of satisfaction, Grey complained that UK interests had been sacrificed in it (Sykes, extraordinarily, concurred)³⁸ and nominated Zionism as a means to strengthen them. An approach by him to France and Russia about the possibility of offering the Jews 'an arrangement in regard to Palestine', such as they had been actively coveting since 1897, led in March to a mission by Sykes and Georges-Picot to Petrograd, whence they brought back approval of the idea as a possible solution to

the continual problem Russia had with its Jewish population. On 16 May Britain, France and Russia signed the Sykes–Picot Agreement, Grey stipulating that the co-operation of the Arabs had to be secured and – reverting to Husayn/McMahon – that they ‘fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus and Aleppo’.³⁹ It was to come into effect if and when Husayn’s Revolt began.

Elie Kedourie claims, like Clayton, that ‘Between the Sykes Picot Agreement and the promises of McMahon, there could be and there was no incompatibility’. An American opinion was that ‘Great Britain had sold the same pup twice’.⁴⁰ Not everyone shared this view. In a minute circulated to the Cabinet on 21 August, 1919, Balfour wrote, ‘It is rather dangerous to speak to the *Times* . . . unless we can reconcile our letters to Husein of 1915 with the Sykes–Picot agreement of 1916. *I cannot*. Can anyone else?’. The purpose of Sykes–Picot in its final form was, however, to square its terms not with those of Husayn/McMahon but with the interests of France, which had not been associated with McMahon’s ‘pledge’⁴¹ – a fact of which Sykes had been well aware but disregarded.⁴² It was constructed so as to suit the imperial ambitions particularly of the UK and France.

The terms of the Agreement were far from identical with those of the February memorandum. They divided the area originally demanded by the Sharif into five parts, only two of them covering what might be termed Greater Palestine (Palestine and Transjordan):

- (1) An international (British, French and Russian) Brown Zone, closely resembling the Ottoman Sanjaq of Jerusalem, moved Palestine (which McMahon had not overtly denied to Husayn) further beyond Arab reach. Keeping apart the areas earmarked for the UK and France within it,⁴³ and enlarging the French bridge-head, it had four components: a British Haifa with a French free zone in the port; a British Acre; a French Upper Galilee, Safed, Lake Hulah and upper R. Jordan; and Jerusalem. The holy city was to be ‘under international administration or control, subject to consultation with Russia and the Allies’, among whom was Husayn. The Brown Zone was surrounded on three sides by territory under British control or direction; and
- (2) Zone B, covering Transjordan, the Negev and eastern and northern parts of the future Iraq, including Kirkuk, was to become an Arab state under British protection. The zone linked the Red Sea at ‘Aqaba and the Mediterranean at Gaza with Iraq, providing the UK with both an imperial corridor to India from Egypt or (failing Egypt) Palestine and a potential barrier to southward expansion by France.

Reaction to Sykes–Picot

Sykes–Picot was received largely with scorn. Lawrence deplored it, rating the boundaries it had invented ‘entirely absurd and unworkable’. Curzon was to describe it in November 1919 as ‘An “unfortunate” document which has been hanging like a millstone round our neck ever since 1916’; contradicting Kedourie, it conflicted, he said, with Husayn/McMahon and was ‘iniquitous’, obsolete and ‘absolutely impracticable’. He derided ‘the gross ignorance’ with which the boundary lines had been drawn, creating divisions so ‘fantastic and incredible’ as to provoke incessant friction between Britain, France and the Arabs. In his *War Memoirs*, Lloyd George ridiculed it as ‘a fatuous arrangement judged from any and every point of view’.

History has, quite rightly, been unkind to Sykes–Picot. It seems incomprehensible that an official British policy statement – one in which Sykes was able to carry through his strange Crusader obsession – should have been issued, only to be condemned at birth. In a minute to ‘Blinker’ Hall, Sykes himself criticised it because it deprived Syria of an outlet to the Mediterranean and bisected districts which were economically and socially interdependent. While it gave a political character to Palestine for the first time for hundreds of years, despite the claimed involvement of Husayn as a consultee it left the Arabs no foothold within it – a position which was soon to be reinforced in order to satisfy the aspirations of the Zionists.

Weizmann Secures the Abandonment of the Internationalisation of Palestine

Two factors combined to overturn Sykes–Picot’s internationalisation of Palestine, British imperial strategy and Zionism. Even before the agreement was signed, in Cabinet on 1 May Curzon had urged that the UK should hold on to the whole of the territory in order to block German expansion from Ottoman Syria towards the Suez Canal and its threat to the sea communications of the Empire. Palestine was now found to have a vital, threefold strategic importance: as a fallback position in case Egypt (soon to be in flames) had to be evacuated by Britain, as a protector of the Suez Canal gateway to India, and, following Curzon, as a buffer between Syria (likely soon to be occupied by France) and the Canal. These strategic questions arose in the wake of the rapid Zionist advance which began when London lighted upon the Agreement as the means to ensure that Palestine would not be ruled by Arabs. Sykes had

told Georges-Picot that 'If the great force of Judaism feels that its aspirations are not only considered but in a fair way to realisation, then there is hope of an ordered and developed Arabia and Middle East'.⁴⁴

Weizmann put his full weight behind the Zionist wheel. Since 1904 he had been active in helping to bring about closer relations between the Zionist Organisation and the Yishuv, in promoting the use of Hebrew in Palestine and in his research at Manchester University as (now) Reader in Biochemistry. In 1912 he had discovered a bacterium, *Clostridium acetobutylicum*, which would convert carbohydrate into acetone,⁴⁵ a solvent in the manufacture of cordite only available at the time in Germany. In March 1916 he made a presentation to the Admiralty about this alternative method of rendering gunpowder smokeless.⁴⁶ When C.P. Scott revealed the existence and terms of the draft Sykes-Picot to him, aided by the determination of the British government not to allow France or Russia to profit from its Palestine provision⁴⁷ he redoubled his Zionist energies. He immediately began working, with remarkable speed and success, and as a sort of accredited agent for HMG, to undo the projected international status of the territory.

Only five days later, Lloyd George told the British ambassador in Paris that 'Palestine is really the strategic buffer of Egypt' and that an international regime there 'would be quite intolerable to ourselves'.⁴⁸ Sir Ronald Graham, a Foreign Office AUS, informed Hardinge, his new PUS, back from India, that 'Suddenly and without any preliminaries the Prime Minister insists that we must obtain Palestine . . . His Majesty's Government are now committed to support Zionist aspirations'.⁴⁹ On 25 April Weizmann – who had already made astonishing inroads into UK ruling circles – felt able to tell Robert Cecil, the Foreign Office Under Secretary of State, that he objected both to an international regime in Palestine and to any French control there, which would be a 'great disaster' like 'a third destruction of the Temple'. Zionist leaders, he said, were deeply disturbed by Sykes-Picot, by which 'Palestine is cut up into two halves. By the separation of Galilee from Judea, Palestine has been deprived of a very valuable part of the country . . . The Zionists will particularly suffer because around the Lake of Tiberias the country is dotted with Jewish colonies'.⁵⁰ As early as this he was talking in terms of a state. He theorised that it might be necessary for the Jews to construct one in one part of Palestine 'until such time as they could take over the rest'.

On 28 April, a Sub-committee on Territorial Desiderata, under Curzon's chairmanship, approved the government's wish to modify Sykes-Picot so as to ensure for the UK 'definite and exclusive control' over Palestine. In a triumphalist spirit, it moved British Palestine's

projected northern frontier deep into Lebanon, up to the R. Litany and north of the Hawran plain in Syria.⁵¹ In the same month, so vertiginous had the pace of development been since the Scott-Weizmann meeting, Lloyd George ordered Sykes–Picot Zone B to be revised so as to give the UK all of Palestine by the addition to it of the Negev and Transjordan.

The agreement was the death knell for an Arab Palestine.⁵² Its demise was completed by the publication of the Balfour Declaration on 2 November.

Balfour Settles the Fate of ‘The Non-Jewish Communities’

A Zionist Political Committee had been formed in January 1915 with Weizmann as chairman⁵³ and Samuel (risking conflict of interest charges) among its members. It insisted that it had not dropped the idea of a British-protected Palestine as a shelter to a reviving Jewish life and that, as early as this, it was completely opposed to the internationalisation of the territory. In the same month, a number of Weizmann’s younger associates in London and Manchester launched the weekly *Palestine*, with Sidebotham’s help, ‘[t]o reset the ancient glories of the Jewish nation in the freedom of a new British dominion in Palestine’.

After the fall in December 1916 of the government of Asquith, the mocking and, as it turned out, shortsighted critic of the idea of the restoration of a Jewish state in Palestine, by the beginning of 1917 Weizmann and Sokolow had acquired such influence in Whitehall that the government found it necessary to appoint Sykes, by now in favour of Zionism, as a formal negotiator with the ZPC. When he and Weizmann met for the first time on 28 January, he hinted at the willingness of the government to favour ‘a Zionist solution’ to the Palestine question.⁵⁴ A series of meetings that month and in early February between them, Samuel (now out of government) and Gaster resulted in the first draft of what became the Declaration to which the ‘resolutely anti-Jewish’ Balfour oddly gave his name.⁵⁵ On 7 February, they, the French Baron Edmond de Rothschild, Sokolow and several other leading Zionists inaugurated ‘the new [Zionist] era’⁵⁶ at Gaster’s house. They called for Palestine to become a British-protected Jewish state, society or nation. They objected to Sykes’s view that places such as Galilee and Jerusalem should not be included in it, as in the emerging draft Sykes–Picot Agreement of which all but one of them were at that stage still unaware. Samuel, who did know about it, played the strategy card, reiterating Lloyd George’s conviction, and theirs, that an international regime in Palestine ‘would be quite intolerable to ourselves’ because the

presence of a foreign power there might seriously affect the position of the UK on the Suez Canal and in adjacent Arab areas. The meeting agreed that all Jews wishing to move to Palestine would be granted full immigration rights, which would be regulated by a chartered company or some Jewish authority.

On 3 April, Lloyd George stressed to Sykes the importance, if possible, of securing the addition of Palestine to the British area, which Sykes–Picot in draft had not as such recommended. On the 8th., accordingly, Sykes impressed upon Balfour the seriousness of the ideas of securing the appointment of Britain as patron of Palestine and of using Zionism as a lever against the French. At another meeting with the ZPC on 16 April, in line with this he proposed the British–French condominium over Palestine which they had ruled out. It would feature the charter company mentioned and be headed by an Arab prince. At the same time, Lloyd George, in complete contradiction of the last point, was telling him that the Arabs realised from McMahon's silence on Palestine that there was no likelihood of their being allowed even partial control over the territory.

Progress Checked

The Zionist advance was now temporarily held up both abroad and at home. At the tripartite conference which met in April 1917 at St. Jean-de-Maurienne on the Franco-Italian border to award Italy its share of the dying Ottoman Empire, the suggestion of Lloyd George that Palestine should come under UK control did not win approval and its internationalisation was confirmed. In London, a counter-initiative to the pro-Zionist surge came from the presidents of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association. These two most anti-Weizmann and -Sokolow official organisations in British Jewry, together making up a so-called 'Conjoint Committee', on 24 May sent a note to the Foreign Office protesting against the idea of political Zionism and published it as a manifesto in *The Times*. It was immoral, they said, to grant the Yishuv rights in excess of those of rest of the population. The national and political aims of the Zionists would create bitterness and strife with their neighbours. The committee would only co-operate with them in the postwar rehabilitation of the Yishuv, they warned, if they subscribed to Ahad Ha-Am's aim of making the territory a spiritual centre for it, and for colonists and settlers who might join it. A rebuttal came from Lord Walter Lionel de Rothschild, head of the British De Rothschilds and of British Jews, who referred to 'an autonomous Jewish

state' where, in a cynical comment, Weizmann expressed the hope that 'the new suzerain' over Palestine (the Arab prince) would observe 'the cardinal principles' of Zionism that 'all races and sects' should enjoy full justice and liberty.⁵⁷

The Advance Resumes

A pro-Zionist statement on 4 June by the Director-General of the Quai d'Orsay provoked two Under-Secretaries at the Foreign Office, Ronald Graham and Robert Cecil, to advise Balfour that it was time for a preemptive public British commitment to Zionism. During a visit later in the month to the USA, following that country's declaration of war, he was lobbied by Louis D. Brandeis about a British-protected Jewish National Home. The US Supreme Court judge, President of the American Zionist Organisation and friend of President Wilson, told the private secretary accompanying the Foreign Secretary that the ultimate aim of the Zionists was a "national state" (which he gathered had Balfour's personal support) but that in line with Herzl's policy they were not going to claim it to start with.

On his return home, Balfour claimed that Zionist political support was vital if Russia was to remain in the war. He invited Edmond de Rothschild and Weizmann 'to submit a formula'. A draft reached ministers on 3 September. Weizmann had wanted it to express UK support for a Palestine reconstituted as a Jewish state and National Home for the Jewish People. Making no mention of the Palestinians, it envisaged their almost immediate establishment. 'HM Government', it said, 'accepts the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish people . . . HM Government will use its best endeavours to secure the achievement of this object, and will discuss the necessary methods and means with the Zionist Organisation'. The Zionist tail coyly wagging the British dog, a speech by Weizmann in May stated that Palestine was to become a British protectorate where Zionist aims would be realised and that he had the authority of the British government to say so.

Balfour produced a revision of the formula which did not differ significantly from it, and Milner, Minister Without Portfolio in the War Cabinet, reconciled the two versions and made very minor alterations. He submitted his text to De Rothschild, Gaster and Samuel for approval, and they, Weizmann and Sokolow eagerly accepted it.

Cabinet Opposition

When on 3 September the Cabinet decided to consult France, Italy and Russia (but not Husayn, the 'Arab Prince') about Milner's text, objections by Edwin Montagu (the new India Secretary, the Conjoint Committee's spokesman in the Cabinet and Samuel's cousin), Curzon and Bonar Law slowed progress again. In a Cabinet paper in August, Montagu had asserted 'that there is not a Jewish nation' and denied that Palestine was a suitable place for Jews to reside. Curzon agreed, believing Palestine inappropriate and not big enough for large-scale Jewish immigration from Europe. He told Montagu that he could not conceive 'a worse bondage' than exile in Palestine for the advanced and intellectual Jewish community. Montagu himself considered that the 'national home' proposal would provoke anti-Semitism. He correctly forecast that it would mean that Christians and Muslims in Palestine would have to give way to the Jews, whose return was supposed to require divine agency. He did not know that either De Rothschild or Weizmann was the Messiah. Zionism was a 'mischievous political creed'.

On 14 September Montagu proposed that there should be 'every opportunity for the establishment in Palestine of those Jews who cannot, or will not, remain in the lands in which they live at present.' The most the government should do was promise complete liberty and equality for all the inhabitants of Palestine. Judah Magnes, a reformist rabbi and leader of the Zionist Organisation in the USA, who opposed the Jewish state idea, was of similar mind. He said later that a National Home was not the sole hope for Jewish survival and that assimilated Jews 'were participating in the world's redemption even against their will'.⁵⁸

On 4 October, Curzon asked his Cabinet colleagues 'How it was proposed to get rid of the existing majority of Mussulman inhabitants and to introduce the Jews in their place?' To secure for the Jews already in Palestine equal civil and religious rights seemed to him a better policy than to aim at large scale repatriation, which he regarded as sentimental idealism. Would the adherents of two of the three faiths to which Jerusalem was sacred stand by, he wondered, while the third took it for its capital? On 26 October, in a paper to Balfour in which he recapitulated his main views, he pointed out that a National Home must mean a National State. Palestine, which 'we are invited . . . to convert into the national home of a people numbering many millions', was already inhabited by half a million Arabs. What was to become of them? They had been there for 1,500 years, they owned and worked the soil. 'They will not be content to be expropriated for Jewish immigrants, or to act

merely as hewers of wood and drawers of water to the latter'. Besides, Jerusalem was a city in which 'too many peoples and too many religions had "a passionate and permanent interest" for it to become a future Jewish capital'. Almost doubling their actual number, he said that he believed that its 100,000 Christians would not wish to be disturbed. He considered that the projected national home would infringe existing political, national and religious interests and that a Jewish administration in Palestine was an impossibility.

The minds of Curzon's colleagues were made up, however, only the relatively junior Montagu attempted to answer him and the government proceeded to issue a final version of the Balfour Declaration. It was much less pro-Zionist than the earlier drafts and limited its support to a Jewish National Home *in* Palestine, not one overtly designed to take over the whole of the territory. Even though Lloyd George and his co-conspirators had no intention of so limiting it (on 22 July 1921, Balfour and Lloyd George were to assure Weizmann that by the Declaration they had always meant the eventual creation of a Jewish state), to Curzon and Montagu's credit is the inclusion in the declaration, at last, of a reference to the Palestinians who constituted 93% of the population of the territory. An extraordinary achievement in view of all the heavyweight drafting which had gone before, the third quarter of the text read, 'it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country'.

Alleged German Competition

Real or imaginary German competition came into play to carry the National Home plan over the line. In a very clever move, Weizmann caused alarm by thinking aloud that the Zionists could be tempted by a possible better offer from Germany which, he said, might bid to be their protector in Palestine and force its Ottoman ally to issue a more tempting declaration than Balfour's. *The Jewish Chronicle* claimed on 22 September that the German press was advocating its country's sponsorship of a National Home and urged the necessity of pre-emptive action. The pro-Zionists in the Foreign Office, notably Graham (who most influenced Balfour to commit himself to their cause), were convinced, and even George Antonius maintains that 'powerful Zionist elements in Germany and Austria . . . were actually in negotiation . . . for the issue of a Turkish Balfour Declaration'. Weizmann seized the opportunity

presented by the gullibility of Whitehall in its reaction to this alleged threat to British leadership of the Palestine project. In Cabinet on 4 October Balfour, who had at first disbelieved the canard, reported that the German government was making 'great efforts to capture the sympathy of the Zionist movement' and that, the Zionist leader having paved the way, he and his colleagues had decided to seek official support from President Wilson. Now inflating to the maximum the danger posed by Germany's supposed rival plan, and stressing the need for urgent action, Balfour sent a revised version of Milner's draft to Washington. It read:

'His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish race, and will use its endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed in any other country by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship.'

The prestige and influence of the US government proved decisive in quashing doubts in the Cabinet about issuing its declaration ahead of the feared German strike. Conveying the first of the crucial contributions made by the USA to the creation of Israel, on 16 October a message arrived in which Wilson gave approval to the Foreign Secretary's wording. Endorsing it on 26 October, *The Times* urged the Cabinet to steal a march on Germany, which was 'attempting to forestall us' in giving official recognition to Zionism. The spectre (genuine or invented) of German intervention had enabled the Zionists – playing '“delicately and deftly” upon the ignorance and prejudice of British officials' –⁵⁹ to accelerate the pace to the conclusion they desired.

The Balfour Declaration

The Cabinet pressed on. On 31 October, Balfour described the national home to it as 'some form of British, American or other protectorate, under which full facilities would be given to the Jews to work out their own salvation' by building up 'a centre of national culture and a focus of national life'. He maintained that this would not necessarily involve the early establishment of an independent state. *Pace* the vocal opposition of Curzon, he gathered that everyone was agreed, and he repeated

Zionist claims that ‘the vast majority of the Jews in Russia, America and all over the world “appeared” favourable’ to Zionism. With no glance in the direction of the majority population of Palestine which had never been consulted about the future of its as yet unoccupied territory, the Cabinet authorised him to publish the Milner text, which had undergone a final revision.

The Balfour Declaration was issued on 2 November 1917. Incorporated in a letter to Lord Walter Lionel de Rothschild, its text said that:

‘His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.’

Of the Declaration, by which, in the words of Arthur Koestler, ‘one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third’, Storrs remarked that ‘Palestine, up to now a Moslem country, had fallen into the hands of a Christian Power which on the eve of its conquest announces that a considerable portion of its land is to be handed over for colonisation purposes to a nowhere very popular people. (The UK proposed to hand it, without consulting the occupants, to a third party; and what sort of third party! To the lowest and (in Arab eyes) the least desirable specimens of a people reputed parasitic by nature, heavily subsidized, and supported by the might of the British Empire.)’⁶⁰

Jack Philby, then a British official in Baghdad, deemed the Declaration ‘an act of betrayal for whose parallel, the shekels and the kiss and all the rest of it, we have to go back to the Garden of Gethsemane’. More to the point, whereas the Cabinet minutes of 2 November quote Balfour as saying that the National Home would in due course naturally evolve into a Jewish state and Weizmann was to comment in July 1921 that ‘The Declaration meant an ultimate Jewish majority’, in March 1922 the latter told *The Times*, ‘We do not seek to found a Zionist State . . . we have never proposed that a Jewish minority should rule over the rest’.⁶¹ This was to be revealed as staggering hypocrisy by the 1947 Ben-Gurion quotation at the head of this chapter.

Reaction to the Declaration

Rarely, if ever, can a single sentence have had such momentous and dire consequences as that which embodied the Balfour Declaration. There was immediate Arab protest, by both Muslims and Christians,⁶² in Palestine, Syria, Egypt, the UK and the USA. It was, however, uncoordinated and of insufficient weight to be of concern to the authors of the Declaration, who throughout the build-up to its finalisation had shown not the slightest interest in its implications for the Palestinians and Arabs.

Anxiety was of course greatest in the target area. From there, a 4 November telegram came to Balfour whose authors, approaching "respectfully" the man in whose name the future of the Arab Middle East was being unilaterally and heartlessly jeopardised, called his attention to 'the fact that Palestine forms a vital part of Syria – as the heart is to the body – admitting of no separation politically or sociologically' and stressed that, as much as by the Jews, it was looked upon by both Muslims and Christians as 'the polar star and birthplace of their religious ideals'. Members of the Islamic Society in London – whom Sykes, a talented name-caller, labelled a 'crew of seditionists and CUP agents', most of whom 'ought to be behind the barbed wire' – affirmed that they regarded with great concern 'the mischievous movement started by some people calling themselves Zionists' and hoped that the British government would as soon as possible 'remove any misapprehension which may exist in the minds of the Moslems'. Early in the new year, Palestinian notables in Jerusalem, led by 'Arif Paşa ad-Dajany, who was to found the earliest Palestinian and anti-Zionist nationalist organisation, the MCA (*Al-jam'iyyah al-islamiyyah al-masihyyah*) there,⁶³ rejected both the establishment of a Jewish National Home and the separation of Palestine from Syria.

A Sokolow speech to an audience in the Kingsway Theatre after the publication of the Declaration reads ironically a century later. The purpose of the National Home, the Zionist leader said, was 'to conserve the great traditions of our people. Judaism has shown humanity the road to progress, and the noblest axioms governing the life of the civilised world came from Judea. We are a peace-loving people. Our future lies not with the sword, but with the plough; with the Book, not the Bullet . . . We are striving to create bonds of friendship with the Arabs and we welcome, in brotherly affection, the formation of the Arab Kingdom [of the Hijaz]'

His theme was seconded by some of the speakers at a public meeting held on 2 December at Covent Garden Opera House to give thanks for

the Declaration. De Rothschild's address from the chair, pledging the Zionists to respect the rights of 'their prospective non-Jewish neighbours', and those of Samuel and Sykes, demonstrated the influence Montagu had exerted. Samuel, in the outstanding speech, stressed that 'there must be full, just recognition of the rights of the Arabs who constitute a majority of the population of that country'. Sykes cautioned his listeners 'to deal generously with the Arabs and to recall that the Holy Land would have to be shared fully by both peoples.' These noble sentiments were to guide developments on the ground in Palestine for no more than six months.

Discordant notes, in contrast to them, were struck at the meeting by other speakers who made it abundantly clear that, despite the Declaration's bow in the direction of the 'non-Jewish communities', the aim of the Zionists was to dispossess the Palestinians. Gaster announced that the Zionists wanted to set up 'an autonomous Jewish commonwealth in the fullest sense of the word', . . . not merely a Palestine for Jews . . . a land of Israel. The ground must be theirs'. British speakers equalled him in conviction and excelled him in enthusiasm. Robert Cecil clearly did not account the Palestinians a 'people'. He claimed that a UK war aim had been to secure to 'all peoples' the right of self-government and that the greatest step in this direction was the recognition of Zionism. He said, 'our wish is that Arabian countries shall be for the Arabs, Armenia for the Armenians, and Judaea (sic) for the Jews'. Austen Chamberlain referred to 'the new Jewish state, which is to be established', and Ormsby-Gore felt that behind the Jewish claim to Palestine was 'the finger of Almighty God'; he detected something 'so sincere, so British, so straightforward' in the Zionist leaders. Early in the following year, he gave them further support, expressing his certainty that 'If this splendid country is ever to be properly developed and still more if it is ever to be British, it is only the Zionists who can accomplish these two aims.'

The Declaration Considered No More than a Mistake

Ernest Bevin was to admit that the Balfour Declaration was the UK's biggest twentieth century foreign policy mistake. Officials at the time of its issue, in venturing to criticise it, went no further. Clayton suggested that it might have been one.⁶⁴ Just as none has since, no public figure involved at the time felt it necessary to apologise to, or commiserate with, the Palestinians for the 'mistake'. On the contrary, Balfour expressed the hope that the Arabs 'will not begrudge that small notch

. . . whatever it may be historically . . . being given to the people who for all these hundreds of years have been separated from it'.⁶⁵ Eighteen months later, he appeared to attribute to himself no blame for the chaos he must have been able to foresee Britain inflicting on those in the Near East to whom it had made contradictory commitments: 'France, England and America have got themselves into a position over the (Syria/Palestine) problem so inextricably confused', he complained, 'that no really neat and satisfactory issue is now possible for any of them'. He had no care for the possible repercussions of the policy which he himself had sponsored. Nor did most of those most closely involved in the conception and creation of his Declaration, even those (like Clayton) whom the Arabs considered fair and honest. Balfour, however, outdid them all in the frivolity of his attitude. When reminded in 1918 that, 'according to prophecies, the end of the world would follow the return of the Jews to Palestine', he said, 'that is just the point . . . think how interesting it will be for us all to see it!'⁶⁶

Motives for the Declaration

The reasons adduced for issuing the Balfour Declaration were many and varied. That it would be of benefit to the war effort was the principal one. The July 1937 Peel Report was to quote Lloyd George as saying that he had anticipated that Jewish support would boost the Allied cause and make it more difficult for Germany to reduce its military commitments and improve its economic position on the Eastern Front. Persuaded by the Zionists, themselves cynically 'aware that no such Russian Jewish backing for the war effort existed',⁶⁷ the UK had hoped that the Declaration would persuade Russia's Jews to keep their country in the war, counteract the growing influence of the revolutionary leaders in St. Petersburg even though at the time they were believed to be Jewish, and obstruct German exploitation of the Ukraine's grain, which was largely in Jewish hands. (Despite Lloyd George's claim in the Commons on 4 July 1922 that the Declaration had been 'a definite palpable advantage' in Britain's struggle to win the war, all of these hopes turned out to be illusory after the Revolution withdrew Russia from the conflict.)

A motive was to reward Weizmann for his services in acetone. Another was to enable Balfour to salve his conscience about the illiberal terms of the Aliens' Act of 1905 which, passed when he was Prime Minister, had particularly affected Jews wishing to come to the UK from Russia and East Europe and been seen as harsh and insulting by British Jews. These were genuine motives, even if Nevill Barbour not unreason-

ably suggests that to reward Weizmann with the gift of the Balfour Declaration was disproportionate. But the practical purpose of the Declaration, Lloyd George wrote, was to exploit Zionism in order to retrieve the rights London had, in Sykes–Picot, conceded to the French in Palestine and to prevent other powers from taking control there and threatening Britain’s position on the Suez Canal and in the surrounding area.⁶⁸ As Magnes saw it, the intention of ‘the “Jewish National Home” of the Balfour Declaration was under all circumstances to hold Palestine as a “military bastion” for the protection of the Suez Canal’.⁶⁹

The Declaration Dispensable

As the date of issue of the Balfour Declaration had approached, and at the same time as Weizmann was promoting the clashing German/Ottoman Balfour Declaration, the UK had been receiving feelers from the Ottomans about a separate peace. Reflecting disunity within the CUP Triumvirate, they came from two different originators. To proposals from Talât Bey, the Interior Minister, the War Cabinet responded that, if Istanbul granted the Allies permanent free passage from the Dardanelles to the Black Sea, Turkey would not be dismembered and would receive financial aid and, if necessary, protection against Germany. Milner believed that the flag of the Ottomans could continue to fly, though they would have no administrative control, over Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine. The Foreign Office was dismayed. Curzon protested: ‘Almost in the same week that we have pledged ourselves, if successful, to secure Palestine as a national home for the Jewish people, are we to contemplate leaving the Turkish flag flying over Jerusalem?’ Sykes, Hardinge and, of course, Balfour were outraged, and Graham deemed the suggestion ‘a complete betrayal’. The War Cabinet nonetheless arranged for British emissaries to talk to Ottoman counterparts, and it was only on the day of the Opera House celebration that Tal’at’s spokesman indicated that a Russian offer of an armistice and peace rendered further conversations on the subject, from Istanbul’s point of view, redundant.

A separate approach from Enver, however, remained live into February 1918 as the UK continued to offer to support the right of the Turks to fly their flag in Palestine which, under those circumstances, Lloyd George promised, ‘will not be annexed or incorporated in the British Empire’.⁷⁰

Beaming a shameful light on the utter lack of integrity already displayed by Britain’s leaders of the day, this unprincipled willingness to

abandon the Balfour Declaration at the moment of its birth (and to jettison all the strategic and anti-French advantages of the National Home policy) for the sake of peace with a beaten opponent was a manifestation of extraordinary duplicity, ranking with the earlier ones which have been noted. If a separate peace had been secured, the flippancy rating of the Declaration would have been shown up as equal to those of the previous British promises (to the Arabs) and would, like them, have been proved to have had no serious intent.

The Death of Sykes–Picot

The Sykes–Picot Agreement had meanwhile continued to fail to expire. Its scope was of course geographically far wider than that of the Declaration, with which in relation to Palestine it ran in parallel for over a further year as though Balfour had not made his announcement. In March 1918, however, Sykes told Wingate and Clayton that it had to be abandoned, *inter alia* because of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, issued on 8 January. In June, he advised the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee that France should be asked to concur in it no longer applying. On 16 June, after Husayn's Revolt had been in progress for two years, Wingate (its greatest supporter and supplier) disowned Sykes–Picot but was not allowed by the Foreign Office to tell the Sharif, who had never heard of it, that it was for all practical purposes dead. On 3 October, Lloyd George informed the War Cabinet it was 'quite inapplicable to present circumstances; was altogether a most undesirable agreement from the British point of view'.

On 21 November a War Cabinet resolution rejected the Sykes–Picot concept of an international regime in Palestine. It demanded instead the appointment of a mandatory power other than France or Italy there. It noted that the USA was a possible candidate but added, coyly if not hypocritically, that the UK was to be preferred. The choice would, however, depend on the wishes of the Palestinians and the Yishuv, of whose 66,000 members only a few thousand were neither indifferent nor hostile to Zionism. With 200,000 British troops in occupation of Palestine, Syria, south Turkey, Mesopotamia and lower Iran, in contrast to 'a poorly equipped, ragtag French army of 6,000 men (half of them Armenian refugee conscripts) hopefully representing the French "presence" in the eastern Mediterranean',⁷¹ in December Lloyd George introduced a fresh argument to keep France out of Palestine: an immediate revision of Sykes–Picot was necessary, he averred, because 'it [now] entirely overlooked the fact that our position in (the Ottoman Empire)

had been won by very large British forces, whereas our Allies had contributed but little to the result'.⁷² French Prime Minister Clemenceau, who was opposed to colonial expansion by his country, not least into the Middle East, had nonetheless initially resisted the British suggestion that the Russian Revolution had invalidated the whole agreement. In the first week of December, however, in a conversation with Lloyd George he allowed it to be varied. The British Prime Minister persuaded him to permit UK to be substituted for international control of Palestine in the Brown Area and for Mosul to be removed from French-protected Zone A and added to the British-protected B. In return, ignoring Grey's agreement that the Arabs could have Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo and the east of the country if their Revolt took the four towns, he offered France exclusive control over the whole of Syria.

Palestine had already been well on the way to being barred to the Arabs. Now even that part of Syria which McMahon had left them, and in the direction of which Lawrence had pointed Faysal, had been taken from their grasp. The Arab Revolt's contribution to the UK war effort in the Middle East, which Allenby, Wingate and Lloyd George (mostly) had praised, had brought the Arabs nothing but loss.

PART THREE
OCCUPATION

CHAPTER

4

The UK Conquers Palestine and the Sharif is Hoodwinked

‘Syria and Palestine, which for centuries had been one country, were forced asunder to satisfy the rival claims of Britain and France.’
(Edward Atiyah)¹

Husayn’s Arab Revolt got under weigh on the strength of the McMahon ‘pledge’, which, contingent upon British success in the war, guaranteed the Sharif recognition of the Hijaz as an independent state and the Arabs retention of the four towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo (and, by implied extension, the east and south of Syria and Transjordan along with them) if they could take them. Deluding himself that the ‘pledge’ would in the end bring him the remainder of the regions demanded by the Damascus Protocol, and trusting to British honour, Husayn ordered ‘Aly and Faysal, his eldest and third sons, to proclaim in his name the independence of the Arabs from Ottoman rule and started the Revolt on 5 June 1916. He did not at the time know that the Sykes–Picot Agreement, concluded the previous month, had further shrunk the scope of his expectations by – in addition to his loss in Husayn/McMahon of ‘the portions of Syria’, Mesopotamia, Alexandretta, the Gulf and anywhere else to which France had a claim – putting Palestine firmly out of Arab reach. Lawrence admitted that the Arab Revolt was based ‘on false pretences. To gain the Sherif’s help our Cabinet had offered, through Sir Henry McMahon to support the establishment of native governments in parts of Syria and Mesopotamia, “saving the interests of our ally, France.” The last modest clause concealed (Sykes–Picot), kept secret, till too late, from McMahon, and therefore from the Sherif . . . not being a perfect fool, I could see that if we won the war the promises to the Arabs were dead paper’.²

Under Faysal, the Revolt made enormous progress on its heroic but largely pointless task. It overran Mecca and Ta‘if and, vitally aided by British and French support, especially from the Royal Navy, took the Red Sea ports of Jiddah, Rabigh, Yanbu‘, Wajh and ‘Aqaba. It did not

aim for Palestine, which was firmly on the line of march of the Egyptian Army's Expeditionary Force commanded by Sir Archibald Murray, and which Whitehall had not envisaged it invading. Deeming the territory part of Syria, he and his sons had never had it as a named item on their Damascus Protocol list, and McMahon's tantalising talk of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo had steered them away from it. They accordingly prepared to advance through Transjordan, heading for the four Syrian inland towns rather than the territory for which its sponsor had plans which did not involve Arabs, whether residents or liberators.

The Revolt's primary target was Damascus, far from which Lawrence observed – in the famous remark which 'had fallen like a sword in their midst' – that Faysal was when he first met him. It is perhaps not entirely fanciful to suspect that the comment was intended to ensure that his attention remained diverted from Palestine, at which it would have been feasible for the Revolt to aim.³ If, when it had cleared the Gulf of 'Aqaba, it had turned west towards Palestine, it could have greatly complicated UK plans and perhaps even thwarted the whole Zionist project. The Palestinians in Faysal's forces could have urged a northwesterly march, even if their possible Palestine ambitions would have been restricted by Cemal's oppressions, which ensured that few of their co-nationals on the spot could have participated in the Revolt even if they had wanted to. (After the capture of Wajh, however, Faysal had reported⁴ that, although the powerful secret military organisation that Al-Faruqy had promised would rally to Husayn had failed to appear, the Revolt had been joined in great numbers by chiefs of five northern tribes, including three from Palestine. After it took 'Aqaba in July 1917, its ranks remained composed solely of Iraqis, Syrians, Palestinians and eight Hijazis.)

The claims of Lloyd George that the Palestinians fought for the Turks, and of Kedourie that the Muslims of Palestine were unmoved by the Sharif's rebellion and indeed 'supported the Ottoman Power firmly and continuously throughout the War', are countered by Liman von Sanders. The German commander of the Ottoman armies (the Seventh and Eighth) in Syria complained that – because of the local interpretation of McMahon's 'promises' – when the EEF began to move under Murray's successor, Allenby, it found itself 'fighting in a friendly country, while the Turks who were defending their own territory operated in the midst of a decidedly hostile population'.⁵ (The 1920 Palin Report stated that Palestinians recruited from Faysal's army took an active part in Allenby's offensive.)

Circulars inspired by Wingate had been dropped over Ottoman lines and populated areas of south Palestine at the turn of 1916/17. They shed

clumsy doubt on the British intention for the Revolt to concern itself only with Syria. Giving further proof that it was disingenuous of McMahon to insist that he had intended to withhold from Husayn the Palestine for which he had not specifically asked, the circulars appealed to Arab soldiers and civilians 'to help us as your allies to liberate your country from Turkish rule so that it could form part of the Arab kingdom under the Sharif of Mecca'. (If those apostrophised by the circulars had done as they were urged, they would in reality have been fighting, as things turned out, to help Britain and France to take over their land.)

Jerusalem

After Murray had lost the first and second Battles of Gaza in March and April 1917, a revitalised EEF under Allenby, which included Royal Fusilier Jewish Legion battalions 38–40, in one of which Ben-Gurion enlisted,⁶ inaugurated what turned into the 11-month conquest of Palestine by winning the third on 7 November.⁷

After it had occupied Jaffa on 16 November and on 8 December cut the road to Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem fell before,⁸ on 9 December (five weeks after the Balfour Declaration), Jerusalem – the Christmas present for the British nation for which Lloyd George had asked Allenby – was taken. The number of Palestinians who were directly affected by these events is not recorded. What is known, however, is that, ahead of Allenby's advance, which seems to have been aided by the fact that 'Allenby' and An-Naby ('prophet') are almost the same word in written Arabic, large numbers of people were expelled from Gaza, Jaffa and Tel Aviv by the Ottomans.⁹ Between July 1917 and the occupation of Beirut 15 months later, Syria's total 'contribution to the holocaust of the War must have been not far short of a quarter of its population of considerably under four million.'¹⁰

No doubt assuming, like his co-nationals, that he was taking the first step towards the independence of Palestine, the Mayor of Jerusalem, Husayn al-Husayny, handed its keys to the commander of the EEF's 60th. Infantry Division. On 11 December, Allenby led a procession on foot into the city made up of 20 British officers (including Clayton, Lawrence and Wyndham Deedes, one of his Intelligence GSOs), Georges-Picot, the commanders of French and Italian detachments, and a US military attaché. The Sharif, annoyed that Faysal had not been invited, that no Arab representative had taken part, and perhaps that the UK and France had, at the end of October 1916, not allowed him to be

King of the Arab Nations, did not send a congratulatory message. The Mayor and the Mufty of Jerusalem and a number of notables walked out when Allenby referred to the Crusades in a speech written for him which he was too loyal not to deliver despite its mendacious sentiments. It made him announce that Britain sought 'the complete and final liberation of all peoples formerly oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations in those countries deriving authority from the initiative and free will of the peoples themselves'.¹¹

The Balfour Declaration had already ensured that Allenby's hearers were deceiving themselves if they thought that any of these commitments would apply to their own country. If they had known about the Declaration, would the Palestinians – meekly surrendering themselves to Allenby's army rather than attempting to rule their liberated territory themselves and grasp the independence they had never before enjoyed – have risen against the forces of those who had issued it a month before? Lacking military training and equipment, would they have invited the Turks to join them in opposing occupation by the UK? As an alternative to the decades of useless and leaderless strife and suffering which awaited them, such a bid to escape a fate which was contrary to the repeated professions of the Allies could not have been any worse. They had been persuaded that Sykes–Picot would not harm them. It would perhaps have been too much to expect them to fall for London's protestations about the Declaration. As it was, Britain had now securely and with treacherous intent occupied almost the whole of the Sanjaq of Jerusalem.

The Revolt Loses its Independence but Meets Grey's 'Conditions'

Fearful no doubt of public agitation, Allenby had refused to allow the Balfour Declaration to be publicised in Palestine, but Husayn heard about it in January 1918. Perhaps consoled somewhat by the 12th. of President Wilson's 14 Points, issued four days later,¹² he was nonetheless greatly disturbed by it. In March Lawrence reported his Arabs as no longer having any faith in the word of Britain and France. As forecast by Faysal's adviser, Col. Stewart 'Skinface' Newcombe, an Egyptian Army engineer and railway specialist heavily involved in the Revolt, they believed (correctly) that only territory they could secure for themselves would in the end belong to them. Of arms of their own, the Palestinians of course had none.

On 19 August, the EEF's final Palestine/Syria offensive began against

both Ottoman armies. By the 26th., in one week, the whole of Palestine had been overrun and the Ottoman strength there had been reduced to a few scattered columns. On the fall of Damascus on 1 October, although the 4th. Australian Cavalry Division had been in the lead in transitting it, Allenby arranged for the Revolt to be first to actually occupy the city. He thus enabled it to fulfil the most important item in Grey's 'conditions'. Homs and Hama fell in the middle of the month and Aleppo at the end of it. It was, however, an ephemeral achievement, to be robbed of its significance by Lloyd George's agreement with Clemenceau five weeks later.

Allenby's Political Settlement

The armistice with the Ottoman Empire was concluded on Mudros on 30 October. Remaining head of the administration of the whole of a Syria/Palestine split into thirds in accordance with Sykes–Picot, Allenby created three Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) areas, all under UK military control and with Clayton (Chief Political Officer of his Palestine force) in charge of them. Faysal protested at the carve-up and was only minimally pacified when Allenby ruled that as the representative of his father he could set up a military administration, and fly his flag, in OETA East. This comprised Sykes–Picot Area A and the part of Area B which stretched from Damascus down to 'Aqaba east of the R. Jordan and under the Agreement was to be controlled by Arab governments under French and British protection respectively.

Palestine became OETA South, a territory dominated by the UK but still with some temporary French involvement. The former Ottoman sanjaqs of Acre, Nablus and Jerusalem under its new name, it comprised Sykes–Picot's Brown Area plus that part of Area B which was west of the Jordan. Its denial to the Arabs and the Palestinians had been made irretrievable by the Balfour Declaration: they were to have no status west of the Jordan since Husayn/McMahon had accorded them none, Sykes–Picot had provided for Palestine to be internationally administered, and the Balfour Declaration had taken it even further away by handing it to the Jews.

Husayn's Self-deception

General Sir George Macdonough, Director of the War Office Intelligence Department and Sykes's boss, had stressed the importance,

in the light of Sykes–Picot, of telling Husayn which of the territories whose independence he had sought Britain and France proposed to allow him to rule. The consultation with the Sharif provided for in its description of the Brown Zone was, however, completely forgotten, and unanimity remained unbroken that the existence of the Agreement should not be revealed to him. (In Jiddah, Col. Wilson, Wingate’s liaison officer with the Sharif, urged that the future of Syria ‘should not be arranged behind his back . . . For Heaven’s sake let us be straight with the old man’.)

The shrewd suspicions of ‘Abd Allah and Faysal that British policy had undergone a change since McMahon’s second letter led to a crisis in the relations of the Hijaz with the UK. In late March 1916, three months before starting his Revolt and two before Sykes–Picot was finalised, their father had cabled Wilson to suggest ‘a review of the documents’ if his pact with McMahon ‘was not to be respected’. Since Sykes and Georges-Picot were on a Middle East tour, it was decided that they should stop over in the Hijaz in order to give the Sharif at least an outline of their Agreement’s proposed arrangements for Syria.

On 19 May, with Faysal, they called on Husayn in Jiddah¹³ and did not admit the existence of Sykes–Picot. In response to their informing him of its general terms and pointing out the special place of Palestine within it, the Sharif responded by declaring that he would continue to base his hopes on ‘His British Majesty’s promise through the McMahon letters’ which were ‘good enough for me’ – the failure of which ‘principle’, Kedourie noted, ‘involved him in ruin at the end of the War’.¹⁴

Sykes reported Faysal as being delighted to learn ‘that the French Government approved of Arab aspirations on the Moslem Syrian littoral as the British did in Baghdad’, where their occupation was to be only temporary. This disclosure led Husayn to believe that he had ‘ironclad guarantees for Mesopotamia [from McMahon] and now for Syria too’.¹⁵ Newcombe criticised Sykes and Georges-Picot for allowing the Sharif to reach this conclusion when he had no real idea of the bases of British rule in Iraq.¹⁶ He and Wilson were unhappy about the conduct of the negotiations and at the outcome, as they might well have been in view of the incomplete picture of Sykes–Picot which its authors had presented to Husayn and Faysal. They charged Sykes with creating confusion and misunderstanding about UK thinking on Syria. Should this game of duplicity and deception be continued, Wilson said, he ‘could not remain’. Himself misguided about McMahon’s ‘pledge’, he made the threat to Wingate that ‘if the frontiers of the Arab lands are not to be the same as has been agreed upon with Great Britain I will be obliged

by my good-will both to Great Britain and to my country and nation finally and decidedly to withdraw'.¹⁷

In Cairo, Clayton complained to Sykes that the Sharif had not understood at all what he and Georges-Picot had told him about the future of Syria and Iraq. It was not a good augury for the Arab cause that Husayn's wish soon afterwards to post a diplomatic representative to Paris (much needed, given the imminent involvement of France in the settlement in Syria) was blocked by the Foreign Office, which high-handedly pronounced the appointment unnecessary since the Sharif's interests, it said, were already being taken care of. Lacking the drive of a Weizmann, Husayn could not but back down.

Sykes–Picot Unmasked

Following the withdrawal of Russia from the war in October, Trotsky publicised the details of Sykes–Picot in *Izvestia*. When they reached Damascus, Cemal circulated them throughout the Ottoman Empire. In a letter to Faysal which concluded with the offer of a separate peace, he blew the gaff on the half-truths which Sykes and Georges-Picot had retailed, revealing that Palestine was to be placed under an international regime and that the rest of Syria was to go to France. Faysal passed the news on to his father, whose curt rejection of it was rewarded by a speech in Beirut on 4 December in which Cemal blamed the Revolt for the successes of Allenby's Palestine campaign. With total inaccuracy, he claimed that the arrival of the British outside the gates of Jerusalem was the sole achievement of the Sharif's Revolt. Even if the liberation and independence they had promised him had not been a mirage and a delusion, he declared, Husayn would have 'bartered the dignity conferred upon him by the Caliph of Islam for a state of enslavement to the British.'

'The Hogarth Message'

Lloyd George had claimed that, before the Balfour Declaration was issued, his government had informed Husayn and Faysal of its meaning for Palestine. This cannot have been done with much thoroughness since on 8 and 9 January 1918 (coinciding with the release of President Wilson's 14 Points), David Hogarth – who had disapproved of British secrecy about Sykes–Picot, since Husayn 'trusts us implicitly' – was sent to the Sharif in order to attempt to pacify him about it. His message, calculated to mislead, was one which George Antonius rightly says

‘nothing can excuse – or, for sheer duplicity, surpass.’¹⁸ Without revealing that the idea of an internationalised Palestine had now been dropped, he warned him that he should put no obstacle in the way of the realisation of the return of Jews to the territory. He added, however, that the government had affirmed in January 1916 ‘that no people shall be subjected to another’ there and that support of Zionist aspirations under the Balfour Declaration would go only ‘so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population’. (In using these terms, he had allowed himself a slip of the tongue, or revealed himself ignorant about its text, by going beyond those of the Declaration itself, which had guaranteed only the ‘civil and religious rights’ of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine. As Storrs had noted, it had made ‘no mention whatever of their political rights. Clearly, they had none’.)

That his fraudulent remarks to the Sharif were deemed necessary shows, by implication, that London had indeed regarded Palestine as within the area of Arab independence agreed to by McMahon: ‘Otherwise why was it necessary to reassure him about the implications of the Balfour Declaration for it?’¹⁹ That they met their mark was shown when Husayn volunteered – insofar ‘as the aim of the [Balfour] Declaration was to provide a refuge to Jews from persecution’ – to ‘use all his influence to further’ it and ‘welcomed the Jews to all Arab land’.²⁰ There were limits, however. Husayn, who regarded as one and the same his own rule and the Arab unity which, Hogarth had stressed, was a prerequisite of the revival of the Arab nation, was adamant that there could be no question of a surrender of Arab sovereignty to a Jewish state. The Sharif also, Hogarth reported, ‘left me in little doubt that he secretly regards (Palestine) as a point to be reconsidered after the Peace, in spite of my assurance that it was to be a definite arrangement’.²¹

The Sharif Belittled

Husayn did not remain reassured for long. He now forwarded Cemal Paşa’s communication to Wingate, his Revolt comrade-in-arms in Cairo, and, in ‘two pathetic letters’ on 3 and 4 February 1918, asked for an explanation about its contents (which his correspondent must have seen before) and once more about the Balfour Declaration. He complained to Wingate that the Ottomans were telling the Palestinians that the UK intended ‘to put them under Jewish rule and make the Zionists govern them’. He asked him to deny claims that Britain and France had designs on Syria and Palestine. He could no longer vindicate his revolt against

the Caliph if he had been misleading the Arabs. He faced abdication or suicide.

Wingate elicited a telegram, composed by Lawrence and his fellow Arab Revolt officer Col. Pierce Joyce (Faysal's military adviser) and signed by Balfour. Rightly scorned by Antonius as 'a piece of deliberate equivocation' and 'a dishonest communication . . . obviously designed to deceive', it was conveyed in an 8 February note. It maintained that the documents cited by Cemal had not been an agreement but merely a record of tripartite exchanges early in the war about its conduct against the Ottomans. It noted that Cemal had omitted any mention of their stipulations about the consent of the populations concerned and the safeguarding of their interests. '[A]n altogether different situation' now obtained following 'the striking success of the Arab Revolt' and the withdrawal of Russia from the war. Balfour praised the Sharif's 'loyal motives' and his rejection of Cemal's peace offer – a dishonest Ottoman attempt to divide the Arabs and the UK – as exemplars of the friendship and mutual sincerity which had always marked the relations of the Hijaz and Britain. He assured him that HMG 're-affirm their former pledge in regard to the liberation of the Arab peoples'. It remained their policy 'unflinchingly' to protect those Arabs who had already been liberated and to assist those still 'under the yoke of the tyrants to obtain their freedom'.²² (This reaffirmation of the UK's intentions vis-à-vis the Arabs came some two days after Balfour had expressed to Asquith and Lionel de Rothschild his 'personal hope that the Jews will make good in Palestine and eventually found a Jewish state'.)²³

Yet once more, Husayn voiced his belief in the word of his treacherous ally and declared himself for the moment satisfied.²⁴ But no assurances convinced the Hashimite camp for long. While in the months that followed, the Sharif – the last to be disillusioned – continued, remarkably, to urge his followers to keep faith with Britain, ordered his sons to do what they could to allay misapprehensions about the Declaration and in March exhorted the Palestinians to welcome the Jews as brethren and co-operate with them for the common welfare,²⁵ uncertainty about the matter continued in Mecca. It is therefore no surprise that at the end of March 1918 Wingate reported that Faysal had recently been in correspondence with Cemal about Britain's Zionist policy in Palestine and French ambitions in Syria and that an Ottoman offer to cede these Arab territories to the Sharif had resulted. But the infinitely credulous Husayn prevented his son from meeting Cemal because the allies were 'in honour bound to hand us the boundaries you know'. London's thanks for his loyalty and its gratification that enemy propaganda would not harm his 'frank and open relations' with it did not,

however, prevent Faysal from reopening negotiations with Cemal in the summer which also came to nought.²⁶

Further Attempts to Allay Hashimite Fears

Despite growing boredom with Husayn, Britain continued to seek to persuade the Hashimites to see its perfidy in a favourable light. Even the Zionists were enlisted to help keep the Sharif sweet. Clayton now sent Weizmann to take part in a meeting, between 'Aqaba and Ma'an, with Faysal (and Lawrence, Joyce and Osmond Walrond of the Arab Bureau in attendance) on 4 June. Acting as though leading a victim to the slaughter, Walrond reported, Weizmann told Faysal that the Zionists would not encroach on land worked by Arab peasantry but rather reclaim and restore unused, uncultivated areas. The Arab kingdom would receive Jewish help and 'Jewish influence would be used with President Wilson in favour of the Arab movement'.

Accurately summarising Faysal's ambitions (signposted for him by the Damascus Protocol and by Lawrence at their first encounter), Weizmann added that, conveniently, 'He is not interested in Palestine, but on the other hand he wants Damascus and the whole of northern Syria. He is contemptuous of the Palestinian Arabs whom he doesn't even regard as Arabs'. Joyce reported that Faysal had welcomed Jewish co-operation, which he deemed essential for the realisation of Arab aims. Though it was a question for the Palestinians, whose 'national feeling' Clayton had described as 'very weak',²⁷ and not for him, Faysal corroborated Weizmann's view and confirmed that, subject to his father's agreement, he would accept a Jewish Palestine if that would influence the Allies in his favour over Syria.

Weizmann wrote a report to Ormsby-Gore. Clayton 'had a running fight' with him over it, requiring him to correct claims that there were no Arabs on the Syrian coast but only in the desert and that Allenby had drawn the boundaries of Palestine from Dan to Beersheba and from the sea to halfway between the R. Jordan and the Hijaz Railway.

'Consent of the Governed'

The threat of Zionism to Palestine looking menacing, and the Arabs showing no sign of preparing countermeasures, half a year of pulling the wool over the eyes of the Hashimites was still not deemed sufficient by the Allies. Three further statements were directed to the Arabs. The two

earliest, the Declaration to the Seven and the Mount Vernon Address, succeeded once more in reducing the misgivings aroused by Sykes–Picot and the Balfour Declaration. A wave of jubilation swept the Arab world as the contents of the former became known.

On 7 May 1918, seven Syrian leaders domiciled in Cairo had asked for ‘a clear and comprehensive definition’ of the UK’s intentions with regard to the question of the ‘complete independence’ of the Arabs. The British Prime Minister had stated, they noted, that bringing about the sovereignty and independence of the Ottoman Empire’s Turks was a British war aim, but no similar commitment had been made about its Arabs. On 16 June, in the Declaration to the Seven – in which ‘the reservations of the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence . . . were totally ignored’,²⁸ – Sykes gave an assurance which was less comprehensive than Balfour’s telegram to Husayn had been. The Allies, he merely repeated, were working for ‘the freedom and independence of the peoples liberated from the Turkish yoke’. He also promised that British policy towards territories occupied by the Allied armies remained as in a statement of President Wilson to the Senate on 22 January 1917 which Lloyd George had repeated the following month to the TUC and in his War Aims’ Declaration: ‘No peace can last. Or ought to last, which does not recognise and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no rights exist anywhere to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property’.

The ‘consent of the governed’ principle was not in fact to be applied to Palestine (or Iraq), as had already been decided in the case of the former. Nonetheless, the Declaration now shamefully reiterated that the future government of the Allied-occupied territories – which at the time were most of Iraq and south Palestine, including Jerusalem and Jaffa – ‘should be based’ on it.²⁹

On 4 July, President Wilson in his Mount Vernon Address asserted that the postwar settlement of every question, ‘whether of territory, or sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship’, would be tied to ‘the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people.’

The developing situation in Palestine had little of the character of ‘free acceptance’. Husayn was still far from confident, as the war approached its end, about the fruits of his four-year relationship with the UK. On 28 August, he again wrote to his ally strongly to reassert the Arab claims, agreed to (he believed) by Britain, to the establishment of an independent Arab state within the frontiers defined in his first letter to McMahon.

By now, however, with the commencement of discussions about the peace settlement and the need for the Allies to get down to tackling the question of the postwar revision of the map seriously (rather than with the unconcentrated irresponsibility which had led to Husayn/McMahon and Sykes–Picot), the Sharif had become more and more a figure of fun. He was now a tiresome object of contempt for London, which had been only too keen to enlist him in its assault on the Ottoman occupiers of the Middle East and was in due course to sing loudly, and almost unanimously, in praise of the achievements of his Revolt.

The Franco-British Declaration

On the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration the Franco-British Declaration³⁰ was issued. As though the continual reiteration of false assurances would pacify the Sharif in the end, Wingate was asked by the Foreign Office to communicate it to him. Its intentions, according to Lloyd George, were to supersede all earlier agreements, particularly Sykes–Picot, to mitigate the “unsettling effect” of that agreement on the Arabs and to conform as closely as possible to Wilson’s Fourteen Points.

This latest Declaration, largely a repeat of Balfour, stated that the war aims of France and the UK in the Middle East were the liberation of nations long oppressed by the Ottomans, the setting up of freely elected national governments and administrations both in territories which were still unliberated and in Syria and Mesopotamia which (it said) had already been, and to recognise them once they were in being.

Palestine was once more not mentioned. Thanks, however, to classic British clumsiness, the Declaration was not only distributed in Syria and Iraq but also in Jerusalem, again raising the hopes of its inhabitants, twofold since they still regarded themselves as Syrians even if London and Paris did not. (As late as 1937, Antonius told the Peel Commission, ‘Palestine has always been an integral part of Syria’.)³¹ A large deputation of the MCA,³² founded six months before, formally asked Storrs to confirm whether or not Palestine was one of the liberated countries which was being invited to choose its future. He told them that Palestine was free to elect its own government. When Clayton, on the other hand, queried this to the Foreign Office, he received a reply in the opposite sense: the Declaration’s provisions did not apply to Palestine. Unless its transmission to the Sharif was intended to divert his gaze from Palestine to a Syria which was not to include it, it is not clear why it was felt necessary to inform him of its provisions.

CHAPTER

5

Faysal Fails to Fight for Palestine

‘These three all-powerful, all-ignorant men sitting there and carving up continents, with only a child to lead them.’ (Balfour)¹

Shortly after the Armistice with the Ottoman Empire on 31 October 1918, a Foreign Office minute had confirmed that the UK was not prepared to tolerate the presence of another power in Palestine. In an address to the Eastern Committee, Curzon had asserted that ‘we must recover for Palestine, be it Hebrew or Arab, or both, the boundaries up to the Litany on the coast, and across to Baniyas, the old Dan’. Assenting, the committee affirmed that Britain would demand sole control over Palestine at the Paris Peace Conference, which opened on 18 January 1919 and lasted until 21 January the following year.

Faysal in Paris and London

On 21 November 1918, Faysal left Beirut aboard HMS *Gloucester* on a UK-financed trip to attend the Paris Peace Conference. Accompanying him was a delegation of six, including Nury as-Sa‘id (a future Prime Minister of Iraq, who had played a prominent role in the Arab Revolt) and two co-founders of Al-Fatat, Rustum Haydar (an Iraqi minister until his assassination in 1940) and the lawyer ‘Awny ‘Abd Al-Hady, a future minister in Gaza and Jordan and an ambassador for the latter. Husayn had reluctantly authorised his son’s travel and – in line with his later claim that ‘Had it been simply to free the Hijaz, I would never have revolted. Even under the Turks it was I who dominated the Hijaz’² – instructed him to speak for all Arab territories. Thus amateurishly was the Arab case to be put.

The French generally treated Faysal with contempt, their Intelligence opening his letters and delaying his telegrams home. Joining him in France as his adviser and interpreter, Lawrence was all but asked to leave the country.³ On 10 December Faysal arrived in London, one week after

Lloyd George and Clemenceau had made their conspiratorial decision about Syria's future. With Lawrence, he twice called on Balfour. He invoked to him McMahon's 'pledge' and the Declaration to the Seven and – without raising the subject of his host's Declaration – voiced his doubt, bred in him by the secrecy over the Sykes–Picot Agreement, about the genuineness of the UK's friendship. He was still unsure about the status of the agreement and asked for it to be annulled. 'If you do not help us', he said, 'we shall proclaim to the world your perfidy, while ourselves fighting those who aspire to occupy our country'. The Foreign Secretary blandly spoke of his confidence that the Peace Conference would help the Arabs attain their aims.

Faysal wrote to the conference on 1 January⁴ to state the desire of the nationalists for the independence of the Arabs as, eventually, one nation and to give his views on the future of Palestine, where 'there is no conflict of character between Arabs and Jews . . . In principles we are absolutely at one'. But he also began the process of ratifying Britain's seizure of Palestine, the sub-unit of Syria in which he had already revealed his lack of interest, by adding that 'the Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in (Palestine), so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee.' On 4 January, he repeated his first point in a letter to Balfour.

The Faysal–Weizmann Agreement

Straight after his meetings with Balfour, Faysal had renewed his acquaintanceship with Weizmann for the first of several times, when the Zionist leader called on him (and Lawrence) at the Carlton Hotel. A number of Faysal's remarks which were favourable to Zionism,⁵ such as that it was 'curious' that there should be any friction between Jews and Arabs and that there was no shortage of land in Palestine, served as useful propaganda material for Weizmann. The two drew up a 'Faysal–Weizmann Agreement', which was signed in Paris on 4 January. In spite of Lawrence's dubious help, it is unlikely that Faysal understood much of the document, which was drawn up by Weizmann in English, which Faysal did not know. Having been assured by Sykes that the Jews were not plotting to expel the Arabs from Palestine,⁶ he played straight into the hands of the Zionist. Their agreement stated that 'all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the (Balfour Declaration) . . . All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large

scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants on the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil.’

Speaking as though envisaging a Jewish state rather than merely a National Home *in* Palestine, Weizmann promised that the Zionist Organisation would use its best efforts to assist the Arab state – of which Faysal was ready to accept that Palestine, hosting a Zionist programme under Arab sovereignty, should be part – by providing the means for the development of its national resources and economy.⁷ (An APO in Jerusalem observed, ‘No greater mistake could be made than to regard Faysal as a representative of Palestinian Arabs.’ He doubted Faysal’s probity: ‘he is capable of making contradictory agreements with the French, the Zionists and ourselves, of receiving money from all three, and then endeavouring to act as he pleases’.⁸ He was at the time receiving a monthly £15,000 from the UK.)

As if fearful that he had gone too far when he signed their agreement on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hijaz, Faysal appended to it in Arabic, ‘If the Arabs attain their independence as we demanded in our memorandum dated 4 January 1919 addressed to (Balfour) I shall agree to the contents. But if the slightest change or adjustment is made I shall not then be tied or bound by any of its provisions, and the agreement will then be null and void.’⁹ And in fact he repudiated it within six months.

Faysal was received by King George V and made a GCVO. He met Montagu. Banquets were given for him by the De Rothschilds and the Lord Mayor of London at the Mansion House. He learned that Sykes–Picot was hard fact and that France continued to harbour a grudge at his status in OETA East. Although before the Arab Revolt had taken Damascus Paris had agreed that the Arabs should be recognised as a belligerent ally, it did not officially accept the Hijaz as one and objected to Faysal representing it at the conference.

Palestine Delegation Debarred

With Faysal away in Paris, the first conference of the MCA, which came to be regarded as the first Palestinian National Congress, was held in Jerusalem from 27 January to 10 February. No delegates represented Acre, Beersheba and Hebron, where the OETA military governors were Jews, and from the rest of the territory only 29 came. While they called for an independent Palestine united with Syria (though there was some feeling in favour of a separate Palestine) and urged the appointment of a national government under Faysal answerable to a popularly elected parliament, their principal purpose was belatedly to nominate

Palestinian Peace Conference representatives. It chose four delegates in vain. Storrs boasted that both the Palestinians and the Zionists accused him of favouring the other. His influence against the former was, however, weighty. He prohibited the nominees from travelling to France, as he was to do again in March, for fear that they would demand the unification of Palestine and Syria,¹⁰ which would of course have been an outcome completely unacceptable to the UK. As a result, Palestine was left with no one to speak directly for it during the Peace Conference – which remains without a mention in Storrs's *Orientations*. It had to rely on petitions and protests to it by individual towns and cities, and otherwise on Faysal, a non-Palestinian, whose primary objective was winning Syria for himself. His efforts on its behalf were erratic, inconsistent and ineffectual.

Faysal Disclaims Palestine

At the conference, as the Zionist Commission was tightening its grip on the territory, which it had entered nine months before, Faysal put up no sort of useful fight for Palestine. He was 'the most picturesque and the most ineffective figure' in Paris and the event was an 'adventure in bewilderment' for him.¹¹ His father and he, who had respectively mounted and led the Arab Revolt in support of the UK, were regarded 'as less than allies' by it at the conference. The Sharif's hope had been vain that Britain would 'advocate their case effectively in the peace negotiations'. His son's entourage included no one who knew English or French, apart from Lawrence, who was primarily an adviser on 'special subjects' to the British delegation. The worst possible friend for Faysal with (despite his many virtues) his untrustworthiness and practical joking, he only replied on behalf of Faysal to communications received by his Arab Revolt partner after clearing them with the Foreign Office.

On the first day of the conference, the Weizmann magic having worked, Faysal spoke favourably of Zionism and, in accordance with their agreement, specifically omitted Palestine from the area he claimed for his state. On 24 January, he suggested to the Zionist leaders that the Jews and the Arabs should seek, instead of British and French mandates, an entente between themselves.¹² On the 29th., on the other hand, and basing his request on Husayn/McMahon, the Franco-British Declaration and the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, he submitted a largely self-contradictory statement to the Supreme Allied Council. As though McMahon had rejected no part of the Damascus Protocol sponsored by his father, he asked in it for independence for the

Arabic-speaking peoples 'from the line Alexandretta-Diarbekr southward to the Indian Ocean'.

On 6 February, appearing before the Council of Ten, including Balfour, he changed tack once again and piled confusion on confusion. He condemned Sykes-Picot, abandoned the Protocol and summarised some new geopolitical priorities, disclaiming Palestine for the second time. In confirmation of his letter of 1 January, he proposed that his hearers should support the idea of a confederation of unpartitioned and united Arab nation states, made up of the Hijaz, Syria proper, Iraq, the Jazirah, Najd and the Yemen. Until it attained its independence in, perhaps, 50 years, it should, he advised, be under single European control or US mandate. In a passage which Storrs understandably considered disbarred him from any further involvement in the Palestine question, he declared that he was prepared to acquiesce in the exclusion of Lebanon (the 'portions of Syria') and Palestine from his confederation: 'on account of its universal character, I shall leave Palestine on the side for the mutual consideration of all parties concerned'. Grateful to Britain and France for the help given them to free their lands, the Arabs now asked them, he said, to fulfil the promises they had made in the Franco-British Declaration. The Arabs 'asked for freedom only, and would take nothing less'. It was not clear how he was able to reconcile 'freedom' with an independence postponed for half a century.

Six days later, continuing to lash out wildly, in an interview with a Paris paper he executed another volte-face, now specifically demanding complete independence for Palestine. On the 19th., Balfour repeated to Lloyd George his unwavering, shameful contrasting line:

'in Palestine we deliberately and rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants are consulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish verdict. Our justification for our policy is that we regard Palestine as being absolutely exceptional, that we regard the question of the Jews outside Palestine as of world importance, and that we conceive the Jews to have an historic claim to have a home in their ancient land.'

He added, fantastically, that the historic claim of the Jews would predominate 'provided that a home can be given them without either dispossessing or oppressing the present inhabitants'.¹³

On 1 March, declaring that Jews who were oppressed would receive a welcome in Palestine, Faysal laid down the hopeless 'condition that they submit to an Islamic authority, or to a Christian authority delegated by the League of Nations'.¹⁴

The Zionists

Weizmann had convened an advisory panel headed by Samuel to prepare the Zionists' conference case. Although they had played little or no part in the war and victory, the Zionist Organisation was allowed, unlike the Palestinians and Arabs, to mount a forceful lobbying operation in Paris. In addition to Weizmann and Samuel, its delegation consisted of Sokolow, David Eder (a British psychiatrist), Israel Sieff and Rabbi Dr. Stephen Wise, President of the American Jewish Congress. It took a hard line from the start and delivered it with increasing forcefulness. On 3 February, it requested the UK to sponsor Palestine as the Jewish National Home 'during a period in which immigration would permit its development "into a Jewish commonwealth . . . in accordance with the principles of democracy" '. It demanded a Palestine, greater than in Sykes-Picot, bounded by the R. Litany and the east bank of the Jordan and including the Sinai Peninsula up to Al-'Arish.¹⁵ While surprisingly, or tactically, proposing the creation of free ports for an Arab state at Haifa and 'Aqaba, it also sought joint use with the Arabs of the Hijaz Railway. At the request of the Foreign Office, it omitted a demand for a Jewish governor for Palestine and a Jewish majority on executive and legislative councils there.

On the 27th, Weizmann and Sokolow submitted to the Council of Ten – including Balfour, Milner and Clemenceau, who is alleged to have told Sokolow that 'the Zionist claims are exorbitant, their appetites too big' –¹⁶ a draft resolution on the execution of the Balfour Declaration. This included a demand by Weizmann that, while 'the established rights of the present non-Jewish population' were to be safeguarded, such conditions should be drawn up as would' (he added in illogical juxtaposition) 'ultimately render the country as Jewish as England is English, or America is American'.¹⁷ On 20 March, going well beyond the Declaration, the delegation asked for Palestine to be 'placed under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will ensure the establishment therein of the Jewish National Home and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Jewish Commonwealth'.¹⁸ It fraudulently maintained that Faysal, in a letter on 1 March to Felix Frankfurter, a Zionist member of the US delegation, had said that this was 'moderate and reasonable'. The letter was in fact a forgery, a joint production of Lawrence, Meinertzhagen of the War Office, Weizmann and Frankfurter himself with which Faysal had had nothing to do.¹⁹

King–Crane Proposed

Perhaps believing that after all his floundering he needed to do something to prevent the immediate development of ‘non-Arab projects’ in Palestine, Faysal made what Storrs saw as the ‘adroit suggestion’ that a commission of enquiry should visit Syria (including Palestine) in order to ascertain the wishes of its people. President Wilson gave his immediate support, Lloyd George accepted the idea with good grace, Clemenceau was hostile. On 13 February Dr. Howard S. Bliss, President of the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut which later became the American University, seconded Faysal’s call. Wilson suggested a French, UK, Italian and US commission, which Faysal, with understandable relief, rated ‘the best thing he had ever heard of in his life’. On 25 March, the Council of Four (the Supreme Council less foreign ministers and the Japanese) formally adopted the idea, forecasting that ‘the relics of the Sykes–Picot Agreement were to be swept aside.’²⁰ Wilson nominated two of his conference team, Dr. Henry Churchill King (President of Oberlin College, Ohio) and Charles R. Crane (a Chicago businessman and philanthropist) as the commission members.²¹ The UK made the half-hearted nominations of McMahon and Hogarth. Curzon – believing that a commission might extricate Britain from the position, approaching the untenable, he believed it had reached in Palestine – was one of the few European statesmen who saw any merit in the plan. Samuel, naturally, did not. When he wrote to Balfour to express his anxiety that King–Crane might delay and harm the Zionist programme, the Foreign Secretary recommended without success that Lloyd George exclude Palestine from it on the grounds that there ‘we are dealing not with the wishes of an existing community but are consciously seeking to re-constitute a new community and definitely building for a numerical majority in the future’.

Faysal left on 21 April for Beirut on the French cruiser *Paris* – the French being keener to get rid of him than to continue hosting him – in order to prepare for King–Crane.

Mandate Preliminaries

Jan Christian Smuts, Lloyd George’s confidant during the second half of the war, had been the Boer War opponent of Britain and Defence Minister of South Africa but was now a member of the Imperial War Cabinet. On 28 April, he put a plan for “mandates” before the conference. (A.J.P. Taylor calling him ‘the great operator of fraudulent

idealism', charged that he aimed by this new phenomenon 'to conceal Imperialist greed'²² from the USA.) When the conference formally adopted the plan, the UK did not wait to learn the findings of King-Crane, in whose researches it in the end played no part. In the spring of 1919, with the conference only a third of the way through, its delegation, numbering nearly 400, began discussions with the Zionist Organisation about a mandate to be inflicted on the Palestinians. A Balfour minute of 11 August to a Curzon departmental committee shrugged off King-Crane while reaching impressive heights of erudite cynicism:

'The contrast between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the independent nation of Palestine (sic) than in that of the independent nation of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country . . . The four great powers are committed to Zionism, and Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land. I do not think Zionism will hurt the Arabs, but they will never say they want it. It is not enough, moreover, that the Jews should have access to Palestine, but that their homeland be a viable one.'

The minute concluded on a note of defiant honesty: 'so far as Palestine is concerned the powers have made no statement of fact that is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate'.

The minute's recognition, at last, that the 'non-Jewish communities' of Palestine were Arabs, and its clear admission that what Britain was undertaking in the territory was immoral, did not delay progress towards the aim of the British and Zionist co-conspirators. An agreed mandate draft, a mostly Zionist document,²³ was ready by December.

Faysal Returns to Europe

Faysal now came to Europe for the second time. Passing through France, Clemenceau would not see him and he was kept out of Paris ('Clemenceau seems to think I smell'.) He arrived in the UK on 18 September and this time had to do without Lawrence's aid. He thrice met Lloyd George, who had invited him, but failed to move him over the question of London's decision to evacuate Syria with effect from 1

November.²⁴ Towards the end of the month he met Weizmann again. The Zionist leader offered, in return for Faysal's help in realising Zionist aims in Palestine, to provide money and advisers, if required, for the Arab government in Damascus.²⁵ Nonetheless, in an interview with *The Jewish Chronicle* on 3 October, Faysal deplored Zionist extremism and sketched out another geopolitical rethink. The Zionists were startled by his insistence now that Palestine, which he had fought so feebly for at the conference, should, with Syria and Iraq, be part of a revised Arab confederation. On the 7th. they sent Samuel – armed with a copy of the spurious Frankfurter letter – to protest at the Foreign Office about his remarks and to ask it to intervene with Faysal because they would alarm the Jews and encourage Arab 'intransigence'. It was remarkable, since the Zionists had so much the upper hand, not least in the Foreign Office, that Hardinge should have minuted that 'nothing need be said to Faysal' and Curzon have protested that he certainly did 'not propose to take a hand in this game'. (Despairing of being able to invoke Jewish co-operation in combating French plans for 'the portions' of Syria, Faysal severed his connection with Weizmann later that autumn.)

The UK Secures the Palestine Mandate

Between 19 and 25 April 1920, in north-west Italy, the San Remo Conference convened to enable the Supreme Council of Britain, France and Italy to confirm the future of Arabic-speaking Asia and to organise the mandatory regime of 'imperial rule over unconsulted peoples'.²⁶ No Palestinians were in attendance. Lloyd George, Balfour, Curzon, Samuel, Weizmann and Sokolow stayed in the same hotel. Although the Zionists engaged in energetic and successful lobbying, there was really little need for them to do so. It was no surprise that on 24 April the council awarded the UK the mandate for Palestine,²⁷ which 'can easily be read as a Zionist document',²⁸ stipulating that it should put the Balfour Declaration into effect.

The letter and spirit of the 4th paragraph of Article 22²⁹ and Part 1 of the League of Nations' Covenant, the bases of the entire mandatory system, had been approved by the Peace Conference and incorporated in the concluding Treaty of Versailles. They had laid it down that, in choosing a mandatory to render administrative advice, the wishes of the mandated inhabitants were to be 'a principal consideration'. In selecting a mandatory for Palestine, while enjoining London to help it to full independence, San Remo transgressed this stipulation. The Palestinians had no say in the award of their mandate to the UK, which of course

harboured an entirely contradictory, anti-independence agenda. In August, the Treaty of Sèvres compounded the inequity by awarding provisional independence to Syria and Mesopotamia while denying it to Palestine.

Stinging comments about this discreditable piece of work came from both Jewish and Gentile sources. The pro-Zionist Arthur Koestler wrote that the conference ‘requisitioned Palestine from its owners to provide the Jews with a permanent abode, and appointed Britain to act as billeting officer’,³⁰ and Magnes lamented to a friend that, through it, Palestine, ‘made “Jewish” by the iniquitous Peace Conference’ had been ‘[c]onceived and born in uncleanness. Just as the Versailles Treaty is a denial of almost every principle of democracy, of self-determination, of reconciliation, so is San Remo. As to Palestine, the principle of self-determination was disregarded. If self-determination is a just answer to other disputed problems, why not for Palestine and for the Jews? The fact is that Palestine has five or six times as many Arab inhabitants as Jews . . . You speak of the ‘historic rights’ of the Jews to offset the claims of the present-day Arab majority. I am aware of the way in which historic rights and strategic rights and economic rights have been manipulated whenever it suited the needs of the conquerors’.³¹

Much later, in 1983, Arnold Toynbee gave it as his considered opinion that ‘Balfour was a wicked man’ who had used the League to deny the Palestinians the right of self-determination.³²

Curzon had told Balfour he was ‘Personally . . . so convinced that Palestine will be a rankling thorn in the flesh of whoever is charged with (it), that I would withdraw from this responsibility while we yet can’. But it fell to his lot to telegraph the news of the mandatory award to Faysal, who protested, pointing out that the Foreign Secretary (Curzon had succeeded Balfour in October 1919) had admitted that, since McMahon had not excluded Palestine, the question of a mandate over it should never have arisen. He added that Sykes–Picot had provided for the country’s administration to be decided after agreement with representatives of Husayn and that his father had not in the event been consulted.

Denying his known intentions, and turning a Nelsonian blind eye to the enormous bridgehead already made by the Zionist Commission on Palestinian soil, the Cabinet did not, Lloyd George later claimed, have the idea at this time that ‘a Jewish State should be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants’, the 93% of the population who were not Jews. Implying that the creation of a state was only a matter of patience, he concluded

that 'when the time arrived for according representative institutions in Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a National Home and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth'.³³

PART FOUR
CAPITULATION

CHAPTER

6

‘Mr. Lloyd George’s Madness’ Crowns the Zionist March into Palestine

‘The Zionist movement had been a useful ally in achieving British aims in Palestine.’ (Frischwasser-Ra’anan)¹

‘The inconsistencies of Zionist statement [as to whether or not it was a state they sought in Palestine] did great harm to their cause . . . they left a lasting blemish on the political conduct of Zionism. In later years it became a Zionist habit to speak not only in two but in several voices.’ (Christopher Sykes)²

In contravention of the accepted Hague Convention principles applicable to enemy territory occupied in war, six months in advance of the armistice, before the Peace Conference had been scheduled, and with two years to go before the mandate was to be awarded by the Treaty of Versailles, the War Cabinet’s Middle East Committee sent a Zionist Commission to Palestine. Its arrival in the first week of April 1918 was the first, and challenging, move by the Zionists to take over from London the joint project to deny Palestine to its owners. The Apprentice was now beginning the process of jettisoning the Sorcerer without whose inspiration the opportunity to do so would not have existed. The move was opposed as premature by the leading officials of OETA (South) who were to head the UK military administration of Palestine when the Ottomans were finally defeated.

Partly Occupied Palestine was in no state to receive the commission. No formal British administration was in position and no High Commissioner had been appointed. That these deficiencies were disregarded forcibly suggested that London had given the Zionists *carte blanche* to take charge of the territory: the commission ‘was for some reason let loose in Palestine, protagonists of a mere fraction of the whole population of the invaded State . . . before more than half the country has been conquered’.³

The Foreign Office had defined the commission's role as being 'to carry out, subject to General Allenby's authority, any steps required to give effect to the Government's decision in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people'.⁴ The commission itself saw its aims as being to 'act as an advisory body to the British authorities in all matters relating to Jews or which may affect the establishment of a National Home', to organise the Jewish population and to take in hand 'the development of Jewish institutions of self-government'. It made no mention of a Middle East Committee reference to the 'help in establishing friendly relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities' which it might render. Unofficially, Storrs wrote, it sought 'to produce certain *faits accomplis* creating an atmosphere favourable to the [Zionist] project in advance of the Peace Conference'.⁵

The seven-man commission team, led by Weizmann, included Eder, Major James de Rothschild who 'could open doors for Weizmann even at Army Headquarters' and Lieut. Edwin Samuel, whose father was to be the first High Commissioner two years later. It was escorted by Ormsby-Gore, holding the rank of Major. En route, it stopped off in Egypt. It was ominous that Weizmann refused to receive Palestinian 'exiles' there with the excuse that he preferred to deal with Arab leaders resident in Palestine itself, which in the event he was too dismissive to do in any meaningful way. He would not consider approaches from an Arab Committee in Cairo, whose members included Sulayman Bey Nasif, Fawzy Al-Bakry (Faysal's unofficial representative in the Egyptian capital) and Dr. Faris Nimr (the leading nationalist journalist and staunch Christian advocate of the unity of Palestine and Syria). He would not discuss a memorandum from them which stated *inter alia* that, subject to the rights of the native population, '[a] fair opportunity' should be given to Zionist immigrants to buy state land. He outlined the Zionists' initial objective as 'a British Palestine which would act fairly and justly to all groups which inhabit the country'. Selecting the same disclaimer as Lloyd George, his denial that they wished to set up a Jewish state in Palestine 'immediately' cannot have given them much comfort.

The Commission in Palestine

The commission made Jaffa its headquarters. Relations among the members were uneasy and, since they regarded themselves as at least the equals of the UK's future OETA (South) officials, whom they expected to get to work at once on implementing the Balfour Declaration, those with the British soured rapidly. The commission criticised them for

refusing to give publicity to the Declaration and therefore not explaining its 'exact meaning and scope' to the locals, which Storrs did not agree was one of their duties. He was in no doubt about Zionist intentions. In a letter to Sykes in July he anticipated an eventual Jewish state. At about the same time he expressed to him his opinion that "non-Jewish elements in the population" would eventually have to take 'a lower place in the land which the others are in the end absolutely certain to possess.' Since the Palestinians made up 93% of the territory's population at the time, this was extraordinarily prescient, and fatalistic, of him. He clearly felt that the point was approaching when there would be nothing the Sorcerer could now do, or could wish to do, to stem the Zionist advance, and he was right. Storrs was not alone. Despite Weizmann's assurances, it was commonly assumed that the commission was in Palestine to take the first steps towards the establishment of a Jewish state. Ormsby-Gore cautioned the commission members, however, to eschew the word 'state', and Weizmann accordingly – following the strategy of Herzl – did not admit that that was what he and his colleagues were planning.

Even before the commission had arrived in Palestine, Balfour had been concerned about reports of its hostile behaviour. In Palestine, its perpetual nagging interference and obstructionism aroused distrust among British officials and Palestinian notables alike. Though the commission met some of the latter in Jerusalem several times, Weizmann disparaging them as 'unscrupulous Levantine politicians', it made no formal contact with any of their leaders.⁶ Its members were 'invariably indiscreet', ill-mannered, unaccommodating, narrow-minded and inimical to Palestinian nationalists. They made 'unjust and intolerable demands' and were 'not interested in fairness – whoever was not for Zionism was against it'.⁷ Wearing khaki and Sam Brownes, they acted as if the Balfour Declaration had already received international approval and a mandate been awarded. The Yishuv shared the generally hostile view of them. Its devout communities in Jerusalem, Safed and Hebron and the dwellers in agricultural colonies (notably Petach Tikvah and Rishon Le-Tsiyón), had to some extent adopted their neighbours' ways and style of life, learned Arabic, and in general regarded themselves as assimilated 'foreigners settled permanently in Palestine'.⁸ Quickly forced by the commission to cut their ties with their Palestinian friends and (although, except in the synagogue, they spoke Yiddish) to learn Hebrew, they complained that its attitude was 'offensive and insulting', that it was without Yishuv representation and that it paid no attention to their views.

OETA (South)'s military administrators had to tread with care. Clayton warned Maj.-Gen. (Sir) Arthur Money, his Chief

Administrator, that strategy was paramount. In the interests of retaining Palestine as a back-up to Egypt as guardian of the Suez Canal gateway to India, the UK could not afford to ignore or antagonise the Zionists, since it would be essential to have 'Zionist influence at the Peace Conference in favour of a British Palestine'. (Britain could equally, of course, if it had so chosen, have enjoyed the influence at the Peace Conference of Husayn, Faysal and the Palestinians, who would not have opposed a British mandate written in the same terms as those for Iraq and Syria).

At a garden party hosted by Storrs in late April, illustrating the Zionists' 'not undeserved reputation in the world for chronic mendacity',⁹ Weizmann protested that 'all fears expressed openly or secretly by the Palestinians that they are to be ousted from their present position are due either to a fundamental misconception of Zionist aims or to the malicious activities of our common enemies'. He childishly lodged a formal complaint about a Palestinian school where 'intransigent and aggressive nationalism' had hung up a wall map entitled 'La Palestine Arabe' and about an event there at which two speakers had concluded their remarks with 'Vive la Nation Arabe' and 'Vive la Palestine Arabe'. In an official note he asserted, no doubt correctly, that world Jewry had 'acquired rights under the [Balfour] Declaration that outweighed those of the indigenous Arabs'. At the end of the month, he addressed guests at a dinner given by Storrs for the commission, the Mufty (Kamil al-Husayny), and Muslim and Christian notables. He ruled out self-government for Palestine, said that the Jews were returning to the country for 'a free national development' and referred to large-scale future Jewish immigration. He added in contrast that 'there was room for both peoples to work side by side; let his hearers beware of treacherous insinuations that the Zionists were seeking political power – rather let both progress together until they were ready for a joint autonomy'. He told Palestinian leaders in Jaffa that Palestine was the goal of the hopes of the millions of Jews and their only national home. His manner led them in due course, referring to Menachem Ussishkin, 'the "strongman" of Russian Zionism', to prefer 'the direct approach of the future Ussishkins and [to] find it hard to confront the doubletalk and dishonesty of the future Weizmanns'.¹⁰ (As Curzon remarked, 'While Weizmann is telling you something and you are thinking "Jewish National Home", he has something completely different in view. He envisages a Jewish state and a submissive Arab population governed by the Jews.')

The Zionist Commission despised the military leaders of OETA (South) and charged that they were 'in the hands of Turkish officials of

Arab and Syrian extraction'. Its opinion of the majority occupants of the country could hardly have been more contemptuous. Ormsby-Gore described the Palestinians to Balfour as 'parasitic, treacherous, self seeking and lacking in ideals even of patriotism, let alone moral ideals'. In 1914, Shertok had spoken of the 'savage culture' of the Palestinians, Weizmann called them 'the rocks of Judea . . . obstacles that had to be cleared.' In a letter he wrote to Balfour in May 1918 he disparaged Arabs as 'superficially clever' and by nature 'treacherous' and 'shifty'. The fallah was at least four centuries behind the times, and 'the *effendi* . . . is dishonest, uneducated, greedy, and as unpatriotic as he is inefficient'; 'superficially quick and clever', he worships only 'power and success'. To Ahad Ha-Am in August, he described the Palestinians as 'a demoralised race.'¹¹ The fascist¹² Vladimir Jabotinsky described them as a 'yelling rabble dressed in savage-painted rugs' whom an 'iron wall' of Jewish bayonets was necessary to subdue.¹³ (This Zionist anti-Arabism name-calling has continued, and even worsened, under Israel.)¹⁴

Weizmann objected to OETA (South) rightly treating the despised Palestinians as the majority people in the territory, enabling them, he protested, to outweigh the Jews, to whom the temporarily prevailing system was 'distinctly hostile'. He demanded that the foundation stone of a university in Jerusalem should be laid, that Al-Buraq (the Wailing Wall) should be handed over to the Jews and that a land scheme should award them 'the whole of southern Palestine', which he claimed was, largely, 'practically unoccupied land'.

In August, the MCA, which hoped that its Christian members might be able to enlist the support of their British co-religionists against the danger posed by the Christian devisers of the Balfour Declaration, asserted to Storrs that the whole population stood 'ready to sacrifice themselves' in the struggle against Zionism.¹⁵ In contrast, the Mufty and the Qadhy (Raghib ad-Dajany) were offering the Zionists cooperation on a basis of equality. The Zionists, however, had no intention of letting the grass grow under their feet. A principal cause of complaint by the military administrators was the commission's practice of going over its head, via the Zionist Organisation, direct to the UK government. In about September 1918, Weizmann, in London, demanded that the commission should be appointed adviser to the military authorities, the number of Jews in the administration be increased, Hebrew be made an official language and a Zionist committee be authorised 'at once' to examine the land laws. Clayton rejected these proposals, commenting that the commission should not be given any executive powers, that increased Zionist activity was in the circumstances inopportune, that

there were 7 Jews (no Palestinians) in the higher ranks of the administration, that English was still the only official language and that the question of land must await the formation of a civilian government.

Zionist Pressure

After the Ottoman armistice on 30 October, 1918, the OETA (South) regime became a Military Administration. Acting on instructions from the Foreign Office, the War Office was responsible for the execution of policy, Money taking his orders from Allenby. Military Governors were posted to every captured town.

On the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, two days after the inauguration of the military administration, the Zionist Commission (which Gen. Sir Walter Congreve, C.-in-C., Egypt and Palestine, denounced as ‘a standing insult to the British administration’) held a grand parade in Jerusalem which alarmed the Palestinians. The mayor, Musa Kadhim al-Husayny, considered by Sykes the elder statesman of Palestinian nationalism, led a deputation of Christians and Muslims to protest against Zionist policy to Storrs, now military governor of Jerusalem (and a temporary Lieut.-General), who was to become civil governor under the mandate.¹⁶

Later in November, all parties involved in the future of Palestine sought to establish their positions. The mayor, the Mufty and the DG of Awqaf demanded that a government headed by Sharif Husayn should be established. From Damascus, 33 Palestinian Arab Muslim and Christian leaders wrote to Balfour to protest against Zionism’s apparently privileged position in Palestine, arguing that justice forbade the introduction of a nation of foreign Jews who aimed gradually to reduce another nation, in its native land, to minority status and to final extinction. The Foreign Secretary shelved their petition. In connection with Zionist proposals for the development of a Jewish commonwealth, on 17 November Arnold Toynbee, working in the Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department, minuted, ‘Surely our foundation should be a *Palestinian* state with *Palestinian citizenship* for all inhabitants whether Jewish or non-Jewish. This alone seems consistent with Mr. Balfour’s (Declaration). The Jewish element should not be allowed to form a state within a state, enjoying greater privileges than the rest of the population’.¹⁷

Anxious that a Greater Palestine, composed of Palestine and Jordan, might not be going to be available for the National Home, UK Zionists lobbied, *Palestine* and *The Zionist Review* protested at their likely sepa-

ration and, in *The Jewish Chronicle*, Samuel asserted that 'There shall be no division of Palestine' and Lord Bryce that 'you cannot separate Eastern from Western Palestine.'¹⁸ In a quite different spirit, a cable from Weizmann to Eder implied, despite McMahon's failure to exclude it, that the Palestinians had no right to aspire to ownership of their own land and said that 'the Jewries of the world' regarded Arab national aspirations as 'fully realised' in Syria.

In December, at a Zionist conference in Jaffa, Weizmann protested that 'It is not our objective to seize control of the higher policy of the province of Palestine. Nor has it ever been our objective to turn anyone out of his property'. In a Zionist debate on an 'Outline for the Provisional Government of Palestine', however, delegates adopted a far more extreme tone even than that of the Zionist Organisation at the Peace Conference, demanding that the Jewish people as a whole should have a controlling voice in the affairs of Palestine. In their capacity as 'a large Jewish majority' in the country, they stated their objectives: Palestine should henceforth be called Erets Yisrael and fly the Jewish flag. On 12 December, Weizmann tried and failed to persuade Balfour to issue a second Declaration which would call for the free development of a National Home with a population of four or five million and 'make it within a generation a Jewish country that could radiate out into the Near East and so contribute mightily to the reconstruction of countries which were once flourishing'. The Foreign Secretary suggested that he should try instead to reach (another) agreement with Faysal.

After, in a despatch on 31 December, Clayton had put the population of Palestine at 639,000 (512,000 Muslims, 61,000 Christians and 66,000 Jews), Allenby warned London that it was 'highly injudicious' to impose 'an alien and highly unpopular element' on 90% of the country's inhabitants; he urged that 'the rights of the voiceless many' should be safeguarded. In reply, Acting Foreign Secretary Curzon agreed, and commiserated with the future trustee [the UK] over the Jewish Commonwealth which soon, he was convinced, would become an empire. In February, Balfour ignored these sentiments.

The Zionist Advance

London was embarrassed by a Samuel comment that the military administration was not always conducting its relations with the Jews in accordance with the Balfour Declaration. Since nearly all of its officials were hostile to the Zionists, this was not in the least surprising. In January, at the opening of the Peace Conference, Curzon had informed

Balfour that Money and Allenby, whose view he shared, were advising 'that we should go slow about Zionist aspirations and the Zionist State'; he himself had 'for long felt that the pretensions of Weizmann and Company are extravagant and ought to be checked'. In January also, Clayton had warned the Foreign Office that an effective army of occupation would be needed for many years to implement Sykes-Picot and the Declaration. He urged that Britain should propose and sponsor a joint endeavour by the Zionists and the Sharif and that a renewed attempt should be made to moderate Zionist pretensions. Sykes had seen these in embryo. After a tour of over two months in Palestine and Syria, he returned to London in early February disillusioned by the discrepancy he had observed between what he had previously understood Zionism to be and what he had witnessed of it in action on the ground. He was 'shocked by the intense bitterness' it had provoked in Palestine, where the Zionist Commission was attempting to take over control of the territory.

Both the military administration and the Palestinians understandably felt that, quickly beginning to function like a Zionist government-in-waiting, the commission was acting like a state within a state. The OETA staff had their own ideas about how to run the country and saw the commission as a foreign body. Maj.-Gen. Sir Louis Bols, Allenby's Chief of Staff in the Palestine campaign and the future Chief Secretary, complained that the Yishuv took its orders from it, not from him. At first enthusiastic about Zionism, he became 'sick and tired' of receiving orders from commission members. But he was comprehensively undermined by Whitehall as the Zionists were allowed in due course to build up a central administration with 100 staff. They were divided up among thirteen departments paralleling those of the ruling military, collected taxes from Jewish agricultural settlements and subsidised Jewish municipal police, clerks, railwaymen and telephonists in order to bring their pay up to European levels. The commission obtained the freedom to engage in open political activity and organised elections for a Jewish Consultative Assembly in spring 1920 in violation of an administration ban on political organisations. It circulated through the Ministry of Information its view of the Palestine question and its own tendentious reports. It was permitted the use of Hebrew in official communications and, in due course, the establishment of Hebrew primary and secondary schools. An early example of the official London favouritism towards the Zionists which was to be displayed throughout most of the mandate, was the grant to them in addition of perquisites, denied to the Palestinians, such as travel permits, the right to import merchandise on military trains and the free use of army transport, posts and telegraphs.

The majority community was allowed no protest activity, political meetings or demonstrations. It was denied contact with the outside world by telegraph or other means, and continuing wartime censorship suppressed Arabic papers criticising Zionism.

In March, Money threatened to resign if he were pressed further than he deemed legitimate or judicious in furthering the "shadowy claims" of the Jews to monopolise Palestine. He reported in April that 'The Palestinians in fact desire Palestine for themselves [and] have no intention of allowing their country to be thrown open to hordes of Jews from Eastern and Central Europe and will resist any general immigration of Jews, however gradual, by every means in their power, not excluding armed resistance'. He warned that even a moderate Zionist programme could only be carried through by force and in the face of opposition by the majority of the population.

Despite the considerable progress their cause was were making, at home on 7 April Samuel told Balfour of the Zionists' 'sense of grievance that the military administration . . . usually proceed(s) as though the Declaration of November 1917 had never been made'. At a meeting of a Palestine Advisory Committee on 10 May, on the other hand, he deprecated some unauthorised public statements in which they had openly admitted that an item of their programme was a 'transfer' policy designed to expel the Palestinians from their homeland and to remove them to Syria to make way for themselves. ('Any movement of that kind', he said, 'must be absolutely voluntary and conducted without any form of pressure. There will be the most equitable and sympathetic treatment of the Arab populations of the country. If we were to go to Palestine to oppress other people it would be an unspeakable disgrace'.)¹⁹ Nonetheless, on 19 May, he had recommended to Curzon the issuing of 'definite instructions' that UK policy was to seek a Palestine mandate, that the mandate would enshrine the Balfour Declaration in its terms, that the political future of Palestine was *chose jugée*, and 'that continued Arab agitation would be fruitless'. (They were so conveyed.) The same day, Balfour rapped an unrepentant Clayton on the knuckles, instructing him to lose no opportunity to impress the reality of HMG's policy on all the inhabitants of Palestine. Curzon, too, felt obliged on 27 May to underline to him in his official tone that Britain was committed to Zionism and that Zionist aspirations had been endorsed by Italy, France and the United States. The single consolation for the Palestinians, diluted by the fact that it was ventriloquised by Balfour, was that, following a warning from Money on 8 June that 'fear and distrust of Zionist aims grow daily', in August Sir William Tyrrell in the Foreign Office sent a telegram to Jerusalem which suggested that the administration should

inform them that they need not fear expulsion from their land and that there would be no minority rule.²⁰

Zionist pressure was unrelenting. On 11 April, as the annual Naby Musa festival culminated in a long processional march to Jerusalem led by a government band, the Zionists blamed the MCA and the administration for permitting what it called agitation. In an electric political atmosphere, an outbreak of violence was only narrowly averted by news of the formation of King–Crane. In July, Brandeis – complementing the patronising claim of Weizmann to Money that there was ‘a fundamental difference in quality between Jew and native’ – proposed to the Chief Administrator on a visit to Palestine that all implementation of policy should be submitted to the prior approval of the Zionist Commission.

The Commission Displays its Power

In mid-1919, the Zionists were able to bring about important changes in the personnel of the military administration. Col. E.V. Gabriel, the anti-Zionist Financial Adviser and a reputed anti-Semite who, Weizmann and the commission claimed, used his position to injure them at every step and to engage in activities they found deeply suspicious and sinister, was recalled after Brandeis’s visit. Curzon protested that it was intolerable that Weizmann should be allowed to criticize HMG’s civil servants. Indeed, it says very little for the Lloyd George government’s loyalty to them and its ability to deliver the Balfour Declaration at its own chosen pace, as well as a great deal for the Zionist Commission, that when Weizmann next turned his attention to those at the very top of the administration he was quickly able to oust Clayton and bring about the dismissal of Money, who had protected Gabriel. Frustrated by their involvement in the Balfour Declaration policy with which they strongly disagreed, in July both of them resigned and left for home.

Money had lobbied for Storrs to be his successor, but Weizmann – who begrudged Jerusalem’s Military Governor’s resentment of Zionist pressure on him to be more than a sympathiser – denounced him (and Clayton) to Graham in the Foreign Office on 2 July; the same day, Samuel complained about his attitude and accused him of taking every opportunity to injure Zionist interests. Maj.-Gen. Sir Harry Watson it was who replaced Money. Outwardly cordial to Weizmann, he opposed Zionism as strongly as his predecessor. With remarkable unrealism, he assured the MCA that, although the UK would indeed set up the National Home, it would give the Palestinians control of the government system. He warned the Colonial Office, however, that a National Home

of even very limited scope would force a mandatory not only to keep troops in the country for many years but – he prophetically added – to lose the lives of many of its sons in a war fought against the principles of the League of Nations.

The London Zionists strove to secure the naming of a more sympathetic successor to Clayton, with mixed results. They failed to obtain the promotion of Deedes to the job and had to put up with Col. C. French as Acting CPO for two months. He shared Clayton's general view of Zionism and rejected Weizmann's repeated claim that Palestinian resistance to it was 'artificial' rather than a genuine national movement which might resort to arms. He urged GHQ in Cairo to abolish the Zionist Commission for acting as though it were the government but was put in his place when Balfour repeated to him Samuel's 'definite instructions' of 19 May. (Balfour was in no mood to weaken. Thoughtlessly determined to plough on in the face of repeated warnings about the dangers of doing so, in the same month he wrote his 'Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad . . .' note.)

On 1 September, the Zionists were able to engineer, as successor to Clayton, the fanatically pro-Zionist Richard Meinertzhagen,²¹ and in November Bols replaced Watson. These two new officials had completely opposite ideas about the future of Palestine and rapidly came into conflict.

The King–Crane Report

The preamble to the King–Crane Commission's instructions had stated that 'Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone'.

The wishes of these communities had, it was told, to be a principal consideration in the selection of mandatories, which were to conduct their administration in the spirit of the Franco-British Declaration, quoted in full. King and Crane were required to form a definite opinion as to 'the division of territory and assignment of mandates' and to record the views of the inhabitants of the territories to be visited. Alive to their unpopularity in Palestine, the French appointed no commission representatives, the Italians did likewise and the UK withdrew McMahan and Hogarth because the French and the Zionists had persuaded it to and it (and Balfour) feared what the commission might say

after visiting Palestine and Iraq. (In the event, the commission did not go to the latter.)

King and Crane began their ill-fated exercise predisposed in favour of Zionism. They received large delegations in 17 cities and towns in Palestine, Syria and Cilicia between 10 June and 21 July. Under the impact of ‘the actual facts in Palestine’, they recommended major modifications to ‘the extreme Zionist programme’. The extremism had repeatedly manifested itself in the evidence of Jewish witnesses, who had looked forward to ‘a practically complete dispossession of the country’s inhabitants by various forms of purchase’ and to the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state through unlimited immigration.²² (Churchill noted that the Jews ‘whom we are pledged to introduce into Palestine . . . take it for granted that the local population will be cleared out to suit their convenience’.)²³

Recommending, as Arab witnesses had wished, the creation of a Greater Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine, with Faysal as king and the USA as mandatory (and the UK as second choice), King–Crane reported that they had claimed that Syrians and Palestinians were no less developed than the Bulgars, Greeks, Romanians and Serbs who had obtained their freedom from Ottoman rule. They had rejected Zionism and the National Home. ‘Arif Pasha ad-Dajany had told the commission that Jews were bloodsuckers and that, if the League of Nations did not listen to Arab appeals, Palestine would become a river of blood. UK officer witnesses, corroborating Churchill’s belief that 90% of the British army in Palestine were against the Balfour Declaration, presented a practically unanimous view that not even by force could it be implemented in anything like its full form. (Kidston in the Foreign Office observed in September that it never seemed to have occurred to Balfour that carrying out his Declaration would involve bloodshed and military repression).

The report was submitted for consideration to the Peace Conference in August 1919, only to be scuppered there because of its threat to UK and French plans.

A Jewish State Ever More Likely

With things looking enigmatic for him in Syria, Faysal hardened, and modified, his Peace Conference stance on Palestine once more. On 3 October, he outlined a sensible way forward to *The Jewish Chronicle* and *The Times*. He said that he was agreeable to Jewish immigration (of not more than fifteen hundred per annum) and would guarantee the Jews

equal rights with the Arabs, free use of Hebrew and the means of establishing a Jewish cultural centre. 'The Jews are our cousins, and we would willingly make them our brothers'. However, he criticised those Zionists who spoke of Palestine becoming as Jewish as England was English. When the editor of *The Jewish Chronicle* gave the game away and explained that the Jews imagined that the Balfour Declaration meant assistance by political, economic and cultural means to set up a Jewish national home that 'would ultimately become a Jewish state', he replied that 'Palestine, Mesopotamia and Syria are inseparable . . . we Arabs cannot yield Palestine as part of our kingdom . . . we would fight to the last ditch against Palestine being other than part of the kingdom and for the supremacy of the Arabs in the land'.²⁴

Recommendation of Faysal as 'overlord' of Palestine had been urged by Bols²⁵ and thrice by Allenby but greeted with protest by Samuel. It could not, he maintained, be reconciled with British control and would tend to take life out of the Zionist movement. Curzon agreed, asking how recognition of Faisal as King could 'be reconcilable with Zionist claims?'.²⁶ Running with the fox and hunting with the hounds, as so often, at about the same time, on 20 March, he was minuting, 'The Zionists are after a Jewish State, with the Arabs as hewers of wood and drawers of water . . . I want the Arabs to have a chance and I don't want a Hebrew State'.²⁷

At a large London Opera House rally on the second anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, Samuel stressed that a state was an ideal and a goal but not an imminent reality. The Executive of the Zionist Organisation had earlier agreed: a Jewish state would be a disaster and contrary to the first principles of democracy, as long as it involved putting a majority under the rule of a minority. It had already gone brutally further, however: the need, *tout court*, was for the responsible leaders of Zionism to overturn the existing majority via immigration, such ' "that with the minimum of delay the country may become a purely self-governing Commonwealth under the auspices of an established Jewish majority" and indispensably include Jordan'.

In the same month, the organisation demanded that the first Governor-General of Palestine should be a Jew, that his Executive Council and a Legislative Assembly should be at least 50% Jewish and again that the Jewish state should cover "Greater Palestine". Simultaneously, Allenby and Bols and, at the War Office, Milner (who had changed his tune) unsuccessfully recommended – nothing having come of King–Crane – a declaration favourable to Arab aspirations in Palestine and Iraq. But when, contradicting his superiors, Meinertzhagen demanded the complete opposite (a new declaration

committing the government to even greater support of Zionist aspirations), Curzon – rightly detecting input by Weizmann – said that he could see no need for more declarations, and certainly not before the mandate had been won.

Towards the end of the year, Ussishkin took charge of the Zionist Commission, enlarging and reforming it and dividing it into departments mirroring those of the administration. Advisers were appointed for agriculture, finance, health, public works and trade. His firm approach was often offensive to both the military and the Palestinians. Even Meinertzhagen admitted that his attitude to the administration was ‘at the outset of overbearing intolerance with a contempt for compromise’. The Zionists, he remarked, made it clear that ‘they expected to have the new dish of freedom served up to them on a nice gold salver, with a suitable inscription in the Hebrew language, while the Arabs waited gracefully at table’.²⁸

Relations between the administration and the commission continued steadily to deteriorate as the ‘deep-seated intellectual contempt of the Slav for the Briton exhibited itself’. By the end of 1919, useful communication between the Zionists and the British had all but stopped. Bols repeatedly complained to London about the Zionists’ aggressiveness and their ‘intolerable’ accusations against the administration. He demanded the dismantling of the commission, referring to it as ‘a tyrannical and Bolshevik organisation’ and quoting from several of its letters to him which he had regarded as insolent. In February 1920 he promised in the local press²⁹ that the UK’s commitments to the Zionists would not be allowed to injure the interests of the Palestinians. Unluckily for him, in the same month the Balfour Declaration was finally published in the territory and in London the government announced its intention to carry out its provisions. Churchill envisaged the strong possibility of the creation in his lifetime of a British-protected Jewish state.

Samuel Doublespeak

In May 1919, Samuel had been Chairman of an Advisory Committee on the Economic Development of Palestine and of a subcommittee concerned with its financial affairs. Early the following year, anticipating the probable award of the mandate to the UK, the Foreign Office foisted him on the administration to report on the financial and administrative situation in Palestine and to advise on related policy. This gave him the opportunity to see for himself the absence or otherwise of ‘misapprehensions’ on the ground.

Samuel's first visit to Palestine began at the end of January and lasted two months. The depth of opposition he found to Zionism shocked him. For their part, the Yishuv (Weizmann reported) found him 'weak, frightened and trembling. The Jews are very disappointed in him'. Weizmann himself made sour comments about him and declared him 'altogether too cautious', perhaps because Samuel rated the 'Zionist political outlook . . . pessimistic, although not hopeless'. The hostility of the administration to Zionism was an obstacle in the way of the establishment of the National Home, he believed. Repeating the never-implemented mantra that the Zionists should 'remove misunderstandings as to what the proposals of Zionism, in relation to the rest of the population, really are', he threw in the standard self-deluding claim that 'When it is found that none of the evils which are anticipated do in fact take place, . . . the opinion . . . cannot fail to change'. He reiterated that there was no genuine Palestinian national movement. He put out a press statement in which he dismissed Muslim and Christian beliefs that they would be placed under a Jewish majority, that the owners and cultivators of land might be dispossessed and that Jews would monopolise the administration's portfolios. 'I know', he insisted, 'that none of these ideas are entertained by (the Zionist Organisation). I know also that, even if they were, the British Government would never permit the adoption of such policies'.

In view of recent remarks by Churchill and Curzon, as well as himself, about the likelihood of a Jewish state arising in Palestine, it is not clear how he felt able to give these assurances. Nonetheless, broaching a sensible theme he was never to abandon, he also made a detailed proposal, which Curzon did not take up, for a mainly economic, loose confederation of Arabic-speaking states, each self-governing. He believed that, with Palestine under British mandate and with special provision for the National Home, such an arrangement would both allow Zionist political aspirations to be fulfilled and foster the peaceful integration of the Home into the surrounding region. It was a very long shot, but one which might have brought about a satisfactory settlement of the whole question and spared Palestine and Israel the unending strife of the future.

After Samuel's departure, in a despatch sent to GHQ on 20 April, Bols reported that, though the administration had allowed official language status to Hebrew and the establishment of a Jewish judicature, the commission 'accuses me and my officers of anti-Zionism' and appears 'bent on committing the temporary Military Administration to a partialist policy before the issue of the Mandate. It is manifestly impossible to please partisans who officially claim nothing more than a

“National Home”, but in reality will be satisfied with nothing less than a Jewish State.’ Although his plea probably reached Lloyd George at San Remo, no reply (if there was one) is extant.

The Naby Musa Riots

Confirming as accurate the strong criticism Samuel had made of the failure of the Zionist Commission to recognise that ‘the force and value of the Arab nationalist movement’ (which he had earlier claimed had no genuine existence) was ‘very real and no bluff’, the Naby Musa ‘Easter Riots’ began two days after his report on his visit appeared on 2 April.³⁰ They had been preceded by widespread demonstrations in February and March against the Balfour Declaration and Zionism and calls for Arab independence by the MCA³¹ – activity which may have been partly linked to euphoria in Palestine engendered by Faysal’s coronation as King of Syria on 8 March and to optimism at that moment that Palestine might be going to be added to his kingdom.³² As a foretaste of the riots, on 1 March 6 Jews and 5 Arabs had been killed in a Palestinian attack which partly destroyed Metulla in the northernmost corner of Galilee.

The annual, Al-Husayny family-sponsored Naby Musa pilgrimage, initiated by Saladin, was the most important of all Palestinian Muslim festivities. The pilgrim route was from Jerusalem to the supposed tomb of Moses in the desert off the Jericho road, where the believers ‘feast for a week’. Traditionally, the festival attracted large numbers of participants to Jerusalem and had always tended to produce religious tension. The Mufty of the day was conventionally the central figure in the proceedings, but this time Kamil al-Husayny took second place to Musa Kadhim al-Husayny’s nephew, Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayny, who boosted the image of the event, together with his own.

Coinciding with Passover and the Orthodox Good Friday, on 4 April 60–70,000 people assembled in one of Jerusalem’s squares for the send-off. At the Jaffa Gate, Al-Hajj Amin, displaying a large portrait of Faysal, called for cheers for ‘our King’ whose rule over Palestine from Damascus he announced that the UK would support.³³ He and the Mufty spoke against the Balfour Declaration and Jewish immigration. A contingent of Hebron pilgrims, responding with applause and cries of ‘Faisal ya sultan’ and ‘Down with Zionism’, collided with a small group of Jewish communist demonstrators. The conjunction alarmed the Palestinians and led to three days of turmoil – in which 5 Jews and (by the security forces) 4 Arabs were killed and 211–216 Jews, 23–33 Arabs and 7 soldiers were wounded.

An Israeli commentator attributed the disturbances to Al-Hajj Amin and 'Arif al-'Arif, editor of the paper *Suriyyah al-Janubiyyah* [Southern Syria]. He charged that they 'incited the crowd [and] roused the marchers and turned the procession into a violent demonstration' involving 'little more than indiscriminate attacks on Jewish passers-by and their property'.³⁴ Although another report notes Al-'Arif as appearing consistently to have condemned violence, Storrs had felt the same. He wrote that the festival turned into an anti-Jewish riot and blamed 'A man by name of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni' for it. On the other hand, Frances Newton, a missionary who lived in Palestine from 1889 until she was deported for opposition to the administration fifty years later, stated that the attitude of the Zionists had been openly hostile to the administration. Bols, concurring, unburdened himself of his feelings once again: 'I can definitively state that . . . the Zionist Commission did not loyally accept the orders of the Administration, but from the commencement adopted a hostile, critical and abusive attitude. It is a regrettable fact that with one or two exceptions it appears impossible to convince a Zionist of British good faith and ordinary honesty. They seek, not justice from the military occupant, but that in every question in which a Jew is interested discrimination shall be shown in his favour . . . In Jerusalem, being in the majority, they are not satisfied with military protection, but demand to take the law in their own hands. In other places where they are in a minority they clamour for military protection'.

A premature and threatening Zionist Organisation Executive report the following year said, 'It was felt on both sides that the last stage of the conflict had', with Naby Musa, 'been reached, and that the question at issue was now reduced to its crudest and simplest form.' So early in the development of the National Home as this, the Apprentice sought to overthrow the Sorcerer: 'either the Jews or the military Administration', it added, 'would have to go'.

The basic atmosphere in Palestine had certainly become ugly. An underground Jewish army, Hagana ['self-defence'],³⁵ was now founded to heighten protection of the Yishuv and any understanding between Britons, Palestinians and Jews turned to fear and hatred. Mutually incriminatory letters passed between the Zionist Commission and the administration, and Weizmann accused Government House of being anti-Zionist after the commission's overseas cables and publications began to be censored and its offices and his private residence were ransacked during arms' searches. Ben-Gurion, the future General Secretary of Histadrut, the General Federation of Jewish workers in Erets Yisrael, which was to play the major part in bringing Zionism's

plans to fruition, placed the blame for the riots directly on Allenby and Bols. Storrs was accused of blundering in not anticipating trouble and making preparations to deal with it.

To Zionist outcry, Jabotinsky, the driving force behind the establishment of the Royal Fusiliers's Jewish Legion battalions and the father of Hagana,³⁶ was sentenced to 15 years' hard labour for illegal possession of the weaponry which had enabled the arming of the underground army to begin. The majority of Muslim rioters received only light jail sentences. Though shocked by the violence, however, Musa Kadhim, who had not co-operated with the military administration, was humiliatingly relieved of his mayoral office by Storrs for participating in a nationalist demonstration and not complying with government orders to employ Hebrew as an official tongue in his department. He was succeeded by Raghīb an-Nashashībī, the corrupt³⁷ head of the leading political family rivalling the Al-Husaynys,³⁸ who in his new position proceeded to run a 'wretched administration'.³⁹ Al-Hajj Amin and 'Arif al-'Arif fled to Damascus and were given stiff *in absentia* prison terms, the former – who moved on to Transjordan – of 10 years. A Palestine National Congress session was prohibited and, since Bols had also blocked the convening of a Jewish Consultative Assembly meeting, democratic activity was completely halted.

The Military Administration Terminated

On 31 March, Meinertzhagen had written a letter to the Foreign Office which, much impressing Lloyd George, accused Allenby of not attempting to carry out the Balfour Declaration. A fortnight later he launched an attack on Bols and his subordinates in a despatch which described the administration as almost wholly anti-Zionist. He accused senior officials of direct responsibility for Naby Musa and of deliberately failing to quell the riots. He charged Col. Harry Waters-Taylor, Money's former Chief of Staff and now acting CPO, of conspiring with Al-Hajj Amin to foment further anti-Jewish acts. Allenby told the Foreign Office that his charges were 'absurd' and dismissed him. Waters-Taylor was also recalled and Bols resumed his post and on 21 April questioned the validity of the Declaration. He received short shrift despite Allenby in the event endorsing his view.

At the mandate-distribution talks in San Remo, Samuel was summoned to join the British/Zionist team. Following 'the palpable ineptitude of the army bureaucrats',⁴⁰ the military administration was now thought poorly of by both the UK government and public opinion.

On 24 April the Prime Minister decided that it would not be able to carry out the mandate (awarded that day) and that it must be replaced by a civil authority. Probably motivated more by his anxiety to put a Jew in charge in Jerusalem than by a real need to replace the military administration in which Storrs, a civilian, had been the dominant personality, he asked Samuel to become high commissioner. Storrs deemed the idea 'Mr. Lloyd George's madness' and Allenby argued against it. He claimed that the establishment of a civil government in advance of a peace treaty was technically against military law and the Hague Convention⁴¹ and cautioned Curzon that the appointment of Samuel would be extremely risky because the Palestinians would interpret it as handing them straight over to the Zionists. The Foreign Secretary warned Samuel of the consequences which might follow if Allenby's concerns were ignored. His opposition to the appointment was, however, fruitless.

Palestinian reaction to the news of the supersession of the Military Administration by a Jew was strong, with Christians even more bitter than Muslims. (In Damascus, Faysal said that the appointment, made by a conquering power without legal authority, would justify the worst fears of the inhabitants of Palestine and Syria: Samuel was a Zionist who was seeking to found a Jewish state amid the ruins of a large part of the latter.) On 28 April, Bols tried to assure representatives of all communities in Acre that Palestine would be governed by the UK for the good of all its inhabitants.

The Military Administration had contained Zionist activity by restricting Jewish immigration and freezing land transfers, generally rejecting Jewish applicants for official posts, banning public performances of the Zionist anthem *HaTikvah* [The Hope] and postponing the laying of the Hebrew University's foundation stone. It had campaigned ineffectually against the Balfour Declaration, but much development in Palestine was to its credit. As Arnold Wilson was about to discover in Iraq, however, improvements in living standards are not enough to assuage political passions. It remained to be seen to which of his past conflicting statements about the intentions of the Zionists Samuel would subscribe in his attempts to rule and, a civilian with a long history of pro-Zionist activity, whether or not he would fare better than his military predecessors.

CHAPTER

7

Herbert Samuel Lays the Groundwork of the Jewish State

It is ‘manifestly right that the Jews, who are scattered all over the world, should have a national centre and a national home, where some of them may be reunited. And where else could that be but in the land of Palestine with which, for more than 3,000 years, they have been intimately and profoundly associated? We think it will be good for the Jews and good for the British Empire. But we also think it will be good for the Arabs.’ (Samuel, 28 March, 1921)¹

‘Here is a country with 580,000 Arabs and 30,000, or is it 60,000 Jews (by no means all Zionists). Acting upon the noble principle of self-determination . . . , we then proceed to draw up a document which . . . is an avowed constitution of a Jewish state – and the poor Arabs are only allowed to look through the keyhole as a non-Jewish community.’ (Curzon)

Herbert Samuel, the man chosen by the UK to install its Palestine mandate, was aged 49. In some opinions the ablest of the seven High Commissioners, he had been a member of the government since 1909 and of the Cabinet for seven years. He had become Home Secretary from January-December 1916. He should have been a gift to the Zionists since he was one himself. In the words of his biographer, ‘Zionism was the one political passion of a singularly passionless career’.² He had been the first to respond to Lloyd George’s call for ‘the ultimate destiny of Palestine’ to be considered and he had for years been extremely active in supporting the idea of the National Home. In October 1918 he became a spokesman for the Zionists second only to Weizmann and spoke frequently at their meetings. He made manifold representations on their behalf to the Foreign Office. He prepared their desiderata for presentation to the government before the Peace Conference (the Palestinians were not invited to do likewise) and was a leading Zionist representative in Paris.

He had wondered if appointing a Jew as the first High Commissioner

might hamper the attainment of Zionist aims. With Lloyd George's agreement, in April 1920 he discussed the offer he had received from him with Weizmann and Sokolow (not with the Palestinians) and as a result decided that the hope of bringing a Jewish state to reality was worth the sacrifice. Accepting the post, he was sure that 'The fulfilment of the Zionist programme must . . . be gradual and very considerate for the interests of the Arabs and Christians'.³ He arrived in Jerusalem in July.

On the naming of Samuel as High Commissioner and C.-in-C., awarded the KBE at his own suggestion, a member of the military administration commented that, now, 'No really self-respecting Britisher can stay here'.⁴ Writing some two and a half years too late, he added, 'Britain may be about to commit the greatest injustice that has ever been done by any nation in modern times . . . All faith in British honesty and justice has gone from the Arab of the Near East as he sees his country being handed over to the Jews, despite his wishes'. A remark in his diary later by a future Chairman of the Zionist Executive, Col. Frederick Kisch,⁵ bore this out. He observed that 'England sent a Jew as High Commissioner to Palestine and gave him practically a free hand to carry out the pro-Zionist policy of the Mandate'.

Although Husayn/McMahon, Sykes/Picot, the Balfour Declaration and Faysal's failure to fight for it at the Peace Conference had put Palestine out of the reach of the Arabs, Britain's appointment of a Jewish High Commissioner was the opening stroke of the death knell and the final nail in the coffin of Palestinian hopes. Samuel had little in common with the East European Jews who were leading the Zionist charge into Palestine and underestimated 'the fierce nationalism of their leaders'.⁶ He knew nothing about Arabs. Keenly believing that the path to Jewish statehood was clear and that he had the full approval of his government to follow it uninhibited, he was the High Commissioner who (not surprisingly in a former UK Cabinet member) most attempted to lead London on policy, in sharp contrast with most of his successors. He prefaced his appointment by revealing his ambition, a surprisingly long way into the future, for a Zionist Palestine: 'In fifty years there may be a Jewish majority in the population. Then the Government will be predominantly Jewish, and in the generation after that there may be that which might properly be called a Jewish country with a Jewish State'. Ignoring the fears of the Palestinians, he added, 'It is that prospect which rightly evokes such fine enthusiasm.'⁷ Meanwhile, the prospect had to be tempered: 'as a Jew I would have counted it a shame to the Jewish people if the renewal of their life in the ancient land of Israel were to be marked by hardship, expropriation, injustice of any kind, for the people now in

the land, whose forbears had tilled the soil and dwelt in the towns for a thousand years. Nothing could be worse than if it were to appear that the one thing the Jewish people had learnt from centuries of their own oppression was the way to oppress others. I was there to administer the country, not for the benefit of one section of the population only, but for all; not commissioned by the Zionists but in the name of the King’.

His pledge to exercise fairness towards the Palestinians until the territory became a Jewish state was hardly encouraging. In any case, in the short term at least he was not true to his undertaking.

The Aftermath of Naby Musa

Maj-Gen. P.C. Palin of the administration had been commissioned by Allenby to head an official Court of Enquiry into the Naby Musa rioting. In evidence to it, British officers defended their administration and insisted that the malignity of the Zionist Commission had usurped governmental functions and provoked Palestinian hostility. Both Palestinian and Zionist witnesses found the military administration to blame for the violence. The former deemed it ‘powerless before the Zionist organisation’, and the Zionists accused it, and especially Storrs (to whom they gave no credit for having several times prevented outbreaks of trouble), of encouraging the rioters and sanctioning Muslim nationalist activity.⁸ Despite endorsing the Zionist claim that the riots were basically an attack by Palestinians on Jews, the report concluded that ‘the Zionist Commission . . . are largely responsible for the present crisis’, recommended that Palestinian fears should be calmed by a curtailment of some of the commission’s special privileges and criticised Weizmann. While censuring some British officers, including Storrs and Waters-Taylor, for their conduct, as successive enquiries were impotently to do it named the Balfour Declaration as the principal culprit and ‘undoubtedly the starting point of the whole trouble’. It considered that the prospect of Zionist rule – since there was no question of a National Home as such, ‘but only of Palestine becoming a Jewish State’ – was hated by the Arabs ‘far more than they had hated the Turks.’

Almost Samuel’s first act, and his first pro-Zionist decision, was to ditch the report. Ignoring the advice of Allenby and Deedes, as expediency trumped honesty, he persuaded the Foreign Office that the frankest and most accurate analysis ever undertaken of unrest in Palestine would best be shelved lest it cause unnecessary trouble. He asked Storrs to act as Civil Secretary and ordered the release of Jabotinsky and the immediate lifting of the *in absentia* sentences on ‘Arif al-‘Arif and Al-Hajj

Amin. In Palestinian eyes, the latter had become a hero on account of his role in Naby Musa, his escape, his prison sentence and his daring in standing up to the UK and the Jews.

Samuel's Principles

On 7 July, the High Commissioner read to assemblies of notables in Jerusalem and Haifa a message from George V⁹ which gave assurance of 'the absolute impartiality with which the Mandatory Power will be carried out, and of the determination of My Government to respect the rights of every race and every creed represented among you'. (Independence for the Palestinians was not one of these rights.) Samuel announced measures for 'the gradual establishment . . . of a National Home for the Jewish people'. He knew that he could honestly go no further than to claim that it 'will not in any way affect the civil and religious rights or diminish the prosperity of the general population.'¹⁰ (Like the Balfour Declaration, he said nothing at this time about any Palestinian political or economic rights.) In response to 'the yearning of the Jews for two thousand years' while maintaining 'scrupulous respect of the rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants', he included among his own policy priorities the taking of measures to 'reconstruct a Jewish national home' in accordance with San Remo. Palestine had room for a larger population, he said, and Jewish immigrants would be admitted without hurt and 'with much advantage' to the present population.¹¹

In his first report to London he said it was 'the clear duty of the mandatory power to promote the well-being of the Arab population'. Frances Newton was sceptical. She claimed that, with Samuel's coming, 'The normal straightforward conduct of administration had been made subordinate to Zionist political aims. Impartial devotion to "the well-being and development" of the population as a whole was not the first and foremost obligation of the administration. The sword of Damocles hung over their heads in the form of unpleasant consequences should anything be done, or even said' – as it had been said to Palin – 'displeasing to the Zionist Commission', which continued to make life uncomfortable for the administration.¹²

Greater Syria Abandoned

A month after Samuel's arrival, the French, armed with their San Remo mandate for Syria, threw Faysal, his 25 wives and concubines and his

half-brother Zayd out of Damascus. He spent some time in London, at the invitation of the UK government which had betrayed him and ‘had neither the desire nor the intention of retaining responsibility’¹³ for the territory from which he had been expelled, before leaving for the Hijaz in late March 1921.

In reaction to the French takeover of the whole of Syria, including Lebanon which had been withheld from Husayn, Palestinian politicians abandoned their time-honoured conviction that Palestine and Syria were one and dropped all reference to the former as the south of the latter – a concept which Britain could not, of course, have supported¹⁴ because in the war it had taken the opportunity to seize Palestine for itself and striven to enable France to expropriate at the very least ‘the portions of Syria’. In July, Musa Kadhim said, ‘Now, after the recent events in Damascus, we must change our plans entirely. Southern Syria is no more. We must defend Palestine’.¹⁵

After the Arab Revolt’s occupation of Damascus, as a southward extension of the line of the four towns which had defined ‘the portions’, Allenby had awarded Faysal what was soon to become the Kingdom of Transjordan. Samuel had worked to prevent Faysal moving there after his overthrow and urged that it should continue to be part of Palestine. He exceeded his authority by attempting to annexe the territory and to extend the frontiers of Palestine north and east to the Hijaz Railway. Although London told him that the UK did not propose to occupy areas such as Transjordan which were reserved for Arab independence (though clearly not under Faysal or Husayn), Samuel nonetheless made a ceremonial entry into it, telling the people of As-Salt that Transjordan was now under British mandate and extending London’s protection to its shuyukh.¹⁶

Pro-Zionist Moves

Despite Samuel’s proclaimed impartiality, while no steps were taken to carry out the third quarter of the Balfour Declaration, pro-Zionist measures came thick and fast. Va’ad Le-ummi (the elected National Council of the Jews of Palestine) was recognised as a representative body and allowed to hold the first meeting of the Jewish Consultative Assembly Bols had prohibited. True to Zionism’s habitual proliferation of political bodies, the Assembly elected a General Council of 40 which appointed an Executive Committee, with whose members Samuel was to hold regular meetings, and a President, David Yellin. No equivalent Arab body ever arose.

Two immensely significant pillars of the National Home were quickly erected. Zionist Commission members were given direct access to and a weekly meeting with Samuel such as was denied to Palestinian leaders. Hebrew – not spoken for more than 2,500 years and ‘a largely artificial construct, . . . the product of the laboratory and the study rather than a genuine ethnological linguistic survival’ –¹⁷ was made an official language. Like the cabinet of a government in waiting, the commission ran its own school system and banking and health services. Education in Hebrew was independent of government oversight while that in Arabic was directly controlled.

The commission also organised immigration and directed Jewish settlement. Without discussion with the Palestinians, Samuel had agreed an immigration strategy with Weizmann and Sokolow (who resided in London and never moved to Palestine) even before his arrival. It provided for him and the commission to set six monthly immigration quotas. In August 1920, in which month Col. French warned that the implementation of a Zionist policy would require military force, a Civic Administration Immigration Ordinance was enacted which allowed free entry for all Jews of independent means and families of residents; the Zionist Organisation was allotted an annual ‘labour quota’ of 16,500 which, with dependants, was capable of rising to 70,000. Palestinian leaders told Samuel that he had no right to spend their people’s money on admitting foreign immigrants and providing employment on public works for the majority of them for whom Jewish enterprises had no vacancies. (After the establishment of Histadrut in December 1920, militant pickets began to enforce *avodah ivrit*, an apartheid, Jewish labour only policy, under the leadership of Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, President of the Consultative Assembly’s Executive Committee from 1931 to 1948 and Weizmann’s successor as President of Israel.)

The regulations governing the acquisition of land were varied in the Zionists’ favour. Despite a Palestinian outcry over the commission’s purchase, from 1921, of 50,000 Marj Ibn ‘Amar acres from the absentee landlord Sursuq family, which led to the eviction of 8,000 Arab tenants, the freeze on land sales which had been imposed by the military administration was ended. When land formerly available to poor peasants became reserved for immigrants, it was seen by Palestinians as a blatant attempt to assist the Jewish land purchase programme.

On stamps (replacing EEF ones) and coins, Palestine was called ‘Falastin’ in Arabic and ‘Pelesheth’ in Hebrew. To the latter name, however, the Hebrew letters Alif and Yodh (the initials of ‘Erets Yisrael’, the Land of Israel) were added in brackets despite the objections of Foreign Office anti-Zionists. No clearer sign could have been given of

the future prepared by the UK for the country via what Gertrude Bell called 'the impossible and ridiculous Zionist programme'.¹⁸

Despite these measures in its favour, at the end of the year the Yishuv was anything but satisfied. All anti-Zionist administration officials had not been dismissed, the number of Palestinian civil servants had increased, and Samuel had appointed E.T. Richmond, an ardent anti-Zionist, as Assistant Chief Secretary and director of Samuel's political department. The High Commissioner admitted to Weizmann that a great many UK officials, if not all, were not in sympathy with a Zionist policy which would be detrimental to the Palestinians, and were not prepared willingly to carry it out. It says much about the democratic deficit of the Balfour Declaration that he added, 'But if the whole of the present staff were changed and replaced by others chosen by yourself, in six months the newcomers would hold precisely the same views'.

The Arab Executive Committee

Samuel took what he described as 'a first step in the development of self-governing institutions' by appointing an Advisory Council, to which all major laws were to be submitted for approval. Its members were 11 British officials (himself, the civil and legal secretaries and the heads of the principal departments) and 10 nominated unofficial counterparts. These were three Jews, including Yellin and Jabotinsky (responsible for organising Hagana, the "underground" army to the existence of which the administration was turning a blind eye); four Muslims (including a leading member of the Al-Husayny family, Isma'il Bey) and three Christians, including Sulayman Bey Nasif.¹⁹ Montagu made a strong protest to Curzon at what he saw as the inadequate representation of Muslims on the Council: greatly underestimating their strength, he said that 'to give 70% of the population minority representation was a monstrous and flagrant violation of the principles to which I understood His Majesty's Government were committed, that the Government of Palestine should be composed of the various races therein living in proportion to their numbers'.

In the face of this constitutional development, the Palestinians set out to create their own representative body to parallel the Jewish Consultative Assembly. From 13–19 December, the MCA convened the Third²⁰ Palestine National Congress in Haifa. Poorly attended by some 36 delegates, half from Haifa itself, Samuel reported to Curzon that only about 25 came.²¹ Harking back to Husayn's self-delusion about Sykes–Picot, it adopted the slogan 'Equality with the Mandate of Iraq' and

demanded an end to the Balfour Declaration, Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews; a national constitution; and the lifting of all restraint on full and free Palestinian self-government. It declared that Palestine belonged to Christians and Muslims and it rejected all Jewish claims to rights in the country. Its protest that Samuel had no business enacting laws without reference to an elected legislative assembly and before the mandate had been accepted by the League was received in London with disdain: Eric Forbes-Adam, the Foreign Office Palestine specialist, minuted that it should be ignored and that not even an acknowledgment should be sent.

The Congress made the unofficial appointment of an Arab Executive Committee – a ‘board of directors of the Palestinian national movement’²² – to balance the Zionist Commission. Its nine members (two Christians) elected Musa Kadhim (passed over for Samuel’s Advisory Council) as President, a post he would hold until 1934. Deputy and secretary were ‘Arif ad-Dajany and Jamal al-Husayny, a cousin of Al-Hajj Amin but rarely in agreement with him. Samuel denigrated the committee in his reporting as consisting of ‘certain persons . . . engaged in a movement having as its object a change in the declared policy of the British government with regard to Palestine’. Nonetheless, early in 1921, assuring it that ‘he regarded it as his duty to carry out the second part of the Balfour Declaration no less than the first,’²³ he gave every sign of recognising it; by April he began in practice to treat it, *faute de mieux*, as a ‘constitutional opposition’²⁴ and ‘spokesman for the Palestinian Arab community’ whose unofficial government it became. When, however, it made it clear that it would not work within the terms of the mandate, he ceased as rapidly to deal with its leaders or the organisations which had elected them even though the military administration had recognised and negotiated with them for two years.²⁵ The AEC unsurprisingly gave no credence to an account by Jewish leaders at the 1921 Zionist Congress that the Jewish people were determined ‘to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the upbuilding of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development’.²⁶

Samuel’s report to government for 1920 corrected the estimate of the size of the Jewish population he had given in his dithyrambic memorandum, reducing it to 76,000, one tenth of the total. In his response, Curzon said, ‘I view with some apprehension the reported tramp of crowds of seedy Jews towards your shores from Central Europe’.

Bell in Baghdad was not impressed by the political structure the High Commissioner was erecting. Samuel, she wrote, ‘has established in

Palestine proper, exactly what has borne sway here, a British Government with native advisers. He does it because any sort of native institution of a really independent kind . . . would reject Zionism – but isn't that a sufficient condemnation of Zionism?'²⁷

Churchill in Jerusalem

The February 1921 creation of the Colonial Office Middle East Department,²⁸ which took responsibility for Palestinian affairs over from the Foreign Office, had the advantage, from the Zionist point of view, of removing Curzon from the scene and placing policy in the hands of a pro-Zionist Colonial Secretary. Although Curzon's support for the Palestinians had been largely theoretical and not followed up by action, Churchill's appointment was bad news for them.

One of his first initiatives was the Cairo Conference, held from 12–24 March, and mostly about Iraq. After it, he went across to Palestine. Hostile crowds caused him to leave his train early, at Gaza, where he was presented with the demands of the Palestine National Congress. He was met by Palestinian demonstrators all the way to Jerusalem. On his first day, violent clashes occurred during an illegal demonstration in Haifa. During the remainder of his stay, there was a strike in Jaffa, two R. Yarmuk bridges were dynamited and a Haifa-bound train was stopped and looted.

Samuel reported that Churchill had had useful talks with deputations from the principal communities. He did not, however, mention a disastrous meeting on 28 March between the Colonial Secretary and the AEC. At it, Churchill 'treated the Arab demands like those of negligible opposition to be put off by a few polite phrases and treated like children'. His interlocutors reiterated their objection to the appointment of a Jew as High Commissioner, repeated their Third National Congress's demands and added one for a parliament to be popularly elected as in Ottoman times. In a lengthy reply,²⁹ Churchill promised that the UK would faithfully fulfil the third quarter of the Balfour Declaration: Palestine was to be a National Home for the Jews, not a country in which a Jewish government would dominate the Arabs. (It was not obvious how it could be both). He undertook that there would be a 'step by step' development of representative institutions leading to full self-government and urged his visitors to give the Zionists a fair chance. The frustration of the Palestinians 'led to . . . the outburst on 1 May.'³⁰

Churchill bridled when receiving a delegation from Haifa next day. 'I thought when listening to your statements', he blustered, 'that it

seemed the Arabs of Palestine had overthrown the Turkish Government. That is the reverse of the true facts. It has been the armies of Britain which have liberated these regions'. His listeners must have recalled that the Zionists had themselves played little part in the overthrow of the Ottomans and it must have seemed to them that the benefits of being 'liberated' were looking somewhat dubious. The AEC presented Churchill with a memorandum which noted that, while the Palestinians were to retain their civil rights, 'the Jews have been granted a true advantage, namely that of becoming our rulers . . . they are to have . . . the preference in politics and in the economic life of the country, of which the mandate has seen fit to deprive us'.

Transjordan Ceases to be a Geographical Expression

In January, Husayn had started his second son, 'Abd Allah, off on a march towards Syria to avenge the French dethroning of Faysal, his third. On 2 March he had arrived in Amman with 30 officers and 200 badu. He set off north from there with a force which had grown to about 8,000 men. Preemptively, the French blew up a key railway bridge at Dara'a to stop him. In London, Faysal agreed to get his father to persuade his brother not to complicate Franco-British relations by initiating hostilities against France.

Gen. Congreve had suggested at the Cairo Conference – in the face of the Zionist demand that the National Home should straddle the R. Jordan, and largely in order to save military expenditure – that Palestine should be divided into halves, with the river as the boundary between them. Churchill put this into practice by implementing a supplementary Congreve proposal that Transjordan should cease for the first time to be a geographical expression and become an independent state in treaty relations with the UK. While in Jerusalem, where he was fêted by Sokolow, Ruppin and a crowd of 10,000 Jews on the site of the future Hebrew University, and before his premature departure for home after abandoning a planned visit to Galilee, he negotiated with 'Abd Allah for 3 days. With Samuel, Deedes and Lawrence in attendance, he offered to create for the Hashimite the post of Amir of Transjordan, conditional upon him abandoning his Syrian venture, accepting the validity of the Palestine mandate, and following the counsel of British High Commissioners and advisers. No doubt attracted by the idea of becoming the ruler of a country of his own, and having realised that bringing the tribes in to join him in a march on Damascus would overstretch him financially, he accepted the suggestion and the

accompanying largesse. He was installed as ruler of the new state of Transjordan in April, with a £160,000 budgetary subsidy and £5,000 for himself from the UK. So casually was a new country brought into existence by the all-powerful conquerors of the Middle East.

It had been generally taken for granted that the R. Jordan divided Palestine and that therefore the Balfour Declaration covered both banks of it. Churchill's Parliamentary Secretary, Leo Amery, recalled that when the Cabinet decided on the Balfour Declaration it had considered that the Transjordan region was part of Palestine. A British official there, alluding to the Zionist policy of 'transfer', said that it had been intended 'to serve as a reserve of land for use in the resettlement of Arabs once the National Home . . . became an accomplished fact'.³¹ At the talks in Jerusalem, however, 'the remarkable discovery was made that the clauses of the mandate relating to the establishment of a National Home for the Jews had never been intended to apply to the mandated territory east of the river' Jordan.³² Since, therefore, 'Abd Allah's kingdom was not in the event to be subject to the National Home provisions of the Balfour Declaration, any idea of resettling Palestinians on Transjordanian land had to be abandoned. In September 1922, at the urging of Churchill, the Council of the League of Nations ratified the division of Palestine into two, and eight months later the independence of the new country of Transjordan, which had not existed two years before, was proclaimed. This was a most surprising British check to the ambitions of the Zionists, who thereby lost 78% of what they had hitherto regarded as potential National Home territory.

The International Workers' Day Revolt

The increased pace of immigration during 1920, when nearly 10,000 Jews entered Palestine legally, became the main cause of the revolt. (A pro-Zionist writer blamed Churchill's visit, Article 4 of the draft mandate's award to the Jewish Agency of a status not granted to any Arab body, Zionist contempt for local customs and the Palestinians' fear, worked upon by nationalist leaders, of immigrants.)³³ The uprising lasted a week. It began on May Day³⁴ when separate processions organised in Tel Aviv by left-wing or Communist Jewish parties (the Zionist Workers' Party and the Workers' Socialist Party, or Mopsi) and by Histadrut³⁵ collided and began fighting. British troops fired in the air. The Palestinians of Jaffa, the principle immigration port nearby, believed that they were being attacked. The main aggressors thereafter,³⁶ in a savage outburst of anti-Zionist feeling they seized the

opportunity to invade the Jewish immigrants' hostel. Before help arrived, 48 Jews and 47 Palestinians had been killed and about 200 people injured. The rioting spread to 5 Jewish farm settlements on the central coastal plain and to Qalqiliyyah, Petach Tikvah and Tulkarim. The month before, Musa Kadhim had called on the Palestinian people to remain calm and 'put its hope in the government of Great Britain, which is famous for its justice, its concern for the well-being of the inhabitants, its safeguarding of their rights and consent to their lawful demands. It will not disappoint the people's hopes.'³⁷ Now Raghīb an-Nashashībī, the mayor of Jaffa and the MCA tried to calm their supporters and, led by Al-Hajj Amin, denounced the outbreak. The last, whom Samuel had allowed to return to Jerusalem, kept in touch with the High Commissioner, helping him to prevent the violence spreading.

His garrison having been reduced from 25,000 to 7,000 that month, in response to the revolt Samuel asked Gen. Congreve to hold back in Palestine units which were on the point of leaving. On 3 May he imposed martial law. He ordered the RAF to bomb Palestinian, not Jewish, rioters. Demonstrating how much power over immigration the UK had handed to the Zionists, he asked the Zionist Commission temporarily to stop Jews embarking for Palestine from European ports. He himself turned back boats carrying some 300 immigrants and requested Allenby (now Special High Commissioner in Cairo, succeeding the dismissed Wingate) to provide any already approaching by sea with temporary accommodation. (Because of the political situation in Egypt following Sa'd Zaghlul's return home from his second exile,³⁸ he refused and shipped them back to Istanbul, but he did send three destroyers to the coast of Palestine.)

After suspending immigration for two months from 14 May, in the inevitable Zionist view capitulating to Palestinian pressure, and violently denounced by the Zionist Congress at Carlsbad in September, Samuel permitted a more toughly regulated resumption halfway through the period: future applications for entry had to be supported by guarantees of employment and were to be considered by reference to the Economic Absorptive Capacity of the territory.

The Disillusionment of Samuel

While the International Workers' Day Revolt had no drastic consequences for Samuel's career like those the Naby Musa Riots had had for the military administration, the measures he took after it further worsened his relations with the Zionist Commission. They cost him much of

his former popularity with the Jews, who were incensed by his attitude and downgraded him from a god to a traitor. Eder labelled his actions a 'surrender to Arab coercion' which would 'knock the bottom out of the Jewish National Home'. (Deedes felt the same.) The UK, Eder protested with no thought for the favours it was doing his people, 'should give up the mandate and leave us Jews to have it out ourselves with the Arabs'.³⁹ Ruppin said that the Zionists now regarded Samuel as a traitor, and Weizmann, who treated him as if he were one of his staff, privately denounced him as a coward. (Storrs was considered a traitor by Eder and a coward by Weizmann and Ben-Gurion.)⁴⁰ Samuel threatened to resign because of these Zionist slurs, and Weizmann pondered suggesting a replacement for him.⁴¹

Early in his period of office, Samuel had begun to feel let down by the Jews Calling the kettle black, he complained that the Zionist Commission had not handled the problem of the Palestinians adequately and had misrepresented the ultimate aims of Zionism; sufficient Jewish capital had not arrived in the country and the Zionists had fulfilled none of their promises of rapid development. The riots caused him to lessen his uncritical support for their cause, provoked a painful re-examination of his feelings towards the National Home and shattered any illusions he might have had with regard to the possibility of harmony between Palestinians and Jews. The result was a modification of British policy. Having deceived himself about the readiness of the Palestinians to accept Zionism in return for the benefits of an honest, efficient and fair-minded *Pax Britannica*, he now moved to a much more realistic and pessimistic view of the prospects. On 21 May 1921, with the support of Deedes, he pointed the obvious out to Churchill. The fact that Foreign Office and Zionist teams were drafting the mandate with no Palestinian input invited gave the impression that a partnership was being institutionalised between the Administration and the Zionist Organisation. He asked him to consider making some correction to this by scrapping mandate Article 4 – which in its final form appointed the organisation as the administration's assistant in the development of the country – or inserting a 'counterpoise' to it elsewhere in its text.

The riots motivated the Zionists to intensify illegal immigration and arms-smuggling and to boost their military capability. London's reaction was to step up support for them by giving active help to Hagana, which had the task of protecting Jewish settlements. (Churchill's successor as Colonial Secretary, Lord Devonshire, was to instruct Samuel the following year to allow the Zionists what arms they needed. He authorised no arms for the Palestinians.)

The Rise of the Mufty

Out of the Revolt arose the game-changing elevation of Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayny. On 8 May, at the age of 26, he was named Mufty. His grandfather, father and half-brother Kamil, who died on 21 March and whom he succeeded, had all held the post. Like Kamil, he was given the enlarged title of Grand Mufty. His appointment had something of the air of a panic measure. He obtained the position – by an odd procedure which looked very like ‘bribing him with office to be a good boy in the future’⁴² – even though he had not completed the obligatory academic studies at Al-Azhar in Cairo, had not been elected to the post, and was not the best candidate his family could have put forward. His nomination had strong local and administration support: it followed pressure by Richmond and Storrs on Samuel, Deedes and Norman Bentwich (‘the son of an original Hovév Tsiyón’, now Attorney-General, who had written a book on Zionism), the latter two opposing it. One purpose of his appointment was to restore the balance between the Al-Husayny and An-Nashashiby families which had been upset when the former had lost the post of Mayor of Jerusalem.

Eleven days before being selected while, extraordinarily, remaining on an administration political ‘black list’, Al-Hajj Amin had assured Samuel of his earnest desire to co-operate with the UK and of his belief in its good intentions towards the Palestinians. Having promised that his influence and that of his family would be devoted to maintaining peace in Jerusalem,⁴³ he worked to prevent a recurrence of rioting and thereafter concentrated mostly on legitimate political means to further the Palestinian cause.⁴⁴ Some UK officials considered him ‘most pro-English’⁴⁵ and for years he was to be denounced by extremist Arab politicians as a British agent. An Israeli opinion is that ‘not only did (he and the Husayny family) prevent an escalation of tension during the 1921 festivities, but the calm was also maintained during the following years’.⁴⁶ Another, on the other hand, views Samuel’s faith in Al-Hajj Amin as a profound misjudgement, born of his failure to perceive the Mufty’s ‘love of intrigue, his intransigent and uncompromising hostility not only to Zionism but also to British imperialism, his readiness to resort to any lengths of brutality against his own people as much as against the Jews and the British. No man was, in fact, less suited by personality to the collaborative role that Samuel conceived in investing him with such authority.’⁴⁷

In the same spirit, Kedourie rates him ‘An all-or-nothing adventurer’ whose appointment allowed the Al-Husaynys ‘to direct the political strategy of the Palestinians until 1947, and led them to utter ruin’.⁴⁸

Samuel's Modified Policy

At the King's Birthday Party in June 1921, Samuel delivered a policy speech⁴⁹ to officials and notables (none from the Palestinian National Congress) which demonstrated that the Zionist charge of cowardice against him was anything but justified. It displayed a marked change of tone. In a telegram to Churchill on 27 May, he had described the National Home as a 'spiritual centre' whose builders would 'develop country to advantage of all inhabitants. If any methods have been adopted which depart or even appear [to] depart from those principles they must be changed. If in order to convince Moslems and Christians their rights are really safe any measures are needed they must be taken'.⁵⁰

Now, as he 'qualified, in all important respects, his earlier support for political Zionism by expanding Britain's commitment to the second part of the Balfour Declaration', he redefined the National Home – from which term, to Zionist concern, he omitted the 'National'⁵¹ – as something which had to be balanced, at all times, with the UK's obligations to the Palestinians. There had been an 'unhappy misunderstanding', he declared, about the meaning of the Declaration, for 'the British Government . . . would never impose on the Arabs a policy which was contrary to their religious, their political, and their economic interests'. (The use of the adjective 'political', which – like 'economic' – did not occur in the Declaration, was noticeable but unfortunately not significant.) The Zionists objected to the speech. Weizmann described it to Lloyd George and Churchill as 'timid and apologetic', and the allegedly unextremist Eder, calling Samuel a Judas, attacked it as a 'concession to [Palestinian] mob violence.' *The Jewish Chronicle* rated it 'really the presage of what will form one of the blackest instances of political betrayal recorded throughout all history'.

In the same month, nonetheless, there was a certain inevitability about a Churchill statement to the Imperial Cabinet that the object of his Palestine policy was 'To do our best to make an honest effort to give the Jews a chance to make a National Home there for themselves . . . If, in the course of many years, they become a majority in the country, they naturally would take it over . . . *Pro rata* with the Arab'. Again misquoting the original terminology, he added, 'We made an equal pledge that we would not turn the Arab off his land or invade his political and social rights'. In a House of Commons' debate on 14 June, after voicing his remarkable diagnosis that promises to the Zionists were the only cause of unrest in Palestine (and by implication would be simple to mediate), he continued, 'There really is nothing for the Arabs to be frightened about . . . No Jew will be brought in beyond the number who

can be provided for by the expanding wealth and development of the resources of the country'. There was, however, no intention of consulting the wishes of the people or – contradicting the undertaking he had made to the AEC during his Palestine visit – giving them representative institutions. (In the debate, Col. (Lord) Josiah Wedgwood, 'the champion of Zionism and of all causes for the liberation of all oppressed nations',⁵² and others voiced strong belief in the strategic value of the potential military base, guarding the Suez Canal, which a Zionist Palestine would afford and an Arab Palestine presumably would not. Samuel himself believed that the strategic importance of the territory 'stood out clearly'. No longer confident that the UK would be able to control the future of Egypt, or that the security of the Canal could be ensured by Britain or the Egyptians alone, in December 1922 (when Allenby had just deported Zaghul)⁵³ Clayton in a note was to record his conviction that a strongly rooted position in Palestine was necessary because events had made it, in place of Egypt, the key of the UK's sea and air communications to the East.

On 22 July, in a display of Zionist power in the topmost British political circles, where Palestinian representation was at no time welcome, Weizmann organised a meeting, attended by the UK Prime Minister and Colonial Secretary, at Balfour's house. Balfour and Lloyd George assured him that by the Declaration they had always meant the eventual creation of a Jewish state. Weizmann complained that the High Commissioner's 3 June speech had been a negation of the Declaration and that his pronouncements and administrative measures were failing to accomplish the aim of bringing about a Jewish majority in Palestine. He had just protested to Samuel that 'everything in Palestinian life is now revolving round . . . how to satisfy and "pacify" the Arabs. Zionism is being gradually, systematically, and relentlessly "reduced" . . . we must be given a fair chance'. On the subject of Hagana, Churchill assured Weizmann that 'We won't mind it' but, lest London's support for it became known, advised him not to talk about it. Despite this governmental chicanery in his favour, Weizmann decided to resign at the next Zionist Congress because only lip service was being paid to the Balfour Declaration by its officials in Palestine.

Although after his speech Samuel initiated a 'general defence scheme' for the Jewish colonies, which were provided with arms strictly for use in self-defence only, his review of his first year in office,⁵⁴ in August, showed a greatly diminished enthusiasm for a Jewish state. Diverging from Churchill's 'they naturally would take it over' of two months earlier, he asked, 'If there were an unlimited Jewish immigration and finally a Jewish majority in the population, how could the safeguards

embodied in the second half of the Declaration be enforced? . . . ’ British policy was not to be one-sided. It

‘contemplates the satisfaction of the legitimate aspirations of the Jewish race throughout the world in relation to Palestine, combined with a full protection of the (rights of the) existing population. I am convinced that the means can be found to effect this combination. The Zionism that is practicable is the Zionism that fulfils this essential condition. It is the clear duty of the Mandatory Power to promote the well-being of the Arab population.’

Jewish immigration was not to involve Palestinian emigration, the use of Hebrew did not imply the disappearance of Arabic. Choosing words which, in this determined Zionist of long standing, would have been unthinkable shortly before, he concluded by saying, ‘In a word, the degree to which Jewish aspirations can be fulfilled . . . is conditioned by the rights of the present inhabitants’.⁵⁵

The First Palestinian Delegation

The Fourth Palestine National Congress in Jerusalem had agreed on 29 May that non-violent political means should be used to persuade the UK to concede its demands. It decided to send a delegation to present its case in London and to the League in Geneva. Illustrating the erratic nature of his actions throughout his dealings with the Palestinians, Samuel, who at first thought that it ‘might have its uses as a means of arriving at an understanding’, later tried to prevent its departure. In contrast, he impressed on Churchill that for it to return empty-handed would risk serious repercussions. He warned the members that they would not be recognised in London as an ‘official representative’ body and that the government – which had been at all times happy to negotiate with the Zionists despite their lack of ‘official representative’ status – would not negotiate with them. Musa Kadhim led the delegation, which included three other Muslim and two Christian notables and Frances Newton. It had the encouragement and support of some former OETA officials (including Waters-Taylor, who acted as its adviser), of *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Morning Post*, *The Daily Express* and *The Westminster Gazette* (all owned by Lords Sydenham and Lamington)⁵⁶ and of a large group of politicians, ex-soldiers, businessmen and clergy.

It set out on 19 July. In Geneva it was many times refused an audience with Balfour, who was in discussions with the League. On one cringe-

making occasion, an official, with unmatched crassness, informed it that 'if it is anything to do with Palestine, Mr Balfour has already seen Dr. Weizmann'. At its one meeting with the sealer of their fate, Balfour spoke to the members gracefully and vaguely of the "experiment" of Zionism.

Successive British governments had kept open house for the leader of the Zionists. The delegation, arriving in London on 22 July, found itself accorded little comparable consideration, viewed as ineffectual and treated with contempt. Musa al-'Alamy, related to Al-Hajj Amin and a future prominent but peripheral Palestinian political figure, then studying law at Cambridge, felt this appropriate. He described it as 'a pathetic body. Apart from their secretary . . . none of them had had any contact with the West, or spoke a word of any language other than Arabic and Turkish; they were living in another world'. Seeing a great deal of them, he became more and more depressed by the ineptitude of their dealings, not least with the Colonial Office, which repeatedly recommended them to make contact with the Zionist Organisation and by which, he heard, 'they were treated like backward children'. Shuckburgh, now Colonial Assistant Under Secretary and Head of the Middle East Department, remarked that, lacking English and 'very slow of understanding', the delegation was 'a hopeless body to deal with'. Discussions with it would in any case be 'a mere waste of time' unless it realised that abandoning the Balfour Declaration was out of the question. He passed on to political leaders advice from Churchill not to grant it interviews. The Colonial Secretary himself, however, received it three times. After one of their meetings, 'obstructive methods' were used against the members, including an attempt to impound their papers and notes. Weizmann, kept privately informed of the delegation's activities by Shuckburgh, wrote that they were 'fifth rate people but they can make a stink and they are supported by an anti-semitic clique.'

On 12 August, the delegation presented a memorandum to Churchill. Appealing to the spirit of League Covenant Articles 20 and 22 and impossibly ambitious in its demands, it sought the abandonment of the Declaration, the scrapping of the National Home project, the immediate cessation of Jewish immigration, and the inclusion of Palestine in an Arab federation in free association with its Arab neighbours. On the 22nd., Churchill told the members, 'the Jews will not be allowed to come into the country except insofar as they build up means for their livelihood.' The politician who had told Weizmann not to talk about Hagana, continued, 'They cannot take any man's lands. They cannot dispossess any man of his rights or his property . . . If they like to buy people's land and people like to sell it to them, and if they like to develop and cultivate

regions now barren and make them fertile, then they have the right [to do so]’.

The variability of Zionist policy, as confused as Churchill’s, was demonstrated at the 12th. Zionist Congress in Carlsbad in September. The congress announced that Jews ‘were not going to the Holy Land in a spirit of mastery’; they were ‘determined to work in peace with the Arab nation . . . on terms of unity and mutual respect, in relations of fraternity, and together’ – a resolution on which little or no work was ever done – ‘make the common home into a flourishing community’. That the ultimate aim was a state was, however, made uncompromisingly explicit by Yellin, who declared that ‘the Jews are ready to take Palestine by war, if the outflow of blood is necessary to establish their claim upon the land’.

Adjustments in tactics continued to be made. One which would have been unlikely to calm Palestinian fears was Samuel’s suggestion on 14 October to Churchill of a revised Declaration which would make it clear, in the face of Yellin’s challenge, that the Zionists’ purpose was not a state but a commonwealth, ‘as Jewish as England is English’. More to the point, the number of immigrating Jewish labourers, he said, should be set by reference to vacancies in new enterprises, and the security of Palestinian property should ‘be absolutely guaranteed’. Finally, a completely unrealistic point (given the speed of the Zionist political advance), and one Bols would have applauded, was that after its fierce rejection of his 3 June policy the Zionist Commission should have its functions limited to economic and cultural questions and leave political representation to the headquarters which, unlike Husayn, it had been permitted to establish in London. The delegation, too, developed its demands, now with greater balance. In a letter to Churchill on 22 October it asked for the Declaration to be superseded by an agreement safeguarding ‘the rights, interests and liberties of the people of Palestine’ which would at the same time ‘make provision for reasonable Jewish aspirations, but precluding any exclusive political advantages to them which must necessarily interfere with Arab rights’.

On 15 November, at a delegation lunch, Lord Sydenham declared that ‘the Jews had no more right to Palestine than the descendants of the ancient Romans had to this country’. With keen foresight, he added that the Balfour Declaration was ‘loaded with dynamite . . . If we did not give justice and peace to Palestine, assuredly we should light a fire in the Near East which would strain all our resources to extinction’. The injustice suffered by the Palestinians was ‘unprecedented in history’.

To the delegation’s displeasure (‘we did not come here to come to an understanding with the people whom we consider as aggressors, but to

negotiate with HMG'), it was forced to meet Zionist representatives at Churchill's insistent request. Although officials reaffirmed that the Zionists did not want to dominate the Palestinians, the results of the meeting, on 29 November, were far from positive. They were not helped by Weizmann, who acted like 'a conqueror handing to beaten foes the terms of peace'⁵⁷ and in whose opinion the delegation consisted of 'political blackmailers' and 'trash'.⁵⁸ When Shuckburgh (who on the 7th. had written that Palestinian fears of 'Jewish political ascendancy' were 'groundless') made it clear from the chair that the draft mandate was not open to revision, Musa Kadhim rejoined that this was unacceptable because of the special rights it would grant to the Jews. His delegation would not discuss the matter further until a clear interpretation of the Balfour Declaration had been made. The Colonial Office attempted to make one in a statement to it and the Zionist Organisation on 17 December. Choosing Samuel's nomenclature rather than a 'state', and again awarding the Palestinians a right withheld by the Declaration, this said that it was British policy to build 'in Palestine a commonwealth, based upon a democratic foundation, in which all sections of the community will enjoy equal political rights'.

The Colonial Office sought to win the delegation over to the principles of Samuel's 3 June speech and, in addition, to plans for a legislative council. But the response in January 1922 was that the Palestinians considered that immigration policy should be the responsibility of a national government rather than, as was the case, of the Zionists. They would reject 'political rights' if it was proposed that 'the Jews who were not indigenous to the country' were to enjoy equal ones with them.

The Haycraft Report

A report written immediately after the May riots by Intelligence Capt. C.D. Brunton had enumerated the multiple anxieties of the Palestinians, among them the 'injustice' they perceived of independence being granted to 'nomad savages' in Transjordan while their more advanced selves were denied it and the lack of Palestinian representation in the administration of their own country. A more considered examination of the riots was a Commission of Enquiry under the newly appointed Chief Justice, Sir Thomas Haycraft, a Colonial Service veteran and former judge in Cyprus and the West Indies. The first of many commissions, almost all of them a waste of time and money because they could never place blame on the Balfour Declaration, the only essential point, its report appeared

on 2 November. The intention to make Palestine a Jewish state had been 'made embarrassingly clear' by Zionist witnesses appearing before it. Eder had stated in evidence that 'there can be only one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and there can be no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish predominance as soon as the numbers are sufficiently increased . . . the Jews should, and the Arabs should not, have the right to bear arms.'

A lone voice in the Colonial Office called for his removal.

The report placed responsibility for the riots squarely on basic Palestinian political grievances. They were 'not Jew haters but opponents of Zionism', they suspected the administration's favouritism towards the Yishuv and they feared the political and economic impact of Zionist immigration. Al-Hajj Amin 'did not do much more than anybody else' during the riots, it remarked, and 'the Mufty and his personal friends are always active in times of political crisis . . . in preventing people getting too excited and violent'.⁵⁹ It blamed the attitude and statements of many of the Zionist leaders, and the arrogance of many younger immigrants, for the growing fear and resentment of the Palestinians over the development of the National Home. The riots would not have taken place, it stressed, without the distrust inspired in them by the Zionist Commission, which had failed to convince the Palestinians that the National Home was for the benefit of them as much as of the Jews. Their distrust had been heightened by the influence they believed to be exercised by the commission (to which they had no similar body able to exert comparable influence) over legislation and the selection of administration officials. It concluded with the feeble recommendation that either representative government should be established or the garrison should be increased.

In the aftermath of the report, which had no impact in London, Samuel showed how attitudes had changed when he advised Weizmann to issue a formal statement renouncing any aspiration to a Jewish state. (To Deedes, Weizmann indignantly rejected the idea: 'what else are we striving for? . . . what other meaning is there in the National Home?. What is all the struggle about?. What are we all working for?')⁶⁰

Deedes's Rethink

Deedes told Lt.-Col. W.F. Stirling, Governor of Jaffa from 1920–3, who regarded him as a religious fanatic, that 'The more he could assist in the return of the Jews to the Holy Land, the quicker he would hasten the second coming of the Lord'. In May 1920 he had pledged to Weizmann

that 'from now on the whole of such abilities and strength as God has given me will be devoted unreservedly to the realisation of your ideal.' Despite these powerful and merciless convictions, even he, like Samuel, was for the same reason forced to modify his total support for Zionist aims. He drove Weizmann to despair in November when he reported to Shuckburgh that the Palestinians could not distinguish between the administration and the Zionists. He repeated the recommendation, already made by Samuel and now turned down by Churchill as too radical, that the anomalous position assigned to the Zionist Organisation in Article 4 of the draft mandate should be withdrawn. He added that the administration should be left to get on with the job of governing the country with the help of a body representing all sections of the community. If the Zionists had adhered to the administration's policies, he wrote, the association of the Zionist Commission with it might have been intelligible to the Palestinians, but since they had not the latter could only conclude 'that HMG was bound hand and foot to the Zionists . . . and that all Legislation here was, and would continue to be, inspired by Zionist interest'.⁶¹ (In March 1922, he advised Churchill, in apparent contradiction of Samuel, that, with an Arab population many times greater than the Jewish, and growing, it was wholly impracticable to make Palestine as Jewish as England was English.)

The Supreme Muslim Council

Following rioting in Jerusalem in November,⁶² as a counterpart to the Jewish Agency Executive Samuel created a Supreme Muslim Council in January 1922. His administration's wish, he had told a Muslim conference the previous August, was to establish a body to represent the Muslims and assure them that they were in complete control of the *awqaf* and that the Shar'iah courts were being supervised by the people they had themselves chosen. .

Granted no access to real state authority but with (in 1924) a staff of 1,193 and a budget of £P50–65,000, Samuel hoped that this 'most important Arab institution of quasi-government' would co-operate with him in helping maintain law and order.⁶³ Al-Hajj Amin, who quickly became its President, saw the AEC headed by Musa Kadhim, with whom he was always at cross purposes, as a rival. But the SMC completely identified itself with the AEC's political line until it turned against it to become the vanguard of the Palestinian national movement in the late 1920s.⁶⁴ Since it was sometimes allowed to divert funds from religious

to political purposes and to encroach on areas outside its strict remit, it presented Al-Hajj Amin with a source of nationwide influence to complement that of his office as Grand Mufti.

Pressure at Home

The owner of *The Times* and *The Daily Mail*, Lord Northcliffe, spent ten days in Palestine in February 1922. In Rishon Le-Tsiyón village hall he mounted 'a violent tirade' against the Jews and the Balfour Declaration. Angered by Zionist churlishness towards him, he returned from his visit determined to launch a campaign to publicise Palestinian wrongs and attack the mandate, which he believed would endanger the UK's prestige in the Muslim world. He charged one of the *Mail's* journalists, J.M.N. Jeffries, with the task of spearheading it.

In May, Samuel travelled to London, aiming to get the government to clarify its intentions and come clean about its policy. He stressed to the Colonial Office the need for the Balfour Declaration to be reinterpreted so as to win moderate Palestinian support for the mandate. Illustrating the muddled optimism of all who were involved in Palestine policy, however, on 24 May he wrote in *The Morning Post* that the Jews 'were bound to increase and ultimately to become the majority'. Notwithstanding that statement, on 3 June, demonstrating the continuing Zionist lack of confidence in him, Weizmann told Eder, 'he is meek and mild and timid. Still he is . . . the best we can have in the circumstances'.

On 21 June, an anti-Zionist debate took place on a motion by Lord Islington in the Upper House. Referring to McMahon's second letter, whose terms it completely misinterpreted, and to the Franco-British Declaration, this said that 'The Mandate for Palestine in its present form is unacceptable to this House because it directly violates the pledges made by His Majesty's Government to the people of Palestine in the Declaration of October 1915, and again in the Declaration of November 1918.' It was opposed to 'the sentiments and wishes of the great majority of the people of Palestine.' In his first appearance in the Lords, Balfour replied without making any contact with reality or common sense. Contradicting Samuel, he 'resented the suggestion that the British Government or its representative or the Mandates Commission of the League would tolerate the oppression and domination of one section of the population by another': again attributing to the Palestinians rights which his Declaration had not awarded them, 'I cannot', he said,

‘imagine any political interest exercised under greater safeguards than the political interests of the Arab population of Palestine . . . we desire to the best of our ability to give (the Jews) that opportunity of developing, in peace and quietness under British rule, those great gifts which hitherto they have been compelled to bring to fruition in countries that know not their language and belong not to their race.’

He appealed ‘for a chance for the Jews to show whether they can in Palestine, without injury to others, organise a culture in a Home where it will be secured from oppression.’ Concluding by referring to the political vivisection being carried out on his Palestinian victims without their consent, and happy to test his theories on others, with typical flippancy he added, ‘I do not deny that this is an adventure. Are we never to have adventures? Are we never to try new experiments?’ To his scorn, the government was defeated by the large majority of 60 to 25, encouraging Palestinian leaders to believe that further diplomatic efforts and stronger political arguments could bring them concessions.⁶⁵

The 1922 White Paper: A National Home *in* Palestine

On 30 June, the so-called Churchill White Paper was published. It had been reluctantly accepted in advance by Weizmann, who was once more given the advantage over the Palestinians, whose delegation was offered no preview of it. Endorsing the Zionist policy of expelling the Palestinians (‘transfer’), the Zionist confided that he had blessed the White Paper ‘because when the time is ripe, I shall make it a blue paper. The Arabs must go elsewhere’. The first official interpretation of the Declaration, it was heavily influenced by Samuel’s new stance. Approaching a definition of what the National Home could, with Palestinian agreement, have been, its aim, it said, was ‘not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community . . . in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride’.

A passage in the White Paper attempted to quash the doubts which still made UK consciences uneasy about McMahon’s intentions for Palestine and had continued actively to exercise the Palestinians. In the spring, Churchill – suggesting that his knowledge of the geography was no better than Grey’s – had told the delegation that the proof that McMahon had included Palestine ‘in the reserved area was that the Vilayet of Damascus contained the whole of Transjordan [sic] . . .

Transjordania stretched right down from the borders of the [Sykes-Picot] French area to south of the Red Sea [sic], and Palestine lay parallel to it and west of it all the way'. Renaming and resiting Lebanon, he continued, 'Therefore, . . . since the portions lying to the west of the Vilayet of Damascus were excluded, and Palestine lay west of Transjordania which was part of this Vilayet, Palestine was one of those portions and was excluded'.

The despised delegation pointed out that McMahon had made no reference to vilayetler and that there had never been a Vilayet of Damascus: 'The vilayet which turned tail and ran south was a fabrication of Mr. Churchill, or of his advisers'.

The White Paper now incorporated the further official thinking about McMahon's exclusion or otherwise of Palestine. Contradicting Churchill, it was based on a clarification drafted on 23 June by Hubert Young in the Middle East Department, of which the delegation had been informed. It had skated over the Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus of McMahon's second letter to Husayn, the only one of the Correspondence then publicly known. Shuffling the vilayet pack in the most childish and ludicrous of ways, the White Paper performed a complete and blatantly obvious volte-face in order to claim that McMahon's "promise" 'was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district [sic] of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the Vilayet of Beyrout and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge'.

(This revised version can make no sense – and in any case not convince – unless McMahon's 'portions of Syria lying to the West of . . .' is taken to have been shorthand for the Vilayet of Syria and unless its omission of any reference to the Sanjak of Lebanon or the Vilayet of Aleppo, both of which were also 'to the West', is ignored. In the view even of the pro-Zionist Christopher Sykes,⁶⁶ the exclusion of Palestine rests on a lie based on 'a piece of sharp practice' amounting to 'the falsification of documents'.)

The White Paper did at least acknowledge the presence of Arabs in Palestine. Challenging Samuel's own 24 May statement, it asserted that they 'would not be subordinated to the Jewish community' and that – while the Jews were in Palestine 'as of right and not on sufferance' and while the ultimate goal of a Jewish state was not necessarily excluded but would not come quickly – they had nothing to fear because Palestine 'as a whole' was not to become a Jewish National Home, which was to

be a home *in* Palestine'. (How the White Paper squared 'the ultimate goal of a Jewish state' with 'a home *in* Palestine' was not clear, especially as some commentators thought that an entity already existed which possessed national characteristics more like those of a state than a 'home'. A Colonial Office paper, the same month, reaffirmed that the Balfour Declaration did not 'contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population . . . or disappointment to the Jews'.)

In speaking of the need for Jewish immigration if the policy of expanding the population of the Yishuv were to succeed, the White Paper, explaining a new principle,⁶⁷ said that 'immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time . . . the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole', all of whom would be Palestinian by nationality, 'and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment'. It confirmed that Palestine east of the Jordan was to become Transjordan. Although the Zionists thought this only a provisional arrangement, they were disappointed that – challenging Weizmann's conviction, at the 1921 Zionist Congress, that 'The question of the eastern frontier . . . will be better answered when Cisjordania is so full of Jews that a way is forced into Transjordania' – it was to be excluded from the mandate.

On 1 March, a Weizmann interview with *The Times* assisted Jeffries in the task Northcliffe had just given him. He said that the Jews did not seek 'to found a Zionist State' but a country with equal rights for all. 'We cannot hope to rule in a country in which only one-seventh of the population at present are Jews. By the establishment of the Jewish National Home we mean the creation of such conditions' as would enable large numbers of Jews to enter and the creation of 'Jewish institutions so that' (using terminology disclaimed in the White Paper) 'the country may become as quickly as possible as Jewish as England is English.' There was no reason for differences between Jews and Arabs. There was plenty of room for both in Palestine, which had space for 'five or six million people'. Asserting that non-Jews would not 'suffer at our hands', he asked, 'are we likely to deal out oppression? . . . we have never proposed that a Jewish minority should rule over the rest. Palestine will only become a Jewish self-governing commonwealth 'when' [not if] 'the majority of its inhabitants are Jewish'.

When this statement, with its glaring in-built self-contradictions, was noticed by the delegation, it rejected the White Paper, partly because its members believed that its aim was the 'disappearance or subordination of the Arabic population, language, and culture' and because they thought a change of UK government was imminent. (A Milner remark,

leaked to them in April and, as noted, taken over in part by Balfour, had perhaps contributed to their optimism: 'if practical experience will show (the idea of a National Home) to be impossible', he said, 'there will be no escape from altering the policy. I consider the entry of Jews into Palestine an experiment.'⁶⁸

On 4 July, the Lords' defeat of two weeks earlier was reversed when the anti-Zionist Conservatives led by future Home Secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, were decisively defeated in the Commons by 292 votes to 35. They had concentrated their attack on the economic burden of the mandate for the UK, which line was trumped by an announcement by Churchill that he had cut the annual expense of maintaining Palestine from £8m in 1920 to an estimated £2m in 1922.

The Delegation Departs

The delegation prolonged its stay in London in the belief that there were more British politicians to be converted to its view of the Palestine question. Now it was summoned back by the AEC and left in July, empty-handed as Samuel had advised that it should not be but sure that it had gained support for its cause, at least in the House of Lords, and was winning the public's sympathy. It made it clear that it intended to stick to constitutional and legal campaigning methods – a policy which played directly into the hands of the Zionists, allowing them to make gains, undisturbed, between 1921 and 1928. (The claim by its Palestinian opponents that the delegation had rejected UK proposals restricting the annual quota of Jewish immigrants to 3,000 and limiting the extent of the National Home to 40 square miles, which would have met Weizmann's earlier wish for a Vatican or a Monaco, appears to be a canard.)

The Mandate

Smuts's mandate formula, dubbed 'the worst fig-leaf in the whole show',⁶⁹ placed the Middle East's most advanced peoples under foreign domination while its less developed areas were slated for independence. Grey admitted that 'Greed was the predominant impulse'⁷⁰ as the mandates exposed the pretence that they were designed to benefit the inhabitants rather than the powers chosen to administer them. Those allotted to the UK gave it a continuous Palestine-Jordan-Iraq route towards India.

A Palestine mandate draft, ready by mid-December 1919, rectified the surprising Zionist failure to have the Balfour Declaration inserted into the Treaty of Versailles. It promised the Zionists far more than the Declaration alone had. Although its authors – Forbes-Adam and Robert Vansittart – claimed that its provisions were ‘in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned’, at no stage – understandably, since the mandate was to be a trusteeship ‘for a people not yet in the country’⁷¹ – was there consultation with any Palestinian or other Arabs. The mandate did not even mention Palestinians, referring to them merely as ‘other sections of the population’ or ‘existing non-Jewish communities’.

In the devising of the mandate, the wishes of the Zionists unsurprisingly came out on top. All but five of its 23 Articles which related to the political future of Palestine were drawn up by them. Proceeding to follow up with no action while complaining that the draft ‘reeks of Judaism in every paragraph’, Curzon made a violent protest that he had not been consulted about the draft, which had not come before the Eastern Committee for almost a year: ‘I think the entire conception is wrong’, he complained.⁷² Balfour deceitfully remarked that, indeed, ‘certain elements’ in the population took exception to the mandate, but the UK was ‘most anxious to give them every reasonable guarantee that their interests will be fully safeguarded’. A standing committee on which Arab representatives would always be in the majority would be set up to advise the government on immigration.

After the White Paper and the draft mandate had been accepted by the Commons, the Palestinians perhaps missed an opportunity (of the existence of which they were probably unaware) by failing to attempt to take their case to the Permanent Court of International Justice, as allowed by the League Covenant. In mid-July 1922 the draft was therefore submitted unopposed for approval in Geneva. So strong was the position which the Zionist Organisation had attained that it felt able, as the League permitted, to demand on its own authority that it be accepted by the League Council, which endorsed it on 24 July. Unlike those of Syria and Iraq, the mandate for Palestine was written without regard to a League resolution which had awarded it category ‘A’ mandate status. Subject to it receiving ‘administrative advice and assistance’ in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant, this should have given it provisional recognition as an independent nation. Instead, rather than prepared for independence, it was to be ‘administered’.

A further blow to the Palestinians and to the principle of self-determination was the Council’s delegation of the right to advise the British authorities on their policies under the mandate not to the overwhelming Palestinian majority but to the Zionist Organisation. The organisation

offered the assurance that it understood that the National Home implied 'not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole' but the creation of 'a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and pride'.⁷³ The mandate, however, stated that the Jews were to reconstitute the country not as *a* national home *in* Palestine but as their national home. Bell was scathing: 'we pretend to be setting up [in Palestine] a Govt. [sic] in accordance with the wishes of the people, liars and knaves that we are!' A fortnight later, she attacked the League, which was 'forever damned for having passed the Palestinian and Syrian mandates which are contrary to its every principle'. In Palestine, Jeffries wrote, 'we have given . . . the most sustained exhibition of hypocrisy that has ever been seen . . . the Mandate represented by British Ministers to the Arab people as a behest sacredly received and dutifully observed by them was in all that mattered written by the Zionists and for the rest written by themselves'.

Only the mandate's Article 6, which 'definitely made immigration subordinate to the rights and position of the non-Jewish sections of the population . . . appeared', in conformity with Balfour's assurance, 'to give real protection to the Arabs'.⁷⁴

The Dimensions of the National Home

At the Peace Conference, the UK seems not to have attached much importance to indicating the boundaries it envisaged for the National Home. The Balfour Declaration had not spoken on the subject and the Palestinians had not been invited to. The nearest approach to a definition was Lloyd George's vague 'Dan to Beersheba', which gave no help over the eastern frontier. Long before the terms of the mandate had been settled or its award to Britain certain, the Zionist Organisation had demanded a National Home which bore no relation to Weizmann's original 'something like Monaco' idea but very much resembled a state. The boundaries it proposed were the Mediterranean in the west, the slopes of Lebanon, the headwaters of the R. Jordan and the summit of Mt. Hermon in the north, and the Syrian desert in the east. It also wanted the inclusion of the Al-'Arish region and access to the Gulf of 'Aqaba. As the Jews pushed for the largest possible Palestine and 'not unnaturally claimed everything within reach', the Zionist delegation to the conference submitted a map which included South Lebanon, the Jawlan [Golan] Heights and a large area east of the Jordan.⁷⁵

A Franco-British Convention set up a joint demarcation commission,

aided by 'Zionist engineers' but with no Palestinian participation in deciding their own country's boundaries. In 1923, to the resentment of Lebanese and some French observers, its work modified Sykes–Picot by adding to Palestine Safed, Lake Hulah, the Sea of Galilee and the Metulla area, and thereby all the Jewish colonies in the region of the source of the R. Jordan. The Zionists, clearly anxious from the start to control as much water as they could grasp, were only denied the R. Litany, the Upper Jordan, the Hawran and the Mt. Hermon they had coveted.

Dan, the modern Banyas, was secured only in March 1923 after negotiations between Stewart Symes – Governor in Haifa of the Palestine North District (Gallilee and Samaria) – and the French. The northern frontier of Palestine was modified and a slice of French Syria, including a narrow and 'awkward' salient in Upper Galilee from the southern end of Lake Hulah to the headwaters of the Jordan, was brought into Palestine. Thus were the Biblical boundaries so casually mentioned by Lloyd George restored. Finally, on 23 October 1924, the Jews obtained 'Afulah in the Jezreel Valley, linking Jewish settlements at a station on the Haifa-Damascus railway. The extensions of 1948 and 1967 were at that time unimaginable.

CHAPTER

8

Balfour Savours his Handiwork

‘We are pushing an alien and detested element into the very core of Islam, and the day may well come when we shall be faced with the alternatives of holding it there by the sword or abandoning it to its fate.’ (Clayton)

Defying Lloyd George’s advice of the previous July, Samuel now attempted to bring the Palestinians into a single political system which would enable them and the Jews to meet in a common assembly and discuss major issues, even if only in an advisory capacity. In August 1922, he promulgated a constitution which provided for the replacement of his Advisory Council by a larger and more democratic Legislative Council. It might pass no anti-mandate resolution but no subjects would be reserved. There would be eleven British official members and an increased number of unofficial ones, in the ratio of eight Muslims: 2 Christians: 2 Jews. (Richmond protested that this ratio did not fairly reflect a census held in October. This, admittedly flawed, had put the total population at 757,000, of whom 84,000 (11%) were Jews. He thought the ratio should have been seven Muslims: 1 Christian: 1 Jew.) In addition, in connection with Article 6 of the mandate, Samuel would confer over the regulation of immigration with a committee to be formed of half of the representatives of each community.

Weizmann accepted the idea in advance. The Palestinians and the SMC, on the instructions of the Fifth Palestine National Congress, rejected it. (They had the backing of the anti-Zionist Conservative group in the UK Parliament and were inhibited by a Mufty decree which – speedily calling into question his proffered ‘co-operation’ with Samuel – laid it down that Muslims participating in elections to the new council would be denied burial in Islamic cemeteries.) They reasoned that the council would give them only limited legislative and no executive power and calculated that the official members and the Jews could together outvote them. (It is perhaps surprising, since most British officials were pro-Palestinian, that this point should have been made.) Appealing to the spirit of Articles 20 and 22 of the Covenant, they said that the only

outcome of the creation of a Legislative Council would be to give the 'Zionist policy of the Government a constitutional guise, whereas at present it is illegal, against the rights and wishes of the people, and maintained by force of arms alone'. Jamal al-Husayny, Secretary of the AEC, condemned it as 'a means by which the [Arab] nation will execute [its own] death sentence'.¹

As anticipated, although the elections went ahead, the AEC – encouraged by the members of the returned delegation and, extraordinarily, by Richmond, boycotted them in February 1923. Its Vice-President, 'Umar al-Baytar, said that involvement in them would mean 'participation in the imposition of the yoke of Zionism on the necks of the nation'.² Only their first stage took place and six of the Palestinians elected withdrew.³ An-Nashashiby bitterly criticised the administration for not taking firm action to make a success of the project, whose failure was a major blow to Samuel. As it was, the Palestinians decided on an annual commemoration of what they perceived as their successful election boycott.⁴

UK Self-doubt

In December 1922, British frustration at the collapse of the elections opened a brief phase when, for the first time, London's determination to make Palestine Jewish faltered. A hysterical Shuckburgh described the Legislative Council fiasco as a 'farce and a failure'. Attempting to reconcile the Palestinians to Zionism had no prospect of success, he now believed. He called on the government to decide 'either to proceed to carry out our policy by force if need be' (which he rejected) 'or to modify the fundamental basis of the offer which is of course the building of the National Home'. This was the line Samuel had taken in London in May. But Shuckburgh went much further than his White Paper co-author would have been prepared to go, demonstrating the UK's lack of resolution in the wake of the Legislative Council disappointment. He submitted that the logical conclusion would be 'our final[ly] disembarassing ourselves of these promises'⁵ even though, if Britain did indeed withdraw and abandon its pro-Zionist policy, the mandate and Palestine would be lost and the Turks would return. But it also aired a theme, borrowed from the Zionists, which would be repeated several times in the next months. Palestinian fears, it was now averred, were largely the result of a 'misunderstanding of the real aims and intentions of the Government'⁶ – which since October 1922 had been a Conservative one under Bonar Law, replacing Lloyd George's.

The British pro-Arab Group

As *The Morning Post* urged the jettisoning of ‘the *damnosa heritas* of Palestine before we become too embroiled’, the concern of the Upper House about the problem was not allayed. Lord Sydenham warned that, because of the Balfour Declaration, ‘our prestige in the Near East and far beyond it has undergone a very dark eclipse’.⁷ The British pro-Arab political group, headed by him and Lord Islington, now invited a second Palestine delegation, a three-man team led by Musa Kadhim, to come to London. En route, it went to Istanbul and Lausanne. Its request to be allowed to address the Conference in the latter city was disallowed and in both places it failed to persuade Turkish leaders to support its cause. Arriving in London on Christmas Eve, only five months after the first delegation had returned home, in the New Year it met sympathetic *Morning Post* and *Daily Mail* journalists and was able to obtain an interview with Lord Devonshire, the new Colonial Secretary, who, however, stuck to the terms of the Churchill White Paper. It returned home in the second week of March with little accomplished.

A debate in the Lords on 27 March⁸ sprang from the first publication of a translation of Husayn/McMahon, in *The Daily Mail* in January-February. This was the work of Jeffries, and it could have strengthened the Palestinian position. A reading of the letters led Lords Islington, Buckmaster and Grey, the outgoing Foreign Secretary, to decide that the Balfour Declaration and, as it stood, the mandate were unacceptable. The government, they now considered, had violated the pledges which they thought had been given in McMahon’s October 1915 letter (at a time ‘when we were gravely beset by difficulties, to the relief of which the Arab help in no slight degree contributed’) and in the Franco-British Declaration. Implying, to Samuel’s concern, that he agreed that McMahon had not excluded Palestine, in a reversal of his former position Grey pointed out that the Balfour Declaration ‘promised a Zionist home . . . A Zionist home . . . undoubtedly means, or implies, a Zionist Government over a district in which the home is placed, and if ninety-three per cent of the population of Palestine are Arabs I do not see how you can establish other than an Arab Government, without prejudice to their civil rights.’ The mandate had been issued, he continued, without so much as a reference to Arab Palestine or the Arab nation as a whole. The repetition by Devonshire of the dishonest claim that the UK was in Palestine only at the instance of the League could not prevent a 50:29 defeat. Two days later, in a major change of emphasis, he told Samuel that what the government now wanted was the development of the Jewish community, not separately but ‘as a body of Palestinian citizens’.⁹

The Advisory Council Resurrected

Samuel abandoned the Legislative Council idea for one of a modified Advisory Council, made up as before but now with its members nominated. A group of ten Palestinian notables, including An-Nashashiby, 'Arif ad-Dajany (who had been removed as President of the AEC in June 1922) and Sulayman Bey Nasif, agreed to serve. But the AEC and the 6th. Palestine National Congress, meeting in Jaffa from 16–20 June and proposing non-cooperation measures including the withholding of taxes, called on them to withdraw. Thereupon the candidates either declined to stand or cancelled their acceptances, which they had made conditional on the administration appointing an Arab Amir over Palestine (like Faysal in Iraq), setting an annual limit on Jewish immigration, increasing the number of Palestinian officials, and permitting a Palestinian majority on the council. Not surprisingly, Samuel and the Colonial Office rejected these conditions even though for once they had not included the scrapping of the Balfour Declaration. As a result, by the beginning of September it was apparent that the new Advisory Council was going the same way as the Legislative Council. 1923 marked the failure of the mandate within a year of its birth and there was no longer any chance that Jewish immigration and the rights of the Palestinians could be reconciled.

It was perhaps this impasse which led the UK and the Zionists now to speak with several different voices. In his Political Report in June, Samuel had openly looked towards a Jewish majority in Palestine. Addressing a Jewish gathering in Baltimore, Weizmann did likewise, but noted that 'In Erets Yisrael there is . . . a people which resists our coming'. On 9 June, Devonshire told Clayton, 'Again and again it has been stated that the intention from the beginning has been to make a National Home for the Jews, but every provision has been made to prevent it from becoming in any sense of the word a Jewish State or State under Jewish domination'. He repeated this assurance in the Lords on 27 June. Milner took up the Balfour 'notch' theme: 'If the Arabs go to the length of claiming Palestine as one of their countries in the same sense as Mesopotamia or Arabia proper is an Arab country, then I think they are flying in the face of facts, of all history, of all tradition, and of associations of the most important character – I had almost said, the most sacred character'.

He was adamant that Palestine could never be regarded as a country of the same kind as the others, and its future – the right of conquest emboldened him to add – could not possibly be decided by 'the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority of the present day'.¹⁰

(Only a remarkable lapse of memory could have provoked him to describe as ‘temporary’ impressions and feelings which had no doubt been held by the Palestinians throughout their occupancy of the territory for at least eighteen and a half centuries).

The Palestine Cabinet Committee and the Third Arab Delegation

A reconsideration of the UK’s desiderata with regard to Palestine had been undertaken under Bonar Law in order to dispel continuing British self-doubt on the subject. In June, a special Palestine Cabinet Committee was formed on Curzon’s initiative (and chaired by Devonshire) to advise Stanley Baldwin (who had succeeded Law as Prime Minister the previous month) as to whether or not the UK should remain in Palestine and, if it should, whether there should be any change in the policy of adherence to the Balfour Declaration. Hope in what the committee might produce decided the Sixth Palestine Arab Congress to despatch a third delegation to London.

A three-man team led by Musa Kadhim left on 15 July. Since Samuel had reported that it was more hardline than its predecessors and needed to be kept at arm’s length, it was not allowed to appear before the committee, which was a principal purpose of its journey. Shuckburgh observed that, even though representing the majority view of the Palestinian 90% of the population, it was ‘in no sense an official body’ and to have invited it to do so would have given it too much importance. (It was not clear what he would have regarded as an official Palestinian body.) While a memorandum to the committee from some 110 Conservative M.P.s drew attention to Palestinian grievances, in a letter to Devonshire Ormsby-Gore deplored the idea that it ‘should see those people or make any concessions’. (The committee had no qualms about seeing Weizmann, who had been deemed ‘an official body’.)

Samuel was in London to help make the Zionist case to the committee. Questions of conflicts of interest aside, he brilliantly defended his policy at meetings on 6 and 9 July. On the first occasion, he made the endlessly repeated assertion that Palestinian opposition to the National Home project was largely derived from a misunderstanding of the still undefined goals of Zionism. Despite his own frequent self-contradictions, he felt able to claim that a flood of Jewish immigrants, the confiscation of Palestinian lands and a Jewish state – none of these was ‘included in the programme of the Government’ or ‘now contemplated by responsible Zionist leaders’.¹¹

On 27 July, the committee issued its report. Clayton, Acting High Commissioner in Jerusalem, had again advised Devonshire that the best way to meet the objections of the Palestinian majority was to modify the pro-Jewish clauses of the mandate. Decisively swayed by Weizmann and Samuel, however, the committee concluded that the policy must be maintained as in the White Paper. The UK, it said, could not withdraw its support for Zionism. Were it to, it would risk losing the mandate and the strategic advantage which – in the view of all but the General Staff – possession of Palestine afforded.¹² In the Middle East Department, however, doubts remained. Hubert Young, its second in command, voiced his personal view that if local opinion was ‘incurably anti-Zionist we should throw over not only the Zionist policy but also the mandate’.¹³ As it was, the delegation returned home in mid-September, a fortnight before, on the 29th., the mandate came into force.

The Arab Agency

At one of the committee’s meetings, Samuel agreed to a Curzon suggestion that an Arab Agency – which the Colonial Office had been discussing with the delegation – should be created with similar rights of consultation vis-à-vis the administration as the Jewish Agency enjoyed but composed, unlike it, of members nominated by the High Commissioner. On 11 October, Samuel announced to Palestinian notables that the government was minded to establish such an agency (the SMC had been offered up before) to occupy ‘a position exactly analogous to that of the Jewish Agency under mandate Article 4.’ It would be recognised as a public body advising and co-operating with the administration on economic, social and other matters, including immigration, which affected ‘the non-Jewish population’. It might assist, and take part in, the development of the country and would have ‘the right to be consulted as to the means of ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced’.¹⁴

An offer of parity in the mandate with the Jewish Agency, seeming to present the Palestinians with an enormous enhancement of status, looked attractive. But Samuel scuppered its apparent promise by attaching to it, no doubt with the approval of London, the conditions – which he must have known were unthinkable – that the members would have to accept the Balfour Declaration and agree to the equalisation, in their own country, of the rights of the Arab 90% and those of the tiny Jewish minority. His hearers unanimously and indignantly rejected the idea of this ‘pale reflection of the Jewish Agency’ which gave them no

assurance of protection against pro-Zionist policies. As Devonshire had had the grace to admit to Samuel in October, its official recognition and right of access to the High Commissioner accorded the Jews a preferential position.¹⁵ In addition, by virtue of the diplomatic representations it maintained at the Permanent Mandates' Commission in Geneva, in London and elsewhere, the Jewish Agency was an international body. Offering the Palestinians no formal place in the mandate itself, the proposal fell short of their demands on account of their subject status: 'When we submit a petition to the League of Nations', his audience pointed out, 'it is carried by His Majesty's Government which is there our antagonist, we are not represented there, and our case is being made by our opponents'.¹⁶

Some have regarded the rejection of the Arab Agency idea by the Palestinians as a political mistake, passing up an offer of consultation with the administration which could have been of benefit to them and perhaps, even, the end of an expandable wedge. But the UK's clumsy attempt to obtain a fundamental revision of its Palestine policy had failed because the price demanded was far too high.

Now the British government reluctantly concluding that further attempts were useless, the Colonial Office instructed Samuel to break off negotiations with the Palestinians and to administer the country, without their consent or assistance, through Executive and Advisory Councils composed entirely of British officials. A Shuckburgh minute to Devonshire, which advised that it was essential not to give powers or privileges to the Yishuv which were not to be awarded equally to the other communities, 'whether Moslem or Christian', rang somewhat hollow. Later, however, he advised him that relations with Zionists should not be allowed to grow even closer.¹⁷

The Palestinian National Movement Split

On 10 November, the Palestine National Arab Party (Al-Hizb al-Watany al-'Araby al-Filastiny)¹⁸ was formed in Jerusalem. Hostile to the AEC, it stood for a national government and a democratically elected parliament. It was dominated by the Ad-Dajanis and the An-Nashashibys, the latter a family in permanent opposition to the Mufty's branch of the Al-Husaynys. (While of course against the Balfour Declaration, the An-Nashashibys were prepared to accept the reality of the mandate and to collaborate both with the UK administration and – though not openly – the Zionists, whose 'covert moral and financial support' they enjoyed.¹⁹ The An-Nashashiby newspaper *Mir'at ash-*

Sharq (Eastern Mirror) avoided strong anti-Zionist attacks.) Although it failed from the start in its attempt to attract to it all anti-AEC groups, the new party, called ‘moderate-extremist’ by Kisch, wrested the political initiative from it and the SMC until June 1928. It split and weakened the nationalist movement (such as it had been) during the rest of the mandate so that ‘What remained of the Arab Executive and the Muslim Christian Association during the years 1924–8 was no more than an office run by Jamal al-Husayni’.²⁰ It also frightened off the Christian Palestinians who – apprehensive lest Islamic revivalism be utilised to break the political and constitutional deadlock – withdrew from participation in nationalist activities.

Official Unhappiness

When Deedes resigned as Chief Secretary in 1923 in protest at what he saw as the administration’s weak handling of Al-Hajj Amin, Richmond was conspicuously absent from his send-off at the station. (As the departure date approached, he told his brother, ‘Deedes goes in a month’s time – a very good riddance. He is a fanatical little missionary with his old Testament and other Hebraic furniture’.)²¹ Kisch admired ‘the character and qualities’ of both Deedes and Clayton (Richmond was political secretary to both), who returned to Palestine to succeed him in April. Within nine months, in January 1924, Clayton – who sensibly favoured an expanded Yishuv serving as a cultural and sentimental centre for Jews from around the world within a UK-administered Palestine which would not become a Jewish state – told Samuel that unless the territory were to be run by Englishmen [sic] on British lines he would have to resign: ‘you cannot have Jews – however upright and honourable – in control, and hope to convince the Arabs that they are going to get a fair run’. Similarly, Samuel, Deedes and Bentwich, Stirling believed, were three British Jews who ‘were good men in themselves, but that they should have been chosen by our government for the posts they held blackened the good name of England in the Middle East, and led to the final downfall of our reputation for fair play’.²² Humphrey Bowman, the Education Member, felt the same. He saw no good coming to the country until the pro-Zionist clauses in the mandate were brought into line with the White Paper. Nothing that Bentwich or his department did could be ‘regarded as other than suspect by a very large majority of the people in this country’.²³

Clayton remained ‘disgusted’ and ‘unhappy’. In March, repeating to it much of his letter to Samuel, he criticised the Middle East Department,

warning that 'the day may well come when we shall be faced with the alternatives of holding (Palestine down) by the sword or abandoning it to its fate'.²⁴ Expressing himself similarly the following month, Richmond – regarded by Samuel as a fanatic but nonetheless his principal channel to the Palestinians – resigned in protest, convinced that the High Commissioner and his officials, the Middle East Department and the Zionist Commission were, he informed Samuel, all 'dominated and inspired by a spirit which I can only regard as evil'.²⁵ On 19 April, 1925, Clayton departed, to be replaced by Symes.

In 1924, the USA closed its previously open immigration door, adopting a quota system which kept out all but a limited number of foreign nationals, including Jews. As a result, pressure on Palestine, especially from Poland, increased greatly in the middle of the decade and led to the high point of Jewish immigration. Despite the Jewish influx, Asquith, visiting Palestine in November 1924, found 'The talk of making Palestine into a Jewish National Home . . . seems as fantastic as it has always done'.²⁶

Balfour Visit

A visit to Palestine by Balfour, now Lord President of the Council, was arranged by the Zionist Executive, with neither Clayton nor Storrs knowing about it until his programme had been finalised. It was, the latter wrote, 'an event much wished for by the Jews, conspired [sic] by the Arabs, dreaded by the Police'. Commencing on 24 March 1925, it was a thoroughly insensitive event, which demonstrated the confidence and arrogance of the Zionists and showed how little London understood about the situation on the ground in Palestine and the depth of the Palestinians' aversion to Britain's project to remove them from their homeland. Security was provided for Balfour by the garrison and, blatantly displaying the UK's intentions for Palestine, by Hagana.²⁷ The Palestine leg passed without untoward incident.

Storrs believed that Balfour's stay, during which he inspected farms and kibbutzim, had put reconciliation back by at least a year. Mrs. Bertha Vester, leader of the American Colony in Jerusalem, claimed that Balfour 'did not notice the Arab residences and places of business draped in black with black flags flying and women giving the death cry . . . he was surrounded by Zionists who did not enlighten him'.²⁸ According to Bowman, he never seemed to wish to hear the Arab point of view.²⁹ His private secretary destroyed the hundreds of protest telegrams which awaited him at Government House and did not tell him about them. He

was boycotted by the AEC and by Al-Hizb al-Watany, the choir of St. George's Cathedral refused to let him read a lesson and he was denied entry to the Dome of the Rock. His escort, Antonius, reported that he saw Palestine as 'a game, a sort of historico-intellectual exercise and diversion . . . Of the Arabs he was at first not even conscious . . . When the Arabs became vocal, he regarded them as a nuisance – hooligans who . . . must not be suffered to disturb . . . the delicate equilibrium of his fantastic experiment', which, and its consequences, he described to Antonius as 'extraordinarily interesting'.³⁰

On 1 April, at the Mount Scopus ceremonial opening of the Hebrew University, whose head Judah Magnes considered his visit a provocative act that would aggravate relations with the Arab world, 'with tears running down his face' Balfour delivered 'the most Zionist in spirit of all the speeches that day'.³¹ He moved on to Damascus by rail on 8 April, a tourist guest of Weygand, the French High Commissioner to Syria. On arrival, he got off his train one stop early to avoid a crowd of about 6,000 which Storrs thought would have torn him to pieces. Next day, a mob shouting 'Palestine is Arab' surrounded the Victoria Hotel and he had to leave it after a few hours. Once a demonstration against him had been quelled by a cavalry charge, armoured cars, and 'planes dropping smoke bombs, and after the Governor of Damascus had offered up an agonized prayer for his safe departure, he boarded the French Messageries' boat *Sphinx* in Beirut, bound for Marseilles, in which he was marooned for three days and guarded from hostile spectators on the shore by a circling French torpedo-destroyer.

Balfour's visit was rapidly followed up by a less disastrous one in the middle of the same month by Amery and Samuel Hoare, the Colonial and Air Secretaries. In discussion with Samuel and Va'ad Le-ummi, the Yishuv's elected lay administrative council, Amery voiced a cat-and-mouse view which was quite different from the one he, the Zionists and his interlocutors actually held. He said that he recognized the need for special provision to provide for the cultural and social needs of the Jews. It was, however, important not to prejudice the progress of the inhabitants as a whole. The National Home, which existed by right, and was 'quite independent of whether the Arab majority like it or not', had to be established side by side with an Arab "National Home" and, with it, constitute a Palestinian national entity'.³²

Samuel Departs

After a farewell call on the SMC on 1 July, at which he was attacked by the Mufty, Samuel departed from Palestine. Accorded little of the pomp

which had marked his arrival, after inspecting a few native policemen he was taken off from Jaffa in a small rowing boat to a Lloyd Trestino 'packet'. He had planned to live in Palestine on retirement but Amery agreed with objections to that raised by his successor. Mollified with a KCB, he returned to British politics.

Amery's view, contradicting the High Commissioner's own July statement, was that Samuel's 'wise and highly efficient administration' had 'created the framework of a modern state, on the very primitive foundation' which (he claimed on the basis of little knowledge of the subject) the Turks had left. Nonetheless, Kisch welcomed his departure because he believed that by the end of his term he had ceased to be a Zionist and become a danger to Zionism. Considering that Samuel's duty had been to side with the Zionists against the Palestinians, he accused him of harming the interests of the former by 'his deliberate policy of compromising with his opponents under any pressure', showing 'lack of moral courage' in times of crisis and giving unfettered powers to the Mufty and the SMC 'clique'. He opposed the prevailing view that the principal effect of Samuel's work had been 'to advance the Zionist interest'³³ and Jewish rights. Starting from the Zionist standpoint that anything less than 100% support for the development of the National Home, and anything more than a minimal concession to the Palestinians, amounted to treason, he claimed that the Zionists had received very little recognition in Samuel's time.³⁴

In a report to Amery on the development of Palestine during his term of office,³⁵ Samuel said that 'His Government had never planned for a wholly Jewish Palestine, but for a Jewish National Home'. Although in his period of office Jewish immigration had soared, he congratulated himself on discharging the 'invidious task of confining the (Jewish) immigration within the limits that the situation imposed'.³⁶ Not referring to the fact that he had consistently blocked Palestinian attempts to emulate the Zionist success in making direct contact with British governments and networking internationally, his administration, he claimed, had been 'as active in promoting the welfare of the Arabs as if there had been no Zionist complication and no [Palestinian] refusal to co-operate'. (Musa al-'Alamy disagreed, and in addition blamed Samuel for 'the gradual impoverishment of many Arabs and for large tracts of Arab lands falling into Jewish hands', creating a class of landless ex-smallholders.)

In the absence of much else in the way of recorded Arab views about him, Jeffries and Stirling are commentators who could have been expected to condemn Samuel. In fact, the journalist called him 'a Zionist with scruples', which seems about right, and the official considered,

surprisingly, that he 'took great care to show no bias towards his co-religionists' and was 'an essentially fair-minded man'.³⁷ Storrs noted that 'His tenure of office was criticised by Moslems and Christians because he was Jewish, by extreme Zionists because he was not Jewish enough.'³⁸ The modification of his enthusiasm after the International Workers' Day riots and until World War II, which lost him so much Zionist credit, does not, however, absolve him of blame for the course the 'National Home' project had taken. His part-impartiality is not the same as repentance. While, therefore, his involvement in the process cannot be overlooked, at least he displayed some conscience about the vital damaging role played by the groundwork he laid.

PART FIVE
VACILLATION

CHAPTER

9

A White Paper and a Black Letter

‘I can only agree with Sir John Chancellor that the Balfour Declaration was a colossal blunder – it has proved to be a catastrophe for the Palestinians.’ (Avi Shlaim)¹

The appointment as High Commissioner of the 68-year old Field Marshal Baron Plumer of Bilton, who had relieved Mafeking, been one of the few successful British generals of the First World War and held the post of Governor-General of Malta for the previous 5 years, generally nonplussed. After the Zionist success in removing Clayton, it is surprising to find Weizmann complaining that he had not been consulted about it. Linking it with UK strategic thinking about the regional vacuum which would open up with Allenby’s forthcoming departure from Egypt, Kisch said that the appointment “met with little enthusiasm anywhere”. Plumer arrived on 25 August 1925. After actually meeting him, Weizmann said that he ‘makes an excellent impression. He seems to be without prejudices’, ‘well-disposed’ and ‘very straight’. They developed ‘a sound and friendly relationship’.² Two months later Kisch was sure that Plumer’s term would be beneficial in a variety of ways.

Now that, according to the view of the Peel Commission twelve years later, the main lines of the National Home had been firmly established, Plumer presided over a period of uninterrupted peace in marked contrast to the lively reign of Samuel. Contributing to this was what Kisch saw as, in relation to Zionist proposals, his unswerving adherence to the line his political masters wished him to take at any given time: “Is the request justified under the policy of HM Government? – If so, I must grant it and carry it through”. The last High Commissioner’s first reaction was: “What will the Arabs say to this?”³

While under Plumer there were steady consolidation and progress, especially in commerce, industry and agriculture, and the construction of Haifa harbour and the Haifa terminal of the Mosul pipeline was begun, the first considerable slump and a large fall in revenue, mainly on account of a catastrophic drop in the exchange rate of the zloty, almost brought a halt to the transfer of Jewish capital from Poland. After

a huge number of migrants had arrived under Samuel, doubling the population of the Yishuv from 61,000 in 1920 to 120,559 in 1925, immigration from there and from Russia almost collapsed. As Plumer applied economic absorptive capacity strictly and insisted that Jews could not enter the country without adequate private means or promises of work,⁴ net immigration figures fell from 1925's 35,000 to a low of 2,178 in 1928. The Zionists complained that the progress of the National Home had almost come to a standstill. Nonetheless, during his term, the Jewish population rose to some 150,000, 2.5 times what it was in 1918 and (with the Palestinians at 800,000) 16% of the total.

Politically, any expression of overt dissatisfaction by the Palestinians at the absence of new conciliatory overtures to them was muted by this comparative decline in the irritant of immigration and inhibited by Plumer's military firmness. There were no major disturbances, allowing Amery, at the October 1926 Imperial Conference, to pronounce Palestine to be 'a progressive, contented and prosperous little country'. Kisch (a Jew who was reluctant to have any dealings with Arabs) felt able to claim that the Palestinian population 'had come to realise that their fears of Jewish immigration had been unfounded, and that the influx of Jewish capital and Jewish settlers was benefiting them in the same measure as the Jews themselves'.⁵ Co-operatively, the Mufty – who had earlier admitted to Kisch that he could not deny the right of the Jews to return to Palestine, provided that the rights of the Arabs were respected – 'opposed the Balfour Declaration as if he were not dependent on the British, but restrained himself and cooperated with the British as if there were no Balfour Declaration'.⁶

Plumer was firm about the arming of settlements which, with Jewish weapons' smuggling, had been a serious problem throughout 1922 and 1923 – one not lessened by the administration itself at times issuing 'illegal' arms to Hagana and making use (as we have seen) of the underground Zionist army. He rejected out of hand as infinitely harmful a bid by the Jewish Agency for a militia to be raised within the Yishuv to protect Jewish colonies.

Councils

Palestinian proposals for a share in government continued to be put forward without success. In October 1925, a delegation led by Musa Kadhim vainly petitioned Plumer for a representative council elected by Arabs and Jews in proportion to their share in the population and a national government responsible to it. Holding municipal council elec-

tions, seen in Egypt as ‘an arrangement straight out of *Alice in Wonderland*’,⁷ was the furthest, however, that Plumer felt that he could go. Politics were entirely devoted to them in 1927. They offered the communities the power, of which only the Jews availed themselves, to tax their members for common purposes, including education. Showing how little effort the Palestinians were putting into a unified resistance against Zionism, the Al-Husaynys, playing with the fire which would eventually engulf them, approached the Zionists to suggest in vain making common cause against the An-Nashashiby opposition,⁸ which swept the polls.⁹

Palestinian Arab Unity Resumed – and Frustrated

Postponed from June 1924, when disunity prevented its convening, the holding of the 7th. Palestine National Congress from 20–22 June 1928 ended five years of Palestinian political division. The AEC reappeared, revitalised and relatively moderate, with 48 delegates, 12 of them Christians.¹⁰ Musa Kadhim was retained as President. He and his Vice-Presidents told Plumer that in the past Jews and Arabs had enjoyed complete equality in Palestine and that the Palestinians ‘still do not desire to change this policy . . . towards the Jews, so long as the Jews do not desire to prejudice the political, economic and social rights of the Arabs’.¹¹ In statements to *Al-Karmil* in August and September, Musa Kadhim indicated that he would be agreeable to an annual Jewish immigration figure – derisory in Zionist eyes – of up to 1,000.¹²

With hitherto warring factions reunited and independents and liberals included, during 1928–30 the Palestinians (even prepared to consider accepting the mandate) pressed the UK to establish representative institutions at a higher level than the municipal councils of which they had taken little advantage. The AEC submitted a memorandum, jointly signed by Musa Kadhim and Raghīb an-Nashashiby, for a Legislative Council, only for the British now to show reluctance, Amery rejecting the idea on the advice of Plumer. The setback drove Al-Hajj Amin into more extreme positions and provoked a strong anti-Christian reaction in him.

The Jewish Agency Transformed

Towards the end of Plumer’s term, the Zionists took a step which, unsurprisingly, alarmed the Palestinians, contributed further to the hardening

of the Mufty's political outlook and, the Peel report was to consider, was 'largely responsible for the revival of violent anti-Zionism among the Arabs'. It involved a major change in the role of the Jewish Agency, the central Zionist administrative body (eventually to become the government of the Yishuv) which had an office in London. Now, in January 1928, it took over the Zionist Executive and was charged, as the executive arm of the World Zionist Organisation, with representing the whole, Zionist or not, of World Jewry. Crowning efforts Weizmann had made from 1923 to transform the Jewish leadership in Palestine from a party headquarters into an expression of the will of the whole of the world's Jewish people, Zionist affairs were in future to be run from Palestine rather than from outside as a means to enlist large-scale US financial support. Once the Wall Street stockmarket collapse of the early '30s was over, the new arrangement led to much larger sums than previously being placed at the disposal of the Zionist movement. It also boosted its confidence and intransigence and led in Palestine itself to 'more frequent and more blatant displays of Zionist flags and performances of Zionist songs'.¹³

A Pro-Palestinian Phase

Lt.-Col. Sir John Robert Chancellor, a very different man from Plumer, became the new High Commissioner for Palestine and C.-in-C. and High Commissioner for Transjordan on 6 December 1928. He was regarded on the one hand as the most successful of British Colonial Governors, in Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago and Southern Rhodesia, and on the other as a run-of-the-mill bureaucrat. No amount of knowledge of the complexities of Palestine, which contemporaries such as Clayton had in abundance, would have stemmed the Zionist advance. The fact was, in any case, that, like all the other High Commissioners, Chancellor had none, and for this reason it seemed precipitate (and naive) of him to promote as soon as he did the idea of a Legislative Council which dominated his term of office. He came quickly to hate Palestine and the situation in which he found himself. He complained about the difficulties of governing the Zionists, with their free access to the UK Prime Minister and his cabinet, he himself 'did not believe the Jews . . . , about whose National Home he became uninterested, would be loyal to Britain . . . and he expressed his sympathy with the Arabs openly in official meetings with their leaders'.¹⁴ With his pro-Palestinian stance, along with that of Sidney Webb, now Lord Passfield, who had come in as Colonial Secretary in May when Baldwin's administration was replaced by

MacDonald's second one, he was able to disrupt the smooth progress of Zionism. But he also failed to earn the trust of the Palestinian majority.

Chancellor Attempts a Legislative Council

If a stagnant atmosphere had marked Plumer's reign, his successor's thirty-three months were full of activity, nearly all of it nugatory. The international slump caused unemployment and business depression in Palestine. Together with the rise of Hitler and anti-Semitism, however, it led to the diversion of both Jewish and non-Jewish capital to Palestine, particularly from Poland and Romania, and increased the attractiveness of immigration to the territory. The AEC – which was in despair about the revival of immigration (especially in its illegal form), Jewish land purchases, and signs of a Zionist military build-up and the smuggling of arms – immediately renewed its appeal for some sort of legislative powers.

Before the war, Palestinians trained in the Ottoman Empire's leading institutions¹⁵ had served with distinction in an appreciable number of posts in its highly organised system of local government. Ottoman provincial or district governors had exercised power through almost wholly Palestinian elected councils endowed with considerable measures of autonomy. Palestine, nevertheless, was unique among the territories which had been ruled by Istanbul in having no representative or legislative bodies. Perhaps inconsistently with his earlier remark that 'There is no visible indigenous element out of which a Moslem Kingdom of Palestine can be constructed',¹⁶ Storrs observed that 'the leading Palestine Arabs, conscious . . . at least of some ruling capacity, found their ambitions . . . confined to subordinate or municipal functions, with preference given to two foreign races, within a territory no larger than Wales'.

But now a new spirit existed in Government House. In July, before setting off for his post, Chancellor had said at a pro-Zionist soirée, 'Once you grant the representative stage, you are driven on. What would you say to nominating Palestinians to the (administration)? I don't advocate it'.¹⁷ Early in his term of office, however, he came to believe that Palestinian nationalism should have some constitutional outlet to steer it away from militancy. His response to the AEC's appeal was therefore cautiously positive and in early January 1929 he initiated proposals for a Legislative Council. In a further show of unity, the Al-Husaynys (with the exception of the Mufty) and the An-Nashashibys jointly suggested to him the names of possible members who would serve if appointed.

On 12 June Chancellor – with beginner’s optimism reporting that the Palestinians were no longer demanding the abrogation of the Balfour Declaration and the mandate and that their fear of Zionism had almost vanished – recommended to Passfield that a 100% nominated Legislative Council should be tried. The Colonial Secretary was interested in its suggested make-up of 15 non-official members (10 Muslims, 2 Christians, 3 Jews) and 14 official counterparts even though the arrangement would still have enabled Jews and officials together to outvote the Palestinians. This would have made a successful launch unlikely even if serious countrywide riots in August had not put an abrupt end to discussion of the question.

1929, The Year of No Return¹⁸

Al-Afdhal, who ruled central and south Syria after the death of his father, Saladin, had dedicated Al-Haram ash-Sharif, including Al-Buraq, as a Muslim waqf. It was later assigned to poor Moroccan scholars and their descendants as beneficiaries.¹⁹ Successive governments had allowed pious Jews to stand on a pavement in front of the Wall to wail and meditate. Eleven weeks before Chancellor’s arrival, however, on the eve of the Jewish Day of Atonement (24 September), without permission a Jewish beadle called William Ewart Gladstone Noah placed a screen to separate male and female worshippers on the pavement, thereby fuelling rumours among Muslims that the Jews intended to take control of the Wall. The SMC deemed the screen a ‘permanent structure’ such as was customarily forbidden and contrary to the Ottoman prohibition of benches and chairs at the site. Palestinian–Jewish tension built up inexorably over the next year and precipitated a much worse and more widespread outburst of Palestinian violence than in 1921.²⁰ (That it was in reaction to Jewish provocation is suggested by the claim by the US correspondent of a Jewish Palestinian paper that the Jews had been urged by the 16th. Zionist Congress to create a “bust up” at the Wall.)²¹

The climax was reached on 15 August 1929, after a Jewish football had been kicked into a Palestinian garden, where a little girl refused to release it. A crowd of Jewish youths entered the area in front of the Wall, raised a flag though they had been told by Chancellor not to, sang HaTikvah and shouted ‘The Wall is ours’. An official SMC march took place next day, Jewish prayer books were burned, building work began beside and above the Wall to convert a cul-de-sac into a thoroughfare, bricks were dropped on worshipping Jews, donkeys were encouraged to

excrete near them, and calls to prayer, more loudly recited than normal, were timed to coincide with Jewish services.

As Curzon had noted,²² British ambassadors seem nearly always to be absent when their countries of posting erupt and Chancellor was no exception. He was away in the UK as rioting spread throughout the country. It was particularly bad in Safed, a centre of orthodox pre-Zionism Jewry, and An-Nashashiby Hebron. In the two towns, some 200 Jews were killed and 439 injured, mostly at the hands of Palestinians, and some 125 and 232 Palestinians at the hands of the Army. A few Palestinian families prevented the extermination of the Hebron Jewish community, over two thirds of its members finding refuge in Palestinian homes; one list of Hebron Jews saved by Palestinians contains 435 names. In Jaffa, Haifa and even Hebron, however, Palestinians attacked Jewish hospitals and synagogues. Jews retaliated by destroying mosques in Jaffa and Jerusalem. Four Jewish colonies and six agricultural settlements were left in ruins. In Jerusalem the water supply and street lighting were cut, there were no meat or food distributions for several days and the streets became filthy. Although at the end of Plumer's term, Kisch had lamented 'that the growing abuse of power by the Mufti . . . would no longer be tolerated . . . , we were beginning to feel the menace of violence', now Al-Hajj Amin, with his friend Antonius,²³ called on crowds to 'Arm yourselves with compassion, wisdom and tolerance, because Allah is always with the tolerant'. Anxious not to ruin the Legislative Council negotiations and 'at pains to prevent any development that was likely to lead to a confrontation with the authorities',²⁴ the Mufti urged Muslim politicians in Jaffa and Gaza to keep the peace and attempted to calm villagers coming to mosque services in Jerusalem. Acting High Commissioner Harry Luke persuaded him, Raghīb an-Nashashiby, Musa Kadhīm, 'Arif Ad-Dajany and others to issue a joint statement urging Palestinians to avoid bloodshed and denying rumours that the government was arming the Jews.

Nonetheless, when at the time of the outbreak the administration's two companies of armoured cars were in Transjordan, in a UK gift to Zionism 500 Jewish civilians were armed by the administration to fill the gap until troops could be brought in from Egypt, whence they did not begin to arrive – too late to be useful – until 24–27 August.²⁵ So major were the disturbances that, on the 30th., Reuter reported that Jerusalem had been a city of death for eight days. Although relative peace was established by the beginning of September, on the 4th. Bowman lamented in his diary that 'We have built for 10 years, & it has crumbled to pieces in 10 days'.

Back from a badly-timed leave, Chancellor issued two contradictory

proclamations, displaying in some views a lack of nerve. That of 1 September infuriated the Palestinians. It implied that he held them solely responsible for the bloodshed, strongly condemned the entire community for the attacks and declared that its members were unworthy of self-government. The Mufty described it as a 'premature and unjust condemnation of the Arab population for acts of savagery which they were not alone in committing'.²⁶ Three days later, a second proclamation withdrew the first and offered what amounted to an apology to the Palestinians, who made no expression of satisfaction while the Jews protested. The subsequent trials, however, exhibited overt pro-Jewish bias. Of 124 Palestinians accused of murder, 55 were convicted, 25 sentenced to death and three executed; 70 Jews were charged with murder, two were convicted and both were given sentences of death which were commuted to life imprisonment.

The riots had a marked effect on the political outlook of each of the three main protagonists – the Zionists, the Palestinians and the High Commissioner – and confirmed that the mandate was doomed. They proved to be a shot in the arm for both the Jews and the Palestinians and foreshadowed the bitterness of their struggle in the 1930s.²⁷ By early 1929, Zionism had seemed 'neither so imminent nor so formidable as earlier; the severe economic crisis of the Yishuv, the exodus of large numbers of Jewish immigrants, Zionist Organisation financial difficulties – all this suggested that Zionism was a sinking ship'.²⁸ The year turned out, however, to have been the nadir of Zionist fortunes: a recovery began and became a surge forward as immigration started to rise once more. The Al-Buraq riots steeled the determination of the Zionist leaders and strengthened their conviction that the final outcome of the struggle for Palestine would depend largely on their own efforts and willpower.

The Palestinian nationalist movement also acquired new confidence.²⁹ The Mufty – still considered 'well-intentioned, a man of sense and decency and a persistent influence for moderation' –³⁰ also benefited from the uprising. While his 'dependence on the British continued to dictate restraint on his part . . . the events of 1929 reinforced the administration's need of him as a channel to the Arab population'.³¹

Chancellor, too, was greatly affected. Having idealistically converted to the idea of political institutions, to his chagrin 1929 crystallised Zionist opposition to institutional co-operation with "pogrom-launching" Palestinians.³² The unrest confirmed him in his view of the Balfour Declaration as 'a colossal blunder'. He became one of the very few UK leaders involved in the fate of Palestine to feel able to admit that it had constituted 'grave injustice to the Arabs' and been 'detrimental to

the empire's interests'.³³ He now harboured an obsessive antipathy to Jews ('an ungrateful race') and to Zionism. As early as mid-September, he pressed his government urgently to alter the direction of its policy to the benefit of the Palestinians. In October, only ten months after his arrival, he told his son that he was 'so tired and disgusted with this country and everything connected with it' that he wanted only to leave as soon as he could. In the same month, London forbade him to resume negotiations for a Legislative Council.

Problems in the Administration

In addition to his other disappointments, Chancellor had hierarchical problems in the shape of a falling-out with Norman Bentwich, 'the worst clash between any High Commissioner and a Jewish Mandatory official'.³⁴ Sir Michael McDonnell, the Chief Justice, informed the High Commissioner of his strong conviction that the administration was being seriously hampered by having Bentwich as Attorney-General. So long as the post was held by a Jew, he said, the Palestinians would regard the administration with suspicion and feel that the law was biased against them. Chancellor himself, believing that no Jew sincerely subscribed to British interests, shared his assessment and the Colonial Office endorsed it. Shedding interesting light on the fragility he considered still to surround the National Home, Bentwich remarked, before his duties in Palestine were terminated in 1931, that 'If . . . the policy of HMG were to change and ceased to be Zionist', he would not remain.³⁵

The Fourth Arab Delegation

Chancellor continued to support the Palestinians. In January 1930, he reiterated to Passfield his belief that the only way to preserve the UK's position in Palestine was to give them a measure of self-government. The Jews could consider the country their national home without taking it over as a state, he wisely suggested, their right to buy land should be restricted and immigration should be matched with the country's economic absorptive capacity.

On 21 March, the 4th. delegation, the first since 1923 and one representing all the leading parties, arrived in London. It would have been understandable if it had expected a warmer reception than its predecessors but it received no official welcome at Victoria Station. It was made up of the six most important Palestinian Muslim and Christian leaders:

Musa Kadhim (whom Al-Hajj Amin had tried in vain to exclude from the party), the Mufty, Jamal al-Husayny, Raghīb an-Nashashībī, ‘Awny ‘Abd al-Hādī and Alfred Roq of the Christian-led Palestine National Arab Party. Some of them had sat as deputies in Ottoman imperial parliaments. Their mission underwritten by Chancellor, they met Ramsay MacDonald, who had visited the territory in 1921, and Passfield. It was disappointing that the Colonial Secretary – who had been slow to grant an interview to Weizmann and, when he did, had made it clear that he was strongly opposed to mass Jewish immigration – should have told them that the UK could not create a Legislative Council (‘this Parliament as you call it’) unless they saw its principal task as carrying out the mandate. He discouragingly stated that ‘it is our duty under the mandate to endeavour that you should rise to the point of a colony’ like Australia and Canada. He urged them to accept the Arab Agency they had rejected six and a half years previously.³⁶ It is not clear whom Passfield meant by the ‘you’ in this strange and, in this context, atypical statement or how he proposed that Palestine should, under the Balfour Declaration, come to resemble Australia or Canada when the terms of the mandate provided for no such thing.

Despite this frosty welcome to Zionism’s opponents, Kisch (‘a shifty character’ according to Chancellor) had little success in trying to convince Passfield of the potential value to Britain of a strong Jewish settlement in Palestine. Weizmann, who that year proposed that the Palestinians should be ‘transferred’ to Transjordan,³⁷ remarked to Shuckburgh that ‘The rights which the Jewish people has been adjudged [sic] in Palestine do not depend on the consent, and cannot be subjected to the will, of the majority of its present inhabitants’.³⁸ In the Zionist view, the claims of the million Palestinian Arabs were not to be equated with those of the Yishuv but of sixteen million Jews worldwide. It was the ‘notch’ argument again: the Arabs did not need Palestine because they already had many lands of their own.³⁹

Although the delegation gained no ground over its requests for more Palestinians in the higher levels of the civil service and for British technical advisers, as in Iraq, HMG was prepared to make concessions (which would have been remarkable if contemplated by its predecessors) over its demands for an end to immigration and for the prohibition of landsales by Palestinians to Jews.⁴⁰ But since the government would not move towards a national democratic government ‘elected by the people in proportion to their numbers, irrespective of race or creed’, Al-Hajj Amin, Jamal al-Husayny and Roq decided, against the opposition of Musa Kadhim and his supporters, to abandon the trip. The delegation left abruptly after two months, cabling the AEC that it was ‘convinced

that continuation in usurping our rights in favour of Zionist policy means our extirpation as a nation and consequent disappearance from our country.’ The Mufty said that what the British wanted them to do was ‘to cooperate with them for our detriment’.

The Shaw Report

An enquiry by an international Wailing Wall Commission was the only one to settle a dispute during the mandate. It visited Jerusalem in June 1930 to consider the respective rights of Palestinians and Jews at Al-Buraq and issued a report in 1931 which – adopted by the UK and the Zionists, if not by the Palestinians, Al-Hajj Amin and the AEC – marked the end of Al-Buraq disputes during the British occupation. It was followed up by a Committee of Enquiry into the causes of the riots. Led by Sir Walter Shaw, ex-Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements, it published its report on 31 March. Strongly influenced by Chancellor’s developing opposition to the transfer of land, although the Zionists dredged up the Frankfurter Letter to it as evidence of Palestinian approval of their programme (its authenticity was challenged, and from Baghdad Faysal himself repudiated it), it decided that Jews and Palestinians would never be able to share a state. It stressed the latter’s fear of being outnumbered by excessive Jewish immigration. It recommended that their political grievances should be taken seriously, reiterated that ‘the absence of any measure of self-government is greatly aggravating the difficulties of the local administration’ and urged London to clarify its vision for the development of Palestine, which it had certainly made no effort to do. It reaffirmed the 1922 White Paper point that the Jewish Agency was not entitled under the mandate to share in administration. It acquitted Al-Hajj Amin of charges of complicity or incitement in connection with the riots but charged him with failure to restrain his followers.

**‘An international obligation from which there
can be no receding’**

The Shaw Report, and Chancellor’s convictions, left the British Government fundamentally unmoved. As early as 1921, Storrs had been so disingenuous as to describe the mandatory task as one ‘that has been imposed upon us by the will of the nations’.⁴¹ Now, on 3 April, Ramsay MacDonald affirmed that his administration would continue to adhere to the terms of the mandate and ‘to give effect in equal measure to both

parts of the [Balfour] Declaration . . . , an international obligation from which there can be no receding.' In June, a highly critical meeting of the League's Permanent Mandates' Commission 'denounced', to UK displeasure, a government report which had further indulged in the dishonest practice of implying – since Britain had seized Palestine for strategic reasons of its own – that the mandate was an onerous obligation imposed upon it by the League of Nations and which it was attempting to fulfil out of loyalty to it. It described as negligence the administration's failure to ensure that sufficient forces were available to ensure security at the time of the Al-Buraq riots and to monitor Palestinian disaffection. The administration should have worked harder to convince the fallahin of 'the undeniable material advantages that Palestine has derived from the efforts of the Zionists'.⁴² It did not specify what these were.

In October 1930, a report entitled *Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development* by Sir John Hope-Simpson,⁴³ was published. His commission had been in Palestine from May to August to investigate how many more Jews the country could absorb. Chancellor suspended all labour immigration until its recommendations were known. Bentwich believed its leader 'had received at the least a hint from the Colonial Office that he should take an adverse view of the prospects of settlement'. Despatched following pressure by the Conservative opposition on MacDonald's government, which wanted Shaw's anti-Zionist conclusions to be overturned, the commission's conclusions were strongly favourable to the Palestinians. It calculated that, pending further development (especially of water resources), reform of Palestinian land holdings and the modernisation of Palestinian farming methods, there was room in the territory, the amount of whose cultivable land it seriously underestimated, for only another 20,000 families or about 100,000 people – a figure which the future would make to look ridiculous. Lest irreparable harm were to be done to Palestinian interests, however, it recommended that no more Jewish agricultural colonies should be started up. It claimed, like Musa al-'Alamy, that Zionist land purchases had rendered nearly 30% of Palestinians landless and described the Zionist colonies' *avodah ivrit* policy as contrary to the mandate and 'undesirable from the point of view both of justice and of the good government of the country'. Any state land which became available for cultivation, the report said, should be reserved for landless Palestinians and not offered to Jewish settlers, whom it saw as 'aliens whose immigration could not be allowed to interfere in any way with the interests of the indigenous inhabitants' and whose number should be greatly cut.

Pro-Palestinian White Paper

On the same day as Hope-Simpson was published, the Passfield White Paper⁴⁴ was issued. Chancellor, adamant that HMG's Zionist policy was a danger to its strategic interests in the Orient, was probably responsible for its even more marked bias towards the 'non-Jewish communities'. At a time when the Yishuv numbered no more than 200,000 and owned less than one twentieth of Palestine and only one sixth of its cultivable land, it made it appear that the National Home was in being. Chancellor thought that the UK had already carried out the Balfour Declaration: 'we *have* favoured the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine.' It would be maintained but, 'without violating the other part of the Balfour Declaration, without prejudicing the interest of the Arabs, we cannot do more than we have done'.⁴⁵

Based on its 1922 predecessor, the White Paper reaffirmed Shaw and Hope-Simpson, incorporating all the latter's recommendations on land, immigration and employment. It made its anti-Zionism clear through its omission of his opinion that there could 'ultimately be room for a substantial number of Jewish settlers' and his favourable view of the employment of 'Jewish capital which would not otherwise have been available'. It proposed that Zionist acquisition of land without special governmental permission should be stopped until a new agricultural system had been developed. Suggesting that the obligation to Zionism had already been discharged since the Yishuv possessed by now 'its own "national" characteristics', it reiterated Churchill's distinction between a National Home *in* Palestine and the conversion of the whole of the country into one. It stressed its belief that a Legislative Council, along 1922 lines, needed to be established, with Palestinian representatives nominated if their community would not voluntarily take part in elections to it. The UK's dual obligation meant, it pointed out, that, since the Palestinians were not to be harmed through unemployment, immigration and land sales had to be restricted. The White Paper attacked pro-Zionist interpretations of the mandate and said that 'in estimating the absorptive capacity of Palestine at any time account should be taken of Arab as well as of Jewish unemployment.' With a token bow in the direction of impartiality, it called on the Palestinians to accept the Jews living in the territory, warned (depressingly) that they 'could not hope for any kind of progress towards self-determination', and declared that it was 'useless for Arab leaders to maintain their demands for a form of Constitution which would render it impossible for His Majesty's Government to carry out, in the fullest sense, the double undertaking'.⁴⁶

Reaction to the White Paper was fierce. Smuts thought it a retreat

from the Balfour Declaration and demanded its revision. Lloyd George characterised it as hostile to the mandate and Jews. Churchill and Amery, who 'did not care a fig for World Jewry, but . . . were anxious to discredit the Labour Government', made sustained attacks on it. It was criticised in editorials in *The Times*. Chancellor complained to his son that a letter in the paper from Baldwin, Austen Chamberlain and Amery which was inspired by Weizmann and organised by Blanche Dugdale, Balfour's niece and apologist biographer, wrecked the White Paper.

A 17 November Parliamentary Debate on the White Paper was predominantly pro-Zionist. Weizmann had enlisted the support of Lloyd George, Churchill, Samuel and Bevin and tried to induce Passfield to alter it. Kisch saw it as a 'disastrous setback' and said that 'the whole document breathes prejudice against the Jew.' Although it was welcomed by Palestinian newspapers, he somewhat inflated the reaction of the Arabs, reporting them as being 'jubilant'.⁴⁷ In fact, consistent with their standard, and often grudging, reaction to favourable developments, it was received positively but unenthusiastically and only 'reasonably well' by them, while Al-Hajj Amin, though not completely rejecting it, was severe in his criticism.⁴⁸

The 'Black Letter' and the Change in the Mufty

Despite the apparent triumph of the White Paper, Chancellor had by now lost all heart and confidence. Kisch found him 'more hostile than ever', and apparently convinced that it was his duty to devote his last months of office to improving and safeguarding the position of the Palestinians. He could explain the High Commissioner's attitude only by assuming 'that he believes the absurd allegation that the Yishuv is inimical to England and that he therefore regards it as his duty to oppose any accession to our strength. He does not trust us and therefore denies us the opportunity of real cooperation.' In that, he contrasted Chancellor's very different attitude with that of Plumer: 'It is clear that no *rapprochement* with the Government in London can be of any value until there is a radical change in this respect'. The Administration 'could not be expected to function effectively so long as the Head of the Government and a number of senior officials appeared to be definitely out of sympathy with the conception of the Jewish National Home.'⁴⁹

Although on 12 February the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons that there had been no revision of policy and the Colonial Office told Jamal al-Husayny that the government would stand firm on

the White Paper, the next day an undignified volte-face was executed via the release of a humiliating letter (called by the Arabs the 'Black Letter') from Macdonald to Weizmann. The Zionist had treated the Prime Minister insubordinately and, with his colleagues, had 'in effect dictated' it.⁵⁰ Displaying both the extraordinary power of the Zionists and the Prime Minister's 'lack of firm resolution characteristic of the later stages of his career',⁵¹ it followed a humiliating Passfield announcement on 14 November that because some passages of the White Paper had been discovered to be incompatible with articles of the mandate, the government had invited representatives of the Jewish Agency to confer with a special Cabinet Sub-Committee. (Chancellor pointed out to the Colonial Secretary that the mandated Palestinians themselves received no similar invitation.)⁵²

Macdonald said that the purpose of his letter was to give the definitive interpretation of the White Paper and the Colonial Office told Chancellor that 'the purpose of the letter was to remove misunderstanding but not to make changes in policy'. In fact, however, the 'Black Letter' was an almost complete repudiation of the White Paper. There would now be 'no obstacle to Jewish land acquisition, particularly in areas that had previously been regarded as uncultivable, and Jewish labour maintained by Jewish capital would continue to be admitted to Palestine'. It reaffirmed all the Zionist liberties which Passfield, upholding Hope-Simpson's recommendations, had threatened. In Bentwich's opinion, as 'The White Paper had been succeeded by the White Flag',⁵³ the 'Black Letter' drove a wedge between Jews and Palestinians 'so far as to be beyond recovery' and accentuated, if it did not originate, a transformation of the Grand Mufty's pro-British attitude. 'Now whenever al-Hajj Amin addressed a large angry crowd, he had to revert to the role of the aggressive, demagogic *sheikh* pouring fire and brimstone on Zionism and British policies'.⁵⁴ The Peel Commission was to remark that to the Palestinians the 'Black Letter' was 'plain proof of the power which World Jewry could exert in London, and such confidence as they might previously have had in British determination to do at least what justice could be done under what they have always regarded as an unjust Mandate was seriously shaken'. As Storrs remarked, it was '“unfortunate” that the Arabs should have seen almost every step taken by His Majesty's Government to reassure them vehemently and sometimes successfully assailed by the Jews'.⁵⁵

The Palestinians made indignant use of the word "betrayal". They had no doubt that the administration could not carry out its mandatory obligations towards them, however convinced it was of the need for reform. The Al-Husayny and An-Nashashiby factions were briefly

reunited. At an extraordinary meeting of the AEC in Jerusalem in March, even the latter could not accept that the Jewish 17 percent of the total population should determine the character of the country and that many more immigrants would arrive. The meeting protested that the 'Black Letter' had violated the White Paper's terms 'before its ink was dried on the paper'.⁵⁶ Many Palestinian political activists argued that any further efforts by them to achieve a Legislative Council must be made not through persuasion and compromise, but through militancy and tough bargaining from a position of strength. The AEC expressed its 'utter disillusionment with the British government and their conviction that further cooperation with them was useless'.

The 'Black Letter' remained the basis of UK policy until 1939. Kisch had complained that 'the maintenance of proper relations between the [Jewish Agency] Executive [in London] and the Colonial Office had been seriously prejudiced' by the changeover of Colonial Secretary from Amery to Passfield. (It would not have occurred to him that the Palestinians were denied any relations at all with British governments). In March, he still claimed that the Colonial Office and the administration were hostile to Zionism, but Weizmann pointed out that the 'Black Letter' had reestablished the basis for co-operation on which Zionist policy rested which 'enabled us to make the magnificent gains of the ensuing years'. He hoped, he said, that now the UK, the Arabs and the Jews would together work out a constructive policy for the future good and development of Palestine. On 20 March, after being outside the country for two years, he called on Chancellor, who saw no grounds for such optimism, whether sincerely meant or not. The High Commissioner disagreed with his belief that in 8–12 months co-operation between the Palestinians and the Jews could be brought about and said it only could if the Jews would concentrate on economic development, show less aggression towards the Palestinians and refrain from political agitation. He challenged the genuineness of Weizmann's claimed desire for fair treatment for the Palestinians with the example of the attitude of the Jews towards land distribution, which suggested that they thought the majority population should be confined to the hills. He considered that the fact that the Palestinians had only him with whom to discuss matters, while the Jews were in direct touch with the UK Government, seriously disadvantaged the former. As though to underline this point, Al-Hajj Amin visited London at about this time. Although he was given a Colonial Office guide, he was granted no meetings with ministers, and his hosts (unlike Mussolini and Hitler later, who treated him respectfully and ceremoniously as a national leader) made him feel that 'he was a primitive

colonial native' and displayed towards him only 'superciliousness and disdain'.⁵⁷

At a High Commission staff meeting on 20 April, the Police Commandant said that after the 'Black Letter' the Arabs were convinced that the Jews had such power in London and Europe that they could overturn any decision taken by HMG. Chancellor thought likewise. The Letter undermined even further his faith in Britain's Palestine policy and he now felt his situation to be impossible. 'He had done his best to be impartial', he maintained, 'and neither side had been grateful. But the Jews were the worst because they neither saw any point of view other than their own nor recognized anybody else's rights or claims'.

Last Chancellor Throw

Although during the drafting of the mandate, Smuts had made it quite clear that no autonomous government would be allowed in Palestine until the Jews had become a majority through British-sponsored immigration, and although Chancellor was convinced that the same would be the case with 'the establishment of any form of representative institutions', the High Commissioner told Passfield that he continued to share the latter's view that the question of establishing a democratic infrastructure could be put off no longer and proposed a Legislative Council of a novel shape⁵⁸ which he intended should benefit the Palestinians. (The 17th. (Extraordinary) Session of the PMC on 16 August affirmed that the immediate obligations of the mandatory were to 'secure the establishment of the National Home and to foster the development of self-governing institutions'.)

The Palestinians were not grateful, however, for Chancellor's concern for them. In April he had received an AEC team including Musa Kadhim, Jamal al-Husayny and 'Awny 'Abd Al-Hady and begged them not to refuse to participate in any future Legislative Council 'so that they would have the representation they had deprived themselves of for so many years by their standing aloof'. Meeting with the delegation, now including the Greek Orthodox Ya'qub Farraj, a week later, a defensive High Commissioner said that their attitude came as a disappointment to him at the end of his period of office. He had tried for three years to give them advice as to the line of policy they should follow. He was leaving in 10 days and their reaction would not help him in talking to the Secretary of State about the arrangements for his new Legislative Council idea. He felt sure that they realised by now that during the last three years he had tried to help them. Now, Chancellor insisted, they

should nominate a Palestinian representative for a new Development Commission set up to ascertain the number of Palestinians who had been 'displaced from their land by . . . land purchases by Jews, and to arrange for their resettlement on the land as early as possible'. Until that had been done, the question of settling more Jews did not arise. Musa Kadhim was adamant, however, that they did not wish to discuss the Commission because anything promised to the Arabs was reduced to nothing by Jewish pressure – like the Hope-Simpson report's facts and figures the Jews had not liked. This disappointing response⁵⁹ showed that, as Musa al-'Alamy believed, Chancellor had failed to win the confidence not only of the Jews but also of the Palestinians whose cause he had tried so hard to help. It also showed that not only did the Palestinians not believe in the good faith of the administration but also that their normal reflex action was, often to their own disadvantage, to boycott.

A particular example arousing Palestinian distrust was the help the administration had given the Jews to organise the defence of their settlements. At the meeting, Jamal al-Husayny had underlined 'the bad effect caused among the Arabs by the fact that the Jews were now to be supplied with arms which could be used against Arabs'. This provoked the Palestinians to urge the establishment of a defence organisation and the acquisition of weapons and to demand that the administration balance defence of the villages and tribes on the one hand and the settlements on the other by arming the former.

At the end of August, Chancellor's term was prematurely ended, and with it his Legislative Council plans. (Al-'Alamy thought that his methods had been inappropriate in relation to the complications of the Palestine problem.) He made clear his disillusionment at how things had gone in a speech at a farewell banquet in Jerusalem: 'I came hoping to increase the country's prosperity and happiness. I am leaving with my ambition unfulfilled. Conditions were against me'. One of his ambitions which was fulfilled, perhaps as a final dig at the Jews, was the granting at the end of his term of his wish (odd in someone who hated Palestine so much) for a street in Jerusalem to be named after him.

Prime Minister MacDonald had not liked Chancellor and 'would have dismissed him long ago, if he could'.⁶⁰ He feared that on his return to the UK he might engage in pro-Palestinian activity, as though that would have been a crime. Chancellor had had conflict with his staff and with the army. His successor, Wauchope, like Samuel and Plumer, Bentwich said, 'had a deep sense of mission to the two peoples of Palestine, and the determination to make Palestine prosperous, and to help the development of the Jewish Home. That, not consideration of

English strategy in the Middle East, was his main concern'. His implication was that Chancellor, to whom Wauchope offered 'a striking contrast', had none of these aims. No Arab voice was raised to defend the departing High Commissioner.

CHAPTER

10

Zionism Resurgent

‘In the early 1930s, Jewish immigration became an oppressive reality, and the lack of appropriate action by the British government heightened the feeling of the Palestinian leadership that Palestine could only be saved by extreme measures.’ (Ilan Pappé) ¹

Lt.-Gen. Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope was aged 57. He came to Palestine from commanding UK forces in Northern Ireland. Unknown outside the Army, his posting was another surprise. In complete contrast to Chancellor, he was a Zionist and took the Zionist leadership into his confidence as he never did the Palestinians. Ben-Gurion, close to Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, and his associates frequently met with him and other officials of the administration and ‘coordinated almost every matter with them’.³ He was the only High Commissioner to serve two terms, under four Colonial Secretaries. His first term, from 20 November 1931 to 1936, marked by great economic prosperity, was ‘the heyday of Zionist history’⁴ as ‘The Jews felt that for the first time the national home was being fostered by the government’.⁵ (In Kisch’s calculation, Wauchope ‘kept the doors of Palestine open’ to about 240,000 Jews, compared with about half that number under his three predecessors.)⁵ His second term, dominated by violent Palestinian reaction to the fact that the Jewish National Home was already virtually in being, was a very different matter.

Zionist Insincerity

At the 17th. Zionist Congress in Basle in summer 1931, Weizmann had ‘in effect’ been deposed from the Presidency of the Jewish Agency after a severe attack on him by Jabotinsky for being over moderate vis-à-vis Britain and the Palestinians. Before handing over to Sokolow, he delivered a resignation speech which was anything but moderate. He warned, ‘The Arabs must be made to feel, they must be convinced by deeds as well as by words that, whatever the numerical relationship of the two

nations . . . , we Jews on our part contemplate no political domination. But they must remember that we on our side shall never submit to any political domination’.

The deeds were not forthcoming. Ignoring his recent discussions about ‘transferring’ Palestinians to Transjordan, his repeated blunt admissions that a Jewish state was his target and his awareness of the ground being systematically gained by Hagana, he felt able to add, ‘we recognize that Palestine is going to be the common homeland for Jews and Arabs . . . with peace in our hearts and minds, we could serve as a bridge between two cultures that watch each other to-day with suspicion but might be united tomorrow’. In an interview in 1932, he returned insincerely to the theme of a settlement agreeable to both Jews and Palestinians and combined it again with the threat of Jewish hegemony: ‘We are attempting to build a home in Palestine’, he said, which ‘can only be successful if it will be done in co-operation with the peoples and population of Palestine. We are coming . . . not to dominate anybody . . . taking our place according to our merits and our achievements. The other people in Palestine, the Arabs and Christians, have to recognize that we have a right to do what we intend to do.’

In January 1933 the Nazis came to power in Germany and a steadily increasing stream of Jewish refugees began to flood in to Palestine from there. The Zionist Congress in Prague in August demanded that the National Home be built as a matter of urgency and on a far larger scale than previously contemplated. In August of the following year, however, a Zionist *démarche* betrayed an unexpected diffidence about the future. One of two (the other was in autumn 1936), it was presented to Musa al-‘Alamy, who had no negotiating influence. At a meeting with him, Ben-Gurion and Moshe Shertok, a future Israeli Prime Minister ‘who could talk the paint off the walls (in about seven languages, too)’⁶ – put to him two proposals. They were for (a) Jewish-Arab self-government with equal status for both communities regardless of size, and (b) the inclusion, along Samuel lines, of a Jewish state of Palestine and Jordan [sic] in a federation of Arab states. The Jews would be Palestine’s majority and would rule it, but the federal link with neighbouring Arab countries would give the Palestinians membership of a regional majority.

Clearly, these ideas were quite unacceptable. The Zionist leaders having departed empty-handed, in Lucerne in 1935, ‘with Jewish prospects in Poland worse and in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe no better’, the Zionist Congress reverted to its demands of two years before. It now resolved ‘to focus the energies of the Jewish people on the extension and acceleration of its resettlement in Palestine’ and Ben-

Gurion introduced a plan to bring in 5 million immigrants in 5 years and for the whole Middle East to be the stage of the new Jewish renaissance.⁷

Palestinian Nationalist Reaction

Militancy by the Palestinians provoked by the 'Black Letter' did not take long to show itself. They first boycotted a visit by the Colonial Secretary. Then in March 1933 a Grand National AEC Meeting in Jaffa took extreme positions. Attended by representatives of all the Palestinian political factions, it denounced 'the overall plan of the Jews to seize the soil of this holy land,' the sale of land by Palestinians to Jews, and the pro-Zionist policy of the government. It described the UK as 'the true enemy', to be got rid of by every legal means.

Until 1932 Al-Hajj Amin had continued nominally to support the British government. He had quickly come to terms with Wauchope, who insisted that he was a moderate.⁸ He had made sure that the delegates to a General Islamic Congress in Jerusalem in December 1931 did not take an anti-British line.⁹ Chancellor was told by a journalist in London that Al-Hajj Amin 'was now regarded by the Colonial Office as a person of such international importance in the Moslem world that, in view of the present critical situation in India, it had been decided that no steps should be taken at present to interfere with him in any way.'¹⁰ Since no positive approach to him followed this optimistic claim and no idea emerged of according him a negotiating status on a par with that enjoyed by the Zionists, it is perhaps not surprising that on his return from the meeting he called on the German Consul-General in Jerusalem.

The AEC's policy of adhering to 'legal means' had by now been forgotten. From 8–13 October 1933, after radical groups had persuaded it to sponsor anti-Jewish and anti-British demonstrations in Jerusalem and Jaffa in defiance of a government ban, there were a general strike (*inter alia* in support of calls for a proportionally representative government) and serious synchronised outbreaks of violence in the main towns, widespread but easily quelled. Several thousand protestors came out against the administration's immigration policy and, in clashes with the police, 30 (mostly Palestinians) were killed and more than 200 injured in Haifa, Nablus and especially Jerusalem and Jaffa, where the 83-year old Musa Kadhim (unkindly labelled 'worthy and inept' by Christopher Sykes) was beaten to the ground by stick-wielding British security people. It was not the most tactful or efficient response, when the unrest ended and the strike had failed of its purpose, for immigration to be increased, record figures being recorded in 1935. (In 1932 there had

been some 9,500 legal immigrants. Anti-Semitic steps taken by Hitler prompted the UK to double the authorised rate in 1932–3, to treble the 1932 quota in 1933, and to continue to raise it until 1935, when in addition to record legal numbers German immigration waves brought in up to 24,000 illegals.)

The AEC was dissolved in August 1934. Factors contributing to its demise were Musa Kadhim's death the previous March, accusations that it was not forcible enough, and the refusal of notables to fund it. It was replaced by a number of largely previously unknown and mainly more extremist bodies, including new political parties. Mostly little more than 'personal fiefdoms',¹¹ some half dozen had arisen by mid-1935.¹² Although Al-Hajj Amin's power continued to rest on the SMC, rising to the challenge of the formation that year of the National Defence Party by the leaders of the An-Nashashiby opposition, he set up his own party in addition. This, the Palestine National Arab Party – its impoverished finances contributed to by Wauchope – became increasingly and overtly political.¹³ It started an active campaign to prevent further Palestinian land sales to Jews. This branded any who did not desist as traitors, liable to exile and to the denial of burial in Muslim cemeteries. Youth and sports' movements (especially the scouts) became covers for nationalist incitement and propaganda originating in mosques.

A Legislative Council Accepted by the Palestinians is Vetoed in Westminster

Blaming the Jews for everything on account of the slump of autumn 1935 (much worse than that of 1927), midway through the '30s Palestinian nationalism, though in some disarray, 'had become a genuinely popular movement'.¹⁴ In the autumn of 1935, the Palestinians took two new initiatives. From October, Al-Hajj Amin set out on visits to Egypt and Saudi Arabia which aimed to persuade Arab leaders to pressure the UK to change its policy. More constructively, on 25 November a united front of delegates from five parties, including the National Defence Party and the Palestinian National Arab Party, visited Wauchope and delivered an ultimatum. Convinced that 'the Arabs were . . . as far as ever from obtaining any control over their own affairs',¹⁵ and more immediately provoked by the discovery of a large illegal Jewish shipment of arms, labelled cement, in the port of Jaffa,¹⁶ they asked him to forward to London their demands for 1. the establishment of representative government, 2. the prohibition of land sales to Jews and 3. the immediate cessation of Jewish immigration. They warned that an unsat-

isfactory response might fuel extremism. The reply of the administration was surprisingly mild. It expressed willingness to sponsor a Legislative Council and declared its readiness to limit future immigration in line with a reassessed economic absorptive capacity.

In December, following up his reply, Wauchope spelled out his Legislative Council initiative. He offered a council of 28 members: 5 official, 11 nominated (4 Jews, 3 Muslims, 2 Christians, 2 representatives of commerce) and 12 elected (8 Muslims, 3 Jews, 1 Christian), with a neutral chairman unconnected with Palestine. It would not be able to question the mandate, and the twice-yearly labour immigration schedules would be reserved for the High Commissioner himself. Giving the Palestinians half of the total membership, the Jews only a quarter, the proposed make-up of the council was somewhat more generous to the former than those of earlier ones and provided for a much greater proportion of elected as opposed to nominated members. The response of the united front was to adopt a non-committal position: leaving their people still one short of a majority, it saw the scheme as no real advance on the proposal they had rejected ten years before. Stalling in the hope that rising immigration would in due course make stronger Palestinian council representation unjustifiable, the Jews rejected it out of hand. They found unacceptable their proposed minority membership and the sectarian allocation of seats and doubted that the council would be able adequately to promote their main interests.

It was a surprise, in view of their new militant policy, that the Palestinians should have finally agreed to Wauchope's terms. It was, even more, ironic that an acceptance by them, at last, led nowhere as, after highly effective Zionist lobbying in London, both Houses of Parliament threw the plan out early in 1936. Churchill and Jewish members led the assault on it. Its abandonment, despite Wauchope's determination for it to succeed, was convincing evidence of the Zionist stranglehold on British policy and reinforced the Arab view of British bad faith and subservience to Zionism.

The Palestinians Reject an Invitation to London

Since it had almost completely ignored the point of view of the Palestinians, the government felt that they should not be left completely empty-handed. Accordingly, on 2 April, the Colonial Secretary, now J.H. Thomas, persuaded by Wauchope, authorised him to invite yet another delegation to discuss the situation. This gesture was remarkable in that, at last, London was according one official status.

It was also doomed to fail. There was increasing identity of view between the various Palestinian nationalist groups that violence was now inevitable.¹⁷ The An-Nashashibys were for the time being almost as fervent as the Al-Husaynys in their denunciation of the Jews and the UK. Disturbances leading to the 1936 strike broke out on 20 April. It was unfortunate and shortsighted, and perhaps a tragedy, that a coalition of parties should have informed Wauchope that, under the circumstances, despatching the delegation was pointless.

The pessimism of the Palestinians was now very deep. A 19 April House of Commons' statement by Thomas, promising an impartial study of their grievances, was considered by Antonius to be 'designed to deceive public opinion in England' and one which deliberately ignored the Palestinians' loss of faith in Britain's word.¹⁸ More troublingly, a correspondent in *Great Britain and the East*, echoing a remark by Sokolow,¹⁹ wrote that 'It is obvious that the Arabs have not the slightest historical claims to the possession of Palestine. Their only claims are the claims of people inhabiting the Land for centuries past'.²⁰ It was a sign of their perplexity as to how best to proceed that, realising that their case was going by default, and having just turned down the best offer ever made them by a UK government, the Palestinians should have despatched an unofficial delegation to London in June even though the strike was in mid-course. Jamal al-Husayny led three Christians, including 'Izzat Tannus of the Palestine National Arab Party and Imil Ghury, a leading Greek Orthodox political activist and supporter of the Al-Husaynys.²¹ Though low level and not mainstream, the delegation was several times received by Thomas. It called for further serious negotiations, the suspension of immigration until the recommendations of the forthcoming Peel Commission had emerged, and amnesty for Palestinian rebels. Overall, it was able to achieve little of significance, though Tannus organised a Pro-Arab Parliamentary Committee, chaired by Arab Bureau and Arab Revolt veteran Lord Winterton and also took over the Arab Centre in London. This had been set up in 1935 by Alfred Roq and staffed initially by British ex-Palestine hands, headed at first by Newcombe and assisted among others by Jeffries, Frances Newton, Lord Lamington and H.V. Morton.

Insisting that 'if ever a people seem to deserve at least the opportunity of official public utterance, it is the Arabs of Palestine', Storrs was scathing about the way things were moving. He charged that in the debates in both Houses the case for the Palestinians had gone by the board. The violence of the strike had resulted 'largely from the manner of the Commons' and still more of the Lords' rejection of the Legislative Council.' Its creation, he wrote, 'might have proved cheaper, and could

not have proved dearer, in treasure, prestige and blood – British as well as Jewish and Arab – than its rejection.’ The unrest that followed was largely the consequence of ‘five [sic] peaceful and unsuccessful delegations to Whitehall and the six special, unimplemented, reports of commissions to Palestine’.

The National Home in Being

By the mid-1930s, in less, remarkably, than twenty years since the Balfour Declaration, the Jews were indisputably a state within a state. They had their own parliament and executive. The UK had connived in their formation of Hagana, a private army of about 10,000 armed and trained men (with another 40,000 available for rapid mobilisation) which had imported supplies of weapons disguised as civilian consignments. The Jewish Agency’s offices in Jerusalem were ‘much better placed and more imposing than those of the government of Palestine, hidden away in a hollow near Herod’s Gate’.²² In 1936 Storrs noted, ‘It is no longer a question, whether the Jew shall come to Palestine in large numbers and re-establish his own civilization. He has done so’. He quoted Neville Barbour, who wrote, ‘There exists in Palestine today . . . a Jewish National Home containing some three hundred and fifty thousand souls . . . It is now possible for a Jew to be born in Palestine and pass through an all-Jewish kindergarten, school and university without ever speaking anything but Hebrew; to work on a Jewish farm or in a Jewish factory, to live in an all-Jewish city of 150,000 inhabitants, to read a Hebrew daily newspaper, to visit a Hebrew theatre and to go for a holiday cruise on a steamer flying the Jewish flag. So far the Zionist aim may be said to be accomplished’.

Under these circumstances, Storrs concluded, ‘the arrogant self-absorption and parochial egotism of Palestinian Jewry’ was to some extent understandable as it ‘showed a callousness and lack of regard for everything non-Jewish, symptomatic of the worst forms of nationalism’. At the same time, London could, if it wished, be satisfied that, already, ‘. . . Zionism had served its main purpose . . . by giving Great Britain the entry into Palestine’.²³

The Strike of April–November 1936²⁴

After the murder of two Jews and two Arabs the previous week, on 19 April 16 Jews and 5 Arabs were killed and 100 people wounded²⁵ in

fighting in the port of Jaffa started by ruffianly Syrian contract citrus pickers and labourers from the Hawran. Fallahun rioted where Jewish land purchases most menaced Arab farmers. Next day there were further murders in Jaffa, a town with 'a sinister reputation for violence and lawlessness'.²⁶ The 3,000 Jews there had to be evacuated for safety to Tel Aviv and the port was closed. On 23 April Weizmann declared there that the forces of civilisation and building were struggling against the forces of barbarism, destruction and the desert. He did not point out that those latter forces were motivated by desperation over mounting Jewish immigration, which had helped the Yishuv's proportion of the population to climb from 17% to almost 30% between 1931 and 1935,²⁷ promising to bring about a Jewish majority in a matter of years.

On 25 April, with violence spreading, the Palestinian political leadership under the Mufty sought to take control of events which it had not initiated or organised.²⁸ Reluctant to endanger his constructive relationship with Wauchope by being seen to be openly involved in the unrest, Al-Hajj Amin himself covertly 'joined the rebellion when he couldn't stop it'²⁹ by providing funds and moral inspiration to Palestinian activists.³⁰ An Arab Higher Committee of 10 Muslims and Christians, set up on his initiative,³¹ was established with him as President. Its members were 3 from his Palestinian National Arab Party, including him, 2 from both the National Defence Party and Hizb al-Istiqlal (the Independence Party), and one each from three other political parties.³² Hizb al-Istiqlal was non-sectarian, influenced by Gandhi and Sa'd Zaghlul and standing for pan-Arabism and (inter)nationalism.³³ It was made up of well-known personalities and intellectuals like 'Awny 'Abd al-Hady, who had demanded that Al-Hajj Amin turn against the UK and accused him of co-operating with the Zionists. The party had been challenging the Mufty's position since 1932. It was perhaps a surprise that it was included in the AHC.

Nationwide Disorder

After his own positive response to them, the High Commissioner had been instructed to reject the November demands. On 29 April, the AHC declared a strike to last until the government, which did not prevent its members from touring the country and galvanising its committees 'to organise the strike and make it effective',³⁴ conceded them in full and undertook a fundamental revision of policy by stopping Jewish immigration, prohibiting land sales to Jews and establishing a national government responsible to a representative council. Syrian and Iraqy

volunteers came to help in the inaction, and the walkout remained solid throughout the 170 days the strike lasted. All Jewish import and export traffic had to be diverted from Jaffa to the inadequate Haifa port, whose construction Chancellor had inaugurated less than two miles away. (There, a comparatively moderate leadership enabled Palestinians and Jews to work normally together, as in the railway workshops). The Jews asked to be allowed to build a port at Tel Aviv, 'a modest wooden wharf'³⁵ which began operating within a few weeks of the start of the strike and 'destroyed the livelihood of the Arabs of Jaffa'.³⁶

A Wauchope appeal on 5 May to the AHC to call off its strike was rebuffed two days later at a conference at which it was announced that non-payment of taxes and civil disobedience would begin in ten days. *Pace* the claim of the military that, instead of advocating moderation and calm, the Mufti 'used the occasion to raise rebellion against the government by all the Arabs in Palestine',³⁷ a generally hostile Israeli source notes that at the conference Al-Hajj Amin made 'a marked effort' – as he continued, despite An-Nashashiby taunts, to do until the end of June – to prevent further confrontation with the British. He adds that 'at least until spring 1937 . . . even the leaders of the Jewish Yishuv took note of his efforts to prevent a further radicalisation of the situation' and that 'By virtue of his contacts with the High Commissioner, he appeared to the authorities to be the only guarantee for preventing an all-out war between the British army and the country's Arabs, and the last hope for reaching a settlement which would bring about a return to law and order'.³⁸

Even though in late May and early June the administration began to prevent Palestinian councillors from attending meetings and to deport many of them, criticism was already being made of the High Commissioner's reluctance to act with the firmness the army considered necessary. Some officials, on the other hand, thought that some steps taken were excessive, as when, on 19 June, it blew up some 250 houses and tenements in Jaffa. This action, taken ostensibly for sanitation and town planning reasons but in reality to clear lines of fire for police targeting snipers hindering the functioning of the port before its closure, caused great hardship to innocent people and made hundreds homeless for whom alternative accommodation was only slowly found. In July, Wauchope's former private secretary, Thomas Hodgkin, wrote an exposé in *Labour Monthly* of the punitive nature of the measures taken against the strikers. He claimed that initial savage sentences (3 years for throwing stones at the police, imprisonment without trial, heavy collective fines on Palestinian villages) advanced from about mid-May into brutal army or police raids against villages suspected of damage or arson

and the confining of political leaders to specific towns and villages and then to concentration camps. Finally, Emergency Regulations were drawn up to force strikers to open their shops, the death penalty or life imprisonment was imposed for shooting at a policeman, throwing bombs and damaging or interfering with government communications, and powers were awarded to confiscate or destroy villages.³⁹

Twelve days after Thomas had said in July that there was no question of halting immigration and had expressed complete confidence in him, the High Commissioner published a schedule allowing entry to 4,000 Jewish labourers. This provocative and unwise announcement provoked a deterioration in the situation in August which cannot have caused surprise. Bandits, 'filled with a fanatical patriotic zeal', and soldiers of fortune from Transjordan, Syria and Iraq, appeared in the hills of Galilee (especially) and in Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarim. Organised largely by the Mufty,⁴⁰ their efforts were overshadowed by those of Fawzy al-Qawukchy, an ex-Ottoman Iraqy army officer.⁴¹ No attempt ever having been made to control the borders of Palestine, 'a ship with no sides',⁴² he turned up with a contingent of barbarous Iraqy and Syrian soldiers and attempted with limited success to take control of events as casualties among British troops began to mount.

The Garrison⁴³

Both army and police having been cut by Plumer, at Wauchope's request internal security arrangements were now hurriedly strengthened. In mid-May 1936, additional British units started to arrive, doubling the size of the garrison by the 19th. (It was doubled again by the end of June, and an extra division arrived in September, raising British troop strength to 20,000). Lt.-Gen. Sir John Dill, who became GOC Palestine and Transjordan when security control passed from the RAF to the Army on 7 September, commented that the very large increase in the size of the garrison was not a response to the security situation but to the administration's fear of a violent reaction if it made full use of the powers and military forces already available to it. At the end of the following month, he said that – in a land in which one of the High Commissioner's private secretaries had written that it contained 'more hatred to the square mile than in any other country in the world' – Wauchope 'loves every stone of this country, he has worked himself to the bone for it – and it has let him down. He administers with knowledge and imagination, but he does not rule.'⁴⁴ Not only militarily was the administration under pressure on account of its alleged weakness. Lord Lloyd, influential despite

having failed as High Commissioner in Egypt, noted that ‘the feeling on all sides against Arthur Wauchope was intense’. It had reached a crescendo when, even though they had twice lost appeals in court, he had reprieved three men who had been condemned to death for shooting British soldiers. ‘That was clearly not the sort of thing that gave anyone any confidence that the situation was being handled firmly.’⁴⁵

The Strike Called Off

At the beginning of September, Wauchope suggested to the government that, to encourage the strike to end, it should execute a U-turn and temporarily suspend Jewish immigration despite the Colonial Office’s feelings on the subject. In the event, this proved unnecessary, however, as did implementation of a London idea of sending Al-Hajj Amin into exile. Instead, on 10 October, ‘Abd Allah, Ibn Sa’ud and King Ghazy of Iraq, who had lobbied since June at the instance of the AHC and Al-Hajj Amin, requested the Arab fighters ‘to resolve for peace’. On the 12th. the committee called off the strike. Saving face by doing so in response to this force majeure despite increasing immigration, it asked for violence to be abjured and protest suspended pending the investigation to be undertaken by the Peel Royal Commission which was about to arrive in the country.

The strike – in one opinion ‘little more than a diversion staged by the Mufti to cover the formation of a rebel army’ –⁴⁶ had caused much suffering. Though it had been a strike and not a war, large numbers of people had been killed or injured. Casualty figures vary enormously: 195–1,000 Arabs, 18–89 Jews, 21–25 troops, and 7 British and 9 Palestinian police killed; 804 Arabs, more than 300 Jews, 104–120 troops, and 40 British and 64 Palestinian police wounded. The unrest had been cruelly suppressed by the British, working – as a further clear sign of the UK’s determination that the Jews should win the struggle for the ownership of Palestine – with specially trained Jewish Agency and Hagana units.⁴⁷ The strike had brought the Palestinians nothing from the British government.

Peel

On 7 July 1937, the report of the Peel Royal Commission was issued.⁴⁸ Its visit to Palestine – led by the former India Secretary who had succeeded Montagu in 1922 – lasted until mid-January. Its terms of

reference concentrating on the mandate and how it was being discharged, it was 'To ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances; to inquire into the manner in which the mandate is being implemented; and to ascertain whether . . . either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievance on account of the way in which the Mandate has been, or is being implemented.'

The commission, one of whose members (Sir H. Morris) was written-off with Zionist self-righteousness by Mrs. Dugdale as 'indecently pro-Arab', was not empowered to consider the only underlying cause which mattered – the Balfour Declaration and its reappearance in the text of the mandate. Its journey was therefore a complete waste of time and resources, especially as it seems to have landed with its mind already made up: Peel had written before leaving home that 'The social, moral and political gaps between the Arab and Jewish communities are already unbridgeable'.⁴⁹

Only a week before it had landed in Palestine on 11 November 1936, the Colonial Office had hinted that the UK was considering limiting Jewish immigration: it announced that the High Commissioner had been asked 'to take a conservative view' of the economic absorptive capacity of the country. In the event, however, an unusually generous six-monthly immigration schedule was brought in, clumsily if not deliberately, to coincide with its arrival. The result was, after Peel had humiliated Al-Hajj Amin,⁵⁰ that the Palestinians only called off a boycott of the commission at its 56th. session on 12 January. (That, on the advice of the Arab Kings,⁵¹ they were willing to negotiate at all, 'should be seen', in the view of an Israeli historian, 'as a concession on the part of those who were the original inhabitants of the country dispossessed by outside invaders'.)⁵² Until they relented, the commissioners had spent seven or eight weeks hearing some 60 British and 41 Yishuv witnesses. There was time left for only 15 Palestinians. The Mufty had with some justification said, 'We have had so many commissions; so much has been recommended by them in our favour; and what is the result? Over 60,000 Jewish immigrants in one year'. In his evidence he claimed that the Jews' ultimate aim was to rebuild the Temple of King Solomon on the ruins of Al-Haram ash-Sharif, the Al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock. He declared, 'We have not the least power, nothing to do with the administration of the country, and we are completely unrepresented'. In evidence in London to Peel, with unbridled racism Churchill declared that the 'non-Jewish communities' of Palestine had no more right to the territory than a 'dog in a manger has the final right to the manger, even though he may have lain there for a very long time'; no wrong had been done to them 'by the fact that a

stronger race, a higher grade race, or at any rate, a more worldly-wise race . . . has come in and taken their place'.⁵³ It apparently did not occur to him that the trial of strength between the Zionists and the Palestinians was not an equal contest and that, without the encouragement, support and Macchiavellianism of Lloyd George and Balfour, there would not have been one for the Zionists to enter.

Peel's report recommended that the mandate as it was should be terminated and, 'on the ground that a distinct Jewish entity had crystallized',⁵⁴ that Palestine should be partitioned into three:⁵⁵ a sizeable area in which the mandate would still apply and independent Palestinian and Jewish states whose foreign and defence policies would remain subject to British control. The parts of Palestine where it was recommended that the mandate should still obtain were Jerusalem, Bethlehem, a Jaffa-Ramlah-Jerusalem corridor (which included Lydd airport), the port of Haifa, Tiberias, Safed, the Sea of Galilee, Nazareth and Acre. According to Weizmann, who tried to assure the commission that his notorious 1922 phrase should have read, 'to create in Palestine *something* that shall be as Jewish as England is English', its report was the first to discuss the Palestine problem in terms of independent states and as such 'a turning point in the search for a solution to the conflict'.⁵⁶ At a time when the Jews owned only 7% of the country, the proposed partition would have awarded their state 55%⁵⁷ of Palestine and most of the best of its agricultural land. It would have required an exchange of land and population involving the 225,000 Arabs living within its proposed borders in swapping with the 1,250 Jews who were residing in Palestinian areas and would 'in the last resort . . . be compulsory'. The Jewish state was to include the coastal plains of Sharon and Esdraelon, most of largely Arab Galilee and an enclave south of the corridor incorporating Jewish settlements between Ramlah and Gaza. The wish of the Zionists for their state to contain the Negev and the predominantly Arab Samaria and Judea was not met, but nonetheless Peel had in one view awarded them much of what they had sought⁵⁸ – 'a Jewish state in part of Palestine and the setting up of a poverty-stricken and backward Arab state in its neighbourhood',⁵⁹ the latter united with Transjordan and 'presumably under the rule of Amir Abdullah', who 'saw the recommendation as an opportunity not to be missed'.⁶⁰ A contrasting Storrs's opinion was that the commission had shrunk 'the dream of the original *Judenstaat* – the National Home – lopped, by the cutting-away of Transjordan, to a Wales, and now pared down to a Norfolk. And even so minished [*sic*], Zionism without Zion'.

The commission recommended that the Palestinians should retain very little of their own land. Their state – which was to receive an annual

income from the Jewish one and a grant of £10 million from the UK – was to consist of the rest of Palestine, including Jaffa. (Its distinct parts would be joined by a corridor.)

The report urged that land-sales to Jews in certain areas should be prohibited and that immigration should be limited to 12,000 per year for 5 years before being reviewed. The economic absorptive capacity yardstick, its scope limited by Zionist ability to provide employment, had allowed the rate of immigration to be fixed by the Jews themselves. It was no longer to apply. Instead, immigration was to be set by the mandatory on the basis of ‘what (it) considered to be the legitimate political aspirations of the Arabs’. Article 6 of the mandate had by now been well and truly forgotten.

There was no likelihood that either side would agree to independence restricted by British control, as in Egypt, over the foreign and defence portfolios. Further, the Jewish state, the Palestinians protested, would share with the mandatory zone ‘practically every resource, moral and material, which the country possessed’.⁶¹ The AHC strongly rejected the settlement, deeming it a prescription for a Jewish state in the richest part of the country – a state such as, until 1937, Zionist Congresses had denied ‘that there was, or ever had been, any intention or desire on the part of Jews to establish . . . in Palestine’.⁶² The Mufty had kept the Arabs docile from 1931–6. Now he announced his ‘absolute opposition’ to Peel, presaging ‘a head-on collision with the mandatory government’.

Zionist Opposition

At the 20th. Zionist Congress in Zurich, a bitter Weizmann supported the partition scheme. The Jews, he urged, ‘would be fools not to accept it even if it is the size of a tablecloth’.⁶³ Ben-Gurion’s view, unthinkable in a Palestinian politician, was identical. He told his son: ‘I am certain we will be able to settle in all the other parts of the country, whether through agreement . . . with our Arab neighbours or in another way. Erect a Jewish State at once, even if it is not the whole land. The rest will come in the course of time’.⁶⁴

Another of the ‘big beasts’ of Zionism, however, registered outspoken objection to Peel. This was Samuel, who had asked Ormsby-Gore, Colonial Secretary since May 1936 and labelled “Zion itself” by Jeffries,⁶⁵ ‘by what right’ the British Government could ‘claim to determine’ the whole future of the Arabs and the Jews, ‘these two intelligent and politically conscious communities, without even hearing their views upon proposals which may be entirely novel?’ When the report was

debated on 20 July in the House of Lords, a further contribution to the question by him was both significant and surprising. Mrs. Dugdale rightly believed that his 'kind of "Brith Shalom" proposal will bring on his head the wrath of Jewry'.⁶⁶ He had indeed come full circle. Peel, he said, 'seems to have gone to the Versailles Treaty and to have picked out all the most difficult and awkward provisions it contained. They have put . . . some half-dozen entities made up of separate states, enclaves and corridors, . . . a Saar, a Polish corridor, and half a dozen Danzigs and Memels into a country the size of Wales'.

He interpreted the report as 'in effect an appeal to the Arabs to get out and make room for a Jewish state'. He called for it not to be adopted and for the mandate to continue, with self-governing institutions (such as he himself as High Commissioner had been unable to establish) like the Ottoman milletler to be set up. Arab and Jewish representative bodies would send delegates 'to sit, together with British members, on a Central Advisory Council . . . Out of this might grow at a later stage a constitution more formal and more democratic'. He recommended that 'Transjordan should be assisted by a British-guaranteed Development Loan of a substantial amount . . . to finance the settlement of Arabs and Jews in equal numbers'. To institute future friendly co-operation, the Jews, he urged, should agree that predominantly Palestinian areas should be excluded from Jewish settlement; and that, while Jewish immigration should continue, its rate for a period of years should be limited, so that, at the end of the period, the Palestinians would not find themselves in a minority and the Jewish proportion of the population would not be greater than 40%. He made no mention of a Jewish State disguised as a National Home. He commented later, in his *Memoirs*, that, 'In my speech, I stated the fundamental objections to a division of Palestine but dwelt chiefly on the practical impossibility of putting into effect the plan that was proposed. One-third of the existing Jewish population would be left out of the so-called Jewish State. Included in it at the outset would be almost as many Arabs as Jews.'

In December 1923, hoping that it would help bring about an improvement in the then situation, Samuel had fleshed out his old proposal for the creation of a confederation of Arab States under Husayn as president. It would have included the Hijaz, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq and possibly Najd and given the Jews the right to settle in both Transjordan and Palestine. Opposed by Shuckburgh, it had been rejected with scorn by Curzon.⁶⁷ Now, since he believed that the answer to Palestine was not partition but the construction of a large Arab federation, he updated his idea and urged that 'Any movement among the Arab-speaking States towards a confederation should be encouraged,

and Palestine be prepared to enter into it', perhaps along with the five countries (Saudi Arabia replacing the Hijaz and Najd) he had listed fourteen years earlier, plus Lebanon. In it the Jews should, he reaffirmed, be kept for 'a period of years' to 40% of the population. (In 1940, he repeated that 'No solution can be hoped for by a geographical division of the country', and that 'the transfer [out, of Arabs] could only be carried out by the cruellest means.')

⁶⁸

Jeffries noted that the opposition to the plan of 'one of its main progenitors' had been passionate. It caused the Jews, charging Samuel with severely injuring them, to make a vain attempt to erase from signs and nameplates in Tel Aviv any reference to the man whose change of heart had come too late to undo the damage he had caused as High Commissioner.

Samuel was not the only Zionist to reject Peel. In the Commons on 21 July, Ormsby-Gore announced that the government did not accept the commission's proposal for the compulsory transfer of the Palestinians from the proposed Jewish state. In August, Leonard Stein, formerly the Zionist Organisation's Political Secretary, derided the report and warned that any swap of populations would in fact be 'a case of unilateral transfer and not of "exchange"' and would heap odium on Jews everywhere.⁶⁹ A Zionist Congress in Zurich from 3–17 August, hostile to the partition boundaries proposed, found the Peel scheme entirely unrealistic politically. Mrs. Dugdale detected UK government skulduggery. This 'great change', she observed, 'brings Haifa into the centre of the picture, makes it necessary for the British to get rid of the Mandate, so that they can make a naval base 'and garrison it with 2,000,000 Jews.'

The Permanent Mandates' Commission shared the general dissatisfaction with Peel and in August voiced its opposition to the idea of the immediate creation of two independent states in Palestine. In November, Ormsby-Gore told the Zionists that he would like them to work towards a demand for one only, a Jewish state in the British Empire.

The Mufty at the Crossroads

Peel was a watershed. Storrs thought that now, 'secured against the just dread of submergence by a Jewish minority, his grievances now recognized by the Mandatory and proclaimed to the League and the world, the Palestinian Arab might see fit to reason with his assumed adversary'. The Palestinians did not see fit to do so but, after Peel, at first stayed calm. Nevertheless, some accused the Mufty of weakness because he

refused to adopt extreme measures in the face of the commission's recommendations. The An-Nashashibys charged him with cowardice and many even of his own side considered him 'a friend, even an agent, of the authorities'.⁷⁰

In late 1936, however, realising that holding on to his leadership of the Palestinians required him to take an anti-British position, to the satisfaction of his followers the Mufty abandoned the stance he had adopted towards all previous UK administrations in Palestine and declared his unequivocal support for the strike. In response, the administration – 'taken aback by the defection of their leading intermediary, the man who had kept a lid on things'⁷¹ – now sharply changed its attitude towards the 'not anti-British' Mufty. In 1937, his appeal to the rebels to lay down their arms could not prevent precipitate British action. In an indication that it for the first time regarded him as an enemy, on 17 July – in a step to be emulated by the Israeli blockade of Yasir 'Arafat in Ramallah – all streets leading to his house and to the offices of the AHC were cordoned off by British police armoured vehicles. In August, consequently, he asked Germany for help, with no result except claims by Berlin that he had espoused Nazism.

A Pan Arab Palestinian Assistance Committee congress he convened at Bludan in Syria from 8–9 September further electrified the atmosphere. At it, An-Nashashiby/Al-Husayny conflict was reopened by the resignations of Raghīb an-Nashashiby, whose supporters had opposed any resumption of violence, and Ya'qub Farraj.⁷² Resolutions rejected Peel's recommendations out of hand. The delegates (400 individuals or representatives of unofficial organisations from every Arab territory except the Yemen, but mostly Syrians) voted for Palestinian action against them and for full independence. They unanimously condemned partition and urged the Mufty to go all out against the UK. But there is no evidence that Al-Hajj Amin or members of his family (except 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayny, a cousin) supported the now imminent rebellion or used funds contributed by Arab, Muslim or other sources to finance it.⁷³ Nonetheless, Britain was in the process of overreacting against the Mufty.

The Great Palestinian Rebellion of September 1937–January 1939

In mid-August, instances of violence against settlements and public transport signalled the replacement of the strike by the more widespread Great Rebellion. By September, two 'rebel' armies were in

the field, in Galilee and Samaria, and there were smaller bands near Hebron and elsewhere. On 27 September, Lewis Andrews, Keith-Roach's assistant as newly appointed District Commissioner in Galilee, and unofficial adviser on Arab affairs to Wauchope, 'a very good Australian, . . . about the best administrator in the country', was murdered along with his police escort, P.C. McEwan. While they were probably killed by the Al-Qassam Group, whose leader is regarded as 'the original, iconic martyr of the Palestinian cause',⁷⁴ Bentwich blamed 'the Mufty's minions' for the assassinations, and Mrs. Dugdale⁷⁵ charged that Andrews's 'blood is on British hands – especially Wauchope's and Billy's' [Ormsby-Gore's]. She presciently forecast that, 'This changes the whole situation – makes Partition a certainty, and may I think also lead to the formation of an Arab State under Abdullah'.

As a result of the murders, the course of Palestinian history was indeed abruptly diverted. William Battershill, newly appointed Chief Secretary, was standing in during a leave of the High Commissioner, about whom, as about Arabs, he was uncomplimentary. Like other understudies taking action of which absent superiors were not to approve,⁷⁶ he responded drastically to the assassination of Andrews. He deprived the Mufty of all his offices and at a stroke cut him off from his most important sources of funding. He dissolved the National Defence Party and the AHC, four or five members of whose committee (including Dr. Husayn al-Khalidy) were deported to the Seychelles (most of them were already abroad) and two others were forbidden to return to Palestine. Hundreds of Awqaf officials, employees, minor government servants and municipal councillors were arrested and interned. SMC and Awqaf funds were put under the administration's direct control. Oddly, the Mufty himself was not expelled but left to remove himself. Over a fortnight later, he and Jamal al-Husayny, 'with the connivance of the Administration',⁷⁸ fled to Lebanon, where the French, though putting them under house arrest, granted them asylum and gave them 'what amounted to a free hand'⁷⁹ to continue to lead the now general Palestine revolt from Beirut. Other members of their family helped the cause from Damascus, and the banned AHC conferred with the Mufty in what became his permanent exile from his homeland and succeeded in undermining rivals to his leadership at home. On the ground, however, Palestine was left without institutions and political leadership by the departure of Al-Hajj Amin, whom British hostility 'pushed . . . even further into the hands of Berlin and Rome'.⁸⁰

The uprising, centrally rudderless, became intense from November 1937 under the leadership of the *in absentia* Mufty and the rebel

bands.⁸¹ To meet the challenge, the hand of the military was strengthened at Wauchope's expense.⁸² Wavell, who took over from Dill in October 1937, on 10 November introduced a system of military courts independent of the administration. Linked with an enlarged and tougher code of new emergency regulations, severe penalties were prescribed for a wide range of offences, including death with no appeal for carrying arms. Renewed violence led to fines, house-demolitions and executions. Hugh Foot, a member of Wauchope's staff, described what was happening as 'a text-book example of . . . waste and futility. There was no political initiative . . . We had no means of persuading the people to turn against violence, no alternative to submission to offer them, no assurance and no hope that their deep seated fears might be removed'.⁸³

If the administration had ceded control to the military, it also ceded much ground to the Zionists. The Jewish Agency seized the opportunity presented by the rebellion, which brought the Palestinians only nominal and temporary political gains, to strengthen its near-independent stance. Committees were established to begin planning for a state and 'a team of Zionists got together to map out the embryonic nation', to discuss the 'transfer' of Palestinians to Jordan and to take control of a wider range of the territory's activities.⁸⁴ The agency 'almost seemed like a security branch of the administration, serving . . . as informer, subcontractor, and client'. To a significant extent, the British army might almost have been acting under its orders, 'something like a mercenary force or security service.' Though in theory thousands of Jewish policemen and a settlements' police force, intended to form the backbone of a Jewish military force in 'the inevitable clash with the Arabs',⁸⁵ were branches of the administration, in practice they were under the command of the agency. Hagana was turned from a defensive into an offensive force and the UK permitted it to arm itself and co-operated closely with it.⁸⁶ 'The revolt was a disaster for the Palestinians since they foolishly dissipated their strength fighting the British while their real enemies built up their forces for the inevitable Jewish-Arab showdown'.⁸⁷

Given the advances the Zionists had been able to make during the weak final phase of Wauchope's period of office, it was not surprising that Ben-Gurion should have considered him 'the best high commissioner we have had'. (His administration was of course the most destructive one the Palestinians had endured). In March 1938, Wauchope was retired. He was censured for not showing sufficient strictness in the early stages of the troubles. As they mounted, so did the criticism of his handling of the situation while the rebels were being temporarily dispersed, not defeated. He was 'unceremoniously

dismissed' because he had been prepared to go to 'the extremes of conciliation . . . in dealing with the rebellion' and because his support for local officials who took stern measures seemed half-hearted.⁸⁸

CHAPTER

11

The Sorcerer Prepares to be Overthrown by the Apprentice

‘The organization of an armed force capable of seizing power in Palestine was to be accomplished by the entry of Jewish youth into the Allied forces with the real purpose of receiving military training.’ (The Arab Office)¹

‘The slaughter of European Jews can only be redeemed by establishing Palestine as a Jewish country.’ (Churchill)

The Great Rebellion still had some way to go when Sir Harold MacMichael, a nephew of Curzon, arrived in the early summer of 1938 as High Commissioner. He was the second and last non-military British ruler of Palestine and the first to be sent to try his hand at solving the Palestine problem rather than administering the country. He was the only Arabic-speaking High Commissioner but not the inspirational leader the times required.²

In April, the Army went on the offensive against Arab activists, using as instrument of choice Major Orde Wingate’s Special Night Squads, which were formed of UK troops and Hagana personnel.³ (Wingate’s reliance on the latter indicated again on whose side Britain basically was, as did the erection of the Tegart fence⁴ to hinder the movements of insurgent Arab bands and to prevent arms’ importation which might threaten Hagana’s superiority in weaponry.)

The Jews were suspicious of MacMichael’s Arab experience, gained from nearly 30 years in the Sudan. Their disapproval of him was not diminished when he renewed the ‘unfettered discretion’ given to his predecessor by Peel to limit immigration as he chose. (The 8,000 new arrivals of the six months following Peel were succeeded by a quota of only 3,000 for March–September 1938.) A terror campaign resulted. On 6 July, 56 Palestinians and 3 Jews were killed (79 people were wounded) in the vegetable market in Haifa, 10 more were killed and 29 injured in the Old City of Jerusalem on the 15th., and on the 25th. 74 were killed and 129 injured by landmines in Haifa’s Arab fruit market.⁵ The first

and third of these outrages were perpetrated by Irgun Zeva'i Le'umi (Etzell, the National Military Organisation), which was formed in 1931 by Jabotinsky of breakaway Hagana members⁶ and in three weeks in 1937 had killed 77 Arabs.)

A flying weekend visit in the middle of August 1938 by Malcolm MacDonald, who had replaced Ormsby-Gore as Colonial Secretary in May, was boycotted by the Palestinians, and an appeal by MacMichael for their Revolt to end, with hints that if it did not stronger measures would follow, was unavailing. A week later the Acting District Commissioner in Jenin was murdered, and the administration lost control of Jaffa when a bomb (presumably not a Palestinian one) exploded in its vegetable market, killing 24 Palestinians and wounding 39. By mid-September, much of the south of the country – the Old City of Jerusalem, Hebron, Beersheba, Bethlehem, Jericho, Ramallah and Gaza – was under the control of Palestinian rebels, who destroyed government offices and police stations.⁷

London now decided that the only practicable means of stabilising the situation and reestablishing British authority was temporarily to transfer control again to the military, to abandon partition and to try to win the support of moderate and anti-Mufti Palestinians through concessions over immigration and land sales. It was announced that the army was being reinforced by four more battalions, bringing UK troop strength up to 20,000. With the High Commissioner, like his predecessor, 'ceding virtually dictatorial powers' to the GOC, now Gen. Sir Robert Haining, the police came under direct army command and MacMichael 'approved the appointment of military commanders to take over the particular powers of district commissioners . . . and never regained control'.⁸ The scales were turned as the military fight-back began when, using Palestinians as human shields, on 19 October the army reoccupied the Old City of Jerusalem. In the last week of the month, troops occupied most of the larger villages in the hills of Gallilee. Relations between military and civilians deteriorated and there was an attempt to depose the High Commissioner 'in a kind of palace coup'.⁹

Partition Abandoned and the Status Quo Restored

A promised Technical Commission, resulting from the Foreign Office's opposition to partition and led by Sir John Woodhead, late of the ICS, had been in Palestine from April-August 1938, while the violence was in full flow, to demarcate boundaries and recommend measures to implement Peel. To one observer, who turned out to be right, it appeared

by midsummer that – following the collapse of the Spanish Republicans, the resignation of anti-Zionist Foreign Secretary Eden and the German occupation of Austria – ‘the climate for a Palestinian settlement based on a forceful and determined British policy had evaporated’.¹⁰

On 9 November Woodhead presented his report.¹¹ He offered two variants on the Peel partition blueprint. One assigned northern Galilee to the Palestine state, the other made the whole of Galilee a British mandatory area and drastically reduced the dimensions of the Jewish state by confining it to the Plain of Sharon up to Tantura. Both schemes enlarged the Peel mandated area by including in it the Jewish colonies south of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road. That done, the commission proceeded – as instructed by government, some believe – to endorse the decision to abandon partition, which was ‘already politically dead and now given decent burial’; the Foreign Office was thereby handed ‘the lever it wanted to sink Peel.’¹² Accordingly, London accepted the commission’s advice and, reversing Peel and in one Zionist view burying the Balfour Declaration,¹³ announced that the mandate would continue as it was and that it would invite Palestinian and Jewish leaders to a conference.

On the ground, the situation remained grim until the end of 1938 when, with a strength of about 15,000, the Palestinian fighters had three times as many men as two years earlier. The year had been the worst of the uprising and some 1,624 Palestinians, 486 Jews and 69 UK troops had been killed;¹⁴ in February 1939 113 people were killed and 153 wounded. Nevertheless, early that year, British control was being reasserted via a ‘brutal crackdown on Palestinian Arab nationalist leaders’. In July the rebellion was reported as ‘definitely and finally smashed’ and Haining was able to announce that the whole country was in the hands of the Army; 2,000 Palestinians had lost their lives since April 1936.

The determined British suppression of the Rebellion had been carried out with recklessness and harshness.¹⁵ Macmichael was blamed for aggravating relations between Britain and its mandated protégé and held ‘largely responsible for the perception, etched in the Palestinians’ collective memory, that Britain betrayed them even in the last years of the mandate’.¹⁶ Entire Palestinian, but not Jewish, neighbourhoods or villages were punished for crimes in their vicinity, houses sheltering guerrillas were blown up and Palestinians received more severe sentences than Jews. (Some 112 were convicted by court martial and hanged for arms-possession and many more were killed ‘in acts of unofficial retribution’.) ‘Arabs carrying knives over four inches long were shot, but not the Jews’,¹⁷ and Jews apprehended for arms-possession were often released after serving short prison sentences. In the judgement of a future

Israeli Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben-Ami, 'the brutal repression' of the Rebellion caused Palestinian society to begin 'crumbling from within . . . Leaderless and decapitated of their traditional elites, deeply fragmented, respectful and frightened of the Yishuv's military power, and disoriented as to their real or achievable objectives, the Palestinians [were] in a state of disarray and fatalistic despair'. Their 'resounding defeat', he wrote with hindsight, 'would bring them to the ultimate debacle of 1948 in a state of fatalistic disarray. The years between the (Rebellion) and the Naqbah of 1948 witnessed the dismemberment of the Palestinian community and the loss of their political autonomy to the extent that when they had to face the challenge of partition and war in 1947–8, they were no longer the masters of their own destiny'.¹⁸

A Second UK Lurch towards the Palestinians

As the Jew versus Palestinian conflict was being turned into one of Jew versus Arab, the invitation to talks resulted in the Round Table St. James's Palace Arab–Jewish Conference which ran from 7 February to 17 March 1939. Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary, had admitted in the Commons the previous November – thanks perhaps to influence on him of Musa al-'Alamy, whom the outlawed AHC had sent to lobby in London – that the Palestinians had not been consulted about the Balfour Declaration. He had described the 'rebels' as patriots whose views, for example on Jewish immigration, he might have shared if he had been one of them. Now, after going through the motions of praising Zionist achievements in 'lyrical' language,¹⁹ he took the same line, speaking on 10 February about 'the "natural right" of the Palestinians, and how the Jews had been let in without their consent'.²⁰

Transjordan, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen sent delegations to the conference to join a Palestinian one, some of whose members had been released from the Seychelles (again, thanks to Al-'Alamy) in order to attend. They were in theory handicapped both by the absence of the Mufty,²¹ for whom Jamal al-Husayny stood in as leader, and by the self-inflicted inability of the factions to present a united front: the Al-Husaynys (including Al-'Alamy and George Antonius) and An-Nashashibys (Raghib an-Nashashiby and Ya'qub Farraj) stayed at different hotels. The Zionist delegation, led by Weizmann even though compared to Ben-Gurion he was now a marginal figure, was 44 strong and exuded 'a spirit of arrogant self-confidence'.

The talks with the Jews and the Palestinians were conducted separately, though there were occasional contacts between other Arabs and

Weizmann. The hosts urged both sides to trust them and to think seriously about an independent Palestinian state. The Palestinian thrust now was blunt. It demanded recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to independence in their own country, the consequent abandonment of the National Home, the replacement of the mandate by a treaty of alliance between the UK and an independent Palestine on the Iraq model, the immediate cessation of immigration and the prohibition of land sales to Jews. The British urged them to accept the continuance of the last two items, but with controls.

‘On a Proper Construction of the Correspondence Palestine was in Fact Excluded . . . ’

With some difficulty, the Arabs induced the government to agree to make public the whole of the Husayn/McMahon Correspondence, which Antonius had reproduced in his recently published *The Arab Awakening*. A sub-committee with no Jewish membership²² examined it, and Sir Michael McDonnell, charged by the Zionists with anti-Jewish bias when he had been Lord Chief Justice of Palestine, appeared before it on behalf of the Arabs, who for the first time were thus adequately represented. He ‘made mincemeat’ of the Churchill gloss on the claim that McMahon had excluded Palestine. The British delegation consequently ‘finally felt constrained to admit that the Arab contentions “had more force than had previously been realised”, though they could not quite bring themselves to recognise that they were unanswerable’. Their conclusion was that ‘on a proper construction of the Correspondence Palestine was in fact excluded.’ Even though no reference had been made in it to Palestine, it continued, ‘the language in which its exclusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time’. Pointlessly, and too late, it added that the UK was ‘not free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests’ of its inhabitants, which is exactly what it was in the process of doing.

Having made plain where their sympathies now lay, the British urged the Jews to modify their ambitions. They proposed to them the sort of scheme which a properly thought-out Balfour Declaration should have offered from the start – the replacement of the mandate by an independent, British-protected Arab State of Palestine in which the Yishuv would have been a minority safeguarded by constitutional guarantee. The Jews vehemently rejected this (to them) preposterous proposal and broke off negotiations, demanding that minority status not be imposed on them, that the mandate remain unchanged and that immigration

continue in line with EAC. On 16 February, UK–Zionist talks ended in deadlock and the Zionists had to contemplate a new British policy under which Jewish immigration and land-purchase would be limited or banned and there would be no prospect of a Jewish state anywhere in Palestine.

Even though the mooted Palestinian independence would have required Zionist approval, some commentators saw the outcome of the conference as a complete surrender to Arab demands, one which ‘meant nothing less than the reversal of the Balfour Declaration: the Palestinian Arabs were to be enabled to establish *their* National Home, with an assured majority and a guaranteed veto on further Jewish immigration’.²³ This was a strange result, rewarding the Palestinians for their Rebellion and once again illustrating the unintelligence, illogicality, arbitrariness and indecisiveness of the UK’s actions throughout the mandate.

The Balfour Declaration Expendable

In a 16 March Statement of Policy, tabled before the conference had failed, Britain imposed its own solution, as it had said that it would in the event of a perhaps intended impasse.²⁴ Though it was not the surrender to the Palestinians which had by this point been anticipated, and though it remained to be seen whether or not they would feel able to accept proposals they had always rejected before, it was still largely tilted in their favour. The mandate, it pronounced, would continue, partition would be reimposed and statehood would be postponed for ten years (and then be subject to the agreement of both sides). EAC would (as in Peel) be abandoned: instead 15,000 Jews would be admitted during each of the next 5 years but none thereafter without the agreement of the Palestinians, who would have to consent to every Zionist project. Palestine would be divided into three zones, where – in order to preserve the ‘rights and position’ of the majority population – land sales to non-Palestinians were to be forbidden, restricted or unrestricted. Palestinians and Jews were to have an increasing share in the administration and there would be an Advisory Council on which, as ‘a sop to the Jews’, Palestinians and Jews would be equally represented.²⁵

The Statement, in its apparent abandonment of the Balfour Declaration after over twenty years of effort to impose it on the Palestinians, represented a major and unprincipled UK climb-down. Suddenly, as war approached, ‘Arab opinion in the wider Middle East now seemed more important to British interest than was Jewish opinion in Palestine or Jewish political influence in London’.²⁶ With the Suez

Canal flowing through Arab territory, the Iraqi oil pipeline to Haifa fully operational and the air route to India and the Far East well established, MacDonald admitted in Cabinet on 20 April 1939 that the White Paper which emerged from the Statement of Policy was designed 'to placate the Arabs', whom Austen Chamberlain saw it as of 'immense importance' to keep sweet. This was more vital than honouring the Balfour Declaration at this juncture: 'If we must offend one side let us offend the Jews rather than the Arabs', he said.²⁷ (Lampson had suggested to the Foreign Office eight months earlier that the Jews had 'waited 2,000 years for their "home"'. They can well afford to wait a bit until we are better able to help them get their last pound of flesh'.)

Palestine White Paper

On 17 May, the Statement of Policy became a largely identical Palestine White Paper.²⁸ Illustrating the United Kingdom's extraordinary irresolution and inability to stick to one line of policy for any length of time, however, and thereby helping to secure enough Arab oil to tide itself through the war, it diverged in the important respect that in it partition was abandoned once more . . . It envisaged what should have been the aim from the start, a Jewish National Home erected by agreement in an independent Palestine. As a result of the negotiating influence of the leaders of several Arab states, notably Nury as-Sa'id of Iraq, it obtained considerable and gratifying concessions for the Palestinians. Conditional on the restoration of public order and the establishment of good Palestinian/Jewish relations, it declared unequivocally that it was not part of London's policy, and would be illegal under the mandate, for Palestine to become a Jewish State: with breathtaking dishonesty, or out of shocking ignorance, it said that 'the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country'.²⁹ Nor would it become a Palestinian Arab state: the UK's 'objective is self-government and they desire to see established' within ten years an independent Palestinian State, in treaty relations with Britain and 'in which the two peoples . . . share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured . . . Both sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the machinery of government'. As a first step, Arab and Jewish Palestinians would head departments of government and ultimately become ministers, supported by UK advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. The process towards independence

would continue whether or not both Palestinians and Jews were in favour of it. Meanwhile, land purchase by Jews would be restricted and, as in the Statement of Policy, Jewish immigration would be halted after reaching the 75,000 five-year total unless the Palestinians agreed that it should continue.

It is almost impossible to imagine how, and how without violence, the Sorcerer could have dismantled at this late stage the 'state within a state' which the Zionist Apprentice had built up in Palestine. In any case, the White Paper, 'necessary to secure the benevolent neutrality of the Arabs in the coming war',³⁰ was rejected by the Jews as a betrayal. Ben-Gurion declared that 'Satan himself could not have created a more distressing and horrible nightmare' and called MacDonald 'an inadmissible scoundrel'. Challengingly, Jabotinsky wrote, '... the Arabs must make room for the Jews in Erets Yisrael. If it was possible to transfer the Baltic peoples, it is also possible to move the Palestinian Arabs'.³¹

The Palestinians Reject 'half a loaf'

Even though the National Defence Party and the Arab states approved the settlement, pressure on the Mufti from guerrilla leaders led him shortsightedly to reject the White Paper (thereby passing up a possible chance to become centrally involved once more in Palestine's suddenly brighter future) and forced the Palestinians to make the major error of rejecting what MacDonald rightly called a 'golden opportunity'. Though they came to see the settlement detailed in the White Paper 'as an acquired right',³² they were convinced that it was 'only half a loaf' and particularly objected – as might well have been anticipated – to the 75,000 immigration provision even though that figure was not much above the total for the single year 1935.³³

In the House of Commons in May, Churchill showed how out of step he was with his previous assurances to the Palestinians and the Conservative government by declaring, 'The slaughter of European Jews can only be redeemed by establishing Palestine as a Jewish country', and forecasting that 'The creation of a great Jewish state will be one of the leading features of the Peace Conference'.³⁴ With several future members of his wartime government (Amery, Attlee, Morrison and Sinclair), at the end of the month he voted against the White Paper, which he called a 'base betrayal, a petition in moral bankruptcy' and Morrison described as 'a cynical breach of faith, a breach of British honour'. Both Houses, however, approved it, the Commons giving the government a majority of 89.

In June, MacDonald presented the White Paper, as required, to the Permanent Mandates' Commission. This, in a report to the League, maintained that its immigration and land sales' provisions were not in accordance with its understanding of the requirements of the mandate and were therefore illegal. War was, however, to prevent the League from considering the report and perhaps asking the UK to think again. Meanwhile, maintaining that the National Home was now a reality, on 12 July MacDonald nailed his colours to the Palestinian mast to an unprecedented and astonishing extent by halting all scheduled legal immigration for six months. In a Commons' Palestine Debate on 20 July he said, 'If I were an Arab I should be passionately against Jewish immigration' and he 'made a monstrous attack on the Jewish Agency, hinting that they were organizing illegals in order to defeat the White Paper'.³⁵ Indeed there was, to Palestinian chagrin, a tremendous concomitant increase in the numbers of illegal immigrants, whose total the administration impotently announced would be deducted when legal schedules were restored. Storrs stated that in the last nine months of 1939, 8,600 legal, and 12,000 illegal, immigrants had arrived, with another 2,200 in the second category '[a] little later'.³⁶

British officials in Palestine, on the outbreak of war, sought the support of the ejected Mufty (in Baghdad) for the White Paper and the immigration restrictions. When, however, he offered his co-operation in return for being allowed back to Jerusalem, it was refused.

Intensification of Zionist Terrorism

On 28 February 1940, in accordance with Peel and the White Paper, the land sales' limitation regulations were tightened. The transfer of Palestinian land to Jews was prohibited in two thirds of the country, restricted in most of the rest and only allowed in the 5% of it represented by a section of the coastal plain, some municipal areas and the industrial district of Haifa. Palestine became in 1940, in one exaggerated claim, 'the only country in the world, besides National Socialist Germany, in which Jews were denied the right to acquire land'.³⁷

MacMichael's implementation of the regulations naturally earned him much unpopularity among the Jews. Weizmann announced that, while his co-religionists would suspend all political activities for the duration of the war, he must 'commit the Zionist movement to a policy of non-co-operation' with London. Even more extreme Zionists found this far from adequate. Seeing no alternative to overturning the White Paper by force, they embarked on a fight-back against it which in May

caused the administration to demand that Hagana give up its arms, many of which it had itself provided. This did not prevent another terrorist organisation from immediately starting a campaign of violence. Irgun (some of whose members had had recent training in the Polish Army) had carried out its first anti-British operations in 1939. Now, on 25 November, it blew up in Haifa harbour the liner *Patria*, which was about to take to Mauritius illegal immigrants who had been denied entry to the territory. 263 of them lost their lives,³⁸ while the remainder were able to stay in Palestine.

Zionist Attempts to Collaborate with Fascism

The Mufty of Jerusalem is reviled by the UK and Israel for his ineffectual efforts to collaborate with Hitler and Mussolini. Oblivion has been allowed to mask the Zionists' own attempted co-operation with the Nazis, including by a future Israeli Prime Minister. The details are not entirely clear. Either separately or jointly, however, Avraham Stern, having left Irgun, together with an Irgun group including Yitzhak Shamir, in late 1940 or in 1941 repeatedly offered to fight for Germany if Hitler would support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Stern's successor as leader of the eponymous Gang, Natan Yellin-Mor, was heavily involved in the attempted collaboration. Via Vichy Syria, their offer was relayed to Ankara, where Shamir and Stern told the German ambassador, Franz von Papen, that 'we identify our cause with you. Why then not work together with each other?' A January 1941 letter from Von Papen described his contacts with Stern to his superiors and attached a memorandum by the Nazi intelligence officer in Damascus reporting on negotiations he had had with emissaries of Stern and Shamir and claiming that the Stern Gang, which also considered co-operating with Fascist Italy, was 'closely linked to totalitarian movements in Europe, their ideology and their structures'. Stern offered the inducement that 'the establishment of the historic Jewish State on a national and totalitarian basis, and linked by treaty to the German Reich, could contribute to maintain and reinforce the future position of Germany in the Near East'.

There was no response from Hitler³⁹ to the *démarche*, which was not taken seriously. According to one commentator, it included a proposal which would have enabled a million Jews to emigrate from Germany to the USA. He adds with some sarcasm that vehement opposition to the idea by the Zionist leadership, which insisted on all emigration being to Palestine, led – in 'the outstanding achievement of the Jewish Agency' –

to the consignment of 'a million Jews . . . to the gas chambers and the gallows.'⁴⁰ Shamir was arrested in December 1941 by the UK for collaborating with the enemy and terrorism.

Britain Organises Its Defeat by the Zionists

While the threatened Zionist non-co-operation with Britain in the war was political, it was certainly not military. From that aspect, the conflict was a Godsend for Zionism. The Jews had been estimated by the Peel Commission to have stockpiled illegal arms and ammunition sufficient for an army of 10,000. Now they took full advantage of the hostilities to prepare for the eventual showdown with the Sorcerer. Even though for the moment the underdogs in the Palestine political stakes, during the war they were able to obtain the military expertise they were to need to defeat the Arabs and Britain at the end of it. Over 30,000 Jews were channelled by the Zionist authorities into Britain's Middle East forces (over 300 of them were commissioned) while remaining under clandestine Hagana orders.⁴¹ Chaim Herzog admits that the military, naval and air training they received provided 'much of the organizational, training and technical background that hitherto had been missing in the Haganah' and was invaluable in the creation of the Israeli army.⁴²

In complete contrast to the firm political line it had taken against the Jews in the White Paper, the UK, both knowingly and not, assisted them in strengthening their military preparedness. Giving point to the suspicion of some that the provisions of the White Paper favourable to the Palestinians had not been sincerely meant, far from following them up with implementative steps it gave military preference to the Jews whom it had just disadvantaged politically. As more and more British troops were withdrawn from the territory to fight elsewhere, by the end of 1940 the number of Jews in the British Army had reached 4,226. By October 1941 over 100,000 members of Hagana were armed by the UK as a home guard defence against a German breakthrough into Palestine. Many Jews were in supply and ordnance companies, 'an admirable situation for the smuggling of arms . . . , to which they resorted on a large scale', and Jewish concerns were given contracts to manufacture small arms, including mortars.⁴³ Until early 1943, when the possibility of a fascist invasion of Palestine through Egypt receded, Zionist officials co-operated militarily with Britain. Jewish units in Europe maintained contact with Hagana and established networks for the transfer of refugees and the theft of arms: Ben-Gurion 'oversaw a concerted effort to steal weapons and munitions from (the British).'⁴⁴ Revealing how

shortsighted and self-defeating it was of Britain to train and make military use of its Apprentice, with impressive prescience the CIGS, General Sir Alan Brooke, remarked in the summer of 1943 that in due course it would be targetting British soldiers. He was proved right by the fact that almost of all those who were to rise to become senior officers in the Israeli armies of 1948 to 1967 saw active service under Allied command and secured training through secret missions with UK special forces in the Middle East and Europe.

Jews and (incredibly) the Jewish terrorist organisations which were its principal foes were co-opted to help Britain fight its wars for several years of the conflict. In June 1938 a British Army company and a Hagana unit jointly attacked a village on the Vichy Lebanon border. Habforce, which played a major role in overthrowing the Golden Square in Baghdad in May 1941, included Irgun forces.⁴⁵ In May–July 1941, UK troops and units of Palmach (Plugot Machatz – Spearhead Groups, a ‘crack military force’ of élite commando ‘shock companies’ created by Britain that year) invaded Vichy Syria and Lebanon. Like Hagana, Palmach came to be an “attendant body” of the Jewish Agency.⁴⁶ Of its members, many served in the UK-raised Palestine Regiment⁴⁷ and some received commando training. It was led from 1945 by future Israeli Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, who had been trained in the Special Night Squads⁴⁸ and become their second in command.

Churchill himself contributed to the build-up of trained Jewish manpower. Awarding it the first visible mark of future approved independence, one opposed by the High Commission in Jerusalem, he acceded in 1943 to the Jewish Agency’s request for a Jewish brigade to be formed in the Allied forces. In September 1944 it was flying its own flag, wearing the Shield of David and seeing service as a separate unit in Italy and Germany. Although it did not take an active part in fighting, it became the basis for the Zionist drive against both the British and the Palestinians.

The war efforts of the Palestinians stand in stark contrast to those of their imminent oppressors. In just the same way as they had neglected to ‘create viable political institutions in preparation for any future transition to self-rule’ while the Zionists had seized ‘every opportunity to gain experience in government’,⁴⁹ their involvement in the war, with the valuable opportunities it offered for military training, was far less than that of the Jews. By the end of 1939, only 313 Palestinians had enlisted in the British Army, by the end of 1940 only 2,337.⁵⁰ During the whole of the war – no doubt inhibited by their own understandable suspicions that fighting for Britain might amount to fighting for the Jewish

National Home – a total of only 12,000 of them served in UK units or the British-officered Jordanian Arab Legion. They passed up an opportunity to serve in Arab-Jew Palestinian companies formed within the Royal East Kent Regiment, ‘the Buffs’, because recruitment was to have been on the basis of ‘strict numerical parity’.⁵¹ It was in addition a serious tactical error that ‘the Arab leaders in Palestine called off the revolt at the outbreak of war, and . . . throughout its duration the Palestine Arabs caused no embarrassment whatever to the British Government’.⁵²

Despite the benefits the war was bringing them, as a result of the White Paper the Zionists had lost all faith in the mandatory’s trustworthiness as sponsor of the National Home and transferred their hopes to the USA. The Biltmore Programme of May 1942, emerging from a sort of World Zionist Congress held at the eponymous New York hotel, could not have been more uncompromisingly opposed to the White Paper. It called for unlimited immigration, unrestricted land sales, a Jewish state to occupy the whole of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish army. On the basis of a Weizmann article which demanded that the Palestinians should be ‘clearly told that the Jews will be encouraged to settle in Palestine and will control their own immigration; that . . . Jews who so desire will be able to achieve their freedom and self-government by establishing a state of their own’, Ben-Gurion proposed a motion calling even more baldly for the establishment of a Jewish state.

The violence in Palestine hereafter, and until the beginning of 1948, was Jewish and British, with the the territory’s Arabs kept under by the garrison. Richard Casey, Minister of State in charge of relations with the Free French, was well in advance of events when he warned in April 1943: ‘The country is heading for the most serious outbreak of disorder and violence which it has yet seen, and . . . the explosion is timed to go off as soon as the War ends in Europe, or possibly a few months earlier’.⁵³

MacMichael’s Partition Initiative

Col. Stirling had considered that by 1941 the Jewish Agency was – in succession to the British military – ‘practically dictating policy to the High Commissioner’.⁵⁴ The administration was still not quite past taking initiatives, however. In September 1943, MacMichael in his Ivory Tower gave birth to a new partition proposal. This ‘cantonisation’ scheme divided Palestine, autonomous but under the protection of the UK, into Palestinian and Jewish states and a ‘State of Jerusalem’ which

was to include Bethlehem, Ramallah, Lydda and Ramlah. Surprisingly extending the move towards the Palestinians which had begun at the Round Table Conference, in the first ever institution-constructing proposal which, numerically, favoured them (and that mightily), it recommended a legislature of 28 members and 26 elected nominees (11 Muslims, 7 Christians and 8 Jews) in which they would hold a large majority.⁵⁵ MacMichael's plan did not in the end go through but underpinned much of the government thinking which was to be overwhelmed by the Zionist charge to seize Palestine. When Labour came to power in July 1945, it decided not to proceed with it despite Colonial (though not Foreign) Office approval and acceptance by the Cabinet the previous October.

Seven months after putting his plan forward, a despairing MacMichael confessed to Ben-Gurion that he had had no idea what his government had wanted from him and that no one had told him what measures they expected him to carry out. 'He himself had no clue what he was doing in Palestine'.⁵⁶ He was surely right in his judgement that for 25 years London had not known its own mind about the country. He resented the ingratitude of the Zionists. He informed Ben-Gurion that 'Only one nation in the world was helping them, only one country was doing anything to save them, and the Jews were incessantly sullyng and slandering and humiliating that very nation. Not a word of thanks'.⁵⁷ The Jews did not see it like that. Shortly before his departure, on 8 August, they made it clear that he would be the one to blame for the virtual abandonment of the Balfour Declaration and the turning-back of 'coffin ships' bringing Jewish fugitives from Europe – or failing to, like *Struma*, 'a 180-ton cattle boat' which in February 1942 had hit a mine in the Black Sea before the administration had made up its mind how to deal with the 769 refugees who had boarded it after escaping from the gas chambers of occupied Europe. (Only one of them survived). Opponents of the Zionists, Jewish as well as Gentile, alleged that – in a trick of a kind indulged in by Zionists both before and since⁵⁸ – in pursuit of their political aim 'they had deliberately hazarded the lives of Jewish refugees by embarking them on ships which (they) knew to be unseaworthy for a Palestine which they had no hope of reaching, so that their disaster should arouse sympathy which could be turned to advantage'.⁵⁹ Despite such credible accusations, among Zionist pamphlets was one put into circulation which announced that MacMichael was 'Wanted for Murder of 800 refugees in the Black Sea'. Stern,⁶⁰ the most violent and extreme terrorist group,⁶¹ made several attempts to ambush and kill him⁶² and once severely wounded Lady MacMichael.

PART SIX

HUMILIATION

CHAPTER

12

Israel is ‘Born in Sin’

‘The noble Jewish dream of statehood was stained for ever by a major injustice committed against the Palestinians . . . the Jewish state was born in sin.’ (Shlomo Ben-Ami)

‘I am for compulsory transfer; I see nothing immoral in it.’ (Ben-Gurion)¹

‘If I was an Arab leader I would never make [peace] with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country.’ (Ben-Gurion)²

Appointed High Commissioner in succession to MacMichael, Lord Gort³ arrived in October 1944 as a conference of Arab representatives in Alexandria was declaring that ‘there can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews in Europe by another injustice, that is, by inflicting injustice on the Palestinian Arabs.’

The following month, on 6 November, Lord Moyne, who had succeeded Lord Lloyd as Colonial Secretary in 1941 before becoming Deputy Minister of State in Cairo, was killed by the Stern Gang. He had observed that to allow the *Struma* refugees to reach Palestine would have been completely contrary to government policy and he was, with MacMichael, blamed for the loss of the ship. The Jews had decided that he was not interested in their plight in Europe⁴ when he remarked in the House of Lords in 1942 that they were not descendants of the ancient Hebrews and had no legitimate claim to the Holy Land. The assassination of his friend, even with his contrasting views, shook Churchill’s pro-Zionist enthusiasm. In the House of Commons, he voiced his fear lest ‘our labours . . . produce only a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany . . . these wicked activities must cease and those responsible for them must be destroyed, root and branch’.

Despite the assassination and British reactions to it, the omens looked even worse for the Palestinians than for the Jews. Delegates to the Labour Party’s annual conference in December 1944 called for the White Paper to be scrapped. Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, spoke in favour of a Jewish state. The Party Executive added that there

was a convincing case for 'transfer' in Palestine, 'on human grounds and to promote a stable settlement. Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out as the Jews move in.' Regurgitating Balfour's 'notch' argument, and ignoring the frequently expressed willingness of the Palestinians to welcome Jews under controlled conditions into their homeland, it added that, with the wide territories they possessed, the Arabs should not claim to exclude the Jews from 'this small area of Palestine'.

In April 1945 the Jewish Agency began to tighten pressure on London, requesting it to make 100,000 immigration certificates available immediately for Jewish Displaced Persons who had secured their liberation in Europe. In May, however, when Weizmann made a desperate appeal to Churchill 'to eliminate the White Paper, to open the doors of Palestine and to proclaim the Jewish State', the Prime Minister once again displayed the jaundice with which he now viewed the subject. He brusquely told the Zionist leader that consideration of the question of the final status of Palestine would have to wait for the postwar peace conference. In July, a month before his wartime coalition government was replaced by a Labour one led by Clement Attlee, he complained that it was now somebody else's turn to tackle the Palestine question. Overlooking the strategic arguments of the past, he declared that he was 'not aware of the slightest advantage which has ever accrued to Great Britain from this painful and thankless task' – a task whose initiation and erratic attempted execution the UK (and he along with it) had enthusiastically shouldered.

Labour had by now, thanks to Ernest Bevin, revised the stance taken by his party's 1944 conference. When in April of the following year, President Truman followed up the Jewish Agency request by asking Attlee to implement its demand for the entry of the 100,000, the British Prime Minister was able to reject it. (The Secretary-General of the Arab League, created that year, protested that Palestine had already taken in more Jewish immigrants than most people considered reasonable and should not be expected to take more.)

The Labour Government Flounders

After a World Zionist Congress in London had launched a violent condemnation of the White Paper,⁵ a Cabinet sub-committee chaired by Bevin decided in August, after all – in the absence of an alternative policy and because partition could only be carried out by force, – not to rescind it. (Koestler maintained that the move 'deprived the National Home of both hope and meaning. According to the school of semantics to which

Mr. Bevin belongs, a home was defined as a place which you are not permitted to enter'.) In reaching their conclusion, the members of the sub-committee were influenced by the revised view of the Chiefs of Staff that instability in Egypt rendered Palestine strategically essential as a substitute guardian of the Suez Canal gateway to India and that Arab opinion should therefore not be antagonised. Nonetheless, they urged that the grant of 1,500 monthly permits for DPs should continue despite the fact that the Zionist leaders had often been unable to use up generous immigration quotas.

Having rashly staked his political future on solving the Palestine question, at a press conference on 11 October Bevin emphasised, 28 years too late, his government's belief that assisting in the establishment of a Jewish National Home did not necessarily involve the creation of a Jewish state. Palestine alone could not solve the Jewish problem⁶ (an attitude which the Zionists denounced) and there was in any case no reason why Jews could not now remain in Europe. The Labour Party itself now did not agree with him. A resolution at its Party Conference in December, blithely ignoring the Palestinians, declared that 'there is surely neither hope nor meaning in a "Jewish national home" unless we are prepared to let the Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority.'⁷ (In the Lords the same month, in yet another refinement of his attitude to the problem Samuel went some way to support this approach, commenting that if the Balfour Declaration 'did not promise a Jewish state it had at least guaranteed the opportunity to bring about conditions which might in time make a Jewish state possible'.)

The Jews Institutionalise Terrorism

As the end of the war approached, with significant help from France the Zionists left words behind and began their final push for the acquisition of Palestine. Hagana was already making extensive arms' purchases in Europe and the USA. MI5, the UK's home security organisation, reported that France was selling Czech arms to the 'underground' army. In the summer of 1945 Ben-Gurion sought the help of Jewish millionaires in the USA in obtaining and shipping armaments. Determined to counter with force any attempt to condemn the Jews to permanent minority status, in September of that year Hagana set up a United Resistance Movement with the terrorist Irgun and Stern to fight any curtailment of immigration and to establish a Jewish government in those parts of Palestine it controlled. MI6, responsible for British foreign

intelligence, reported that France was providing funds for the Stern Gang, the aim of which, Yellin-Mor had stated, was to persuade the British people, by means of terrorist acts, to pressure its government to get out of Palestine; the agency had suspected for two years that Stern and Irgun had used Vichy Lebanon and Syria, 'if not with French connivance at least with their tacit approval', as a safe base. In 1946, France had gone further and agreed to the two terrorist organisations using its home territory as another, on condition that they did not there carry out actions against the UK.⁸

In contact with male Jews of military age in 550 Palestinian towns and settlements, Hagana now had a strength of 45,000, including Palmach (about 3,000), Irgun (some 5,000) and the Stern Gang (600.)⁹ It had taken full advantage of the training, practice and rehearsal opportunities given it by Britain in the war and as a result was equipped to rout not only the Palestinians but also the mandatory itself, only a quarter of whose 100,000 strong garrison were combat personnel. In face of London's apparent intention to stand by the White Paper and to resist pressure from Truman to abandon it, it now turned to violence and the booby-trap¹⁰ to achieve its ends. It aimed its terrorism in Palestine almost exclusively at Britain, without whose conception and support the question of a Jewish National Home would never have arisen. The Palestinians, in whose land the fight was staged, were from this point too insignificant to be of serious concern to Hagana and, until their fate was sealed in 1948, little more than onlookers.

Gort had reported in October 1945 that 'Ben-Gurion and the wilder men' were now in control. That month, Dr. Moshe Sneh, the Hagana leader, at Ben-Gurion's prompting proposed mounting with Irgun and Stern 'one serious incident' as 'a warning and an indication of much more serious incidents that would threaten the safety of all British residents in the country'. The first "warning" took wide-ranging form. On 25 October Hagana attacked a coastguard station, wounding over a dozen policemen. On the 31st. and the next day, Palmach damaged the Palestine railway system in 150 places and destroyed three police launches used for intercepting illegal immigrants. Irgun attacked railway yards at Lydda, where were the territory's main railway junction and only international airport, and Stern attempted to blow up the Haifa oil refinery. Six British police and soldiers were killed¹¹ by this terrorism. A Jewish Diaspora military front was opened at the end of October when Irgun wrecked the British Embassy in Rome with a massive explosion.

On 21 November, Gen. Sir Alan Cunningham, aged 58, replaced Gort, who was invalided home with terminal cancer. His arrival saw no let-up in the fierceness of the Jewish advance or in the humiliating

powerlessness of the UK to keep order in its mandated territory. On 27 December, Irgun killed 10 policemen and soldiers and wounded a dozen at CID headquarters in Jaffa and Jerusalem. In January 1946, Palmach attacked three Palestine Police Mobile Force camps and at the end of the month Hagana destroyed the coastguard station at Givat Olga and wounded 17 British troops. In February, as a second 'warning', Palmach destroyed the RAF's Haifa radar station, wounding eight British personnel, and Stern presented the garrison with a bill for £750,000 by attacking three military airfields, wrecking twelve 'planes and damaging 17. In April, it killed three policemen at Ramat Gan and on the 25th. murdered five paratroops and two other soldiers, several of them in cold blood.¹² In June, Irgun attacked four trains and Hagana/Palmach part-destroyed eleven bridges, cutting road and rail links to the outside world and doing £250,000 of damage. Two days later, Irgun kidnapped 6 British officers in Tel Aviv for use as bargaining counters in the cases of two of its members sentenced to death after a raid on a 3rd King's Own Huzzars' ammunition store in Sarafand three months before.¹³

The British–American Committee of Enquiry

At the end of 1945, the first of a series of fruitless investigations by the UK, assisted by the USA, was mounted against the backdrop of a Palestine virtually out of its control. The remit of the British–American Committee of Enquiry was to consider conditions in Palestine in relation to Jewish immigration and settlement and to the well-being of the general population and to look into the question of the Jewish holocaust survivors in DP camps in Europe.¹⁴ The committee's report was published on 30 April 1946. Rejected on behalf of their voiceless Palestinian brothers by the Arab League, it recommended the shelving of the White Paper, the abandonment of partition, a UN trusteeship over Palestine until its Arabs and Jews could live together in a unitary state, the lifting of land purchase restrictions, and the banning of illegal immigration and Jewish paramilitary organisations. Restating the view that Palestine alone could not absorb all Nazism's Jewish victims, it saw no contradiction in also demanding the immediate entry of the 100,000 immigrants whose cause, to the anger of Attlee,¹⁵ Truman had publicly reendorsed and backed with the offer of a grant-in-aid for their settlement.

Even though in an Israeli view the report had sung 'the tune composed by the Jewish Agency',¹⁶ the Zionists gave it only partial acceptance and ruled out the outlawing of the paramilitaries. Clutching at straws, Attlee linked the entry of 'so large a body of immigrants' to the abolition of the

terrorist groups which Britain had so recently co-opted in its wars. He would not implement the report's recommendations, he said in the House of Commons on 1 May, 'unless and until these formations have been disbanded and their arms surrendered'.¹⁷ His Cabinet, however – signalling at last the approaching demise of the fading White Paper, – agreed with his insistence on further negotiations between UK and US Cabinet committees to draw up a joint scheme on the basis of it.¹⁸

The UK Fights Back

In the eight months from 1 November 1945, the Jewish terrorist organisations had killed 18 British servicemen and wounded 101, inflicted a similar number of casualties on the Palestine Police and done £4 million of damage through sabotage. Attlee's wish to abolish them having been unrealised, from 29 June to 2 July, using 10,000 troops and 7,000 police, the administration launched Operation Agatha against them, occupying the Jewish Agency building and arresting 2,718 people, including Shertok and many Palmach commanders. It missed Irgun and Stern, its most fearsome opponents, and Ben-Gurion and Sneh who were in Paris.¹⁹ Despite the alleged ferocity and wanton destructiveness of what Weizmann labelled its attempt 'to wipe out the Yishuv',²⁰ the exercise was a failure. In cahoots with the supposedly unextremist Hagana, Irgun rubbed salt in the wound. In response to London's refusal to allow unlimited Jewish immigration, it carried out one of the worst atrocities of the whole mandate period. On 22 July it killed 91 people (41 Arabs, 28 Britons, 17 Jews and 5 others)²¹ by blowing up the Jerusalem King David Hotel, the temporary headquarters of the administration and the British Army's HQ.

Churchill's response to the crime was to call for the mandate to be abandoned. On 1 August in the House of Commons, contradicting official British military opinion and once again disavowing the whole *raison d'être* of the occupation of Palestine as a guardian of the Suez Canal gateway to India, he averred that retaining the territory was not a vital British interest and that no more UK casualties could be justified there. This former leading supporter of the Zionist cause made plain the depths of his sharp conversion by outraging Zionists with the claim that 'dumping' in Palestine Jews who could now be assimilated in post-Nazi Europe was not the way to solve the Jewish problem.

Zionist reaction to the King David Hotel outrage was subdued. The Jewish Agency sacked Sneh and broke off its United Resistance Movement alliance with Stern and Irgun, but it made no move to find

the perpetrators, and a leader of the latter claimed in any case that it had approved of this and other terrorist actions in advance. A week after the atrocity, the Army launched Operation Shark, over 20,000 troops striking at Stern and Irgun in Tel Aviv and the Jewish quarter of Jaffa, arresting over 370 terrorist suspects, including several Irgun leaders, and uncovering five arms' caches and weapons' dumps.²²

The Provincial Autonomy Scheme

On 31 July, details emerged of a follow-up to the British–American Committee of Enquiry. It was devised by Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council, and Henry F. Grady, the US Assistant Secretary of State. The Morrison/Grady Plan in effect recommended the abrogation of the White Paper and the replacement of the mandate by 'provincial autonomy' under UK trusteeship. While similar in its geographical dimension, the plan differed from MacMichael's 1943 cantonisation scheme in that it savoured less of partition and made no provision for legislatures. In addition to Palestinian and Jewish provinces, it recommended with remarkable optimism that a British High Commissioner should rule two entities: MacMichael's 'State of Jerusalem' and the Negev/Beersheba District, the latter perhaps to act as a corridor between the Army garrisons in the Canal Zone and Transjordan. Within EAC limits the two provinces would have control of immigration, which would continue even after Truman's wishes for the absorption of the 100,000 refugees had been met. Palestinian and Jewish representatives were to be invited to discuss the scheme, which had to be accepted by both.

The Arab League Decides to Invade

Discussions on Morrison/Grady took place at the Lancaster House Conference²³ in London, which lasted from 9 September–2 October 1946 and, after an adjournment, from 27 January–14 February 1947. It was attended by the member states of the Arab League but boycotted by those who most mattered, the Jewish Agency and the Palestinians. The agency considered that the plan, ruling out unlimited immigration and settlement, was not offering genuine self-government and would deprive the Jews of their presumed rights under the mandate in 85% of Western Palestine. The Palestinians would not take part without their only leader, the Mufty, who – allowed by France to return to

Cairo at the end of the war but kept under close UK surveillance there – had persuaded the Arab League that only the banned Arab Higher Committee should speak for them.²⁴

One day before the conference intermission began, Bevin reiterated to Weizmann that he could not agree that Palestine was the only possible home for Jews. He stressed the inescapable nature of Britain's duty to implement the third quarter of the Balfour Declaration. He submitted that, 'If a person's land and livelihood had to go in order to make room for another, his rights and position were certainly prejudiced'.²⁵

Two days later, Truman again provoked Attlee's wrath by making a statement which, seeking the Jewish vote in the imminent US presidential elections, appeared to endorse a Jewish Agency partition plan. Diverging from Biltmore, in the judgement of Ben-Ami it was a 'brilliant move' which completely won over the USA to the Zionist side and greatly influenced London's decision to refer the Palestine problem to the UN.²⁶ Truman considered that it would create 'a viable Jewish State in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of in the whole of Palestine'.²⁷ (Two months later, Bevin quipped to his Party's Conference that the President welcomed it because 'they didn't want too many Jews in New York'.²⁸ Certainly, Truman had a poor opinion of Jews, confiding to his diary that 'neither Hitler nor Stalin has anything on them for cruelty or mistreatment to the underdog'.²⁹ His country, too, had not been blameless in the matter of the entry of Jewish refugees. In 1939, it had turned away from Miami the 937 on board the SS *St. Louis*, 250 of whom became victims of the Holocaust.)³⁰

During the break in the conference, the Arab League – which had held separate conversations at it with Bevin and Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech-Jones³¹ and put forward a plan of its own –³² resolved at Aley in Lebanon to invade Palestine if the partition proposal were approved by the UN General Assembly.

Britain's Back to the Wall

At the war's end, Hagana mounted a huge operation to bring illegal immigrants into Palestine from Europe. With the Lancaster House talks adjourned, its operatives began working in the DP camps to drive Jews to Palestine as Israel was to drive them from Iraq and other Arab capitals after 14 May 1948. A 'vast organization' had been set up in Europe to propel immigrants into Palestine in defiance of the limits prescribed in the White Paper: 'a no-holds-barred campaign under Ben-

Gurion's leadership was launched . . . to persuade, insist upon, organize and even force refugees in the direction of Palestine. [T]he Zionist apparatus . . . proceeded to forcibly recruit some ten thousand soldiers and ship them to fight for a country that none of them knew or belonged to'.³³

During the same period, the garrison continued its operations against Zionist terrorism, admittedly with a far lighter touch than they had shown towards the Palestinian rebels in the 1930s. In February, CIGS Bernard Montgomery told the Cabinet Defence Committee that 76 army personnel and 23 policemen had been killed during the previous month³⁴ and accused Cunningham of preventing the army from acting against the terrorists. The High Commissioner responded by insisting that a general military "crackdown" 'would not have the slightest effect in reducing terror and might well increase it . . . I have always been clear', he protested, 'that the best method of dealing with terrorists is to kill them'.³⁵ In December, dredging up the High Commissioner's 8th. Army loss of nerve at the first Battle of Alamein, Montgomery asserted that Cunningham was not the right man for Palestine. The Colonial Office agreed with the High Commissioner, however, that what the CIGS was advocating would be ineffective against the terrorist organisations which, not being 'formed bodies', were the job of the police.

After four British soldiers (a major and three n.c.o.s) had been kidnapped and whipped by Irgun at the end of December in reprisal for the flogging of a captured militant, and after Stern had blown up the Police HQ in Haifa on 12 January, killing four and injuring 63, including 15 Britons, on the 15th. the Cabinet came to a conclusion about tactics different from that reached by the Colonial Office. It now agreed with Montgomery that more vigorous action should be taken against the terrorists, who, it noted with extraordinary fatalism, 'enjoyed the protection and support of a community, soon to gain nationhood, which chose to overlook all that Britain had done at such cost on its behalf throughout the six preceding years'.³⁷ On 23 January, Lt. Gen. Sir Evelyn Barker, GOC Palestine, told his commanders that the object was to kill or arrest terrorists and seize their arms.³⁷

US delegates had persuaded the Zionist Congress at Basel on 9 December (at which they were a third of those attending, the Yishuv only representing a fifth) to stick to its determination to throw the UK over and go all out for partition; Weizmann resigned as President of the Jewish Agency once more after a self-contradictory call he made for violence to be eschewed was rejected. On 7 January, 1947, Shertok announced that the Agency had significantly hardened the objectives of

its partition plan. It now envisaged Jewish statehood throughout a Palestine in which (at a time when the Jews were still only a third of the population and owned only 7% of the land, including, however, much of the agriculturally most productive areas) the Yishuv was as quickly as possible to become the majority community by dint of a 700,000 immigrant surge additional to Truman's 100,000. He offered the Palestinians an unconvincing guarantee of equal rights.

British Withdrawal and Ejection in Prospect

After almost exhausting a massive wartime loan from the USA, the UK was now facing financial collapse and could no longer afford costly overseas commitments. On 21 February, Attlee announced that it would leave India in August, making redundant any role for Palestine as the guardian of British routes to that country. The Foreign Office bowed to the inevitable and decided, in opposition to the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff,³⁸ that the political advantages of withdrawing from the territory now outweighed the strategic benefits to be gained by remaining. The revolution in Churchill's views continued to amaze. Agreeing, he averred on 4 August that 'No British interest is involved in our retention of the Palestine Mandate' and added that the UK had done its best to carry out what he now described, with an honesty he had not voiced a decade previously, as 'an honourable and self-imposed task'.

On 1 March, Irgun blew up the British Officers' Club in Jerusalem, killing 13 and wounding 16. By April the Jewish revolt had claimed 270 lives. On 12 March Churchill described what was going on as Britain's 'senseless, squalid war with the Jews in order to give Palestine to the Arabs, or God knows who'. On 5 and 7 June, Stern letter bombs arrived in his mail, and in those of Bevin, Sir Stafford Cripps (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Eden, a former Admiral of the Fleet and a prominent trade union leader. On the 28th, Jewish snipers killed 4 soldiers on Tel Aviv beach and Stern gunmen murdered an officer, and wounded 2 more, in the Astoria Restaurant in Haifa. On 30 July, in reprisal for the execution of three of their men by the garrison, Irgun hanged two British Intelligence Corps' sergeants in an orange grove near Netanya; a British officer was caused severe injury by their booby-trapped corpses. Zionist contempt for the mandatory reached its apogee when an Irgun notice displayed in Haifa accused the sergeants of 'Illegal entry into our homeland' and 'Membership of the British criminal-terrorist organisation known as the "British Army of Occupation in Palestine"'. Conveniently overlooking its own flirtations with Hitler, it labelled them 'criminals

who belong to the criminal Nazi-British Army of Occupation'. In reply to this outrage, *The Times* declared that 'The bestialities practised by the Nazis themselves could go no further'.³⁹

In the last three years of the mandate, some 40,000 illegal immigrants entered Palestine. Many more failed to do so as refugee ships were intercepted at sea. In 1946, the Royal Navy returned 17 to their starting points and MI6 sabotaged a number while in harbour. In 1947, over 51,000 refugees on 35 ships were interned in Cyprus. The case which brought the UK the most opprobrium involved the SS *Exodus* that year. As France was casting a blind eye on the substantial illegal refugee traffic to Palestine from its Mediterranean ports,⁴⁰ the British authorities prevented the ship from disembarking the approximately 4,500 DPs on board⁴¹ and sent it back to Marseilles. When the refugees refused to disembark there, it continued on to Hamburg in the British Zone of Germany.

Britain Abandons the White Paper and Seeks UN Assistance

Towards the end of the second session of the Lancaster House Conference, the Palestinians, the Jews, Truman and the UK itself having rejected the Provincial Autonomy Scheme (it had found favour only with the Arab states), the British Colonial and Foreign Secretaries proposed that a variant of it should supersede the White Paper, in accordance with which not even the first step had been taken towards the independent Palestinian state for which it had provided or to bring to an end the Jewish immigration which it had scheduled to cease after five years.⁴² This so-called Bevin Plan for Palestine envisaged liberal local autonomy and control of land sales, the admission of the enormous number of 4,000 Jewish immigrants a month for two years and the replacement of the UK's trusteeship after five by an independent and federal bi-national state. The Arabs and the Jews rejected the proposal. Ben-Gurion's declaration that the Jews 'wanted a Jewish state in Palestine in which the Jews would be a majority' caused Bevin to point out that 'under the Jews the Arabs would have no rights but would remain in a permanent minority in a land they had held for 2,000 years'.⁴³

Denouncing the Jewish demand for a state and courting scorn at the depths to which Britain had sunk after seizing the mandate for a highly dubious purpose and then being shown to be incapable of bringing it to a successful conclusion, he now turned to the UN for its opinion as to how the mandate might be administered or amended. As Creech-Jones, for long a Zionist sympathiser, stressed, he was not surrendering the

mandate but aiming to bring home to third parties who had been over-free with advice the practical difficulties London had faced. Another objective was perhaps to force the USA to take some responsibility for Middle Eastern strategic and political problems.

Following a formal British application therefore, on 15 May a special session of the UN General Assembly was convened. The upshot of the meeting was the establishment of UNSCOP (the UN Special Committee on Palestine), made up of representatives of small and medium countries with no direct involvement in the matter. This 'committee of experts' who 'unfortunately knew nothing about the subject', some of them 'indifferent to it',⁴⁴ was to interview all parties interested and recommend a system of governance acceptable to both the Palestinians and the Jews. It visited Palestine from 16 June to 24 July. The AHC and Transjordan refused to co-operate with it but the major Arab states gave evidence, almost unanimously demanding the creation of a unitary Arab state of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital. On 24 June, between its destruction of the Officers' Club in Jerusalem and its execution of the British sergeants, Irgun – whose disbandment Attlee was still impotently seeking – was, astonishingly, allowed to address the committee despite Cunningham's disapproval. In his evidence, Menachem Begin (a future Israeli Prime Minister) claimed that his quarrel was not with the Palestinians but with Britain. He remarked, 'We reject any statement by the Labour Party as to the transfer of any Arabs from the country. There is enough room in Palestine for all, both Jews and Arabs'. In the medium term, he said, Jews and Arabs would elect a permanent government in which 'there could be Arab ministers, perhaps an Arab Vice-President'.⁴⁵ When action followed these deceitful words, however, it was of a totally different character.

The Zionists had almost silenced the Palestinian case at the General Assembly with unfounded allegations that the staff of the Arab Office in Washington were Communist agents plotting subversion against the United States. Perhaps influenced by these 'dirty tricks', UNSCOP's report, issued on 31 August, was more favourable to the Jews than Peel had been. It recommended that the mandate should come to an end after a two-year probationary period of trusteeship by the UK, or by it and one or more UN member states, during which restrictions on land sales would be abolished and 150,000 Jews admitted. (This was a rate of immigration two thirds greater than that suggested six months before.) Palestine would be partitioned between an independent Palestinian state and an independent Jewish state, the two joined in economic union but only narrowly connected physically. The former, containing no port but two thirds of the population, was to take up

40% of the territory. Its state would contain Western Galilee, a strip on the Egyptian border including Gaza and Rafah, and a large area surrounding Jerusalem and bounded by Beersheba, Latrun, Nablus and the R. Jordan. The state proposed for the Jews, who at the time were 32% of the population, was – at 55% of Palestine – far larger than Peel had recommended. ‘Minuscule’ in Ben-Ami’s view, it was to consist of the Negev and the most fertile land (most of the coastal plain from Jaffa to Haifa, and Eastern Galilee) and contain half a million Palestinians. A third component of the partitioned territory was to be a demilitarised and neutralised international Jerusalem/Bethlehem area under permanent UN trusteeship.⁴⁶

Britain to Erase ‘Palestine’ from the Map

On 20 September, the UK Cabinet, which had swallowed its pride in ascertaining that the reviled Al-Hajj Amin shared its view, resolved to have nothing to do with UNSCOP’s recommendations. Bevin described the report as ‘so manifestly unjust to the Arabs that it is difficult to see how . . . we could reconcile it with our conscience’.⁴⁷ Opening the road to its own humiliation while avoiding Arab accusations that it was helping to bring about partition, Britain would, therefore, simply withdraw from Palestine.⁴⁸ The decision to do so was influenced by such considerations as the effect on British public opinion of the murder of the two sergeants, the cost of remaining, the likelihood that the Suez Canal base would still be viable if its Palestine backstop were withdrawn, and the Cabinet’s belief that it was high time others took a turn at trying (and failing) to find a solution.

The mandate was to be given up on 1 August 1948. Its final phase saw the UK continuing to act with the self-contradiction and lack of singlemindedness which had marked the whole of the period of its catastrophic interference in the affairs of the Palestinians. With complete disregard for any duty of care, it now began to bring to fruition the hostility to them which it had renewed when it failed to carry through the 1939 White Paper and to substitute annihilation for partition. It was determined to uphold the Balfour Declaration to the bitter end, to make sure that the Zionists who despised their British sponsors would enjoy the benefit of its favouritism and to deny the name ‘Palestine’ a geopolitical existence on the map.

The Zionist/‘Abd Allah Alliance

The UK’s decision to withdraw masked its last deplorable trick on the Palestinians.⁴⁹ It had connived in a secret deal between the Zionists and King ‘Abd Allah of Transjordan, who had maintained covert contact between each other since 1921, to divide Palestine between them. According to one source, denying a state to the Mufty, was the motive, and a puerile one at that. His crimes could not be compared with those of the Jewish terrorist armies, let alone of the Führer in the grotesquely exaggerated later view of Binyamin Netanyahu. Britain’s hatred of its bogeyman was worth a kingdom – but not to the Palestinians. With remarkable self-delusion, it allowed itself to harbour the pathetic hope that by handing one half of the territory over to non-Arabs and giving the other half to the wrong Arabs it could maximise its residual influence in the Middle East after its expulsion from the territory.

The division of Palestine was agreed on 17 November 1947 between ‘Abd Allah and Golda Myerson, who became Mrs. Meir, a future Prime Minister of Israel who considered the Palestinians of no account. The alliance permitted ‘Abd Allah to annex to his kingdom the miserly 22% of Palestine which the United Nations’ partition resolution had allocated to a Palestinian state. In return, he entered into a contract which hamstrung the leading Arab army, his own 8,000-strong Arab Legion, in the fight to the finish.⁵⁰ He was to take no part in any pan-Arab military operations against the Jews and do nothing to prevent Ben-Gurion from seizing the rest of the 78 per cent of Palestine which (as distinct from the UN resolution’s 57%) his Jewish state still lacked.

In January 1948, Bevin saw no reason to withhold his informal approval of this vindictive arrangement, even though it seemed to run counter to his heretofore consistently pro-Palestinian line. Enabling Transjordan to occupy the West Bank after the British withdrawal, it was the culmination of London’s programme (starting with Husayn/McMahon) to deny Palestine its post-Ottoman entitlement to independence. It chimed well with Mrs. Meir’s famous comment that ‘It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist’. This was standard Zionist anti-Arabism, identical to Mrs. Dugdale’s remark about Syria, which she described as ‘a non-existent place (for what is Syria?)’⁵¹

Mandate to End

On 29 November, in its Resolution 181 which had no binding force and was not adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly gave approval to the UNSCOP partition.⁵² The Arab League and the Palestinians rejected it, but the Jews accepted it. They had now received international recognition, though not from the UK, of their right to an independent state *in* Palestine as 'the victory at the United Nations was essentially won in the United States.'⁵³ Many of the Zionists, ominously, considered the frontiers of the to-be-partitioned Palestine to be 'provisional and subject to enlargement as opportunity offers'.⁵⁴ Ben-Gurion's acceptance of the state proposed was tactical procrastination. The area of Jewish independence outlined in the resolution was far from final, he said in December, and Allon, who in 1948 was to play a major military part in ensuring that it was not, endorsed the proposition that 'the borders of partition cannot be for us the final borders'.⁵⁵ If they could have brought themselves to negotiate about the Balfour Declaration, this was exactly the sort of stance the Palestinians ought to have taken.

On 11 December, London moved the end of the mandate forward by eleven weeks, to 15 May. It was obviously prepared to leave Palestine in a condition of chaos: on 20 November, the UN had announced the vengeful UK decision not to allow a five-member Palestine Commission – appointed to arrange a peaceful transfer of power to the two UNSCOP states – to enter the country or to transfer any authority there to Palestinians or Jews while the mandate lasted. The commission had to begin its work in New York State.

Crimes against Humanity

UN efforts were powerless to engineer a peaceful conclusion to the mandate with which Britain had wrecked Palestine. Shamefully, with a British administration theoretically still in charge of the country, open Jewish/Arab warfare started on 8 December 1947 when Palestinians (helped by regular troops from several Arab countries) and the Arab Legion (despite Transjordan's territory-sharing agreement with the Zionists) attacked Jewish settlements. The advantage, however, lay with the Jews, whose ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians – 'under international law, a war crime'⁵⁶ despite Ben-Gurion's success in persuading himself of its complete acceptability – began that month and quickly resulted in the expulsion of 75,000 of them.⁵⁷ Ben-Ami summarised the situation: 'An Arab community in a state of terror facing a ruthless

Israeli army whose path to victory was paved not only by its exploits against the regular Arab armies, but also by the intimidation, and at times atrocities and massacres, it perpetrated against the civilian Arab community. A panic-stricken Arab community was uprooted under the impact of massacres and mass expulsions.’

As the UK strictly prevented the Palestinian peasantry from owning weapons, rendering their villages defenceless,⁵⁸ the Apprentice had been almost openly arming its *kibbutzim* as Hagana controlled the areas between them. By February, Ben-Gurion had organised military districts and brigade commands.

Hagana was boosted early in 1948 when Paris approved a \$26m deal to arm 8,000 of its personnel, selling it Czech arms and transporting them by air from France to Palestine. On 5 January in Jerusalem it blew up 26 civilians, including the Spanish Consul, at the Semiramis Hotel and killed 20 and wounded 40 at the Jaffa Gate. On 22 February, at least 52 people were murdered by a bomb in the centre of the Jerusalem Jewish business district⁵⁹ and 9 British soldiers lost their lives in 18 hours. The reaction of Palestinians who could was to leave. In January they began packing up and departing in droves, ‘for the duration’, from Jaffa, Haifa and elsewhere.

As the means to deliver the *coup de grâce*, Ben-Gurion, other Zionist leaders and Hagana finalised a master plan for the mass expulsion of Palestinians from any part of the country they deemed had been awarded to the Jewish state. In March, as Cunningham was complaining to Creech-Jones that Britain now appeared to be getting out of Palestine as quickly as possible without regard to the consequences,⁶⁰ they drew up and activated Plan Dalet, ‘a systematic blueprint for the ethnic cleansing of most of Palestine’ via the seizure of strategic points both on the likely routes of Arab invasion and in areas of Jewish settlement outside the limits of the UN Partition Resolution. Aiming for a Jewish state containing the least possible number of Palestinians, all commanders of Hagana (which now had a strength of more than 50,000 troops, half of them trained by the British Army during the war)⁶¹ were ordered to occupy and destroy every village and neighbourhood in their areas of responsibility and to evict their inhabitants. After Dalet had begun, if not from as early as October 1947, the British Army gave carte blanche to Zionist forces by making it known that it was renouncing its law and order role and would in future occupy itself merely with its own self-defence and with responsibility for Jewish population centers. It did so almost to the end, thus impeding Arab war plans while coordinating with the Jewish Agency the transfer of much of government to it.⁶² It did not attempt to prevent

the onward march of Hagana and at times even assisted expelled Palestinians to abandon their homes.

Between February and May, the Zionists occupied large parts of Palestine and ejected their populations. On 9–10 April, a new atrocity level was reached. '[P]ar une méthode identique à celle des nazis à Oradour',⁶³ Stern and Irgun, with the connivance of Hagana⁶⁴ and with Begin in command, carried out a massacre a little west of Jerusalem, at the village of Dair Yasin, which had signed a non-aggression pact with the Zionists. The bodies of their victims were thrown into the village well. The crime, pitilessly described by future Israeli President Herzog merely as 'one of the more contentious episodes in the war',⁶⁵ was disavowed by the Jewish Agency and Hagana, in Cunningham's view deceiving nobody. Begin protested that there would not have been a state of Israel without what he was pleased to call a victory over, according to Irgun and Stern spokesmen, about 200 Palestinians, half of them women and children.⁶⁶ He clearly felt no shame that, by his own admission, Israel was founded on terrorism. The last Chief Secretary of the UK administration, Sir Henry Gurney, rated Dair Yasin 'typical of the ruthlessness and degradation' of people who are 'the dregs of utter degradation', beside whose 'bestialities . . . Belsen pales.'⁶⁷ (Reinforcing this judgement, Hagana – supposedly committed to "purity of arms" – went on to carry out 'the bulk of more than thirty similar Dair Yasin massacres'.)⁶⁸

The Palestinians now began to flee from all parts into the neighbouring Arab countries as Arabic media accounts of Dair Yasin filled the peasantry with extreme fear. Terrorism breeds terrorism: the Palestinians on 13 April ambushed a medical convoy travelling to the Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem, killing 72,⁶⁹ and on 13 May 124 Jewish settlers were killed, and hundreds more captured, by villagers at Kfar Etzion.⁷⁰

Before Arab armies crossed the borders on the expiry of the mandate, 200,000 to 300,000 or more Palestinians, most driven out, had sought security in refugee camps. Vast areas of Palestine were taken over by the Jews without fear of a response from British forces, who in their anxiety to get themselves away stood idly by as Palestinian villages were destroyed and their inhabitants expelled. 11,000 Arab and Jewish Palestinians had co-existed peacefully for centuries in Tiberias. Hagana bombarded the town with artillery from the surrounding heights, rolled barrel bombs down onto it and terrified the population with loudspeakers. UK troops prevented Al-Qawukchy and the Arab League's Arab Liberation Army, 'the weakest link in the Arab chain',⁷¹ from sending in more than 30 people to help defend the town, which capitulated.

lated on 18 April. Haifa, where British troops were present in large numbers as they awaited reembarcation, was a UK disgrace and ‘one of the most shameful chapters in the history of the British Empire in the Middle East’.⁷² As in Safed, which fell to Hagana on 11 May, the army there told ‘the Jewish authorities’ that it was withdrawing. To avoid heavy fighting and loss of life (including British life), it refused to allow Arab reinforcements to enter the town, sending Irgun ‘a green light to proceed with the city’s “de-Arabisation”’.⁷³ Pleas by an honourable Jewish mayor to the 100,000 Palestinian inhabitants⁷⁴ to stay were trumped as all but a few thousand of them were expelled on 21/22 April. Cunningham commented, ‘It is no wonder that the Arab population have almost left, for how can one expect them to live in an area deserted by the army, where the *Haganah* lord it at will and against whom they have no protection. No doubting it, Haifa is a bad blot on our prestige’.

To London, he attacked Hagana’s ‘mortaring of terrified women and children’. Its broadcasts he found, ‘both in content and delivery, . . . remarkably like those of Nazi Germany’.⁷⁵

In the first week of May, a suspicious outbreak of typhoid poisoned Acre’s water supply⁷⁶ as loudspeakers blared out the message ‘Surrender or commit suicide. We will destroy you to the last man’. On the 13th., ‘with the “help” of British mediation’, the 50,000 inhabitants of Jaffa were driven out by Irgun and into the Mediterranean as they tried to find passage to Gaza.⁷⁷ In parts of Jerusalem, ‘the British even disarmed the few Arab residents defending themselves against Jewish attacks on their neighbourhoods’.⁷⁸

There was only one outside Arab intervention in Palestine before May, led by Al-Qawukchy. It failed. The Palestinians themselves took no Jewish settlements.

The Balfour Declaration is Fulfilled and the Apprentice is Independent

Though a US proposal on 19 March that Palestine should be temporarily placed under UN trusteeship was vetoed by the UK and the USSR, on 16 April a low-level UN Truce Commission, composed of the Belgian, French and US consuls, had been set up in Jerusalem by the General Assembly. On 21 April, it approved a Statute of Jerusalem which included among its provisions a final futilely unrealistic suggestion of a Legislative Council⁷⁹ as Palestine went up in flames and the administration declared an arms’ embargo on both sides. This crippled the Palestinians by preventing them from replenishing their stocks while

Hagana was receiving a large shipment of heavy arms from Czechoslovakia and the USSR in April and May.⁸⁰

On 14 May, enormous amounts of military stores were left behind as Cunningham departed. There being no one to whom he felt that he could hand over, the Union Jack flying over the British High Commission was replaced by the Red Cross flag. (He could hardly have bequeathed Palestine to the Zionists for whom the Balfour Declaration had been issued but who in the end had become Britain's assailant. They expressed their gratitude for the triumph they owed to the UK not only with 'the bitterest misrepresentation by the Zionist press, but a cemetery full of British police and another cemetery full of British soldiers.')⁸¹ Twenty-eight years before, Bols had passed Palestine on 'in good order' to Samuel. Cunningham was the unfortunate who left it in disorder twenty-eight years later.

At midnight, disregarding the UNSCOP recommendation of a two-state Palestine, with a portrait of Herzl behind him Ben-Gurion announced in Tel Aviv the birth of Israel.⁸² Making no mention of the Palestinians at whose expense the 'two thousand year chapter of injustice, homelessness, and frustration' had been closed, Weizmann wrote in celebration of the state whose intention to establish he and the Zionists had repeatedly, if inconsistently, denied. In Ben-Ami's words, 'the noble Jewish dream of statehood was stained for ever by a major injustice committed against the Palestinians . . . the Jewish state was born in sin'.⁸³

The state already occupied most of the territory allotted to it by the UN, as well as major towns like Acre and Jaffa which were to have been Palestinian. In Jaffa, as in Haifa, Safed and Tiberias, no 'non-Jewish' inhabitants were left and more than a hundred of their villages had been requisitioned. In line with the habitual Israeli policy of non-admission, for example of its possession, later, of nuclear weapons, Ben-Gurion left the borders of the new country undefined, as they still are.⁸⁴ The mandate ended, two weeks late, on 15 May, a Jewish Provisional State Council and Executive Council (the latter had superseded the Jewish Agency Executive in November) were ready to take over and the state's army was immediately set to widen the borders by occupying more of the Palestinian partition zone. (To deceive world opinion the army, though one of unparalleled aggressiveness, was dubbed 'the Israeli Defence Forces'.)

More interested in securing territory for themselves and confronting the threat Israel posed to the Arab world as a whole than in attempting to enable a Palestinian Arab state to be born, the armies of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, and the Arab Legion, began to invade the 'land-

grab state', the 'nation built on stolen land'.⁸⁵ The outcome was beyond doubt. The war for Palestine had been 'lost by the Arab community ten years before it even began'.⁸⁶ Although 30 months earlier, Lieut.-Gen. Sir John D'Arcy, Barker's predecessor as GOC Palestine, had told the British-American Committee of Enquiry that 'the *Haganah* would take over all of Palestine tomorrow' and could hold it against 'the entire Arab world',⁸⁷ London's assessments of Israel's military preparedness were in general absurdly far from the mark, and Israel's claims of its defencelessness false.⁸⁸

Israel's "revisionist" or "new" historians have since made it unarguable that the military odds were far from stacked against the new state. Even Ben-Gurion admitted that, since Israel had the larger army, it was not true that the war was one of the few against the many.⁸⁹ Since the Zionists had been preparing to take on the Arabs for so long, the strength of the Israeli forces was 75–100% greater than the combined strength (about 40,000, only a quarter of them in the Arab Legion) of the disunited, uncoordinated and largely inept invading Arab armies. (Nahum Goldman of the Jewish Agency said on 20 April that the trained Zionist strength was 30,000, rising 40,000, that after 15 May another 20,000 would arrive to increase it from outside the country and that Arab troop numbers were only 18,000.) Other estimates put Zionist manpower in the same month at between almost 68,000 (about 30,000 men under arms, 10,000 for local defence, a home guard of 25,000 and in addition Irgun with 2,000 and Stern 800) and 98,000. Overall, no one should be surprised – given the fact that they were operating on internal lines, their superiority in manpower, the amount of military training they had received in the British Army during the war and their acquisition of large amounts of *matériel*, including warplanes from UK personnel or from Russia – that the Jews (anything but defenceless, unlike the Palestinians) were able to defeat all the Arab forces together in 1948. Calling the kettle black, and turning a blind eye to the help given by British troops to Hagana as it 'transferred' thousands of Palestinians, Bevin complained to the US ambassador that his country's policy appeared to be to assist the Zionists to crush the Palestinians while preventing the other Arab countries from helping them.

In 1948–9, in a few weeks, the Jewish-occupied area of Palestine grew by more than it had done during the previous 50 years. The 'new historians' have proved that most of the Palestinians were forcibly driven away. Only 150,000 of them remained within Israel as about two thirds of their population, some 700,000,⁹⁰ became refugees in Lebanon, Syria and the Arab Legion-held West Bank.⁹¹ Commentators put the number

of Palestinian villages in 1948 at between 475 and 531. Of them – as the Zionists abandoned their repeated claims that they did not wish to deprive the Palestinians of their land, – from 385–400 were destroyed,⁹² the great majority of them ‘erased from the land’. Even according to official Israeli sources, 300 ‘abandoned’ villages, 20,000 acres of orange groves, more than 50,000 acres of orchards, and 25,416 residential, shop and workshop buildings in towns were confiscated by the new state. In April 1969, Moshe Dayan claimed that there was not a single Jewish village which had not been built on top of a razed Arab one: ‘Nahalal took the place of Mahloul.’⁹³ Waqf property, which in 1936 occupied a sixth of the area of Palestine, was confiscated. By the end of the war, seven mixed or mainly Palestinian neighbourhoods in west Jerusalem, and nearly all Palestinian villages west of it, had lost all their inhabitants.

In 1937, Ben-Gurion had told his son, ‘We will expel the Arabs and take their place. In each attack a decisive blow should be struck resulting in the destruction of homes and the expulsion of the population’; in June 1938, he had informed the Jewish Agency Executive, ‘I am for compulsory transfer; I see nothing immoral in it’. Co-operatively, the Palestinians had fled prematurely in fear of their lives and been expelled or terrorised into leaving. None were permitted to return. (In the Jordanian zone, while the other Arab armies hung on like vultures to the outskirts of the battle, the Arab Legion did most of the fighting. Its capture on 28 May of the old city of Jerusalem was its only significant success in the war. It emulated Israeli tactics against the Jews there and at settlements near the Dead Sea.)⁹⁴

Weizmann had told Balfour in 1925 that ‘we would never cause any other section of the population to suffer as we have been made to suffer’. Now mistaking crimes for Godsendings – as ‘the establishment of Israel meant the end of a Diaspora’ while ‘for the Palestine Arabs, it was apparently to be the beginning of one’,⁹⁵ – he declared the exodus of the Palestinians to be a ‘miraculous simplification of Israel’s tasks’. To his credit, Bentwich demurred, deeming ‘the fate of hundreds of thousands of Arabs, who fled from western Palestine during the War of Independence . . . a sad comment on the Hebraic teaching to love thy neighbour as thyself.’⁹⁶ Already, on 2 June, the Head of the British Middle East Office in Cairo, Sir John Troutbeck, described to Bevin the newly independent Israel as a ‘gangster state headed by an utterly unscrupulous set of leaders’. These leaders crowned their achievements by their worst massacre, at Dawayma (west of Hebron) on 28 October, when, according to Ilan Pappé, they murdered 455 Palestinians, including 170 women and children.

Though it had neglected to implement a General Assembly resolution of 11 December calling for refugees to be allowed to return to their homes, a year after its successful ethnic cleansing of Palestine Israel was admitted to the UN on 11 May 1949 at the insistence of the USA. Its acceptance by the world body was with the conditions that the status of Jerusalem should not be varied, that the Palestinians should be allowed to repatriate and that the boundaries prescribed by the UN's 29 November 1947 partition decision should be respected. Israel has ignored these provisions and the international community has allowed it to flout them.

Balfour's "Experiment" Unfinished

The march of events after the end of the mandate was hardly disturbed by two 'truces' which the new state repeatedly infringed. During them, the fighting never really stopped in Jerusalem. At the time of the first ceasefire, declared on 11 June by Count Folke Bernadotte (President of the Swedish Red Cross and newly appointed General Assembly mediator),⁹⁷ Israel had far outstripped the dimensions of the partition plan, the Egyptian army was in occupation fourteen miles beyond Gaza, the Iraqis held the West Bank, and Transjordan controlled East Jerusalem, Hebron, Lydda and Ramlah.⁹⁸ The number of Arab regular troops who had entered Palestine grew to 45,000 and the Israelis continued to bring in arms from East Europe.⁹⁹ The principal effect of a blockade imposed by the UK, the USA and France (which flew FF 153 million of arms to Irgun)¹⁰⁰ was to block the shipment of Western arms to the Arabs. After the first 'truce' ended on 8 July, the Israelis occupied much of western Galilee (including Nazareth) in the Palestinian partition zone. Among 14 towns seized were Lydda (now Lod) and Ramlah. Another future Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, ordered the expulsion of up to 60–70,000 of their Palestinian inhabitants, most of them women and children.

Those UK troops who had remained in Palestine during its erasure at last departed at the end of June. After the eponymous Bernadotte Plan had emerged at the end of the month, only to be vetoed by Truman,¹⁰¹ a second 'truce' began on 18 July. The best the Arab League could do for their hapless Palestinian brothers was, with pitiful unrealism, to announce on 20 September that it would establish in Gaza an All-Palestine Government headed by Al-Hajj Amin (who was 'functioning in an imaginary reality unrelated to the disaster on the ground') and with Jamal al-Husayny as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In October, the new

body, in this 'absurd drama',¹⁰² announced that 'The residents of Palestine . . . have decided to declare the whole of Palestine . . . an independent state'.¹⁰³ At a time when the Israelis were taking practical steps to consolidate their conquest of the country of their impotent victims with 'facts on the ground', nothing resulted from this desperate initiative, which collapsed at the end of the month.

Stern assassinated Bernadotte on 17 September for seeking to internationalise Jerusalem. The following month, breaking the second truce on 15 October, Israel defeated the Egyptian Army and occupied the whole of the Negev. On 30 November, it signed a ceasefire with Transjordan. By December, the Palestinian and Arab forces had been defeated. Making nonsense of 'the myth about the Israeli David winning the day against the Arab Goliath with seven powerful invading armies at his disposal determined to throw the Jews into the sea', with its larger and better trained forces Israel had captured the territory awarded it under the UNSCOP partition plan, plus about half that earmarked for the Palestinian State.¹⁰⁴ It now held a total of 75% of Palestine rather than the 57% it had been allotted. In December, UN General Assembly Resolution 194 impotently stated 'that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return'.¹⁰⁵

In early 1949, Transjordan invoked its treaty with the UK when the Israelis crossed the Egyptian border. British troops landed at 'Aqaba. Despite the downing of four British Spitfires and a Hawker Tempest based in Egypt (one of the former was destroyed by the RAF-trained future seventh President of Israel, Ezer Weizmann), on 29 January the UK recognised Israel. On 24 February Egypt signed an armistice agreement, and Lebanon did so on 23 March. In the spring, a statement on Resolution 194 by a peace conference at Lausanne resolved that the bases of a peace should be a two-state solution, an internationalised Jerusalem and the unconditional return of (or compensation for) the refugees. It was accepted by the UN, the USA, Israeli Foreign Minister Shertok, the Arab World and the Palestinians, who, too late, offered to enter negotiations based on the UN partition resolution they had earlier rejected.¹⁰⁶ Torpedoed, however, by arch villains Ben-Gurion and 'Abd Allah, the Lausanne recommendation has lain unimplemented ever since, the Israelis using as the excuse for their non-compliance in the matter of refugee return that – the opposite of the truth – the Iraqis had driven their Jews out and frozen their property when Israel was created. On 3 April, Jordan signed an armistice. Syria did so on 20 July and evacuated three demilitarised zones, 'nominally monitored' by the UN. Israel

proceeded to seize them, replacing Palestinian villagers with settler-farmers and bringing the area of mandatory Palestine it controlled up to almost 80%, four times Peel and 125% of UNSCOP.

On about 12 November 'Abd Allah was crowned 'King of Jerusalem' and on 1 December a conference of notables in Jericho declared him King of all Palestine, including the Palestinian West Bank he had seized. Its call for the unification of both banks of the Jordan (but without the independent Hebrew republic he had also aspired to bring within his rule)¹⁰⁷ was endorsed by the Jordanian parliament on the 13th., when an Israel/Jordan draft peace treaty was initialled. Outlasting his great rival, the Mufty, Raghīb an-Nashashībī was appointed first military governor of the West Bank. On 9 December, the General Assembly reaffirmed that Jerusalem would be internationalised and administered by the UN. Two days later, in blunt contradiction, Israel declared that Jerusalem would be its capital.

The Palestine situation was clearly far from settled. Few would have forecast, however, that, nearly 70 years later, it would still not be. Perhaps even Balfour, if he had had the imagination to envisage such an outcome to his Declaration, would have regretted the fact that his interesting 'experiment' (still uncompleted almost a century later) had caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands and ruined the lives of millions.¹⁰⁸ Not only that. Those who promoted the National Home project as a strategic enterprise surely would have resented the fact that the more than thirty years of stressful effort which had followed Lloyd George's request to Asquith's Cabinet to consider 'the ultimate destiny of Palestine' had brought the UK less than nothing. As the 'non-Jewish communities' lost their homeland and the Sorcerer was expelled from their territory by its Apprentice, Britain had no one to hand Palestine over to and had lost all its prestige in the Middle East as well as the base, the Haifa port, the operating pipeline and the railway to Iraq which it had fondly hoped to secure as the rewards for its sponsorship of a National Home for the Jews on someone else's land.

Notes

Preface

- 1 Norman Rose, *'A Senseless, Squalid War'*, London, Pimlico, 2010, p. 18.
- 2 *Bygone Heat: Travels of an Idealist in the Middle East*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. xiv.

Introduction

- 1 Arthur A. Goren, *Dissenter in Zion: From the Writings of Judah L. Magnes*, Cambridge, Mass., and London, Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 27.
- 2 C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1973, p. 204.
- 3 Freya Stark, *Dust in the Lion's Paw*, London, Arrow Books, 1990, p. 166.
- 4 Churchill believed in 1908 that Jews would be much more trustworthy than Arabs as promoters of British interests (William M. Mathew, "The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917–1923: British Imperialist Imperatives"), *BJMES*, 40, 3, July 2013, p. 247.
- 5 In the words of a senior British ambassador, though Palestine was 'inhabited by Arabs and by a few scattered Zionist settlers the wickedly dwarfing words "existing non-Jewish communities" were applied to the former by Britain'. (Laurence Grafftey-Smith, *Bright Levant*, London, John Murray, 1970, p. 152.) This is like speaking to-day of the UK's non-Muslim community, when it amounts to 97.5% of the total population.
- 6 Saïd K. Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1997, p. 210.
- 7 Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country – The Story of Musa Alami*, London, John Murray, 1969, pp. 102–4.
- 8 Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds.), *The Israel–Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1984, p. 4. The BILU (Beit Ya'akov Lekhu ve-Nelkhah) were members of Hovevei Tsiyón (Society of the Lovers of Zion), a group which stemmed from Hibbáth Tsiyón (The Love of Zion) and was founded in 1881–2 by students in St. Petersburg. It was contributed to by Laurence Oliphant.
- 9 Bernard Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 199–200.
- 10 Mrs. Vowls, in Joyce Cary, *The African Witch*, New York, Harper & Row, 1936, pp. 67–8.
- 11 On the eve of the 1948 war, Ben-Gurion accused Arabs and Palestinians of

being ‘disciples and even teachers of Hitler’. (Norman G. Finkelstein, *Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History*, London, Verso, 2008, p. xxix). During the Eichmann trial, the Israeli press labelled the Mufti as ‘among the biggest Nazi war criminals’ and mastermind of the Final Solution; at it, Netanyahu called him ‘one of the initiators of the systematic extermination of European Jewry’. (Finkelstein, *Beyond Chutzpah*, *op. cit.*, p. xxx).

- 12 Al-Hajj Amin’s memoirs in Hebrew, in Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, p. 65.
- 13 As in their forging of British passports to assist in their assassination of a Hamas leader in Dubai in March 2010 and in their scorn for the likely British reaction.

1 Zionism Emerges

- 1 D.K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 131.
- 2 Ilan Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis 1700–1948*, London, Saqi Books, 2010, pp. 84 and 117.
- 3 James Parkes, *A History of the Jewish People*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1964, p. 184.
- 4 Florian Sokolow, *Nahum Sokolow*, London, Jewish Chronicle Publications, 1975, p. 49. The scheme was in reality a plan for a solution of the Eastern Question, with Palestine (as a British protectorate) providing a better bulwark against Russian expansion than Cyprus, just stolen from the Porte. It was described in Oliphant’s 1880 *Land of Gilead* (Anne Taylor, *Laurence Oliphant*, Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 90–1.
- 5 Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929*, London, Frank Cass, 1974, p. 59.
- 6 Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1994, p. 2.
- 7 Pappé, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
- 8 Norman Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War’, London, Pimlico, 2010, pp. 212–13.
- 9 Michael Rice, *False Inheritance: Israel in Palestine and the Search for a Solution*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1994, pp. 79 and 81.
- 10 Pappé, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
- 11 Ben Cramer, Richard, *How Israel Lost: The Four Questions*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 146.
- 12 E.g. in a letter of 11 January 1902 to him (Roger Garaudy, *Les Mythes fondateurs de la politique israélienne*, Paris, Samizdat, 1996, p. 17.)
- 13 Herzl 12 June 1895 diary entry (Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, Oxford, Oneworld Publications, 2007, p. 243.)
- 14 Yitzhak Laor, *The Myths of Liberal Zionism*, London, Verso, 2009, pp. 6–7.
- 15 Sokolow, *Nahum Sokolow*, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

- 16 Joel Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism: Creating a Single Democratic State in Israel/Palestine*, London, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 90.
- 17 The text of 'The Basle Declaration' is to be found in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds.), *The Israel–Arab Reader*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1984, pp. 11–12.
- 18 Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel*, London, Collins, 1965, p. 23.
- 19 Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
- 20 Sokolow, *Nabum Sokolow*, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–1.
- 21 Christopher Sykes, *Two Studies in Virtue*, London, Collins, 1953, p. 146.
- 22 Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*, 7th edition, Boston and New York, Bedford/St. Martins, 2010, p. 31.
- 23 In 1912, however, 'it appeared almost certain for a moment that the Jewish Territorial Organisation, a party of defeated Ugandists led by Israel Zangwill, would get all that they wanted from the Portuguese in the way of land colonisable by 120,000 settlers in Angola' (Sykes, *Two Studies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 166–8). The scheme foundered in acrimony, however, when the Portuguese could not meet the JTO on all points and found themselves accused of anti-Semitism.
- 24 The question of alternatives to Palestine remained alive. Having in 1930 identified land for immediate Jewish settlement in Abyssinia, Italy held out the delusional promise of a Jewish state in Palestine once it had got control of Greater Syria; as late as at the 1939 St. James' Palace Conference, UK officials were still thinking of offering colonial areas for Jewish settlement. (N.A. Rose, *Baffy: The Diaries of Blanche Dugdale, 1936–1947*, London, Vallentine Mitchell, 1973, p. 25.)
- 25 Jonathan Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010, pp. 10–12. Sokolow put the 1905–1913 figure at 18–20,000 (Sokolow, *Nabum Sokolow*, *op. cit.*, p. 114.)
- 26 Walid Khalidi, foreword to May Seikaly, *Haifa: Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918–1939*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1995, p. vii; Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians*, Washington, Institute of Palestine Studies, p. 1992.
- 27 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestine-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 26, and A.H. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 279.
- 28 'The State of Israel is not a State which has an army but an army which has a state' (Prof. Yeshayahou Leibowitz in Garaudy, *Les Mythes fondateurs*, *op. cit.*, p. 241); 'When the [second] intifada erupted, it was finally clear to all: Israel is not a state with an army but an army with a state' (Ben Kaspit in Finkelstein, Norman G., *Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History*, London, Verso, 2008, p. 96), (note).
- 29 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestine-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
- 30 Cf., *shari'ah* in the UK at the present time.

2 The UK Plans a Jewish Palestine

- 1 Avi Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations*, London and New York, Verso, 2009, p. 10.
- 2 R.J.Q. Adams, *Balfour: The Last Grandee*, London, John Murray, 2007, p. 332.
- 3 Maxim Ghilan, *How Israel Lost Its Soul*, Harmondsworth, Pelican Books, 1974, p. 33.
- 4 Viscount Samuel, *Memoirs*, London, Cresset Press, 1945, p. 147.
- 5 Curzon to Cabinet, 30 November 1920, in Philip Ovendale, *The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*, London, Longman, 1984, p. 47.
- 6 Examples of statements by some of such commentators include the following: Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 2, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1934 and 1962: ‘The tragic misfortune into which (the Zionists) have fallen, in company with the Mandatory Power, is their inability to arrive at an understanding with the existing Arab population of the country: prior claimants and possessors’ (p. 254.);

J.M.N. Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality*, London, Longman, 1939: The Zionists were claiming land ‘with which at no time, since history began, have they had any true, durable, historic connection whatsoever’. The extent and duration of ‘Jewish territorial possession of Palestine. was ephemeral and inextensive. Only during the reigns of David and Solomon [for 70 years, when they held some two thirds of the territory] did anything like Jewish possession of what we call Palestine exist. Eight hundred years afterwards the Maccabees re-established [for some 50 years] the Jewish power which had faded with Solomon, but only for a short spasm did it perhaps reach again the dimensions of David’s and Solomon’s days’. The Arabs had been in continuous occupation for 5,000 years (pp. 8 and 16); ‘. . . if you abstract the writing of the Old Testament and the birth of Christ amidst the Jews from their chronicle in Palestine, there is nothing left worth mention. No great secular Jewish empire ever existed in Palestine, no secular Jewish art, no secular Jewish civilisation descended imperishably to mankind. In the secular order, Jewish Palestine, the tiny Jewish corners in Palestine, were never anything but the home of a few Judaeon Afridis, wrangling together for their townlets’ (p. 696);

Michael Palumbo, *Imperial Israel: The History of the Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza*, London, Bloomsbury, 1992: ‘. . . it was hard for me to believe that in the late twentieth century people would lay claim to a country on the evidence of a two-thousand-year-old vase or an inscription which only a handful of scholars could read. Surely this was not sufficient reason to displace an indigenous population that had lived on this land for centuries?’ (pp. 4–5);

Michael Rice, *False Inheritance. Israel in Palestine and the Search for a Solution*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1994: ‘. . . the existence of the Israeli state is based upon a structure of false premises, invented ‘history’ . . . That claim has no substance in law . . . ’ (p. xvii); the Israeli title to occupation is. wholly without historical or legal validity’ (p. 16); ‘the

myths of a small congeries of tribes living in the Near East in the first millennium BC is the essential substance of the Israeli claim to rights of occupation in the land which was once Palestine' (p. 21); 'the people of Brunei or the Congo have as solid a claim to Palestine as do the people of Poland, Lithuania or Central Asia' (p. 94). (Rice supports his claims on pp. 22–5.)

Joel Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism: Creating a Single Democratic State in Israel/Palestine*, London, Pluto Press, 2007: 'a variegated people suddenly decide after two thousand years that they have a real claim on a part of the earth just because it is the center of their Biblical ancestry. A two thousand-year-old claim would be laughed out of any secular court' (p. 36); the Israeli ruling class were 'johnny-come-latelys in an ancient land, to which they had no claim except that generated by their ideology' (p. 214).

Arab claims to have preceded the Jews as inhabitants of Palestine are summarised in Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929*, London, Frank Cass, 1974, p. 40.

- 7 Ann Mosely Lesch, *Origins and Development of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 2006, p. 50.
- 8 'Mr. Netanyahu. shows me a seal found in recent excavations in Jerusalem. "Do you know what name that is on the stone? It is my name: Netanyahu. So we do have some connection with the place!"' (Interview with Charles Moore, *Daily Telegraph*, 26 February 2011).
- 9 George E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, London, Methuen and Co., 1948, p. 149.
- 10 Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, London, Little Brown, and Co., 2000, p. 40.
- 11 Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, London, Vallentine Mitchell, 1961, pp. 149, 151 and 155.
- 12 Text in John Bowle, *Viscount Samuel: A Biography*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1957, pp. 172–7.
- 13 Bowle, *Viscount Samuel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 175–6; Bernard Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 78 and 209.
- 14 Letter to Sokolow, in Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921*, London, Bowes and Bowes, 1956, pp. 82 and 85.
- 15 Details are in John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate*, London, Cresset Press, 1959, pp. 22–3.

3 Palestine's Doom is Documented

- 1 Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1953, 115.
- 2 Ben-Gurion, 22 May 1947.
- 3 Disraeli had already affirmed that 'It is Arabia alone that can regenerate the world'. (*Tancred*, 465.)
- 4 After their conquest of Egypt in 1517, the Ottomans had removed the Caliphate of Islam from Cairo to Istanbul.

- 5 It is uncertain what Kitchener meant with his talk of Caliphs. Kedourie thinks that he intended the supreme theological and ecclesiastical authority for Muslims but, speculates that Husayn interpreted the reference as envisaging him 'superseding the Ottoman Sultan in the government of the Empire, of becoming the Sovereign of all the Muslims with real and extensive power.' (Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921*, London, Bowes and Bowes, 1956, p. 54.)
- 6 A version of the proclamation is in Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents* (7th edition, Boston and New York, Bedford/St. Martins, 2010, p. 60.
- 7 For a discussion of these talks, see Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin–Baghdad Express*, London, Penguin Books Ltd., 2011, pp. 194–8.
- 8 Text in Z.N. Zeine, *Arab–Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, Beirut, 1958, pp. 9 (note 10).
- 9 '[I]n return for France's acquiescence in the transfer of Cyprus to England . . . , Salisbury had recognised French influence in Syria as paramount'. (Anne Taylor, *Laurence Oliphant, 1829–1888*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 193.) Under the Entente Cordiale of 1904 London acknowledged that it must recognise France's historic interest in Syria and the position it had built up since the Crusades there as a quid pro quo for, now, its acceptance of the British position in Egypt. In 1912, the UK government undertook to 'disinterest themselves' in Syria. (Walter Reid, *Empire of the Sand: How Britain Made the Middle East*, Edinburgh, Birlinn Limited, 2011, p. 58). In February 1915 Grey had agreed with French Foreign Minister Delcassé that Paris should have a prior claim to the country if the Ottoman Empire were partitioned. (D.K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 47.) France was the traditional protector of Catholic Christians in the Ottoman Empire and had ties of friendship with the Maronites of Lebanon. French was the European language taught in the majority of Syrian schools, many of them French institutions, as was the Jesuit Université St. Joseph, founded in Beirut in 1875. French financiers and *concessionaires* had considerable interests all over Syria, notably in raw silk production, and France owned the Beirut–Damascus–Mazayrib and Jerusalem–Jaffa railways. (Howard M. Sachar, *The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914–1924*, London, Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1970, pp. 162–3.) At the Peace Conference, the French Foreign Minister listed further French interests, informing Lloyd George and Balfour that 'France had a great number of hospitals in Syria . . . Beirut was entirely a French port. The gas and electricity works were French, and the same applied to the lighting along the coast'. (James Barr, *A Line in the Sand, Britain, France and the Struggle for the Mastery of the Middle East*, London, Simon & Schuster, 2011, p. 80.)
- 10 Aaron S. Klieman, *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921*, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, pp. 5–6 and 9 (note 20.)

- 11 Bullard, Reader, *Britain and the Middle East from the Earliest Times to 1950*, London, Hutchinson's University Library, 1951, p. 69.
- 12 Like 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Misry, Al-Faruqy became disillusioned with the UK's response to the Revolt. (David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, London, Phoenix Press, 2000, p. 173.) A.L. Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914–1921*, London, Luzac and Co., pp. 73ff, has an interesting and detailed account of Al-Faruqy and the debate about the reply to Husayn's second Note.
- 13 Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country – The Story of Musa Alami*, London, John Murray, 1969, p. 56. For Husayn's dealings with Germany before and during the war, see Philip Ovendale, *The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*, London, Longman, 1984, p. 15.
- 14 Gibbon had noted in Chapter 58 of *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* that after the First Crusade 'the four cities of Hems, Hamah, Damascus, and Aleppo, were the only relics of the Mahometan conquests in Syria'. Kedourie understandably describes the grouping as having, during World War 1, 'no geographical or political rationale'. (Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.)
- 15 Kedourie, Elie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon–Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations, 1914–1939*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 79–80 and 87–8. Maxwell became C-in-C in Ireland in 1916 and was sacked by Asquith for ordering the Kilmainham executions after the Easter Rising. He was a member of the Milner mission to Egypt in December 1919. For more on him, see Long, C.W.R., *British Pro-Consuls in Egypt: The Challenge of Nationalism*, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2005, pp. 199–20.
- 16 Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
- 17 Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 179. McMahon's 'phrases' are well summarised in Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
- 18 Susan Silsby Boyle, *Betrayal of Palestine: The Story of George Antonius*, Boulder, Westview Press, 2001, p. 3.
- 19 The Arab Bureau was set up in June 1916 in Cairo to co-ordinate the Near East policies of London, Delhi and Cairo. Its first directors were Clayton, Col. Alfred C. Parker (acting), Hogarth and Kinahan Cornwallis. It was disbanded by Curzon in February 1920.
- 20 Jeremy Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia*, New York, Collier Books, 1992, p. 101.
- 21 Malcolm Brown, *T.E. Lawrence in War and Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia*, London, Greenhill Books, 2005, p. 108: 'the Arabic language has gradually permeated the country . . . ; but this does not mean that Syria is an Arabian country. On the sea coast there is little, if any, Arabic feeling or tradition: on the desert edge there is much'.
- 22 Disraeli, *Tancred*, *op. cit.*, pp. 368 and 446.
- 23 Priscilla Napier, *A Late Beginner*, London, Michael Joseph, 1966, p. 125.
- 24 In 1922, Clayton told Samuel that Husayn had been orally informed, and

- had fully understood, that the exclusion of Palestine was British policy. (Christopher Sykes, *Two Studies in Virtue*, London, Collins, 1953, p. 247). In support, in *Orientalism* (London, Nicholson & Watson, 1943, p. 375, Storrs says that 'Palestine was excluded. The claim [that Palestine wasn't excluded] has been so often disproved that it is no longer a bargaining asset'.
- 25 Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 461.
 - 26 Grafftey-Smith, Laurence, *Bright Levant*, London, John Murray, 1970, p. 154.
 - 27 Lawrence puts forward further reasons, including the credulity-stretching one that 'The Sherif was ultimately chosen because of the rift he would create in Islam'. (4 November 1918, in Brown, T.E. *Lawrence*, *op. cit.*, p. 213.)
 - 28 15 November 1915 letter to Clayton. (SAD/135/5.)
 - 29 Letters to Austen Chamberlain. (Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth*, *op. cit.*, pp. 121 and 108.)
 - 30 Sahar Huneidi, *A Broken Trust: Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, 1920–1925*, London, I.B.Tauris, 2001, p. 69.
 - 31 Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 37 (note), Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 125 and Zeine, *Arab–Turkish Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 203 (note), prolong the Correspondence to March 1916.
 - 32 Details of this 'Stotzingen mission' are in McMeekin, *The Berlin–Baghdad Express*, *op. cit.*, pp. 308–9.
 - 33 McMeekin, *The Berlin–Baghdad Express*, *op. cit.*, p. 293, gives the number of those executed as 21.
 - 34 John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate*, London, Cresset Press, 1959, p. 64 (note) and Sachar, *The Emergence of the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, pp. 162–3 and 164–5.
 - 35 Roger Adelson, Mark Sykes. *Portrait of an Amateur*, London, Cape, 1975, pp. 199–200.
 - 36 C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1973, p. 108.
 - 37 Hew Strachan, *The First World War: A New Illustrated History*, London, Simon & Schuster, 2003, p. 199. See a further account of the formidable Hall in Robert Vansittart, *The Mist Procession*, London, Hutchinson & Co., 1958, p.195.
 - 38 Sachar, *The Emergence of the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
 - 39 Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
 - 40 Edward Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate*, London, Radcliffe Press, 1994, p. 69.
 - 41 Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 73.
 - 42 Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
 - 43 H.F. Frischwasser-Ra'anan, *The Frontiers of a Nation: A re-examination of the forces which created the Palestine Mandate and determined its territorial shape*, London, The Batchworth Press, 1955, pp. 68–9.

- 44 Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, London, Vallentine Mitchell, 1961, p. 280.
- 45 *Chambers Biographical Dictionary* (2001), 1929. Is the eponymous principal character in 'The Duel of Dr Hirsch', one of the stories in G.K. Chesterton's *The Wisdom of Father Brown* (1914), a representation, admittedly allegorical, of Weizmann? The doctor 'had lately even discovered a noiseless explosive'.
- 46 Details in Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–5, and Joan Comay, *Who's Who in Jewish History after the Period of the Old Testament*, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 377.
- 47 Vereté, Mayir, 'The Balfour Declaration and its Makers', *Middle Eastern Studies* 6/1, January 1970.
- 48 Sachar, *The Emergence of the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p.188 .
- 49 A.L. Tibawi, *Arabic and Islamic Themes*, London, Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1976, p. 326. For Graham, see Long, *British Pro-Consuls*, *op.cit.*, p. 197 and *passim*.
- 50 Frischwasser-Ra'anana, *The Frontiers of a Nation*, *op. cit.*, p. 83.
- 51 Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 144.
- 52 Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, pp. 110–11, dates the start of the decline of Arab Palestine to the fall of Baghdad in March 1917.
- 53 Details are in Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate*, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–3.
- 54 Sachr, *The Emergence of the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 200. (See, with Florian Sokolow, *Nahum Sokolow: Life and Legend*, London, Jewish Chronicle Press, 1975, p. 157, for Sykes's background in Zionism.)
- 55 Michael Rice, *False Inheritance. Israel in Palestine and the Search for a Solution*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1994, p. 83.
- 56 Sykes, *Two Studies*, *op. cit.*, p. 194.
- 57 Sykes, *Two Studies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 214–15; the text is in pp. 236–40 and in Neville Barbour, *Nisi Dominus, A Survey of the Palestine Controversy*, London, Harrap, 1946, pp. 59–61.
- 58 Address on 22 May, 1923. (Arthur A. Goren, *Dissenter in Zion: From the Writings of Judah L Magnes*, Cambridge, Mass., and London, Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 208). Dr. Judah Leon Magnes (1877–1948) advocated the creation of a binational Arab–Jewish state in Palestine with a Yishuv of a maximum of a million and containing a religious and cultural centre to serve as a beacon for Jews all over the world. These proposals, seemingly partly favourable to the Arabs, were however seen by them as 'nothing but another way of reaching the objective of Zionism, that is, the creation of a Jewish state.' (Arab Office, *The Future of Palestine*, Beirut, Hermon Books, 1947 and 1970, p. 73.)
- 59 Jonathan Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010, p. 344. Cf., 'Zimmermann, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had in fact proposed unsuccessfully in the spring of 1917 a joint pro-Zionist declaration by the German and Turkish governments'. (M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question*, London, Macmillan, 1966, p. 346.)

- 60 Storrs, *Orientations*, *op. cit.*, p. 351.
- 61 22 July, 1921 and 1 March, 1922. (Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country*, *op. cit.*, p. 82.)
- 62 See Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 238–9 and 251
- 63 Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 355. Ad-Dajany was, with Musa Kadhim, the only Palestinian to be awarded the title of Paşa by the Ottomans. (Keith-Roach, *Pasha in Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 79 (note.))
- 64 Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, *op. cit.*, pp. 109–110 and Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 317. Elizabeth Monroe, *Philby of Arabia*, Reading, Ithaca Press, 1998, p. 43, called it ‘one of the greatest mistakes in our imperial history’ and Sykes (*Two Studies*, *op. cit.*, p. 234) thought that it would probably be seen as ‘the product of miscalculations not often equalled’.
- 65 Mrs. Blanche Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, London, Hutchinson, 1936, p. 161.
- 66 Lt.-Col. C. à Court Repington, *The First World War, 1914–1918: Personal Experiences of . . .*, Aldershot, Grey Revivals, 1991, vol. 2, p. 258. (27 March, 1918).
- 67 Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
- 68 David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*, II, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939, p. 1144.
- 69 May 1920 letter to a ‘Dear Friend’, probably Bentwich. (Goren, *Dissenter in Zion*, *op. cit.*, pp. 187–8.)
- 70 Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration*, *op. cit.*, pp. 349–57.
- 71 Sachar, *The Emergence of the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 253.
- 72 War Cabinet, 3 October. (Zeine, *Arab–Turkish Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 210.)

4 The UK Conquers Palestine and the Sharif is Hoodwinked

- 1 Edward Atiyah, *An Arab Tells His Story*, London, John Murray, 1946, p. 200.
- 2 T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1935, p. 275.
- 3 This possibility is also suggested by James Barr, *A Line in the Sand, Britain, France and the Struggle for the Mastery of the Middle East*, London, Simon & Schuster, 2011, p. 51.
- 4 The letter was dated 27 March, 1917 and addressed to Lt. Col. Cyril Wilson, former Governor of the Red Sea Province of the Sudan. He had been posted to Jiddah as Wingate’s right-hand man and liaison with the Sharif.
- 5 George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*, Beirut, Khayats, n.d., p. 227.
- 6 James Morris, *Pax Britannica*, 3, London, Folio Society, 1992, p. 135.
- 7 Bernard Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 241.
- 8 Antonius, *Arab Awakening*, *op. cit.* p. 29.

- 9 Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate* (London: Little Brown, and Company, 2000), 19.
- 10 Antonius, *Arab Awakening*, *op. cit.*, pp. 240–2.
- 11 Ilan Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis 1700–1948*, London, Saqi Books, 2010, p. 165.
- 12 John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate*, London, Cresset Press, 1959, pp. 55–6. President Wilson’s 12th Point, the only one to deal with the Ottoman Empire, recommended that the non-Turkish nationalities ‘which are now under Turkish rule’ – as Palestine mostly still was – ‘should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development’.
- 13 See an account of their deliberations in James Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War in Arabia, 1916–1918*, New York, Norton & Company, 2006, pp. 138–40.
- 14 Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921*, London, Bowes & Bowes, 1956, p. 97.
- 15 FO 686/8 and Jonathan Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010, p. 371.
- 16 Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*, Boston and New York, Bedford/St. Martins, 2010, p. 79. On Georges Picot’s belief that Husayn had decided that the intentions of the UK and France in Iraq and Syria respectively were identical, see Jeremy Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia*, New York, Collier Books, 1992, p. 193.
- 17 19 June (Schneer, *Balfour Declaration*, *op. cit.*, p. 235).
- 18 Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, *op. cit.*, p. 396.
- 19 John Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, London, Cresset Press, 1946, p. 43; part-text on p. 45.
- 20 Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, London, Vallentine Mitchell, 1961, p. 633.
- 21 Smith, *Palestine and the Arab/Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
- 22 Antonius, *Th Arab Awakening*, *op. cit.*, pp. 431–2.
- 23 John Lord, *Duty, Honor, Empire: The Life and Times of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen*, New York, Random House, 1970, p. 360.
- 24 The episode thus culminating is narrated in Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, *op. cit.*, pp. 252–8 and 431–2.
- 25 *Al-Qiblah*, 23 March, 1918 (Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, *op. cit.*), p. 269.
- 26 Desmond Stewart, *T.E. Lawrence*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1977, p. 194.
- 27 To Sykes, 4 February, 1918 (Dan Gillon, “Were the British Wrong about the Palestinians?”, *New Middle East* 4, January 1969, p. 30).
- 28 M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516–1922, A Political History*, Longmans Green and Co, Ltd., 1966, p. 277.
- 29 Details of the Declaration to the Seven are in Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, *op. cit.*, p. 433, and Smith, *Palestine and the Arab/Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 76. The text is in Amin Sa‘id, *Ath-Thawrah al-*

- '*Arabiyyah al-Kubra*, II, part I, Cairo, Matba'at 'Isa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1934, pp. 38–40, and a summary in Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
- 30 Since the Declaration was not Anglo–French and 'British–French' is ugly, I prefer this form of nomenclature to the former, more usual though incorrect, one. Text and analysis of it are in Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, *op. cit.*, pp. 435–6, Christopher Sykes, *Two Studies in Virtue*, London, Collins, 1953, p. 244, and Elizabeth Monroe, *Philby of Arabia*, Reading, Ithaca Press, 1998, pp. 85–6.
- 31 Referring to 'the coastal region of Syria', Herodotus notes that 'This part of Syria, all the way to the border with Egypt, is known as Palestine' (Robin Waterfield (tr.), *The Histories*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 89).
- 32 Founded with the approval of OETA South in Jaffa by 'Arif Pasha ad-Dajany, the MCA moved its headquarters to Jerusalem in the November and proceeded rapidly to establish a countrywide branch network. (Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, pp. 175 and 212 and Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929*, London, Frank Cass, 1974, pp. 282, 284 and 285).

5 Faysal Fails to Fight for Palestine

- 1 This remark at the Peace Conference was made either by Balfour (on President Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Hankey) or by Harold Nicholson (Stephen Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets*, vol. 2: 1919–1931, London, Collins, 1972, p. 89).
- 2 To Lawrence, 29 July, 1921 (Desmond Stewart, *T.E. Lawrence*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1977), p. 260.
- 3 For this visit to France by Faysal, see Christophe Leclerc, "Mésentente cordiale", *Journal of the T.E. Lawrence Society* XV:2, Spring, 2006, pp. 43–61.
- 4 Text in Z.N. Zeine, *Arab–Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, Beirut, Khayats, 1958, pp. 248–51.
- 5 Bernard Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 35.
- 6 Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, London, Little Brown, and Company, 2000, p. 111.
- 7 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 35; Aaron S. Klieman, *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921*, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, p. 34.
- 8 Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921*, London, Bowes & Bowes, 1956, p. 156.
- 9 Details in Howard M. Sachar, *The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914–1924*, London, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970, pp. 385–6. The text of the Faysal–Weizmann Agreement is in George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*, Beirut, Khayats, n.d.), pp. 437–9 and A.L. Tibawi, *Arabic and Islamic Themes*, London,

- Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1976, p. 319. In June 1936, Weizmann published it in *The Times* and *The Palestine Post* with Faysal's reservation omitted (Tibawi, *Arabic and Islamic Themes*, *op. cit.*, p. 322).
- 10 Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929*, London, Frank Cass, 1974, p. 124. (The text of an MCA petition sent to the Peace Conference on 3 February, 1919 in this connection is in Ilan Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty*, London, Saqi Books, 2010, pp. 176–7.)
 - 11 Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
 - 12 H.F. Frischwasser-Ra'anán, *The Frontiers of a Nation: A re-examination of the forces which created the Palestine Mandate and determined its territorial shape*, London, The Batchworth Press, 1955, p. 107.
 - 13 A.L. Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914–1921*, London, Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1978, pp. 350–1, Naomi Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine, 1917–1948*, London, John Murray, 1999, p. 14.
 - 14 The papers interviewing Faysal were *L'Information* and *Le Matin* (Frischwasser-Ra'anán, *The Frontiers of a Nation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–9).
 - 15 Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*, Boston and New York, Bedford/St. Martins, 2010, p. 79.
 - 16 Florian Sokolow, *Nahum Sokolow*, London, Jewish Chronicle Publications, 1975, p. 177.
 - 17 John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate*, London, Cresset Press, 1959, p. 53.
 - 18 Two days before the conference had opened, in an impotent démarche Curzon had spoken to Graham about 'the growing and almost insatiable ambitions of the Zionists . . . the "Home" will be pushed on one side, then the "Trustee" will be found superfluous, and finally the "Commonwealth" will emerge triumphant . . . what is the good of shutting our eyes to the fact that this is what the Zionists are after, and that the British trusteeship is a mere screen behind which to work for this end?'
 - 19 Stewart, *T.E. Lawrence*, *op. cit.*, pp. 222–3.
 - 20 M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516–1922, A Political History*, Longmans Green and Co. Ltd., 1966, p. 282.
 - 21 King had been director of YMCA religious work in France in 1918–19. Crane had provided finance for President Wilson's election campaign in 1916 and for projects in Albania, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. He was a future US Ambassador to China (Roger Howard, *The Oil Hunters: Exploration and Espionage in the Middle East*, London, Hambledon Continuum, 2008), pp. 156–64.
 - 22 A.J.P. Taylor, *The First World War: An Illustrated History*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966, p. 263.
 - 23 Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 412–14.
 - 24 For alleged quid pro quo measures for France, see Smith, *Palestine and the Arab/Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
 - 25 Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

- 26 Stewart, T.E. Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 232.
- 27 The text of the Palestine mandate is in Walter Z. Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds.), *The Israel–Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, Ltd., 1984, pp. 205–11.
- 28 Michael Rice, *False Inheritance: Israel in Palestine and the Search for a Solution*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1994, p. 84, and N.A. Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War’, London, Pimlico, 2010, p. 26.
- 29 The text of Article 22 is in *The Middle East and North Africa* (London, Europa Publications Limited, 1976–77), p. 54.
- 30 Arthur Koestler, *Promise and Fulfilment: Palestine 1917–49*, London, Macmillan, 1983, p. 5.
- 31 Arthur A. Goren (ed.), *Dissenter in Zion: From the Writings of Judah L. Magnes*, Cambridge, Mass., and London, Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 186–7.
- 32 Avi Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations*, London, Verso, 2009, p. 23.
- 33 David Lloyd George, *Memories of the Peace Conference II*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939, p. 737.

6 ‘Mr. Lloyd George’s Madness’ Crowns the Zionist March into Palestine

- 1 H.F. Frischwasser-Ra’anan, *The Frontiers of a Nation: A re-examination of the forces which created the Palestine Mandate and determined its territorial shape*, London, The Batchworth Press, 1955, p. 130.
- 2 Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, London, Collins, 1965, p. 26.
- 3 H.J. Simson, *British Rule, and Rebellion*, Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons., Ltd., 1937, pp. 153–4.
- 4 13 February, 1918 to Wingate. (FO 371/3392/419 and Norman & Helen Bentwich, *Mandate Memories, 1918–1948*, London, The Hogarth Press, 1965, pp. 28–31.)
- 5 Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms*, London, Nicholson & Watson, 1943, p. 340. (The members of the Commission are listed on pp. 341 and 405).
- 6 To Shuckburgh, 31 December, 1937. (C0 733/333/75156/30; Ann Mosely Lesch, *Origins and Development of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 2006, p. 50.)
- 7 Gen. Sir Walter Congreve. (Sykes, *Cross Roads*, *op. cit.*, p. 38 and Edward Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate*, London, Radcliffe Press, 1994, p. 70.)
- 8 For further background, see Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country – The Story of Musa Alami*, London, John Murray, 1969, pp. 27–8.
- 9 Sykes, *Cross Roads*, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
- 10 Ilan Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis 1700–1948*, London, Saqi Books, 2010, p. 173.
- 11 19 May. (Dan Gillon, “Were the British Wrong about the Palestinians?”, *New Middle East* 4, January 1969, p. 33, and Joel Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism: Creating a Single Democratic State in Israel/Palestine*, London, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 114.)

- 12 Michael Rice, *False Inheritance: Israel in Palestine and the Search for a Solution*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1994, p. 87.
- 13 Peter Rodgers, *Herzl's Nightmare: One Land, Two Peoples*, London, Constable, 2005, p. 11.
- 14 In March 1993, Rabbi Ovadiyah Joseph, leader of SHAS, said, 'There is no animal worse than the Arabs'. After Baruch Goldstein's massacre of Palestinians in Hebron on 25 February 1994, Rabbi Moshe Levinger of Gush Emunim said, 'I am sorry not only about those dead Arabs but also about dead flies'; Orthodox Jewish nationalists at the time regarded 'the Arabs as nothing more than disease-spreading rats, lice, or other loathsome creatures'. Top-ranking Israeli Army generals have called Palestinians 'drugged cockroaches in a bottle'. (Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 163, 177 and 271.)
- 15 Laura Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2011, pp. 17 and 37–40.
- 16 Storrs 'obviously dominated his colleagues in O.E.T.A.' and was 'mentally far ahead of anyone in the administration'. (Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 75).
- 17 FO 371/3398/190447.
- 18 Frischwasser-Ra'anani, *The Frontiers of a Nation*, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
- 19 Bernard Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life*, London, Cresset Press, 1945, pp. 239–40.
- 20 A.L. Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914–1921*, London, Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1978, pp. 360–1.
- 21 Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, London, Little Brown, and Company, 2000, p. 95. 'I was asked', Meinertzhagen said, 'to represent the Foreign Office on Allenby's staff, keep our Government informed on Palestine and ensure that the policy of HMG was carried out. Such work is tantamount to that of a spy on Allenby's staff'. He was not the last to be inflicted on Allenby. (See Long, *British Pro-Consuls*, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–5.)
- 22 Storrs, *Orientalisms*, *op. cit.*, p. 355, and John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate. An Account of the Palestine Mandate*, London, Cresset Press, 1959, p. 57.
- 23 25 October. (David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, London, Phoenix Press, 2000, p. 494.
- 24 A.L. Tibawi, *Arabic and Islamic Themes*, London, Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1976, pp. 322–3.
- 25 On 8 March, 1920. (FO 371/5032/126).
- 26 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 61 and 80.
- 27 Doreen Ingrams (ed.), *Palestine Papers 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict*, London, John Murray, 1972, p. 157.
- 28 Horace B. Samuel, author of *Unholy Memories of the Holy Land*. (Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate*, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 and 79–80.)
- 29 The papers which published Bols's remarks were *Palestine Weekly* and the

- Jerusalem Christian *Mir'at ash-Sharq* (Mirror of the East), which was owned by the Nashashiby family.
- 30 A description of the Festival's ceremonies is in Thomas Hodgkin, *Letters from Palestine, 1932–36*, London, Quartet, 1986, pp. 124–6.
 - 31 Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929*, London, Frank Cass, 1974, pp. 96, 106–7 and 184. The two leading political families ran rival 'Arab Clubs', the Al-Husaynys An-Nady Al-'Araby (an Al-Fatat affiliate with a membership of Palestinians living in Damascus and Al-Hajj al-Amin as its President until April 1920) and the An-Nashashibys the anti-mandate Al-Muntada Al-'Adaby. Both stood for the unity of Palestine with Syria and responded to these calls of the MCA until it seized the initiative from them when Faysal was ejected from Damascus. Al-Muntada continued to function until early 1921, An-Nady until 1923. (Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel, op. cit.*, p. 62).
 - 32 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, op. cit.*, p. 99.
 - 33 Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*, Boston and New York, Bedford/St. Martins, 2010, p. 108, claims that Allenby and Bols did so.
 - 34 Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti, Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, pp. 6 and 10–11.
 - 35 See George E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1948, p. 204, for background on Hagana.
 - 36 John Lord, *Duty, Honor, Empire: The Life and Times of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen*, New York, Random House, 1970, p. 390 (note). Formed in July 1917, the Jewish battalions came to Palestine in spring, 1918. By the armistice some 5,000 strong (about a third recruited from the Yishuv), they bitterly resented Allenby's refusal to allow them any active role in the conquest of Galilee or anywhere else in Palestine. (Bernard Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine: the Mandatory Government and the Arab–Jewish Conflict, 1917–29*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991, p. 44.)
 - 37 Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty, op. cit.*, p. 231.
 - 38 See Sahar Huneidi, *A Broken Trust: Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, 1920–1925*, London, I.B.Tauris, 2001, p. 38, and Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine: the Frustration of a Nationalist Movement*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1979, pp. 90 and 202.
 - 39 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, op. cit.*, p. 239.
 - 40 Howard M. Sachar, *The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914–1924*, London, Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1970, p. 394, gives details.
 - 41 Henri Laurens, *La Question de Palestine*, Paris, Fayard, 1999, vol. 1, p. 523.

7 Herbert Samuel Lays the Groundwork of the Jewish State

- 1 Samuel, 28 March, 1921.
- 2 Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, London, Little Brown, and Company, 2000, pp. 148 and 190; Bernard Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life*, Oxford, Oxford Univeristy Press, 1992, p. 204.
- 3 Viscount Samuel, *Memoirs*, London, Cresset Press, 1945, p. 151.
- 4 Capt. James Pollock to his father. (Segev, *One Palestine, Complete, op. cit.*, p. 147.
- 5 Recruited by Weizmann in the face of ‘intense and open soreness’ among the Zionists (Ronald Storrs, *Orientations*, London, Nicholson & Watson, 1943, p. 367), Kisch became a member of the Zionist Commission and then Chairman of the Zionist Executive (the Palestinian branch of the Zionist Organisation’s General Council) and Director of the Zionist Political Department. Storrs claims that ‘it was murmured that he could not be a good Zionist because he played hockey’. Husband of a niece of Samuel, Kisch, though British, ‘considered that he owed England no gratitude for anything she had done for him’. Nonetheless, in World War II he became Eighth Army Chief Engineer in the Western Desert where, Auchinleck said, ‘Our chief [leisure] amusement was fighting scorpions against tarantulas. Kisch . . . had a black spider and I had a scorpion. We used to have fights in a tin box after dinner’. (Corelli Barnett, *The Desert Generals*, London, Pan Books, 1960, pp. 234–5.) He was killed in action in Tunisia, inspecting a German minefield.
- 6 Lt.-Col. W.F. Stirling, *Safety Last*, London, Hollis and Carter, 1953, p. 118; Naomi Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine, 1917–1948*, London, John Murray, 1999, p. 3.
- 7 Sahar Huneidi, *A Broken Trust: Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, 1920–1925*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2001, p. 96.
- 8 Huneidi, *A Broken Trust, op. cit.*, pp. 302–3. (See p. 211 for extracts from the Palin Report). Meinertzhagen fully agreed with these Zionist accusations. He regarded the rioting as a deliberate attempt by Allenby, Bols and Waters-Taylor to demonstrate to London the futility of trying to impose Zionism on Palestine. He charged Waters-Taylor with being behind the idea of Faysal becoming at least nominal ruler of Palestine which Bols and Allenby passed on to Curzon, who rejected it.
- 9 The text of the message is in Neville Barbour, *Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy*, London, Harrap, 1946, p. 98.
- 10 Samuel, *Memoirs, op. cit.*, p. 156.
- 11 Huneidi, *A Broken Trust, op. cit.*, p. 118.
- 12 Frances Emily Newton, *Fifty Years in Palestine*, Wrotham, Coldharbour Press, 1948, p. 140.
- 13 P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516–1922. A Political History*, London, Longmans Green, Ltd., 1966, p. 281.
- 14 Gillon, Dan, ‘Were the British Wrong about the Palestinians?’, *New Middle East* 4, January 1969, p. 33.

- 15 Ilan Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis 1700–1948*, London, Saqi Books, 2010, p. 206.
- 16 H.F. Frischwasser-Ra'anán, *The Frontiers of a Nation: A re-examination of the forces which created the Palestine Mandate and determined its territorial shape*, London, The Batchworth Press, 1955, p. 132). Samuel described his own actions vis-à-vis Transjordan as 'an entirely irregular proceeding . . . outside my own jurisdiction'.
- 17 Michael Rice, *False Inheritance: Israel in Palestine and the Search for a Solution*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1994, pp. 75 and 101–3.
- 18 12 September, 1920 Gertrude Bell letter to her father.
- 19 The non-governmental representatives are listed in Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 93 (note).
- 20 The 1st. Palestine National Congress was held in Jerusalem in February 1919. About about a fifth of the delegates were Christians. The second Congress was the one the administration had prohibited in May 1920.
- 21 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 255. Details of the conference's proceedings and its membership are in Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929*, London, Frank Cass, 1974, pp. 108–10, and Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–95 (note).
- 22 Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti, Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, pp. 23 and 24.
- 23 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.* pp. 95–6.
- 24 Gillon, "Were the British Wrong about the Palestinians?", *New Middle East* 4, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
- 25 At the end of the decade the administration 'actually gave full recognition to the Arab Executive as representative of the Palestinian Arab population' and in 1929 the Shaw Commission 'clearly thought of (it) as representative of the Palestinian Arabs'. (Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–8 and Pappé, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 208.)
- 26 Barbour, *Nisi Dominus*, *op. cit.*, p. 108.
- 27 *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, 1920, in V.H.F. Winstone, *Gertrude Bell*, London, Barzan Publishing, 2004, pp. 352–3.
- 28 The Middle East Department arose from the machinations in Egypt of the anti- Wingate Lord Edward Cecil. (For details, see C.W.R. Long, *British Pro-Consuls in Egypt, 1914–1929: The Challenge of Nationalism*, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2005, pp. 43–8, for its staff list see Klieman, Aaron S., *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921*, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, p. 93.) Keith-Roach said of the change of responsible ministry, 'Palestine's real tragedy once Churchill had given up the colonial secretaryship was being transferred from Foreign Office guidance to Colonial Office control . . . Although the Mandate instructed Great Britain to administer Palestine on the basis of an 'A' development, because neither Arab nor Jew would 'play ball' the regime that was set up was based on the 'C' system, which was

- devised for the most backward territories'. (Edward Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate*, London, Radcliffe Press, 1994, p. 90.)
- 29 See text in Klieman, *Foundations of British Policy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 269–73.
- 30 Klieman, *Foundations of British Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 179 (the text of Churchill's address to the Arab Executive is in pp. 269–73), and John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate. An Account of the Palestine Mandate*, London, Cresset Press, 1959, p. 89.
- 31 Sir Alec Seath Kirkbride, *A Crackle of Thorns: Experiences in the Middle East*, John Murray, 1956, p. 19.
- 32 Kirkbride, *A Crackle of Thorns*, *op. cit.*, p. 231.
- 33 James Parkes, *A History of Palestine from 135 AD to Modern Times*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1949, p. 299.
- 34 For the causes and course of the 'Revolt', see Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine: the Frustration of a Nationalist Movement*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1979, pp. 205–7, and Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
- 35 'Communist May-Day demonstrators all of whom were Jewish and demonstrators from the . . . *Histadrut*.' (Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 57.)
- 36 Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, London, Collins, 1965, p. 50.
- 37 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
- 38 Long, *British Pro-Consuls*, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
- 39 9 May. (Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 105.)
- 40 Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, *op. cit.*, pp. 188 and 191.
- 41 Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, *op. cit.*, pp. 132 and 274 (note 24); Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 112–3.
- 42 H.J. Simson, *British Rule, and Rebellion*, Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons., Ltd., 1937, p. 167.
- 43 Elie, Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970, p. 62; Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
- 44 Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, *op. cit.*, p. 186.
- 45 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
- 46 Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
- 47 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 266.
- 48 Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version*, *op. cit.*, p. 69; Howard M. Sachar, *The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914–1924*, London, Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1970, pp. 396–7.
- 49 The text of Samuel's speech is in Storrs, *Orientations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 358 and 383; Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–2; and Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 257.
- 50 Tel. 271 in 26711 of CO 733/3 in Klieman, *Foundations of British Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

- 51 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 132,
- 52 Florian Sokolow, *Nahum Sokolow: Life and Legend*, London, Jewish Chronicle Press, 1975, p. 209.
- 53 Long, *British Pro-Consuls*, *op. cit.*, pp. 119–20.
- 54 In Samuel's first year, 75 elementary schools were opened in Arab villages and training colleges for teachers established. The narrow gauge Lydda-Jaffa railway was widened, the Post Office was expanded, a public telephone service was inaugurated and land registries were opened. A Law School was inaugurated in November, 1921. (Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, pp. 82,85.)
- 55 The full text of Samuel's speech is in Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, *op. cit.*, p. 229.
- 56 Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 220. For an account of the delegation's visit, see Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–7 and 116–17.
- 57 Eric Mills, a member of Samuel's administration. (CO 537/855.)
- 58 Macmillan, Margaret, *Peacemakers*, London, John Murray, 2001, p. 436.
- 59 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 262–3 and 266.
- 60 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 116, and Klieman, *Foundations of British Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
- 61 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
- 62 Storrs, *Orientations*, *op. cit.*, p. 363.
- 63 The SMC was to be responsible for the appointment and dismissal of all qudhah, muftun, shari'a and awqaf officials, and in addition of employees of numerous schools, libraries, orphanages, public clinics, scout groups, other welfare institutions and a newspaper. Autonomous, it gave a crucial portion of the Palestinian elite (but not the An-Nashashibis, who opposed its creation) some control over resources and a measure of prestige.
- 64 Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
- 65 Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19 and 90–1.
- 66 Sykes, *Cross Roadsto Israel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–7 and 88.
- 67 Antonius took an understandably sceptical view of EAC. 'No serious attempt is made', he wrote, 'to arrive at a scientific or even quasi-scientific estimate; no organ of statistical investigation exists; the computation is arrived at by rough and ready methods which are too crude to command respect'. (11 March, 1935). The 'methods' are described in Barbour, *Nisi Dominus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 151–2.
- 68 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–8. (11 April, 1922).
- 69 By Salvador de Madariaga. (Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956*, London, Chatto & Windus, 1963, p. 36.)
- 70 David Gilmour, *Curzon*, John Murray, 1994, p. 522.
- 71 Leon Simon, in *The Jewish Chronicle*, 14 March 1941.

- 72 A.L. Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914–1921*, London, Luzac & Company Ltd., 1978, pp. 431–2.
- 73 Barbour, *Nisi Dominus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–6.
- 74 Barbour, *Nisi Dominus*, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
- 75 Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 63 (note). See Frischwasser-Ra'anan, *Frontiers of a Nation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 89, 95–6, 135–9 and 142.

8 Balfour Savours his Handiwork

- 1 3 February 1923. (CO 733/26; Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine: the Frustration of a Nationalist Movement*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1979, p. 180.)
- 2 Bernard Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 261.
- 3 There were 135,425 Muslim, 16,703 Jewish and 12,319 Christian primary electors but only 1,397 ballot papers were cast (1,172 Jewish) in the whole country and no more than 18% of qualified Muslims, 5.5% of Christians and 50% of Jews voted. (Details are in Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929*, London, Frank Cass, 1974, pp. 156 and 298.)
- 4 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, pp. 151, 155 and 159. (Details of the boycott are in pp. 152–5.)
- 5 Sahar Huneidi, *A Broken Trust: Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, 1920–1925*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2001, p. 64.
- 6 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 261.
- 7 Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, *op. cit.*, p. 255 (note 80), and Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956*, London, Chatto & Windus, 1963, p. 143.
- 8 Details in Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, London, Collins, 1965, pp. 94–5.
- 9 Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
- 10 J.M.N. Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality*, London, Longman, 1939, pp. 695–6.
- 11 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 262–3 and 266.
- 12 In 1922 and 1923, the Cabinet rejected the contention of the Army, the War Office and the Cabinet Committee of Imperial Defence that Palestine had no strategic value for the defence of the Suez Canal: Britain's imperial interests made the continuation of British rule there vital to parry possible occupation by France, Turkey or, most unrealistically of all, Italy.
- 13 Dan Gillon, 'Were the British Wrong about the Palestinians?', *New Middle East* 4, January, 1969, p. 35.
- 14 Details are in John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate*, London, Cresset Press, 1959, p. 94.
- 15 Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
- 16 Rashid Khalidy, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*, Oxford, Oneworld, 2009, p. 45. (The PMC was composed of

- delegates from the UK, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and Norway.)
- 17 23 June and 24 July, 1924. (Details are in Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, *op. cit.*, p. 78.)
 - 18 See May Seikaly, *Haifa: Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918–1939*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1995, pp. 186–8.
 - 19 More details are in Seikaly, *Haifa*, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
 - 20 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, pp. 223 and 243.
 - 21 Huneidi, *A Broken Trust*, *op. cit.*, p. 267 (note 3.)
 - 22 Lt.-Col. W.F. Stirling, *Safety Last*, London, Hollis and Carter, 1953, p. 118.
 - 23 Susan Silsby Boyle, *Betrayal of Palestine: The Story of George Antonius*, Boulder, Westview Press, 2001, p. 115.
 - 24 FO 800/156/177ff; Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
 - 25 David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, London, Phoenix Press, 2000, p. 518.
 - 26 John Bowle, *Viscount Samuel: A Biography*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1957, p. 229. Of Samuel, Asquith said, ‘H.S. [sic] . . . has been brought up under every typical English influence . . . but he remains a Jew of the Jews; of the genuine seed of Abraham.’
 - 27 R.J.Q. Adams, *Balfour: The Last Grandee*, London, John Murray, 2008, p. 369.
 - 28 Bertha Spafford Vester, *Our Jerusalem: An American Family in the Holy City, 1881–1949*, London, Evans Brothers Limited, 1951, pp. 319–20.
 - 29 Boyle, *Betrayal of Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
 - 30 Boyle, *Betrayal of Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 129; Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
 - 31 Ahad Ha-Am. (Paraphrase in Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 267.)
 - 32 Lt.-Col. F.H. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1938, pp. 177–8.
 - 33 Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, London, Little Brown, and Company, 2000, pp. 155 and 171.
 - 34 Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, *op. cit.*, p. 184.
 - 35 Parliamentary Papers. *Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920–5*. Colonial Number 15. (London: HMSO, 1925.)
 - 36 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 268.
 - 37 Jeffries, *Palestine: the Reality*, *op. cit.*, p. 372; Stirling, *Safety Last*, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
 - 38 Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms*, London, Nicholson & Watson, 1943, p. 437.

9 A White Paper and a Black Letter

- 1 Avi Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations*, London and New York, Verso, 2009, pp. 23–4.

- 2 Geoffrey Powell, *Plumer, the Soldiers' General*, Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2004, p. 301.
- 3 Lt.-Col. F.H. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1938, p. 201. (2 September, 1925).
- 4 For categories of immigrants and Economic Absorptive Capacity, see John Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, London, Cresset Press, 1946, p. 84.
- 5 *Al-Falastin* denounced the conditions attached to a system of municipal elections which Samuel introduced in 1924/5 but whose implementation he delayed until they could be dominated by the Jews. (May Seikaly, *Haifa: Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918–1939*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1995, pp. 194–5.)
- 6 Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, London, Little Brown, and Company, 2000, p. 289.
- 7 Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer*, London, John Murray, 1968, p. 198.
- 8 Bernard Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City*, London, Profile Books, 2001, p. 107.
- 9 Seikaly, *Haifa*, *op. cit.*, p. 154; Ilan Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis 1700–1948*, London, Saqi Books, 2010, pp. 230f.
- 10 Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929*, London, Frank Cass, 1974, p. 254.
- 11 *Al-Karmil*, 23 July, 1928, in Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 254.
- 12 Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 255.
- 13 Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country – The Story of Musa Alami*, London, John Murray, 1969, p. 95.
- 14 Naomi Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine, 1917–1948*, London, John Murray, 1999, p. 36.
- 15 Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms*, London, Nicholson & Watson, 1943, pp. 355–6; George E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1948, p. 60. Musa Kadhim had been Governor of the Yemen, Al-Haj Amin and Dr. Husayn al-Khalidy (Raghib an-Nashashiby's replacement as Mayor of Jerusalem in 1934 and leader of a political party) had been Ottoman officers throughout World War 1, Musa al-'Alamy was the son of a prominent Ottoman official and 'Awny 'Abd al-Hady had been educated at the Imperial Service School in Istanbul.
- 16 David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, London, Phoenix Press, 2000, p. 143.
- 17 CP, Box 11, File 1, 1/8-11.
- 18 See Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*, Boston and New York, Bedford/St. Martins, 2010, pp. 124–5, for background on the riots. Maxim Ghilan, *How Israel Lost Its Soul*, Harmondsworth, Pelican Books Ltd., 1974, p. 71, agrees that 'If any single year could be picked out as the point of no return it would be 1929'.

- 19 The Maghribi Quarter facing Al-Buraq was destroyed by Israel in the Six-day War and more than 600 residents were evicted. (Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 285.)
- 20 For the build-up to the Al-Buraq riots and their course, see Pappé, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, pp. 233ff.; Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, *op. cit.*, pp. 310–32; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, *op. cit.*, pp. 250 and 265ff.; and Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti, Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, pp. 16–24.
- 21 David Gilmour, *Curzon*, John Murray, 1994, p. 508.
- 22 CP, Box 12(1), File 2,93–4.
- 23 CP, Box 14(6), 27 – 16. 8.32. (Chancellor interview to Gersho Agronsky, a Jewish journalist, who said that Antonius was in London ‘intriguing on behalf of the Mufti.’)
- 24 Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, *op. cit.*, p. 19; Saïd K. Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1997, p. 154; Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
- 25 C.O. of the Warwicks was Lt.-Col Bernard Montgomery, who typically sent to the War Office, to Chancellor’s chagrin on his return, a memorandum ridiculing a defence scheme which the High Commissioner and the Palestine military authorities had drawn up. (Edward Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate*, London, Radcliffe Press, 1994, p. 194.)
- 26 Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
- 27 Bernard Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 238.
- 28 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 223.
- 29 Seikaly, *Haifa*, *op. cit.*, p. 226.
- 30 Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, London, Collins, 1965, p. 142.
- 31 Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, *op. cit.*, p. 333 (note).
- 32 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 238; Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine: the Frustration of a Nationalist Movement*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1979, p. 199.
- 33 Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
- 34 Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand*, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
- 35 27 June, 1930. (CP 13(3), 5–9, 13(3), 11.)
- 36 Rashid Khalidy, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*, Oxford, Oneworld, 2009, p. 34.
- 37 Nur Masalha, in Rafael Medoff and Chaim I. Waxman, *Historical Dictionary of Zionism*, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2000, p. 402.
- 38 5 March. (CO 733/187/77105; Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.)
- 39 Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, *op. cit.*, p. 356.
- 40 D.K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 162.
- 41 Storrs, *Orientations*, *op. cit.*, p. 385. (A 1921 speech in Britain.)

- 42 Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 131 (note). For a summary and analysis of the Report, see John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate*, London, Cresset Press, 1959, pp. 120–1, Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–6, and J.M.N. Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality*, Longman, 1939, pp. 621–4.
- 43 Hope-Simpson was an ex-M.P. for Taunton and former member of the I.C.S. who had played outstanding roles in famine relief in India and in the post-First World War exchange of Orthodox Greeks from Turkey for Muslims from Greece.
- 44 Details of the White Paper are in Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, *op. cit.*, p. 356. It is analysed in Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality*, *op. cit.*, pp. 624–9, Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–9 and Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate*, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–5.
- 45 To Lord Stamfordham, 27 May, 1930. (Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 49.)
- 46 Overlooking Chancellor, only Passfield and MacDonald, Jeffries said (*Palestine: The Reality*, *op. cit.*, p. 636), ‘ever showed any passing sign of having listened to the Arabs’ fundamental grievances, of having felt a moment’s compunction for the Arabs’ treatment or a moment’s desire to amend it’ or of showing signs of emancipation from Zionist influence.
- 47 Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 192.
- 48 Erik Freas, “Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif: A Pan-Islamic or Palestinian Nationalist Cause?”, *BJMES* 39(1), April, 2012, p. 35.
- 49 Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, *op. cit.*, p. 404. (17 April, 1931.)
- 50 Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
- 51 Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 182.
- 52 24 January, 1931 telegram. (CP, Box 13(5,6.)
- 53 Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
- 54 Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 253.
- 55 Storrs, *Orientalisms*, *op. cit.*, p. 381, gives examples.
- 56 Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 253.
- 57 Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 252.
- 58 Chancellor considered that the number of unofficial members recommended by the Order-in-Council and the October 1930 Statement of Policy was too small to permit of representation on the Council ‘of all interests that are entitled to representation’. He suggested that of 16 official and 18 unofficial members the High Commissioner should nominate 2 Jews and not more than 3 Arabs. (Despatch. CP, Box 13(5), 240/1.)
- 59 For some account of the Commission, see Bernard Wassenstein, *Israel & Palestine: Why They Fight and Can They Stop?*, London, Profile Books, 2003, pp. 52–3.
- 60 Segev, *One Palestine Complete*, *op. cit.*, pp. 338–40.

10 Zionism Resurgent

- 1 Ilan Pappe, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis 1700–1948*, London, Saqi Books, 2010, p. 258.

- 2 Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, London, Little Brown and Company, 2000, p. 382.
- 3 Albert M. Hyamson, *Palestine Under the Mandate*, London, Methuen, 1950, p. 147.
- 4 Edward Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate*, London, Radcliffe Press, 1994, p. 143.
- 5 For six years before 1933 the average rate of immigration had been just under 5000 a year. In 1933 it jumped to 30,000, in 1934 to 42,000, and in 1935 to 62,000. ‘the civil administration . . . just shrugged their shoulders and put the blame on a thing called “economic capacity to absorb”’. (H.J. Simson, *British Rule, and Rebellion*, Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1937, p. 159.)
- 6 Richard Ben Cramer, *How Israel Lost: The Four Questions*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 140.
- 7 Neville Barbour, *Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy*, London, Harrap, 1946, pp. 158–9.
- 8 D.K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 163.
- 9 Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti, Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, pp. 26–9.
- 10 Gersho Agronsky, 16 August, 1932. (CP, Box 14(6), 27. See Note 137,18.)
- 11 Thomas Hodgkin, *Letters from Palestine, 1932–36*, London, Quartet, 1986, p. 107.
- 12 Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism, op. cit.*, p. 163. Details of parties additional to Al-Hizb al-‘Araby al-Falastiny (March, 1935), Ad-Difa’ al-Watany (end 1934) and Istiqlal (4 August, 1932) are in Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti, op. cit.*, pp. 34–6.
- 13 Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism, op. cit.*, pp. 162 and 163.
- 14 For details, see John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate*, London, Cresset Press, 1959, p. 132, and John Marlowe *Rebellion in Palestine*, London, Cresset Press, 1946, p. 70.
- 15 Hodgkin, *Letters from Palestine, op. cit.*, p. 195.
- 16 Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti, op. cit.*, p. 39.
- 17 Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate, op. cit.*, p. 136. See details in Laura Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2011, pp. 119–21.
- 18 To Hodgkin, 23 June, 1936. (Hodgkin Papers; Susan Silsby Boyle, *Betrayal of Palestine: The Story of George Antonius*, Boulder, Westview Press, 2001, p. 234.)
- 19 In Sokolow’s view, ‘this was not a conflict between a majority and a minority . . . but the redress of a two-thousand-year-old injustice, and the right of the victims to restitution’. (Florian Sokolow, *Nahum Sokolow: Life and Legend*, London, Jewish Chronicle Press, 1975, p. 197.)
- 20 M. Edelbaum, 3 July, 1936, in Ronald Storrs, *Orientations*, London, Nicholson & Watson, 1943, p. 352.

- 21 For Al-Ghory, see Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, *op. cit.*, *passim*. He founded an English-language paper called *The Arab Federation*.
- 22 Simson, *British Rule, and Rebellion*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.
- 23 Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 137 and 232.
- 24 See Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 130–3, for the causes of the strike.
- 25 Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
- 26 Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 150, 151, 153 and 159.
- 27 Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
- 28 Saïd K. Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1997, p. 157.
- 29 Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
- 30 Bernard Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City*, London, Profile Books, 2001, p. 108.
- 31 Simson, *British Rule, and Rebellion*, *op. cit.*, p. 225.
- 32 The other three parties were Islah, Mu'tamar ash-Sha'b and Al-Kutlah al-Wataniyyah. (Simson, *British Rule, and Rebellion*, *op. cit.*, p. 190). See photograph of some of the members of the AHC in Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*, 7th. edition, Boston and New York, Bedford/St. Martins, 2010, p. 134.
- 33 Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity*, *op. cit.* pp. 64–5, Freas, Erik, “Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif: A Pan-Islamic or Palestinian Nationalist Cause?”, *BJMES* 39(1), April, 2012, pp. 41 and 41 (note 175). See an account of Hizb al-Istiqlal in Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 37, 39, 41 and 106. According to Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, *op. cit.*, p. 156, ‘Thanks to ‘[t]he Mufti’s disinformation tactics, at which he was a master, and British pressure . . . the Istiqlal’s programme came to nothing’.
- 34 Simson, *British Rule, and Rebellion*, *op. cit.*, p. 230.
- 35 N.A. Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War’, London, Pimlico, 2010, p. 39.
- 36 Pappé, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
- 37 Simson, *British Rule, and Rebellion*, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
- 38 Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, *op. cit.*, pp. 42–4.
- 39 Hodgkin, *Letters from Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 198–9.
- 40 Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 157 and 176.
- 41 See James Barr, *A Line in the Sand, Britain, France and the Struggle for the Mastery of the Middle East*, London, Simon & Schuster, 2011, p. 137. An assessment of Al-Qawukchy is in Reeva Spector Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origins of Tyranny*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 131. Even though at this time Al-Hajj Amin believed him to be a ‘British agent’ (Mahmud ad-Durrah, *Al-Harb al-‘Iraqiyyah al-Biritaniyyah*, Beirut, Dar at-Tali’ah li’t-tiba’ah wa’n-nashr, 1969, pp. 326–7), he was to use him as his military adviser during his Baghdad exile.
- 42 Simson, *British Rule, and Rebellion*, *op. cit.*, pp. 176–7.
- 43 At the beginning of 1936 the Palestine police had a strength of about 900 British, 2,000 Arabs and 100 Jews. (Both communities had auxiliary

- police). Nearly 3,000 Jewish supernumerary constables were in training. Jewish settlements were now issued with hundreds of additional shotguns and Jewish settlers were recruited to protect the railways, the oil pipeline and border security fences. Palestinian auxiliaries guarded vulnerable points in Arab areas and protected Palestinian orange groves and crops. By the start of the strike, the RAF had two squadrons and four sections of armoured cars covering Palestine and Transjordan. There were two army battalions, and the Transjordan Frontier Force (1,000 Arabs with British officers) was available for duty in East Palestine. (Hodgkin, *Letters from Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 164; Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 179).
- 44 To Wavell. (William Jackson, *Britain's Triumph and Decline in the Middle East: Military Campaigns 1919 to the Present Day*, London, Brassey's, 1996, p. 30; John Connell, *Wavell: Scholar and Soldier*, London, Collins, 1964, p. 188. The Private Secretary was C.G. Eastwood and his diary entry was dated 17 June 1933.
- 45 Sir Miles Lampson 3 April, 1937 diary entry in M.E. Yapp (ed.), *Politics and diplomacy in Egypt: The Diaries of Sir Miles Lampson, 1935–1937*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 792. (For Lloyd in Egypt, see C.W.R. Long, *British Pro-Consuls in Egypt, 1914–1929: The Challenge of Nationalism*, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 137–69 and *passim*.
- 46 Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.
- 47 David Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat: Murder, Scandal and Britain's War Against Jewish Terrorism, 1945–1948*, London, Heinemann, 2009, p. 13; Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
- 48 See Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate*, *op. cit.*, pp. 141–6; A.J. Sherman, *Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine 1914–1918*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1997, pp. 105–7. The members of the Commission are listed in Yapp, *Politics and diplomacy in Egypt*, *op. cit.*, p. 741 (note).
- 49 To Ormsby-Gore. (Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, *op. cit.*, p. 401.)
- 50 Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 276, gives details of this humiliation of Al-Hajj Amin
- 51 The half-yearly labour immigration quotas actually declined from 4,500 in April 1936 to 1,800 in November and 770 in May 1937. (Simson, *British Rule, and Rebellion*, *op. cit.*, p. 314, and Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 171, 174 and 175.)
- 52 Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 276.
- 53 Norman G. Finkelstein, *Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History*, London, Verso, 2005, pp. 9–10.
- 54 Finkelstein, *Beyond Chutzpah*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
- 55 A map of the geography of the proposed partition is in Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 111. For discussions of Peel, see Rashid Khalidy, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*, Oxford, Oneworld, 2009, p. 129; Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate*, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–50, and *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 179–83; Barbour, *Nisi Dominus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 175–87; and Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, London, Collins, 1965, pp. 187–216.

- 56 Avi Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations*, London and New York, Verso, 2009, p. 57.
- 57 According to Rodgers, Peter, *Herzl's Nightmare: One Land, Two Peoples*, London, Constable, 2005, pp. 19 and 24, and Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 135, under Peel the Jews would have received about 20% of mandatory Palestine, the Palestinians about 80%.
- 58 Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
- 59 Barbour, *Nisi Dominus*, *op. cit.*, p. 176. A map showing the dimensions of the proposed Peel partition is in Bernard Wasserstein, *Israel & Palestine: Why They Fight and Can They Stop?*, London, Profile Books, 2003, p. 108.
- 60 Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
- 61 Pappé, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 282; Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 200; Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
- 62 Barbour, *Nisi Dominus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–2 and 204.
- 63 Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 27. Towards the end of December 1935, Weizmann had been reelected President of the World Zionist Organisation even though Ben-Gurion had declared him a danger to Zionism and Jewish Agency leaders had insisted on having oversight of his activities and of his letters to the British before despatch lest he become ‘a kind of political dictator’. (Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 112.)
- 64 Rodgers, *Herzl's Nightmare*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
- 65 J.M.N. Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality*, London, Longman, 1939, p. 577.
- 66 N.A. Rose (ed.), *Baffy: The Diaries of Blanche Dugdale 1936–1947*, London, Vallentine Mitchell, 1973, p. 53. B’rit Shalom (Covenant of Peace), founded in 1925 to foster good relations with the Palestinians, proposed a binational or biracial state with neither Arabs nor Jews dominant. It was wound up in 1933. (See Bentwich, Norman & Helen, *Mandate Memories, 1918–1948*, London, The Hogarth Press, 1965, pp. 119–20, Arthur A. Goren (ed.), *Dissenter in Zion. From the Writings of Judah L. Magnes*, Cambridge, Mass., and London, Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 272–3, and Bernard Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict, 1917–29*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991, p. 210.)
- 67 On 31 December 1923, Husayn tried to obtain the consent of the Palestinians to his acceptance of the Balfour Declaration and Jewish immigration by offering the inclusion of Palestine in an Arab confederation.
- 68 Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 209 and 210.
- 69 For extracts from Stein’s ‘Observations on the Partition Proposals’, see Wasserstein, *Israel & Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–12.
- 70 Pappé, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, pp. 276–7; Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, *op. cit.*, p. 426.
- 71 Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
- 72 Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 178–9. Those who resigned from the AHC did so in protest at conduct by Al-Hajj Amin which they deemed arbitrary and at the serious wounding in a shooting in Jaffa of one

- of An-Nashashiby's nephews in July, 1937, for which agents of the Muftý were blamed.
- 73 Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
- 74 Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, *op. cit.*, p. 186 (note). A biography of Al-Qassam is at pp. 37–38, accounts of him are in Rose, 'A Senseless, Squalid War', *op. cit.*, p. 38, and David Hirst, *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010, p. 33.)
- 75 Rose, *Baffy*, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
- 76 (Sir) William Denis Battershill (1896–1959) had had postings to Ceylon, Jamaica and Cyprus. He compared Wauchope to Hitler, claimed that he changed his mind by the minute and ran the administration like a comic opera. (Connell, *Wavell*, *op. cit.*, pp. 196–7). He told the Colonial Office that Arabs were untrustworthy, amoral and murderous. (Rose, 'A Senseless, Squalid War', *op. cit.*, pp. 32–3). An earlier example of insubordinate action by a chargé d'affaires was that of Milne Cheetham in Egypt after Wingate's departure on the leave from which he did not return. (See Long, *British Pro-Consuls*, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–85).
- 77 Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
- 78 Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 186.
- 79 Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country – The Story of Musa Alami*, London, John Murray, 1969, p. 116.
- 80 Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 291. See Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars*, *op. cit.*, pp. 129–130, for the Muftý's activities in Iraq.
- 81 Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–80. For the uprising in Haifa in 1937/8, see May Seikali, *Haifa: Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918–1939*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1995, pp. 253ff.
- 82 Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, *op. cit.*, p. 347.
- 83 (Sir) Hugh Foot on the 1936–8 uprising, in Boyle, *Betrayal of Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 233.
- 84 Seikali, *Haifa*, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
- 85 Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, *op. cit.*, pp. 426–7.
- 86 Ann Mosely Lesch, *Origins and Development of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 2006, p. 51, and Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
- 87 Michael Palumbo, *Imperial Israel: The History of the Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza*, London, Bloomsbury, 1992, p. 19.
- 88 Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 297. Segev (*One Palestine, Complete*, *op. cit.*, p. 415) said that Wauchope departed 'tired, and overworked, with mostly failures to his credit'. Keith-Roach (*Pasha of Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 191) was unconvinced by Ormsby-Gore's claim that he resigned because of ill health.

11 The Sorcerer Prepares to be Overthrown by the Apprentice

- 1 The Arab Office, *The Future of Palestine*, Beirut, Hermon Books, 1947/1970, p. 50.
- 2 Macmichael was in the Sudan from 1905–33, ending up as Civil Secretary

- in Khartum. He had good Arabic. His counterpart in Cairo thought him ‘a man of outstanding ability’ and believed that he was “extremely able” and knew ‘a lot about the Arabs, but I personally should doubt whether he is quite the type that is wanted for that particular job’. (M.E. Yapp (ed.), *Politics and Diplomacy in Egypt: The Diaries of Sir Miles Lampson, 1935–1937*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 944.) Edward Keith-Roach, CBE, also an old Sudan hand and, in Palestine, District Commissioner in Galilee and Governor of Jerusalem during the period 1926–1945, said that ‘His administrative ability, his strength of character and firmness of purpose were almost unknown. He shut himself up in Government House and dealt with everything through his chief secretary . . . His hobbies were ‘maps, reading detective stories, collecting semi-precious stones and cutting down trees’. (Edward Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate*, London, Radcliffe Press, 1994, pp. 195 and 221.) Concurring, Stirling noted that ‘for some reason or other . . . [he] shut himself up in Government House and very rarely came out’. (Lt.-Col. W.F. Stirling, *Safety Last*, London, Hollis and Carter, 1953, p. 211.)
- 3 William Jackson, *Britain’s Triumph and Decline in the Middle East: Military Campaigns 1919 to the Present Day*, London, Brassey’s, 1996, pp. 31–2; Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents* 7th. edition, Boston and New York, Bedford/St. Martins, 2010, p. 138; N.A. Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War’, London, Pimlico, 2010, p. 40.
 - 4 The fence’s inspirer, Sir Charles Tegart, had been police commissioner in Calcutta. (See James Barr, *A Line in the Sand, Britain, France and the Struggle for the Mastery of the Middle East*, London, Simon & Schuster, 2011, pp. 183–4, and N.A. Rose (ed.), *Baffy. The Diaries of Blanche Dugdale 1936–1947*, London, Vallentine Mitchell, 1973, pp. 79 and 133.)
 - 5 Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War’, *op. cit.*, p. 47, D.K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 181, and John Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, London, Cresset Press, 1946, all give slightly differing casualty figures
 - 6 Those who broke away to form Irgun, the underground, militant offshoot and armed wing of Revisionist Zionism which stood for an Israel made up of both Palestine and Transjordan, were opposed to Hagana’s then policy of restraint. (Richard Ben Cramer, *How Israel Lost: The Four Questions*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 283.)
 - 7 For details, see Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 190 and 201–2.
 - 8 Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
 - 9 Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, London, Little Brown, and Company, 2000, p. 432.
 - 10 Jon Kimche, *The Second Arab Awakening: The Middle East, 1914–1970*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, p. 187.
 - 11 The Woodhead Commission’s principal objections to partition are listed in

- The Arab Office, *The Future of Palestine*, Beirut, Hermon Books, 1947/1970, pp. 76–8.
- 12 Neville Barbour, *Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy*, London, Harrap, 1946, p. 198, and Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 and 208, and John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate*, London, Cresset Press, 1959, p. 150.
 - 13 Rose, *Baffy*, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
 - 14 See the varying figures given by Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country – the Story of Musa Alami*, London, John Murray, 1969, p. 116, and Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
 - 15 An Israeli Foreign Minister’s list of examples of British ‘recklessness and brutality’ includes ‘terrorists and guerrillas court-martialled and executed, their houses blown up, collective punishments throughout the Arab communities and R.A.F. razing of whole villages to the ground’. (Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli–Arab Tragedy*, London, Phoenix, 2006, p. 11.)
 - 16 Ilan Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis 1700–1948*, London, Saqi Books, 2010, pp. 297–8.
 - 17 A. Morrison, *On the Road to – Anywhere!*, 75/75/1, Imperial War Museum, in A.J. Sherman, *Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine 1914–1918*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1997, pp. 110–111, 151 and 154.
 - 18 Ben-Ami, *Scars of War*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
 - 19 Barbour, *Nisi Dominus*, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
 - 20 Rose, *Baffy*, *op. cit.*, p. 122.
 - 21 Though the Mufti was barred from attending the Conference himself, Al-‘Alamy and MacDonald encouraged the delegation to consult him and Britain at one point sought his mediation. (Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country*, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–1, and Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 217.
 - 22 Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country*, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
 - 23 Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country*, *op. cit.*, p. 124. The members of the sub-committee were, for the Arab side, Nury as-Sa’id, Tawfiq as-Suwaydy, ‘Abd ar-Rahman ‘Azzam, ‘Awny ‘Abd al-Hady, Musa al-‘Alamy and George Antonius; for Britain, Lord Maugham, Sir Grattan Bushe, H.R. Baggallay, the orientalist J. Heyworth-Dunne and others.
 - 24 Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 216–17; Rashid Khalidy, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*, Oxford, Oneworld, 2009, p. 114.
 - 25 For the manner of the presentation of the Statement of Policy to the largely uncomprehending Arab delegation, see Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country*, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–5.
 - 26 Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 182.
 - 27 Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
 - 28 Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, p. 196.
 - 29 See analysis in Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, London, Collins, 1965, pp. 235ff.; Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

- 30 Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
- 31 Pappe, *Palestine Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 284.
- 32 Edward Atiyah, *The Arabs*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd, p. 131.
- 33 Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 202. In March 1944 immigration continued because the White Paper's 75,000 allowance over 5 years had not been used up. (Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 248.)
- 34 Rose, 'A Senseless, Squalid War', *op. cit.*, p. 65.
- 35 Rose, *Baffy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–3.
- 36 Ronald Storrs, *Orientations*, London, Nicholson & Watson, 1943, p. 390, says that although the White Paper did not affect 'capitalist' migrants, it brought immigration by Jewish labourers to an end.
- 37 Arthur Koestler, *Promise and Fulfilment: Palestine 1917–49*, London, Macmillan, 1983, p. 25.
- 38 Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, p. 267, attributes the atrocity to Hagana. Roger Garaudy, *Les Mythes fondateurs de la politique israélienne*, Paris, Samizdat, 1996, p. 81, states that the killed were 252 Jews plus British crew Members.
- 39 Authorities consulted for the Jewish terrorist attempt to collaborate with Nazi Germany are Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.* p. 268, Norman G. Finkelstein, *Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History*, London, Verso, 2008, p. 322, Roger Garaudy, *Les Mythes fondateurs*, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 and 79, Joel Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism: Creating a Single Democratic State in Israel/Palestine*, London, Pluto Press, 2007, pp. 152–3, Michael Rice, *False Inheritance. Israel in Palestine and the Search for a Solution*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1994), pp. 86–7, and Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict op. cit.*, p. 170.
- 40 Rice, *False Inheritance*, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
- 41 Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 204; Chaim Herzog, *The Arab–Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence to Lebanon*, London, Arms and Armour Press, 1982, p. 12; Philip Ovendale, *The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*, London, Longman, 1984, p. 119. 20,000 members of the Yishuv served with Allied forces; Ben-Ali puts the 1942–44 figure at more than 27,000. (*Scars of War*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.)
- 42 Herzog, *The Arab–Israeli Wars*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19.
- 43 The figures in this paragraph have come from Norman & Helen Bentwich, *Mandate Memories, 1918–1948*, London, The Hogarth Press, 1965, p. 219, Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, pp. 207, 208, 209 and 224, Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, pp. 203 and 205, Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate*, *op. cit.*, p. 179, Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 316, and Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 184–5.
- 44 Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 187; Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, p. 204. See account of Palmach in Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, *op. cit.*, p. 454.
- 45 On the joint attack with Hagana, see Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of*

- Palestine*, Oxford, Oneworld Publications, 2007, p. 16. For Irgun's involvement in Iraq, see Reeva Spector Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars. The Militarist Origins of Tyranny*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 207.
- 46 Rose, 'A Senseless, Squalid War', *op. cit.*, p. 134.
- 47 Maj.-Gen. Dare Wilson, *With 6th Airborne Division in Palestine 1945–1948*, Barnsley, 2008, p. 11. Dugdale (Rose, *Baffy*, *op. cit.*, p. 199) rejoiced in her diary in December 1942 that 'The Yishuv has now contributed 19,000 Jews to the Forces!', especially into the Palestine Regiment.
- 48 Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 166. See for Hagana's stock of weaponry in 1942–3, when it was manufacturing small arms and producing mortars.
- 49 Aaron S. Klieman, *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921*, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, p. 252.
- 50 Dugdale noted in May 1940 that of 100 Palestinians in a pioneer unit only 7 were Arabs. (Rose, *Baffy*, *op. cit.*, p. 167.)
- 51 Rose, 'A Senseless, Squalid War', *op. cit.*, pp. 56–7. He notes that the 'strict numerical parity' was abandoned in 1942 but does not indicate if this altered the Palestinian attitude to the project.
- 52 Edward Atiyah, *An Arab Tells His Story*, London, John Murray, 1946, p. 218.
- 53 Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
- 54 Stirling, *Safety Last*, *op. cit.*, p. 211; Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
- 55 Details of the scheme are in Bernard Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City*, London, Profile Books, 2001, pp. 116–19. It was rather more firmly grounded in reality than the April 1944 Al-Husayny Palestine Arab Party, whose manifesto included independence for Palestine 'within Arab unity', the establishment of an Arab government administering the whole country and the dissolution of the National Home.
- 56 2 April, 1944. (Segev, *One Palestine Complete*, *op. cit.*, pp. 465–6.)
- 57 Segev, *One Palestine Complete*, *op. cit.*, p. 458.
- 58 E.g., the Israeli bombing of Jewish buildings in Baghdad in 1950–1 to persuade its Jews to emigrate to Israel, almost emptying the city of some 105,000 of them, which is habitually but erroneously blamed on Arab Iraq's presumed and mythical hostility to its Jews after the establishment of Israel. (Michael Prior, C.M., "The Moral Problem of the Land Traditions of the Bible", in *Western Scholarship and the History of Palestine*, London, Melisende, 1998, p. 68; Abbas Shibliak, *Iraqi Jews: A History of Mass Exodus*, London, Saqi, 2005, pp. 140, 141, 146, 151–5 and 159–62; Garoudy, *Les Mythes fondateurs*, *op. cit.*, p. 81; Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism*, *op. cit.*, p. 99.) Finklestein, *Beyond Chutzpah*, *op. cit.*, p. 11, does not stop at Iraq: '[W]hy did (the Zionists) stimulate, perhaps even with violent methods, the exodus of Jews from the Arab world to Palestine?'
- 59 Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

- 60 Sherman, *Mandate Days*, *op. cit.*, p. 162. Stern was a radical faction of Irgun, which had split from it in 1937, half of its members reenlisting in Hagana. Those who joined Avraham Stern in 1943 were called the Stern Group/Lochmei Heruth Yisrael [Lehi – Fighters for Freedom]. (Keith-Roach, *Pasha of Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 212). For more details of Stern's history, see Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, pp. 170–1.
- 61 Peter Rodgers, *Herzl's Nightmare: One Land, Two Peoples*, London, Constable, 2005, p. 56.
- 62 Bentwich, *Mandate Memories*, *op. cit.*, p. 170, Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, p. 273, Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

12 Israel is 'Born in Sin'

- 1 To the Jewish Agency Executive, 12 June, 1938.
- 2 Nahum Goldman, *The Jewish Paradox*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978.
- 3 Gort had, like Plumer, been Governor of Malta.
- 4 D.K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958*, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 186; James Barr, *A Line in the Sand, Britain, France and the Struggle for the Mastery of the Middle East*, London, Simon & Schuster, 2011, p. 290. Moyne was also accused by the French of promoting a Greater Syria as a means of removing their influence from the Levant.
- 5 Details are in John Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, London, Cresset Press, 1946, p. 251.
- 6 Elizabeth Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's Arab Policy", *St. Antony's Papers* Number 11 (Middle Eastern Affairs Number Two), p. 30; Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 255–6.
- 7 Arthur Koestler, *Promise and Fulfilment: Palestine 1917–49*, London, Macmillan, 1983, p. 8.
- 8 Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, pp. 289 and 343–5.
- 9 David Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat: Murder, Scandal and Britain's War Against Jewish Terrorism, 1945–1948*, London, Heinemann, 2009, p. 22. Philip Ovendale, *The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*, London, Longman, 1984, pp. 82–3, gives Irgun's strength in 1944/5 as 2000 men, Stern's as 200.
- 10 'It was the terrorist booby-trap . . . that had been largely responsible for causing Britain to give up fighting the Jewish insurgency . . . even when we had had 100,000 men under arms.' (Sherrard Cowper-Coles, *Cables from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West's Afghanistan Campaign*, London, HarperPress, 2012, p. 173.
- 11 George E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, London, Methuen and Co., 1948, p. 210. Maj.-Gen. Dare Wilson, *With 6th Airborne Division in Palestine 1945–1948*, Barnsley, 2008, p. 24, puts the number of breaks in the railway at some 240.

- 12 Details in Wilson, *With 6th Airborne*, *op. cit.*, pp. 45–8.
- 13 Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat*, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–5, Wilson, *With 6th Airborne*, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–1.
- 14 Bernard Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City*, London, Profile Books, 2001, p. 122. N.A. Rose, 'A Senseless, Squalid War', London, Pimlico, 2010, pp. 88–105, discusses the Committee and its report at length.
- 15 Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
- 16 Ilan, Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis 1700–1948*, London, Saqi Books, 2010, p. 325.
- 17 Rose, 'A Senseless, Squalid War', *op. cit.*, p. 100.
- 18 See Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, p. 327.
- 19 Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, p. 322. Further details of Operation Agatha are in Rose, 'A Senseless, Squalid War', *op. cit.*, pp. 107–8.
- 20 Dugdale diary 2 July, 1946: 'the work of the Yishuv can be destroyed in a week. I think that is the Government's policy'. (N.A. Rose (ed.), *Baffy. The Diaries of Blanche Dugdale 1936–1947*, London, Vallentine Mitchell, p. 237.
- 21 Joel Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism: Creating a Single Democratic State in Israel/Palestine*, London, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 150.
- 22 Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat*, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–41. Wilson, *With 6th Airborne*, *op. cit.*, p. 70 (note), reproduces Hagana's General Order following the atrocity.
- 23 Details of the conference are in Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 210–12.
- 24 Details are in Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country – The Story of Musa Alami*, London, John Murray, 1969, p. 150. The texts of the proposals submitted by the Arab Government delegations are in The Arab Office, *The Future of Palestine*, Beirut, Hermon Books, 1947/1970, pp. 96–100.
- 25 Ovendale, *The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 96, who gives some account of the 'dressing-down'.
- 26 Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli–Arab Tragedy*, London, Phoenix, 2006, p. 29.
- 27 Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat*, *op. cit.*, p. 21, Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*, 7th edition, Boston and New York, Bedford/St. Martins, 2010, p. 183.
- 28 Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's Arab Policy", *op. cit.*, p. 30; Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat*, *op. cit.*, p. 18. Thirty years before, the UK, too, hadn't wanted to welcome many Jews, legislating in both 1912 and 1914 against Jewish immigration. (Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929*, London, Frank Cass, 1974, p. 49.)
- 29 Diary entry, 21 July, 1947, in Rose, 'A Senseless, Squalid War', *op. cit.*, p. 274 (note).
- 30 *The Sunday Times*, 11 August, 2003.

- 31 Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's Arab Policy", *op. cit.*, p. 30. On Creech-Jones, see Kathryn Tidrick, *Empire and the English Character*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1992, p. 263.
- 32 The Arab League plan envisaged a Provisional Government composed of 7 Palestinian and 3 Jewish ministers, the prohibition of immigration in advance of a decision on the subject by them, and a legislature elected in line with the proportions of the existing population but with a Jewish maximum of a third of the members. For details, see John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate*, London, Cresset Press, 1959, pp. 215–19.
- 33 Joel Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–1.
- 34 Wilson, *With 6th. Airborne*, *op. cit.*, p. 89, puts the 1946 casualty total among UK forces at 49 killed and 122 wounded and among the police at 28 killed and 34 wounded.
- 35 Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
- 36 Wilson, *With 6th. Airborne*, *op. cit.*, p. xiv.
- 37 Cesarani, *Major Farran's Hat*, *op. cit.*, p. 59. For details, see pp. 56–8.
- 38 The UK Chiefs of Staff continued to consider Palestine a critical strategic base on account of an uncertain Egyptian situation, affecting the security of the Canal Base. (Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 215 and 218).
- 39 Wilson, *With 6th. Airborne*, *op. cit.*, p. 133, and Rose, 'A Senseless, Squalid War', *op. cit.*, pp. 162–8, where is detailed the case of the murdered sergeants.
- 40 Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's Arab Policy", *op. cit.*, pp. 35–6. Details of the *Exodus* tragedy are in Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, pp. 345–8, and Wilson, *With 6th. Airborne*, *op. cit.*, pp. 134–9.
- 41 Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate*, *op. cit.*, pp. 213f, and Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's Arab Policy", p. 30.
- 42 The Arab Office, *The Future of Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
- 43 Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956*, London, Chatto & Windus, 1963, p. 165, and Ovendale, *Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
- 44 Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 329.
- 45 Rose, 'A Senseless, Squalid War', *op. cit.*, pp. 154–5.
- 46 A minority recommendation by India, Iran and Yugoslavia favoured a single, federated state, with the capital, Jerusalem, divided into two municipalities, the old city and 'the areas which are predominantly Jewish'. (Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 127.) Details are in Michael Rice, *False Inheritance: Israel in Palestine and the Search for a Solution*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1994, pp. 189–190.
- 47 Efraim Karsh, *Fabricating Israeli History: The 'New Historians'*, London: Frank Cass, 2002, p. 177.
- 48 More in Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.* pp. 352–3.
- 49 For details, see Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, pp. 358–60.
- 50 Avi Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations*,

- London and New York, Verso, 2009, pp. 38 and 169–70, and Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, Oxford, Oneworld Publications, 2007, pp. 119–21, where the agreement is dated January, 1948.
- 51 *The Sunday Times*, 15 June, 1960, in Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism*, *op. cit.*, p. 39, and, with a slightly variant text, Roger Garaudy, *Les Mythes fondateurs de la politique israélienne*, Paris, Samizdat, 1996, p. 169. The existence of a Zionist/‘Abd Allah agreement to divide Palestine between them – credited among others by Ben-Ami – is fiercely, but unconvincingly, denied by Karsh, *Fabricating Israeli History*, *op. cit.*, pp. 69–107. Joan Comay, *Who’s Who in Jewish History after the period of the Old Testament*, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 255, claims that there was such an agreement but that it collapsed. The Dugdale quotation, of 29 May, 1941, is in Rose, *Baffy*, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
- 52 The text of the Resolution and the voting statistics are in Rice, *False Inheritance*, *op. cit.*, pp. 212–20 and 32–3.
- 53 Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, p. 190. ‘in the end, the crucial factor was the United States, and its domestic politics determined the fate of the Middle East’. (Ovendale, *Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 106.)
- 54 Cunningham to Creech Jones, 30 November, 1947. (Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War’, *op. cit.*, p. 180.)
- 55 Ben-Ami, *Scars of War*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
- 56 Bernard Wasserstein, *Israel & Palestine: Why They Fight and Can They Stop?*, London, Profile Books, 2003, pp. 28–9.
- 57 Pappé, *Ethnic Cleansing*, *op. cit.*, p. 40. Chaim Herzog, *The Arab–Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence to Lebanon*, London, Arms and Armour Press, 1982, p. 20, states that Hagana’s ‘effective force’ on the outbreak of hostilities was 15,000; Palmach had 11 single-engined light aircraft and 20 Piper Cub pilots plus ‘some twenty’ with RAF experience.
- 58 Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, *op. cit.*, p. 154. He also says, however, that the Arab Legion had been ordered by the UK War Office not to enter the parts of the country which the UN partition plan had awarded to the Palestinians until Britain’s evacuation had been completed. ‘As a result, the Haganah area of control soon extended well outside the area allotted to the Jews’.
- 59 The Mufty claimed years later that an Arab group was responsible for the atrocity, but the UK was blamed at the time. ‘The truth seems to be that it was a joint operation by Arabs and British army deserters and police’. (Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 134.)
- 60 Karsh, *Fabricating Israeli History*, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
- 61 Pappé, *Ethnic Cleansing*, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
- 62 Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*, London, Little Brown, and Company, 2000, pp. 512–13.
- 63 Garaudy, *Les Mythes fondateurs*, *op. cit.*, p. 173.
- 64 Ben-Ami, *Scars of War*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

- 65 Herzog, *The Arab–Israeli Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
- 66 Garaudy, *Les Mythes fondateurs*, *op. cit.*, p. 173, quoting Menachem Begin, *The Revolt: Memoirs of the Leader of the Irgun*, New York, Dell Books, 1978, p. 126.
- 67 Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War’, *op. cit.*, p. 194.
- 68 David Hirst, *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East*, London, Faber and Faber, 2010, p. 48. Pappe, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, pp. 334–5, puts the massacre total at ‘some forty’. In addition to Dair Yasin, ‘in villages such as Dawayma and Elabun much of the population was massacred and the remainder expelled from their homes’. (Michael Palumbo, *Imperial Israel: The History of the Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza*, London, Bloomsbury, 1992, p. 40.)
- 69 Herzog, *Arab–Israeli Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 38, claims that UK troops looked on as the incident took place.
- 70 Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War’, *op. cit.*, pp. 206–7, attributes this action to the Transjordanian Arab Legion.
- 71 Herzog, *Arab–Israeli Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
- 72 Pappe, *Ethnic Cleansing*, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–3. His account of the takeover of Haifa continues to p. 96.
- 73 Smith, *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, *op. cit.*, p. 194, Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War’, *op. cit.*, p. 202. (Wilson, *With 6th Airborne*, *op. cit.*, pp. 192–3, disagrees that UK forces told only the Jews that they were leaving and attributes their inaction to the belief that it was ‘most questionable’ that ‘the possible retention of control over a non-vital area was worth the British lives at stake’.)
- 74 Herzog, *The Arab–Israeli Wars*, *op. cit.*, pp. 33 and 37, claims that Hagana (‘as in other places’), some leading Arab citizens and Major-General Hugh Stockwell, commanding the 6th. Airborne Division, asked the Palestinians to remain but pressure by the Mufty and Al-Qawukchy, arguing that Arab forces were about to attack and would restore their homes to them, over-persuaded them.
- 75 Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, p. 366, Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War’, *op. cit.*, pp. 203 and 205. Owendale, *Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 120, says that ‘most of the Arab population of 100,000 was expelled’. (Cunningham also noted, on 26 April, that ‘the Arab members of the (Haifa) municipality left some time ago; the two leaders of the Arab Liberation Army left actually during the recent battle. Now the Chief Arab Magistrate has left’. (To Creech-Jones, in Karsh, *Fabricating Israeli History*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.)
- 76 Pappe, *Ethnic Cleansing*, *op. cit.*, p. xv.
- 77 Pappe, *Ethnic Cleansing*, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 and 102–3. Owendale, *Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 120, says that 67,000 of the 70,000 population of Jaffa were driven out.
- 78 Mark Curtis, *Secret Affairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam*, London, Serpent’s Tail, 2012, p. 38.
- 79 Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 146. The proposal was for a

- Legislative Council – made up of 18 Jews, 18 Arabs and ‘four others’, probably Christians – on which the Jews would enjoy a permanent minority.
- 80 Pappé, *Ethnic Cleansing*, *op. cit.*, pp. 44 and 286. According to Karsh, *Fabricating Israeli History*, *op. cit.*, p. 122, the UK ‘embargo of sorts’ of spring 1948 was imposed on the Arab States (but not on the Arab Legion) ‘in an attempt to prevent the lifting of an American embargo which in turn would have allowed the Yishuv to obtain weapons in the United States’.
- 81 Bertha Spafford Vester, *Our Jerusalem: An American Family in the Holy City, 1881–1949*, Evans Brothers Limited, London, 1951, pp. 355–6.
- 82 The text of Ben-Gurion’s proclamation is in Rice, *False Inheritance*, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–3.
- 83 Ben-Ami, *Scars of War*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
- 84 On this, Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism*, *op. cit.*, p. 39, says: ‘in for a penny, in for a pound: if one is to make the outlandish claim of a territory controlled 2500 years ago by one’s putative ancestors, one might as well go for broke and claim the whole region.’
- 85 Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 and 100.
- 86 Ben-Ami, *Scars of War*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
- 87 Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War’, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
- 88 Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate*, *op. cit.*, p. 235. Herzog, *The Arab–Israeli Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 47, outlines the strategies of the Arab armies and assesses the strengths of both sides.
- 89 Ben-Ami, *Scars of War*, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
- 90 Kovel, *Overcoming Zionism*, *op. cit.*, p. 214. Ann Mosely Lesch, *Origins and Development of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 2006, p. 80, puts the figure 50,000 higher. Hirst, *Beware of Small States*, *op. cit.*, p. 50, believes that the number of refugees internally displaced or driven into other Arab countries was between 700,000 and a million. Abbas Shiblak, *Iraqi Jews: A History of Mass Exodus*, London, Saqi, 2005, p. 89, maintains that 900,000 of the 1,300,000 Arab inhabitants of the territory were displaced.
- 91 Wasserstein, *Israel & Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 24. According to UNRWA, by 1993 the number of Palestinian refugees had grown to some 3.9 million worldwide and about 39% of them were living in camps. (Wasserstein, *Israel & Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 157.)
- 92 Prof. Israel Shahak in 1975. (Garaudy, *Les Mythes fondateurs*, *op. cit.*, p. 181).
- 93 Maxim Ghilan, *How Israel Lost Its Soul*, Harmondsworth, Pelican Books, Ltd., 1974, p. 229.
- 94 John Marlowe, *Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism*, London, Cresset Press, 1961, p. 51; Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 163. (Possible reasons for the Arab defeat are suggested in Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 174 and 195.) These Arab Legion activities provide ammunition for those who believe that the claim of a Zionist/Transjordanian collusion to deny Palestine a place on the map is a

- canard – one ridiculed by Rose ('A Senseless, Squalid War', *op. cit.*, pp. 206–7), who quotes Shertok in support.
- 95 Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
- 96 Norman & Helen Bentwich, *Mandate Memories, 1918–1948*, London, The Hogarth Press, 1965, p. 221.
- 97 See Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country*, *op. cit.*, pp. 156–8, for a graphic description of the intensification of the Arab exodus during the period between the two truces.
- 98 Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
- 99 Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 194. See Karsh, *Fabricating Israeli History*, *op. cit.*, pp. 164f, for a diametrically opposite interpretation of the effect of the truce.
- 100 Barr, *A Line in the Sand*, *op. cit.*, p. 364.
- 101 Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti, Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, p. 99. The Bernadotte Plan provided for restrictions on immigration, an accommodation between Israel and Jordan and a link across the Negev connecting Egypt and the Arab States. It gave Jerusalem and most of the Negev to Jordan.
- 102 Pappé, *Palestinian Dynasty*, *op. cit.*, p. 339. A detailed account of the All-Palestine Government is in Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 37–53.
- 103 Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, *op. cit.*, pp. 99–101 and 106.
- 104 Pappé, *Ethnic Cleansing*, *op. cit.*, p. xiii; Jørgen Jensenhaugen, and Hilde Henriksen Waage, "Coercive Diplomacy: Israel, Transjordan and the UN – a Triangular Drama Revisited". (*BJMES*, April 2012, 39(1), 89.)
- 105 Norman G. Finkelstein, *Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History*, London, Verso, 2008, pp. xxii–xxiii. See Peter Rodgers, *Herzl's Nightmare: One Land, Two Peoples*, London, Constable, 2005, pp. 108–9.
- 106 Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
- 107 Karsh, *Fabricating Israeli History*, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
- 108 'The refugees came from 531 towns and villages, number over 5 million (3.9 million registered with UNRWA and 1.3 million unregistered) and constitute two-thirds of the 8 million Palestinians'. (Hamid Ansari, *The Problem of Palestine: Diplomacy and its Limitations*, Delhi, Academy of Third World Studies, 2003, p. 26.)

Bibliography

Archives

British Library MSS

FO 371

Cambridge University Library

Hardinge Papers

Public Record Office, Kew

Colonial Office and Foreign Office archives

Rhodes House, Oxford

Chancellor Papers

St Antony's College, Oxford

Chancellor, Hogarth and MacMichael Papers

Sudan Archive, Durham University

Clayton and Wingate Papers.

Primary sources

Adelson, Roger. *Mark Sykes. Portrait of an Amateur*. London: Cape, 1975.

Anon. C.P. Scott 1846–1932: *The Making of the 'Manchester Guardian'*. London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1946.

Antonius, George. *The Arab Awakening. The Story of the Arab National Movement*. Beirut: Khayats, n.d.

Barbour, Neville. *Nisi Dominus, A Survey of the Palestine Controversy*. London: Harrap, 1946.

Barr, James. *A Line in the Sand, Britain, France and the Struggle for the Mastery of the Middle East*. London: Simon & Schuster, 2011.

Barzilay, Dvorah and Litvinoff, Barnet (eds.) *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, November 1917–October 1918*. Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1977.

Ben-Ami, Shlomo. *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli–Arab Tragedy*. London: Phoenix, 2006.

Bentwich, Norman. *Fulfilment in the Promised Land, 1917–1937*. London: The Soncino Press, 1938.

Bentwich, Norman & Helen. *Mandate Memories, 1918–1948*. London: The Hogarth Press, 1965.

Bowle, John. *Viscount Samuel. A Biography*. London: Victor Gollancz, 1957.

Boyle, Susan Silsby. *Betrayal of Palestine: The Story of George Antonius*. Boulder: Westview Press, 2001.

- Bullock, David L. *Allenby's War: The Palestine-Arabian Campaigns, 1916–1918*. London: Blandford Press, 1988.
- Busch, B.C. *Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914–1921*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1971.
- Cesarani, David. *Major Farran's Hat: Murder, Scandal and Britain's War Against Jewish Terrorism, 1945–1948*. London: Heinemann, 2009.
- Comay, Joan. *Who's Who in Jewish History after the period of the Old Testament*. London: Routledge, 1995.
- Djemal Pasha. *Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman, 1913–1919*. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1922.
- Egremont, Max. *A Life of Balfour*. London: Collins, 1980.
- Eliahu, Elath, Bentwich, Norman and May, Doris. *Memories of Sir Wyndham Deedes*. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1958.
- Elpeleg, Zvi. *The Grand Mufti, Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement*. London: Frank Cass, 1993.
- ESCO Foundation for Palestine, Inc. *Palestine: a Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Press, 1947.
- Finkelstein, Norman G. *Image and Reality of the Israeli–Palestine Conflict*. London: Verso, 2003.
- Finkelstein, Norman G. *Beyond Chutzpah. On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History*. London: Verso, 2008.
- Frischwasser-Ra'anan, H.F. *The Frontiers of a Nation. A re-examination of the forces which created the Palestine Mandate and determined its territorial shape*. London: The Batchworth Press, 1955.
- Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace. The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. London: Phoenix Press, 2000.
- Furlonge, Geoffrey. *Palestine is My Country – The Story of Musa Alami*. London: John Murray, 1969.
- Garaudy, Roger. *Les Mythes fondateurs de la politique israélienne*. Paris: Samizdat, 1996.
- Gardner, Brian. *Allenby*. London: Cassell, 1964.
- Herzl, Theodor. *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl*. London: Gollancz, 1958.
- Herzl, Theodor. *The Jewish State*. New York: Filiquarian Publishing, 2006.
- Huneidi, Sahar. *A Broken Trust. Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, 1920–1925*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2001.
- Jeffries, J.M.N. *Palestine: The Reality*. Longman, 1939.
- Karsh, Efraim. *Fabricating Israeli History: The 'New Historians'*. London: Frank Cass, 2002.
- Kedourie, Elie. *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth. The McMahon–Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations, 1914–1939*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2000.
- Keith-Roach, Edward. *Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate*. London: Radcliffe Press, 1994.
- Khalidi, Rashid. *British Policy towards Syria & Palestine, 1906–1914. A study of the antecedents of the Hussein–McMahon correspondence, the Sykes–Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration*. London: Ithaca Press, 1980.

- Khalidi, Rashid. *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*. Oxford: Oneworld, 2009.
- Kimche, Jon. *Seven Fallen Pillars*. London: Secker and Warburg, 1950.
- Kimche, Jon. *The Second Arab Awakening. The Middle East, 1914–1970*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.
- Kimche, Jon and David. *Both Sides of the Hill*. London: Secker and Warburg, 1960.
- Kisch, Lt. Col. F.H. *Palestine Diary*. London: Victor Gollancz, 1938.
- Koestler, Arthur. *Promise and Fulfilment: Palestine 1917–49*. London: Macmillan, 1983.
- Kupferschmidt, Uri M. *The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine*. Leiden: Brill, 1987.
- Lesch, Ann Mosely. *Arab Politics in Palestine: the Frustration of a Nationalist Movement*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979.
- Leslie, Sir Shane. *Mark Sykes: His Life and Letters*. London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1923.
- Litvinoff, Barnet. *Weizmann: Last of the Patriarchs*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976.
- Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley. *Iraq 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social and Economic History*. Oxford University Press, 1953.
- Luke, Sir Harry & Keith-Roach, Edward. *Handbook of Palestine and Trans-jordan*. London: Macmillan, 1922.
- Marlowe, John. *Rebellion in Palestine*. London: Cresset Press, 1946.
- Marlowe, John. *The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate*. London: Cresset Press, 1959.
- Masalha, Nur. *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1883–1948*. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1992.
- Masalha, Nur. *A Land Without People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians, 1945–96*. London: Pluto Press, 1997.
- Masalha, Nur. *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion*. Pluto Press, 2000.
- Masalha, Nur. *The Politics of Denial: Israel and the Palestine Refugee Problem*. London: Pluto Press, 2003.
- Mattar, Philip. *The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Mattar, Philip (ed.). *Encyclopaedia of the Palestinians*. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2000.
- Medoff, Rafael and Waxman, Chaim I. *Historical Dicionary of Zionism*. Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2000.
- Morris, Benny. *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Morris, Benny. *1948: A History of the First Arab–Israel War*. London: Yale University Press, 2008.

- Nazzal, Nafez Y. and Nazzal, Laila A. *Historical Dictionary of Palestine*. Lanham, Maryland, and London: The Scarecrow Press, 1997.
- Pappe, Ilan. *The Making of the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1994.
- Pappe, Ilan. *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Pappe, Ilan. *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007.
- Pappe, Ilan. *The Israel/Palestine Question. A Reader*. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Pappe, Ilan. *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian dynasty. The Husaynis, 1700–1948*. London: Saqi Books, 2010.
- Piterberg, Gabriel. *The Returns of Zionism: Myths, Politics and Scholarship in Israel*. New York and London: Verso, 2008.
- Porath, Yehoshua. *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929*. London: Frank Cass, 1974.
- Powell, Geoffrey. *Plumer, the Soldiers' General*. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2004.
- Presland, John. *Deedes Bey: A Study of Sir Wyndham Deedes 1883–1923*. London: Macmillan, 1942.
- Rabinowicz, Oskar K. *Fifty Years of Zionism – A Historical Analysis of Dr. Weizmann's 'Trial and Error'*. London: Murray Abercrombie, 1950.
- Rice, Michael. *False Inheritance. Israel in Palestine and the Search for a Solution*. London: Kegan Paul International, 1994.
- Rimawy, Suhaylah ar-. *Al-Jam'iyyah al-'Arabiyyah al-Fatat as-suriyyah: Dirasah watha'iqiyyah, 1909–1918*. Amman: 1988.
- Rodgers, Peter. *Herzl's Nightmare: One Land, Two Peoples*. London: Constable, 2005.
- Rogan, Eugene L. and Shlaim, A. (eds.). *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Rose, N.A. (ed.). *Baffy. The Diaries of Blanche Dugdale 1936–1947*. London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1973.
- Rose, N.A. 'A Senseless, Squalid War'. London: Pimlico, 2010.
- Sa'id, Amin. *Ath-Thawrah al-'Arabiyyah al-Kubra*. Cairo: Matba'at 'Isa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1934.
- Samuel, Viscount. *Memoirs*. London: Cresset Press, 1945.
- Schectman, Joseph B. *The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story*. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956.
- Schneer, Jonathan. *The Balfour Declaration. The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010.
- Segev, Tom. *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*. London: Little Brown, and Company, 2000.
- Seikaly, May. *Haifa: Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918–1939*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1995.
- Shepherd, Naomi. *Ploughing Sand: British rule in Palestine, 1917–1948*. London: John Murray, 1999.

- Sherman, A.J. *Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine 1914–1918*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1997.
- Shlaim, Avi. *Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Shlaim, Avi. *Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations*. London and New York: Verso, 2009.
- Sidebotham, Herbert. *Great Britain and Palestine*. London: Macmillan, 1937.
- Simon, Leon. *Ahad Ha-Am*. London: the Horovitz Publishing Co. Ltd., 1960.
- Smith, Charles D. *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents*. Boston and New York: Bedford/St. Martins, 2004.
- Sokolow, Florian. *Nahum Sokolow: Life and Legend*. London: Jewish Chronicle Publications, 1975.
- Stein, Leonard. *The Balfour Declaration*. London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1961.
- Sykes, Christopher. *Two Studies in Virtue*. London: Collins, 1953.
- Sykes, Christopher. *Cross Roads to Israel*. London: Collins, 1965.
- Tibawi, A.L. *A Modern History of Syria, Including Lebanon and Palestine*. London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's, 1969.
- Tibawi, A.L. *Arabic and Islamic Themes*. London: Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1976.
- Tibawi, A.L. *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914–1921*. London: Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1978.
- ‘Umar, ‘Abd al-Karim al-. *Mudhakkirat al-Haj Amin al-Husayny*. Damascus: Al-Ahali li’t-Tiba’ah wa’n-Nashr, 1999.
- Wasserstein, Bernard. *The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab–Jewish Conflict, 1917–29*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991.
- Wasserstein, Bernard. *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Wasserstein, Bernard. *Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City*. London: Profile Books, 2001.
- Weisgal, Meyer and Carmichael, Joel. *Chaim Weizmann: A biography by several hands*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962.
- Weizmann, Dr. Chaim. *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1949.

Secondary sources

- Aaronsohn, Alexander. *With the Turks in Palestine*. London: Constable, 1917.
- Abboushi, W.F. *Filastin qabl ad-Dayaa’/ the Unmaking of Palestine*. Wisbech: Menas Press, 1985.
- Abcarius, Michael F. *Palestine through the Fog of Propaganda*. London: Hutchinson, 1946.
- Abu Lughod, Ibrahim (ed.). *The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the origin and development of the Arab–Israeli conflict*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1987.
- Aburish, Saïd K. *A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite*. London: Victor Gollancz, 1997.

- ‘Allush, N. *Al-Muqawamah al-‘Arabiyyah fi Filistin, 1917–1948*. Beirut, 1970.
- ‘Aly, Muhammad Kurd, *Kitab Khitat ash-Sham, Vol. VI*. Damascus, 1925.
- Andrews, Fannie Fern. *The Holy Land under Mandate*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931.
- Ansari, M.H. *The Problem of Palestine: Diplomacy and its Limitations*. New Delhi: Academy of Third World Studies, 2003.
- Arab Office, The. *The Future of Palestine*. Beirut: Hermon Books, 1947.
- ‘Arif al-‘Arif. *An-Nakbah*. Beirut: Manshurat al-Maktabah al-‘Asriyyah li’t-Tiba’ah wa’n-Nashrah, 1956.
- Ashbee, C.R. *A Palestine Notebook, 1918–1923*. London: William Heinemann, 1923.
- Asher, Michael. *Lawrence. The Uncrowned King of Arabia*. London: Viking, 1998.
- Askary, Jafar Pasha al-. *A Soldier’s Story: From Ottoman Rule to Independent Iraq*. London: Arabian Publishing, Ltd., 2003.
- Askary, Tahsin al-. *Mudhakkirat al-ath-thawrah al-‘Arabiyyah al-Kubra wa’tb-thawrah al-iraqiyyah*. Baghdad and Najaf, 1936–8.
- Barr, James. *Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War in Arabia, 1916–1918*. New York: Norton & Company, 2006.
- Bauer, Yehuda. *Scripta Hierosolymitana, Vol. 7*. Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1961.
- Ben Cramer, Richard. *How Israel Lost: The Four Questions*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.
- Bidwell, Robin (ed.). *The Arab Bulletin of the Arab Bureau in Cairo 1916–1918*. London: Archive Editions, 1986.
- Birdwood, Lord. *Nuri as-Said, A Study in Arab Leadership*. London: Cassell, 1959.
- Bowman-Manifold, Maj.-Gen. Sir M.G.E. *An Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914 to 1918*. London: Institution of Royal Engineers, 1929.
- Bregman, Ahron. *Cursed Victory: A History of Israel and the Occupied Territories*. London: Allen Lane, 2014.
- Brodrick, Alan Houghton. *Near to Greatness: A Life of the Sixth Earl Winterton*. London: Hutchinson, 1965.
- Bruce, Anthony. *The Last Crusade: The Palestine Campaign in the First World War*. London: John Murray, 2001.
- Bullard, Reader. *Britain and the Middle East from the Earliest Times to 1950*. London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1951.
- Burrows, Millar. *Palestine is our Business*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1949.
- Carver, Field Marshal Lord (ed.). *The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century*. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 2005.
- Chesterton, G.K. *The New Jerusalem*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920.
- Cohen, Hillel, tr. Watzman, Haim. *1929: Year Zero of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*. Waltham Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 2015.

- Colville, J.R. *Man of Valour. The Life of Field-Marshal Lord Gort, V.C.* London: Collins, 1972.
- Commins, David. *Historical Dictionary of Syria.* London: The Scarecrow Press, 1996.
- Connell, John. *Wavell. Scholar and Soldier.* London: Collins, 1964.
- Crossman, R.H.S. *A Nation Reborn.* London: Hamish Hamilton, 1960.
- Daghir, As'ad. *Mudhakkiraty 'ala Hamish al-Qadhiyyah al-'Arabiyyah.* Cairo: 1956.
- Daly, M.W. *The Sirdar. Sir Reginald Wingate and the British Empire in the Middle East.* Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1997.
- Dann, Uriel (ed.). *The Great Powers and the Middle East 1919–1939.* New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., Africana Publishing Company, 1988.
- Darwin, John. *Britain, Egypt, and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War, 1918–1922.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
- Davidson, Lionel. *The Sun Chemist.* London: Jonathan Cape, 1976.
- Dawisha, Adeed. *Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century: From Triumph to Despair.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
- Dawn, C.Ernest. *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973.
- Dor, Daniel. *The Suppression of Guilt: The Israeli Media and the Reoccupation of the West Bank.* London: Pluto Press, 2005.
- Dothan, Shmuel. *A Land in the Balance: the Struggle for Palestine, 1918–1948.* Tel-Aviv: MOD Books, 1993.
- Douwes, Dick. *The Ottomans in Syria: A history of justice and oppression.* London: I.B. Tauris, 2000.
- Duff, Douglas V. *A Sword for Hire.* London: John Murray, 1934.
- Duff, Douglas V. *May the Winds Blow!* London: Hollis and Carter, 1948.
- Eban, Abba. *Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes.* New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1992.
- Egremont, Max. *Under Two Flags: The Life of Major-General Sir Edward Spears.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997.
- Erskine, Mrs. Steuart. *Palestine of the Arabs.* London: Harrap, 1935.
- Eversley, Lord, and Chirol, Sir Valentine. *The Turkish Empire.* London: Fisher Unwin, 1917.
- Falls, Cyril. *Military Operations, Egypt & Palestine from June 1917 to the End of the War, Vol. II.* London: HMSO, 1930.
- Falls, Cyril. *Armageddon 1918.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964.
- Fieldhouse, D.K. *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Fisher, John. *Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East, 1916–19.* London: Frank Cass, 1999.
- Fisk, Robert. *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East.* London: Harper Perennial, 2006.
- Fraser, T.G. Andrew Mango and Robert McNamara. *The Makers of the Modern Middle East.* London: Haus Books, 2011.
- Gabbay, Rony E. *A Political Study of the Arab–Jewish Conflict.* Geneva: Libraire E. Droz, 1959.

- Garnett, David. *The Essential T.E. Lawrence*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1956.
- Gelber, Yoav. *Jewish–Transjordanian Relations, 1921–1948*. London: Frank Cass, 1997.
- Gelber, Yoav. *Israeli–Jordanian Dialogue, 1948–1953: Cooperation, Conspiracy, or Collusion*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004.
- Gelvin, James L. *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
- Ghilan, Maxim. *How Israel Lost Its Soul*. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, Ltd., 1974.
- Gilmour, David. *Curzon*. London: John Murray, 1994.
- Glubb, Sir John Bagot. *Peace in the Holy Land: An historical analysis of the Palestine Problem*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1971.
- Goren, Arthur A. *Dissenter in Zion: From the Writings of Judah L. Magnes*. Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Gorny, Yousef. *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882–1948: A Study of Ideology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
- Grafftey-Smith, Laurence. *Bright Levant*. London: John Murray, 1970.
- Graves, Philip. *Land of Three Faiths*. London: Cape, 1923.
- Graves, R.M. *Experiment in Anarchy*. London: Victor Gollancz, 1949.
- Graves, Robert. *Lawrence and the Arabs*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1927.
- Hadawi, Sami (ed.). *Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948: A comprehensive study*. London: Saqi Books, 1988.
- Hamilton, Jill. *Gods, Guns and Israel: Britain, the First World War and the Jews in the Holy City*. Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2004.
- Harington, Sir Charles. *Plumer of Messines*. London: John Murray, 1935.
- Hart, B.H. Liddell. *T.E. Lawrence: in Arabia and After*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1934.
- Hart, B.H. Liddell. *History of the First World War*. London: Book Club Associates, 1973.
- Hattis, Susan Lee. *The Bi-National Idea in Palestine during Mandatory Times*. Haifa: Shikmona, 1970.
- Herzog, Chaim. *The Arab–Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence to Lebanon*. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1982.
- Hirst, David. *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East*. London: Faber and Faber, 2010.
- Hodgkin, Thomas. *Letters from Palestine, 1932–36*. London: Quartet, 1986.
- Hopwood, Derek (ed.). *Arab Nation, Arab Nationalism*. London: Macmillan, 2000.
- Hourani, A.H. *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- Hourani, A.H. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Hourani, A.H. (ed.). *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*. Berkeley: University of California, 1981.
- Howard, Harry N. *The King–Crane Commission*. Beirut: Khayyat, 1963.

- Hurewitz, J.C. *The Struggle for Palestine*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1950.
- Hurewitz, J.C. (ed.). *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Volume II. A Documentary Record, 1914–1956*. Princeton: Van Nostrand Inc., 1956.
- Husayn, ‘Abd Allah b. *Mudhakkirati*. Jerusalem: Matba’at Bayt al-Muqaddas, 1945.
- Hut, Bayan Nuwayhid al-. *Al-Qiyadah wa’l-Mu’assasah as-siyasiyyah fi falastin 1917–1948*. Beirut, 1986.
- Hyamson, Albert M. *Palestine, A Policy*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1946.
- Hyamson, Albert M. *Palestine Under the Mandate*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1950.
- Ingrams, Doreen. *Palestine Papers 1917–1922. Seeds of Conflict*. London: John Murray, 1972.
- Ionides, Michael. *Divide and Lose*. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960.
- James, Laurence. *Imperial Warrior, the Life and Times of Field Marshal Viscount Allenby*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993.
- Jargy, Simon. *Guerre et Paix en Palestine: ou l’histoire du conflit Israélo-Arabe, 1917–1967*. Neuchatel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1968.
- Johnson, Nels. *Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism*. London: Kegan Paul, 1982.
- Kasmieh, Khairia. *Al-Hukumah al-‘Arabiyyah fi Dimashq bayna 1918–1920*. Beirut: 1982.
- Kedourie, Elie. *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921*. London: Bowes & Bowes, 1956.
- Kedourie, Elie. *The Chatham House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970.
- Keegan, John (ed.). *Churchill’s Generals*. London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 1991.
- Khadduri, Majid. *Arab Contemporaries: The role of personalities in politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- Khalidi, Rashid et al. (eds.). *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
- Khalidi, Walid. *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971.
- Khalidi, Walid (ed.). *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*. Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992.
- Khoury, Philip S. *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Khoury, Philip S. *Syria and the French Mandate: the Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Kirk, George E. *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1948.
- Kirkbride, Sir Alec. *An Awakening: The Arab Campaign 1917–1918*. Tavistock: University Press of Arabia, 1971.

- Klieman, Aaron S. *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.
- Kovel, Joel. *Overcoming Zionism: Creating a Single Democratic State in Israel/Palestine*. London: Pluto Press, 2007.
- Laor, Yitzhak. *The Myths of Liberal Zionism*. London: Verso, 2009.
- Laqueur, Walter Z. *A History of Zionism*. New York, Chicago and San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972.
- Laqueur, Walter Z. and Rubin, Barry (eds.). *The Israel–Arab Reader. A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1984.
- Lawrence, T.E. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1935.
- Lesch, Ann Mosely. *Origins and Development of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2006.
- Lewin, Ronald. *The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps*. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 2003.
- Lewis, Professor Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Lloyd George. *Memories of the Peace Conference*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.
- Long, C.W.R. *British Pro-Consuls in Egypt, 1914–1929: The challenge of nationalism*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004.
- Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley. *Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958.
- Lord, John. *Duty, Honor, Empire: The Life and Times of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen*. New York: Random House, 1970.
- Lowdermilk, Walter C. *The Untried Approach to the Palestine Problem*. New York: American Christian Palestine Committee Publications, 1948.
- Macmillan, Margaret. *Peacemakers*. London: John Murray, 2001.
- Macmunn, Lt.- Gen. Sir George, and Falls, Capt. Cyril. *Military Operations, Egypt & Palestine. From the Outbreak of War with Germany to June 1917, Vol. I*. London: HMSO, 1928.
- Mansfield, Peter. *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors*. London: Macmillan, 1973.
- Mansur, George. *The Arab Worker under the Palestine Mandate*. Jerusalem: Commercial Press, 1937.
- Marlowe, John. *Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism*. London: Cresset Press, 1961.
- Massey, W.T. *Allenby's Final Triumph*. London: Constable, 1920.
- McMeekin, Sean. *The Berlin–Baghdad Express*. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2011.
- Monroe, Elizabeth. *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1963.
- Monroe, Elizabeth. *Philby of Arabia*. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998.
- Musa, Sulayman. *Ayyam La Tunsu: al-Urdun fi Harb 1948*. Amman, 1982.

- Najem, Tom Pierre. *Lebanon*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Namier, Louis. *Conflicts*. London: Macmillan, 1942.
- Nevakivi, Jukka. *Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920*. London: The Athlone Press, University of London, 1969.
- Newton, Frances Emily. *Searchlight on Palestine*. London: The Arab Centre, 1938.
- Newton, Frances Emily. *Fifty Years in Palestine*. Wrotham: Coldharbour Press, 1948.
- Nicolson, Nigel (ed.). *The Harold Nicolson Diaries, 1907–1964*. London: Phoenix, 2004.
- Oliphant, Laurence. *The Land of Gilead*. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., 1883.
- Ovendale, Philip. *The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*. London: Longman, 1984.
- Palumbo, Michael. *Imperial Israel: The History of the Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza*. London: Bloomsbury, 1992.
- Paris, Timothy J. *Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule 1920–1925*. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
- Parkes, James. *A History of Palestine from 135 AD to Modern Times*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949.
- Parkes, James. *A History of the Jewish People*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964.
- Pearce, Robert D. *Sir Bernard Bourdillon: The Biography of a Twentieth-Century Colonialist*. Oxford: The Kensal Press, 1987.
- Peel, Lord et al. *Royal Commission Report*. London: HMSO, 1937.
- Pipes, Daniel. *Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Provence, Michael. *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism*. Chesham, Bucks.: Combined Academic Publishers, 2005.
- Qasimiyya, Khayriyya. *Al-Hukumah al-'Arabiyyah fi Dimashq*. Cairo: Dar al Ma'arif, 1971.
- Reid, Walter. *Empire of the Sand: How Britain Made the Middle East*. Edinburgh: Birlinn Limited, 2011.
- Repington, Lt.-Col. C. à Court. *The First World War, 1914–1918: Personal Experiences of . . .* Aldershot: Grey Revivals, 1991.
- Robson, Laura. *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011.
- Roskill, Stephen. *Hankey: Man of Secrets, Vol. 2: 1919–1931*. London: Collins, 1972.
- Sachar, Howard M. *The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914–1924*. London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1970.
- Safty, A. *Might Over Right: How the Zionists took over Palestine*. Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2008.
- Samuel, Horace B. *Unholy Memories of the Holy Land*. London: Hogarth Press, 1930.
- Sanders, Ronald. *The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour*

- Declaration and the Birth of the British Mandate for Palestine*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983.
- Savage, R. *Allenby of Armageddon*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925.
- Schama, Simon. *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel*. London: Collins, 1978.
- Shahak, Israel. *Open Secrets: Israeli nuclear and foreign policies*. London: Pluto Press, 1997.
- Shiblak, Abbas. *Iraqi Jews: A History of Mass Exodus*. London: Saqi Books, 2005.
- Simson, H.J. *British Rule, and Rebellion*. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons., Ltd., 1937.
- Smith, Barbara J. *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1993.
- Stewart, Desmond. *T.E. Lawrence*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977.
- Stirling, Lt.-Col. W.F. *Safety Last*. London: Hollis and Carter, 1953.
- Storrs, Ronald. *Orientalisms*. London: Nicholson & Watson, 1943.
- Sultan, 'Aly. *Ta'rikh Suriyyah 1918–1920: Hukm Faysal b. Husayn*. Damascus, 1987.
- Sykes, Christopher. *Two Studies in Virtue*. London: Collins, 1953.
- Sykes, Christopher Simon. *The Big House. The Story of a Country House and Its Family*. London: HarperCollins, 2004.
- Symes, Sir Stewart. *Tour of Duty*. London: Collins, 1946.
- Taylor, Alan R. *Prelude to Israel: An analysis of Zionist diplomacy, 1897–1947*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961.
- Taylor, Anne. *Laurence Oliphant, 1829–1888*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Tibawi, A.L. *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914–1921*. London: Luzac & Company Ltd., 1978.
- Tessler, Mark. *History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. *Acquaintances*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Tuma, E. *Sittun 'Aman 'ala'l-Harakah al-Qawmiyyah al-'Arabiyyah al-Filistiniyyah*. Beirut, 1978.
- Vester, Bertha Spafford. *Our Jerusalem. An American Family in the Holy City, 1881–1949*. London: Evans Brothers Limited, 1951.
- Vital, D. *The Origins of Zionism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Vital, D. *Zionism: The Formative Years*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Vital, D. *Zionism: The Crucial Phase*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Wahbah, Hafidh. *Jazirat al-'Arab fi'l-Qarn al-'Ashrin*. Cairo: Matba'ah li Jannat at- Ta'lif wa't-Tarjamah wa'n-Nashr, 1946.
- Warner, Geoffrey. *Iraq and Syria, 1941*. London: Davis-Poynter Ltd., 1974.
- Wasserstein, Bernard. *Israel & Palestine: Why They Fight and Can They Stop?* London: Profile Books, 2003.
- Wavell, A.P. *The Palestine Campaigns*. London: Constable, 1928.

- Wavell, Field-Marshal Viscount A.P. *Allenby: Soldier and Statesman*. London: Harrap, 1946.
- Williams, Ann. *Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa, 1914–1967*. London: Macmillan, 1968.
- Wilson, Maj.-Gen. Dare. *With 6th Airborne Division in Palestine 1945–1948*. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2008.
- Wilson, Jeremy. *Lawrence of Arabia*. New York: Collier Books, 1992.
- Wingate, Sir Ronald. *Wingate of the Sudan. The Life and Times of General Sir Reginald Wingate, Maker of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*. London: John Murray, 1955.
- Winstone, H.V.F. (ed.). *The Diaries of Parker Pasha*. London: Quartet Books Limited, 1983.
- Worsfold, W.B. *Palestine of the Mandate*. London: Fisher Unwin, 1925.
- Wright, Quincy. *Mandates under the League of Nations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930.
- Young, Major Sir Hubert. *The Independent Arab*. London: John Murray, 1933.
- Zebel, S.H. *Balfour: A Political Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973
- Zeine, Z.N. *Arab–Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism*. Beirut: Khayats, 1958.
- Zeine, Z.N. *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Western Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal’s Kingdom in Syria*. Beirut: Khayats, 1960.
- Zeine, Z.N. *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism with a Background Study of Arab–Turkish Relations in the Near East*. Beirut: Khayats, 1966.

Dissertations

- Ofer, Pinhas. ‘The role of the High Commissioner in British Policy in Palestine: Sir John Chancellor, 1928–1931’. London: London University School of Oriental and African Studies, Ph.D., 1971.
- Sheffer, G. ‘Policy making and British policies towards Palestine, 1929–1939’. Oxford: Oxford University, D. Phil., 1971.

Internet

- Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca, 1915–1916.
(www.gwpda.org/1916mcmahon_sharif.htm).

Articles

- Antonius, George. ‘Syria and the French Mandate’, *International Affairs* 13, 4 (July–August, 1934), 523–540.
- Arielli, Nir. ‘Italian Involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–1939’, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 35, 2 (August, 2008), 187–204.
- Bidwell, Robin. ‘The Brémond Mission in the Hijaz, 1916–17: A study in inter-allied co-operation’, in Bidwell, R.L., and Smith, G.R. *Arabian and Islamic Studies*. London and New York: Longman, 1983.

- Finkelstein, Norman G. 'Israel and Iraq: A Double Standard', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 78, Vol. XX, no. 2 (Winter, 1991).
- Fisher, John. 'Syria and Mesopotamia in British Middle Eastern Policy in 1919', *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, 2 (1998), 129–70.
- Friedman, Isaiah. 'The McMahon–Hussein Correspondence and the Question of Palestine', with comment by Toynbee and the author's reply, *The Journal of Contemporary History* V, no. 2 (1970), 83–122; V, no. 4 (1970), 185–201.
- Freas, Erik. 'Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif: A Pan-Islamic or Palestinian Nationalist Cause?', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39, 1 (April, 2012), 19–51.
- Friesel, Evyatar. 'Herbert Samuel's Reassessment of Zionism in 1921', *Studies in Zionism* 5,2 (Autumn, 1984), 213–37.
- Gillon, Dan. 'Were the British Wrong about the Palestinians?', *New Middle East* 4 (January, 1969), 33–37.
- Goren, Tamir. 'Hasan Bey Shukri and His Contributions to the Integration of Jews in the Haifa Municipality at the Time of the British Mandate', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 33, 1 (May, 2006), 19–36.
- Hodgkin, Thomas. 'Antonius, Palestine and the 1930s', *Gazelle Review* 10 (1982), 1–33.
- Hogarth, D.G. 'Present Discontents in the Near and Middle East', *Quarterly Review*, October, 1920.
- Hopwood, Derek. 'Earth's Proud Empires Pass Away: Britain's Moment in the Middle East', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 29, 2 (2002), 109–120.
- Howard, Harry N. 'An American Experiment in Peace Making: the King–Crane Commission', *Moslem World* XXXII (April, 1942), 122–46.
- Huneidi, Sahar. 'Was Balfour Policy Reversible?', *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXV11, 2 (Winter, 1998), 34–35.
- Jacobson, Abigail. 'A City Living through Crisis: Jerusalem during World War I', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36, 1 (April, 2009), 73–92.
- Karsh, Efraim and Karsh, Inari. 'Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt', *Middle Eastern Studies* 33,2 (April, 1997), 267–312.
- Kedourie, Elie. 'Cairo and Khartoum on The Arab Question, 1915–18', *The Historical Journal*, VII, 2 (1964), 280–97.
- Kedourie, Elie. 'Sir Herbert Samuel and the Government of Palestine', *Middle Eastern Studies* V (January, 1969), 44–65.
- Khadduri, Majid. 'Aziz 'Ali Al-Misri and the Arab Nationalist Movement', in St. Antony's Papers 17, *Middle Eastern Affairs* 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 140–63.
- Khalidi, Rashid. 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraisi and *Al Mufid*: the Press and Arab Nationalism before 1914', in Buheiry, Marwan (ed.) *Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890–1939* (Beirut, 1981).
- Khalidi, Walid. 'The Jewish-Ottoman Land Company: Herzl's Blueprint for the Colonization of Palestine', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 86, vol. XXII, 2 (Winter, 1993), 30–47.

- Klieman, Aaron S. 'Britain's War Aims in the Middle East in 1915', *The Journal of Contemporary History* III, no. 3 (July, 1968), 237–251.
- Levene, M. 'The Balfour Declaration: a case of Mistaken Identity', *English Historical Review* (January, 1992)
- Lieshout, R.H. '“Keeping Better Educated Moslems Busy”. Sir Reginald Wingate and the origins of the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence', *Historical Journal* 27, 2 (1984), 453–63.
- MacCallum, Elizabeth P. 'The Arab National Movement', *The Muslim World* 25 (October 1935), 359–74.
- Marmorstein, Emile. 'A Note on “Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo”', in St. Antony's Papers 11, *Middle Eastern Affairs* 2 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), 161–5.
- Mathew, William M. 'War-time Contingency and the Balfour Declaration of 1917. An Improbable Regression', *Journal of Palestine Studies* XL, 2 (Winter, 2011), 26–42.
- 'The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917–1923: British Imperialist Imperatives', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 40, 3 (July 2013), 231–250.
- McCallum, D. 'The French in Syria, 1919–1924', *Journal of the Central Asian Society* XXXIII (October 1923), 2–49.
- Monroe, Elizabeth. 'Mr. Bevin's Arab Policy', in St Antony's Papers 11, *Middle Eastern Affairs* 2 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), 9–48.
- Polk, William R. 'America in the Middle East, 1947–1958', St Antony's Papers 11, *Middle Eastern Affairs* 2 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), 49–80.
- Porath, Yehoshua. 'Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Mufti of Jerusalem – His Rise to Power and the Consolidation of His Position', *Asian and African Studies* 7 (1971).
- Rabinowicz, Oskar K. 'New Light on the East Africa Scheme', in Cohen, Israel (ed.), *The Rebirth of Israel, A Memorial Tribute to Paul Goodman* (Connecticut: Hyperion Press, 1952).
- Rémusat, Paul, 'Les cent jours du roi de Syrie', *Extrait de la revue des études historiques* XIV (Spring 1924), 1–27.
- Richmond, E.T. "‘England’ in Palestine", *The Nineteenth Century and After*, July, 1925.
- Richmond, E.T. 'Dictatorship in the Holy Land', *The Nineteenth Century and After*, February, 1938
- Richmond, John, 'Prophet of Doom: E.T. Richmond, FRIBA, Palestine, 1920–1924', in *Arabic and Islamic Garland: Historical, Educational and Literary Papers Presented to Abdul Latif Tibawi* (London: 1977), pp. 189–96.
- Schölch, Alexander. 'Britain in Palestine, 1838–1882: The Roots of the Balfour Policy', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, 1 (Autumn, 1992), 39–56.
- Sheffer, G., 'Intentions and Results of British Policy in Palestine: Passfield's White Paper', *Middle Eastern Studies* 9, 1 (January, 1973).
- Smith, Charles D. 'The Invention of a Tradition: The Question of Arab Acceptance of the Zionist Right to Palestine during World War I', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 86, vol. XXII, 2 (Winter 1993), 48–61.

- Tibawi, A.L. 'Syria in the McMahon Correspondence: Fresh Evidence from the British Foreign Office Records', *Middle East Forum* XLII, 4 (1966), 5–31.
- Tibawi, A.L. 'Syria in War Time Agreements and Disagreements', *Middle East Forum* XLIII, 2–3 (1967), 77–109.
- Tibawi, A.L. 'T.E. Lawrence, Faisal and Weizmann', *Royal Central Asian Journal* LV/2 (1969), 136f.
- Toynbee, A.J. 'The MacMahon–Hussein Correspondence: Comments and a Reply', *Journal of Contemporary History* 5,4 (1970).
- Toynbee, A.J. 'The Trouble in Palestine', *New Republic*, 6 September 1922.
- Wilson, Mary C. 'King Abdullah and Palestine', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 14, 1 (1988), 37–41.
- Vereté, Mayir. 'The Balfour Declaration and its Makers', *Middle Eastern Studies* 6/1 (January, 1970).
- Vickery, C.E. 'Arabia and the Hedjaz', *Central Asian Society Journal* X (1923), 46–62.
- Von Kressenstein, Kress, 'The Campaign in Palestine from the Enemy Side', *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* 67 (February, 1922).
- Warburg, Gabriel. 'Wingate and the Sharifian Revolt, 1915–16', *Hamizrah Hehadash*, 19, 4 (1969), 355–63.

Index

- 4th Army (Ottoman), 29
4th Australian Cavalry Division, 61
6th Infantry Division (British), 59
25 Division (Ottoman), 29
- ‘Abd Allah b. Husayn, Amir and King,
2, 32, 62, 112, 176, 177, 178, 183,
225
first approach to Kitchener (1914),
26
commits Husayn to allying with
Britain (1914), 27
asks UK to support Arab independ-
ence in Damascus Protocol area
(1915), 29
on McMahon’s ‘pledge’, 34
accepts validity of Palestine mandate
(1921), 111
agreement to partition Palestine with
Golda Meir (Nov., 1947), 216
‘King of all Palestine’, 226
- Abdülhamid II, Sultan, 16, 29
Abdullah, see ‘Abd Allah
Acre, 16, 71, 178, 220, 221
Sanjaq, 61
proposed terminus for a railway from
Iraq, 35
Advisory Council (Samuel), 108, 109,
138
‘Afulah, 131
‘Ahd, Al-, 27, 29, 36
Akaba, see ‘Aqaba
‘Alamy, Musa al-, 4, 119, 158, 164, 167,
189, 249*n*, 258*n*
on Samuel, 142
Aleppo, 33, 61
District (sic), 31, 32
Vilayet, 31, 34, 35, 126
Alexander II, Tsar, 10
Alexandretta, 38, 57, 72
District (sic), 31
Aliyah, First, 10
Second, 15
Alkalai, Yehuda, 10
- Allenby, Gen. Sir Edmund, 2, 4, 54, 58,
59, 61, 84, 88, 89, 90, 95, 100,
101, 104, 106, 117, 147, 243*n*
promises government based on the
free will of the Palestinians (1917),
60
his political settlement in Palestine
and Syria, 66
Allon, Yigal, 197
UN Resolution 181 partition borders
not acceptable as final (Nov.,
1947), 217
All-Palestine Government, 224
Altneuland (1902), 14
‘Aly b. Husayn, Amir, 57
Am, Ahad Ha-, 15, 18, 43, 87
Herzl’s aim of a Jewish state absurd,
13
Zionism ignoring the Arab
Palestinians, 13
criticises lack of Jewishness and
Hebrew in Herzl’s *Altneuland*, 14
American Jewish Congress, 74
Amery, Leo, 112, 148, 149, 160, 162,
193
need for Jewish and Arab National
Homes to be established side by
side, 141
praise for Samuel, 142
‘Amman, 111
Andrew, Lewis Y., 183
Anglo [sic]-French Declaration, see
Franco-British Declaration
Anglo [sic]-Jewish Association, 43
Anti-Arabism, Jewish and Israeli, 86, 87,
216, 241*n*
Anti-Semitism, 11, 14, 45, 119, 151
Antonius, George, 46, 63, 68, 141, 153,
171, 189, 190, 246*n*, 250*n*
quoted, 65
‘Aqaba, 35, 39, 57, 61, 66, 225
Gulf, 58, 130
port, 74

- Arab Agency, 156
 Palestinians reject (1923), 137–8
 Bureau, 32, 66, 171
 history, 233*n*
 Centre in London (1935), 17
 Committee (Cairo)
 Jewish immigrants should have ‘fair opportunity’ to buy Palestine state land, 84
 Executive Committee, 110, 111, 117, 123, 128, 133, 135, 138, 139, 141, 149, 151, 156, 157, 162, 163, 169, 244*n*
 Samuel treats this unofficial Palestine government as a ‘constitutional opposition’, 109
 UK ‘the true enemy’ (March, 1922), 168
 Higher (Executive) Committee, 173, 174, 176, 179, 189, 210, 214, 255*n*
 League, 204, 207, 209, 217, 224
 resolved to invade Palestine if UN approves partition, 210
 Legion, 216, 217
 strength in 1948, 222
 captures old city of Jerusalem (May, 1948), 223
 Liberation Army
 on Israeli independence, begins to invade Palestine, 219, 221
 Office (Washington), 214
 quote, 186
 Revolt, 2, 25, 36, 53, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 69, 71, 72, 106
 begins on the strength of false British assurances, 37
 loses Syria, 54
 its make-up after ‘Aqaba, 58
 its ‘striking success’ (Balfour), 65
 UK praise for, 54, 65, 68
 Arabia, 31, 41, 135, 186
 Arabic, 85, 118, 119, 127
 ‘Arif, ‘Arif al-, 99, 100, 104
 ‘Arish, Al-, 74, 130
 armies, strengths of Israeli and Arab (1948), 222
 Asquith, Herbert, 18, 26, 44, 65, 140
 ridicules Samuel’s 1915 ideas for development of the Yishuv, 19
 Lloyd George ‘does not care a damn for the Jews’, 21
 abandons ‘Ottoman integrity’ (1914), 27
 Assimilation, Assimilationist School, 14, 85
 Atiyah, Edward quoted, 57
 Attlee, Clement, 193, 204, 212, 214
 demands abolition of the Jewish terrorist organisations (1945), 207–8
avodah ivrit, 12, 107, 158
 Azhar, Al-, 17, 115
 ‘Azury, Najib, 16
 Baghdad Vilayet, 31
 Bairut, see Beirut
 Bakry, Fawzy al-, 84
 if Husayn bid for Arab independence
 Ottoman Army Arab officers would mutiny (Jan., 1915), 27
 Baldwin, Stanley, 136, 150, 160
 Balfour, Arthur James, 25, 39, 43, 47–8, 49, 53, 67, 68, 70, 74, 75, 77, 78, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 96, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104, 108, 109, 112, 117, 118, 119, 128, 129, 130, 135, 140, 178, 199
 quoted xi, 69, 73, 124–5
 not the initiator of the Zionist project, 4
 Husayn/McMahon and Sykes–Picot irreconcilable, 42
 Zionist support vital for keeping Russia in the war (summer 1917), 44
 tells Weizmann his Declaration always meant a Jewish state, 46
 ‘notch’ argument, 50–1
 frivolous attitude to the effects of his Declaration, 51
 reaffirms UK policy of securing Arab freedom while hoping for a Jewish state in Palestine (Feb., 1918), 65
 Zionism ‘of far profounder import’ than Palestinian wishes, 76
 National Home project ‘an adventure’ and a ‘new experiment’, 125
 visit to Palestine and Syria, 141
 Balfour Declaration, 1, 25, 34, 42–53, 61, 63, 64, 67, 70, 74, 77, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 119, 121, 124, 127, 129, 130, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 148, 152, 154, 156, 158, 159, 177, 199, 215, 221
 3rd quarter/second part of the text, 2, 46, 106, 109, 110, 116, 118, 210

- Balfour Declaration (*continued*)
 Declaration a UK tool to turn
 Palestine into a Jewish state, 3
 final text, 48
 protests against, 49
 motives for, 51–2
 not publicised in Palestine by Allenby,
 60
 by it, Lloyd George and Balfour
 always intended a Jewish state
 (July, 1921), 117
 expendable, 192
- Banias, Banyas, 69, 131
- Barbour, Neville
 Balfour Declaration a disproportional
 reward for Weizmann, 51–2
 the Zionist aim accomplished (1936
 quote), 172
- Basrah Vilayet, 31
- Battershill, (Sir) William
 uncomplimentary about Wauchope,
 183
 deprives Al-Hajj Amin of his offices,
 dissolves National Defence Party
 and AHC and freezes funds of
 Islamic organisations (Sept., 1937),
 183
 Arabs ‘untrustworthy, amoral and
 murderous’, 256*n*
- Baytar, ‘Umar al-’, 133
- Beersheba, 66, 71, 215
- Begin, Menachem
 leads Dair Yasin massacre, admits
 that Israel was founded on
 terrorism, 219
- Beirut, 59
 Vilayet, 15, 34, 35, 126
- Bell, Gertrude, 108
 condemns Zionism, 109–10
 attacks League for passing the
 Palestine and Syrian mandates,
 130
- Ben-Ami, Shlomo, 210, 215
 Rebellion to Naqbah period left the
 Palestinians unable to face challenge
 of partition and war in 1947–8, 189
 quoted, 203
 Israeli path to victory paved in part by
 intimidation, atrocities and
 massacres against Palestinian civil-
 ians, 217–18
- Israel, ‘born in sin’, was ‘stained for
 ever by a major injustice committed
 against the Palestinians’, 221
- British ‘recklessness and brutality’ in
 the Great Palestinian Revolt, 258*n*
- Ben-Gurion, David, 4, 48, 59, 99, 114,
 166, 168, 184, 189, 192, 196, 198,
 199, 205, 206, 208, 216, 218, 225,
 255*n*
 original meaning of Balfour
 Declaration and Mandate to
 establish a state, 25
 suggests federation of National Home
 and Transjordan (Aug., 1934), 167
 after Peel, ‘The rest [of Palestine] will
 come [to the Jews] in the course of
 time, 179
- Malcolm MacDonald ‘an
 inadmissible scoundrel’, 193
 ‘I am for compulsory transfer; I see
 nothing immoral in it’, 203, 223
 launches campaign to drive refugees
 from Germany to Palestine (1948),
 210–11, 213
 partition borders of UN Resolution
 181 not final (Nov., 1947), 217,
 221
 Israel’s war against Arab invaders not
 one of few against many, 222
 Arabs and Palestinians ‘disciples and
 even teachers of Hitler’, 228*n*
- Bentwich, Norman, 115, 139, 155, 158,
 161, 164, 183
 expulsion of the Arabs ‘a sad
 comment’ on Hebraic teaching, 223
- Ben-Yehuda, Eliezer, 10
- Ben-Zvi, Yitzhak, 107
- Bernadotte, Count Folke
 Plan, 224, 267*n*
 assassinated by Stern (1948), 225
- Bethlehem, 59, 178
- Bevin, Ernest, 50, 160, 204, 210, 212,
 215, 216, 222, 223
 no reason why Jews could not now
 remain in Europe (Oc., 1945), 205
 Plan, 213
 seeks UN opinion (1947), 213
- Beyrout, see Beirut
- Biltmore Programme, 198, 210
- BILU Group, 227*n*
 1882 Manifestation, 4, 9
 many BILU agricultural colonists
 given warm Arab welcome, 11
 ‘Black Letter’ (1931), 161–3, 168
 transforms Al-Hajj Amin’s pro-British
 attitude, 161
- Bliss, Dr. Howard S., 75

- Board of Deputies of British Jews, 43
- Bols, Maj.-Gen. Sir Louis, 93, 95, 97, 101, 106, 120, 221, 243*n*
- ordered about by Zionist Commission, 90
- UK commitments to the Zionists not to be allowed to injure Palestinian interests (Feb., 1920), 96
- Zionist Commission aggressive and insolent, 96, 99, 100
- will be satisfied with nothing less than a state (April, 1920), 98
- Bowman, Humphrey, 139, 140, 153
- Brandeis, Louis D., 92
- Zionist aim of a 'national state' not to be claimed at first (June, 1917), 44
- Brith Shalom, see B'rit Shalom
- British/American Committee of Enquiry (1945), 207, 209
- report, 262*n*
- B'rit Shalom, 255*n*
- Brooke, Gen. Sir Alan, 197
- Browne, Professor E.G., 31
- Brunton Report, 121
- Buckmaster, Lord
- Balfour Declaration and mandate unacceptable, 134
- Bullard, Sir Reader, 31
- Buraq, Al-, see Wailing Wall
- Cairo, 17, 19
- UK not committed to supporting any of Husayn's claims, 32
- Cairo Conference (1921), 110, 111
- Cambon, Pierre, xi
- Casey, Richard, 198
- Cecil, Lord Edward, 244*n*
- Robert, 41, 44, 50
- a UK war aim to secure self-government for 'all peoples' (Dec., 1917), 50
- Cemal Paşa, Ahmet, 58, 64, 65, 66
- executes Arabs, 26, 29, 36, 37
- terms of Sykes-Picot revealed to Husayn (1917), 63
- the Arab Revolt had enslaved the Arabs (Dec., 1917), 63
- Chamberlain, Austen, 50, 160, 192
- Joseph
- offer of a National Home in Kenya and Uganda rejected by Herzl, 14
- Chancellor, Lt.-Col. Sir John Robert, 150-165, 166, 168, 174
- Legislative Council (proposed, Jan., 1929), 150-2, 153, 155, 156 (1931), 163-4, 251*n*
- Balfour Declaration 'a grave injustice to the Arabs', 154
- presses HMG to alter policy in favour of the Palestinians (Sept., 1929), 155
- disgusted with Palestine, 155
- the Balfour Declaration has been carried out (1930), 159
- Cheetham, Sir Milne, 256*n*
- asks 'Abd Allah if the Hijaz would be 'with us or against us' in a war with the Ottomans', 26
- Christian-Muslim Association, 16
- Christians, 101, 103, 109, 118, 139, 149, 171
- Churchill, Winston, 96, 97, 99, 111, 96, 97, 111, 112, 114, 118, 119, 120, 123, 128, 159, 160, 170, 190, 197, 204, 212, 227*n*
- feeble justification of McMahon's claim to have excluded Palestine (1921), 33
- disastrous meeting with AEC (1921), 110
- UK would faithfully fulfil the third quarter of the Balfour Declaration, 110
- 'There really is nothing for the Arabs to be frightened about' (June 1921), 116
- advises Weizmann not to talk about Hagana, 117
- gives 'proof' of Palestine's exclusion to its first delegation, 125-6
- non-Jews have no more right to Palestine than a dog to his manger (1936), 177-8
- quoted, 186, 193
- pro-Zionist enthusiasm shaken by murder of Lord Moyne, 203
- no reason why Jews could not now remain in Europe (1946), 208
- Cilicia, 94
- Cisjordania, see Transjordan
- Civic Administration Immigration Ordinance, 107
- Claims to Palestine
- Jewish Shamir, 20
- Palestinian 91, 92, 93, 230-1*n*
- Clayton, Col. Bertie, 27, 30, 33, 35, 50, 51, 53, 59, 61, 63, 66, 68, 87-8, 89, 117, 135, 139, 140, 147, 150
- quoted, 132

- Clayton, Col. Bertie (*continued*)
 McMahon's pledge to Husayn committed UK 'to nothing whatsoever', 32
 no incompatibility between Husayn/McMahon and Sykes-Picot, 39
 criticises Sykes and Georges-Picot visit to Husayn, 62
 UK could not risk antagonising the Zionists at the Peace Conference, 86
 calls for joint Husayn/Zionist endeavour (Jan., 1919), 90
 advises Devonshire to modify pro-Jewish clauses of the mandate (July, 1923), 137
 Husayn had been informed that the exclusion of Palestine was UK policy, 233-4n
- Clemenceau, Georges, 54, 61, 70, 74, 75, 76
 he and Lloyd George swap Mosul for the whole of Syria (Dec., 1919), 54, 61
- Clostridium acetobutylicum*, 41
- Colonial Office, 92, 122, 124, 127, 135, 138, 155, 158, 160, 161, 162, 168, 176, 177, 211
 treats first Palestine delegation like backward children (1921), 119
 all sections of Palestine's population to enjoy equal political rights (1921), 121
 Middle East Department, 110, 119, 126, 137, 139, 140; history, 244n
- Committee of Union and Progress, 52
- Confederation proposals, 4
 Ben-Gurion, 167
 Faysal, 73, revised, 77
 First Palestine delegation (1921), 119, 120, 121
 Husayn, 255n
 Samuel (1920, 1923, 1937), 97, 98, 180-1
 UK Cabinet (1915), 38
- Congreve, Gen. Sir Walter, 88, 113
 instrumental in Jordan becoming independent (1921), 111
- Conjoint Committee
 immoral to grant Yishuv rights over other Palestinians (May, 1917), 45
- Councils, Legislative, 159, 161, 163, 164
 boycotted by the Palestinians (Aug., 1922), 132-33, 135
 suggested by the AEC, rejected by Plumer (1928-30), 149
 Chancellor proposal foiled by Wailing Wall riots (1929), 150-4
 rejected by Jews, accepted by Palestinians, withdrawn by UK (1935), 170
 suggested by the UN Truce Commission (1948), 220
 Municipal, 148-9, 249n
- Crane, Charles R., 75, 239n
- Creech-Jones, Arthur, 210, 213-14, 218
- Cripps, Stafford, 212
- Crusades, Crusaders, 8, 28, 40, 60
- Cunningham, Gen. Sir Alan, 206-11
- Curzon, Lord, 41, 76, 77, 89-90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 101, 108, 109, 110, 129, 136, 137, 153, 180, 186, 233n, 239n
 connection 'ending 1,200 years ago' gives Jews no claim to Palestine, 20
 Sykes-Picot, product of 'gross ignorance', conflicts with Husayn-McMahon (Nov., 1919), 40
 Palestine would be exile for Jews (August, 1917), 45
 equal civil and religious rights should be granted in Palestine. A National Home must mean a state. A Jewish administration an impossibility (October, 1917), 46-7
 sees merit in King-Crane, 75
 since McMahon did not exclude Palestine, mandate question should not have arisen, 78
 notes misleading remarks by Weizmann, 86
 'I don't want a Hebrew state' (March, 1919), 95
 Balfour Declaration the 'avowed constitution of a Jewish state', 102
- Cyprus, 213
- Czechoslovakia, 221
- Daily Express, The*, 118
Daily Mail, The, 124
 publishes first translation of Husayn-McMahon Correspondence (1923), 134
Daily Telegraph, The, 118
- Dair Yasin massacre (April, 1948), 219, 265n

- Dajany, 'Arif Pasha ad-, 94, 109, 135, 153, 236*n*
 rejects separation of Palestine and Syria, 49
 founds MCA, 238*n*
 Raghib offers co-operation with the Zionists on basis of equality (1918), 87
 demands establishment of a government led by Husayn, 88
 family, 135
- Dalton, Hugh, 203
- Damascus, 33, 35, 36, 58, 61, 71, 88, 98, 101, 111
 District (sic), 31, 32, 126
 Protocol (1915), 28, 29, 57, 58, 66, 72
 Vilayet (sic), 125, 126
- Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, 29, 57, 58, 106, 126
 Arabs would oppose their occupation by France, 30
 to be administered by the Arabs 'under French influence', 37
- Dan, 66, 69, 131
 'Dan to Beersheba', 130
- Dara'a, 111
- D'Arcy, Lt-Gen Sir John
 'Haganah would take over all of Palestine tomorrow' and hold it against 'the entire Arab world' (1946), 222
- Dawayma massacre, 223, 265*n*
- Dawn, C.Ernest
 quoted, 1
- Dayan, Moshe, 223
- De Bunsen Interdepartmental Committee (1915), 35, 38
 Palestine's destiny must be subject to special negotiations, 21
 recommends division of Syria, Palestine and Iraq between UK and France, 28
 Palestine needed as buffer against France and as railway terminus, 29
- Decentralisation Party, 26
- Declaration to the Seven (1918), 66, 70, 237*n*
- Deedes, Sir Wyndham, 4, 59, 93, 104, 111, 114, 115, 122, 139
 wholly impracticable to make Palestine as Jewish as England was English, 123
- De Hirsch, Baron, 13
- Deraa, Dera'a, see Dara'a
- De Rothschild, Baron Edmond, 11, 42, 44, 45
 family, 71
 Walter, Lord Lionel, 43, 44, 48, 50, 65
- Devonshire, Lord, 114, 134, 136, 137, 138
 UK only in Palestine at the instance of the League (1923), 135
- Diarbekr (sic), 73
- Difa', Hizb Ad-, see Palestine National Defence Party
- Dill, Lt.-Gen. Sir John, 175, 184
- Dreyfus trial, 11
- Dugdale, Blanche, 160, 177, 180, 181, 183, 216
- Eastern Committee, 53, 69, 129
- Easter Riots, see Naby Musa
- Economic Absorptive Capacity, 113, 117, 148, 155, 159, 170, 177, 191, 209, 246*n*, 249*n*
 abandoned by Peel Commission, 179
- Eden, Anthony, 188, 212
- Eder, Dr. David, 74, 84, 89
 UK should give up the mandate (1921), 114
 Samuel a Judas, 116
 'there can be no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs', 122
- Egypt, 12, 14, 18, 20, 33, 49, 84, 88, 113, 117, 149, 153, 189, 205
 UK gateway to India, 21, 40, 86
 on Israeli independence, the Egyptian Army begins to invade Palestine, 221
 Egyptian Army has advanced beyond Gaza (June, 1948), 224
 Egyptian Army Expeditionary Force (British), 25, 58, 60, 93, 107
 conquers all Palestine (August, 1918), 61
- Elabun massacre, 265*n*
- Eliot, George (quoted), 10
- Enver Paşa, 52
 orders 4th Ottoman Army to Gallipoli, 29
- Esdraelon, Vale of, 178
- ethnic cleansing, Zionist, 218
 policy, 11
- SS Exodus, 213

- Faisal, see Faysal
- Falastin*, 16
- Farraj, Ya'qub, 163, 189
- Faruqy, Lt. Sharif b. Muhammad al-, 32, 58
- background, 30
 - the Arabs would accept 'autonomous governments under British control in Palestine and Iraq and exclusion, though Arab, of 'portions of Syria', 30, 35
 - the Arabs could not abandon 'a span of soil' in Syria', 35
 - agrees to Arab rule being limited in Palestine, 35
- Fatat, Al-Jam'iyya al-'Arabiyya al-, 27, 36, 69
- Faysal b. Husayn, Amir and King, 2, 3, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 78, 84, 86, 89, 101, 103, 157
- corresponds with Cemal (1918), 65, 66
 - would accept a Jewish Palestine in exchange for Syria (June, 1918), 66
 - no conflict of character between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, 70
 - makes erratic Paris Peace Conference case for Palestine (1919), 70, 72–5
 - he and Husayn regarded as 'less than allies' in Paris, 72
 - suggests Jew/Arab entente instead of UK and French mandates, 72
 - omits Palestine from his suggested confederation (Feb., 1919), 73
 - suggests King-Crane, 75
 - would accept 1,500 immigrants to Palestine per annum (1919), 94–5
 - King of Syria (1920), 98
 - expelled by the French from Syria, 105, 111
 - King of Iraq (1921), 135
- Faysal/Weizmann Agreement
- signed, then repudiated by Faysal (1919), 70–1
 - published by Weizmann with Faysal's reservation omitted (1936), 239*n*
- Federation, see Confederation
- Feisal, see Faysal
- Filastiny, Al-Hizb al-Watany al-'Araby al-, see Palestine National Arab party
- Foot, Hugh, 184
- Forbes-Adam, Eric G., 109, 129
- Foreign Office, 35, 41, 43, 44, 52, 68, 72, 74, 77, 84, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 100, 102, 103, 104, 109, 110, 114, 199, 21
- blocks Husayn's wish to post a diplomat to Paris, 63
 - UK not prepared to accept another power in Palestine (1918), 69
 - anti-Zionists in, 107
 - objections to Palestine stamp bearing Erets Yisrael superposition, 107
 - opposed to Peel partition, 187
 - 'four towns, the', see Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo
- Fourteen Points (President Wilson, Jan., 1918), 53, 63, 67, 68, 72
- 12th., 60
 - text, 237*n*
- France, French, 1, 2, 36, 39, 40, 41, 45, 51, 52, 53, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 77, 91, 106, 111, 131, 183, 209, 213, 218
- claims in Syria accepted by UK, 28, 232*n*
 - UK agrees to France having authority over the coast from Acre to Alexandretta and influence over the question of the four towns (1915), 37
 - to have no foothold in Palestine, 38
 - provides Czech arms for Hagana and funds for Stern Gang (1945), 205, 206
 - arms to Irgun after Israeli independence, 224
- Franco-British Convention
- demarcates Palestine's boundaries without Palestinian involvement, 130–1
- Franco-British Declaration, 72, 73, 93, 97, 124, 134
- erroneously distributed in Jerusalem, 68
- Frankfurter Letter, 74, 157
- Free French, 198
- French, Col. C., 93, 107
- Frischwasser-Ra'anana, H.F.
- quoted, 83
- Fromkin, David
- quoted, 32
- Gabriel, Col. E.V.
- reputed anti-Semite, 92

- Gallilee, 13, 16, 98, 111, 131, 175, 183, 187, 188, 215
Sea of, 136, 178
- Gallipoli, 28, 29, 30, 31
- Gaster, Rabbi Dr. Moses, 19, 21, 42, 44, 50
- Gaza, 39, 69, 110, 153, 178, 215, 220
first, second and third battles (1917), 59
- Gederah, 11
- General Islamic conference (1931), 168
- George, Lloyd, 14, 21, 25, 29, 43, 59, 63, 68, 70, 73, 75, 76, 77, 84, 97, 100, 101, 102, 116, 117, 130, 131, 132, 133, 160, 178
urges Cabinet to consider 'the ultimate destiny of Palestine' (Oct., 1914), 3, 19
sets the Zionist project in motion, 4
had always supported reunification of the Jews with the land of their forefathers, 18
ridicules Sykes–Picot, 40
insists Britain must obtain Palestine, the strategic buffer of Egypt (1916), 41
orders revision of Sykes–Picot to add Negev and Transjordan to UK Palestine (April, 2016), 42
tells Weizmann the Balfour Declaration always meant a Jewish state, 46
Declaration 'a definite and palpable advantage' in winning the war, 51
Declaration's purpose to use Zionism to retrieve Sykes–Picot concessions to France, 52
ignoring Grey's 'conditions', swaps Palestine and Mosul for all Syria with Clemenceau (Dec., 1919), 54, 61
secures release from the internationalisation of Palestine, 54
claims the Palestinians fought for the Turks in the war, 58
supports 'consent of the governed' (1917), 67
a Jewish state only a matter of patience, 78–9
- George V, 26, 71, 105
- Georges-Picot, François, 20, 38, 41, 59, 62, 63
demands all Syria, 37
- Germans, Germany, 25, 28, 30, 36, 40, 41, 51, 168, 194, 195, 196, 197, 203, 213
alleged threat to Balfour Declaration (Sept., 1917), 46–7, 52
- German Consul-General, Jerusalem, 168
- Ghazy, King, 176, 177
- Ghury, Imil, 171
- Gibbon on 'the four towns', 233*n*
- Gilead, 10
- Golan Heights, 130, 139
- Golden Square, Iraqy (1941), 197
- Goldman, Nahum, 222
- Gort, Lord, 203–6
- Graffey-Smith, Laurence, quoted, 33, 227*n*
- Graham, Sir Ronald, 44, 46, 52, 92, 239*n*
HMG committed to supporting Zionist aspirations (1916), 41
- Great Britain and the East*
Palestinians have no claim to the possession of Palestine, 171
- Great Palestinian Revolt (1937–9), 182–9
provokes Jewish Agency to begin planning the state and discuss 'transfer', 184
British 'recklessness and brutality' in its suppression, 258*n*
- Grey, (Sir) Edward, 14, 19, 20, 35, 54, 125, 128
a Jewish state annexed to the British Empire ridiculous (1914), 18
like Kitchener, 'none too clear what areas could be regarded as Arab', 31
believed that the UK had granted all Husayn had asked for (1915), 32
McMahon's 'pledge' was 'a castle in the air', 34
obtains Cabinet support for an internationalised Palestine (1915), 37, 38
possibility of offering the Jews 'an arrangement in regard to Palestine' approved by Russia, 38
'conditions': need for the Arabs to take 'the four towns' (1916), 49, 61
- Balfour Declaration and mandate unacceptable: McMahon had not excluded Palestine, National Home would prejudice Palestinian civil rights (March, 1923), 134

- Gulf, The, 1, 31, 57
- Gurney, Sir Harry
 Dair Yasin perpetrated by 'the dregs of utter degradation', beside whose 'bestialities . . . Belsen pales', 219
- Habforce, 197
- Hadassah Hospital, 219
- Hady, 'Awny 'Abd al-, 69, 156, 163, 173, 249*n*
- Hagana, 3, 100, 108, 114, 117, 119, 140, 148, 167, 172, 184, 197, 205, 261*n*
 founded (1920), 99
 used by UK in suppressing the 1936 strike, 176
 involved in the Special Night Squads (1938), 186, 187, 196
 the administration demands surrender of its arms (May, 1939), 195
 trained and equipped by Britain, 206
 turns to violence (1946), 206
 drives DPs to Palestine, 210
 manpower strength, half trained by the British Army (March, 1948), 218
 more than thirty massacres similar to Dair Yasin, 219
 terror tactics in Tiberias (1948), 219
 its broadcasts remarkably like those of Nazi Germany (Cunningham), 220
 receives heavy arms from Czechoslovakia and USSR (April/May, 1948), 221
 effectives in Dec., 1947, 264*n*
- Hague Convention, 83, 101
- Haifa, 16, 20, 28, 105, 108, 110, 131, 153, 165, 174, 194, 211, 212, 215, 218, 220
 proposed terminus for railway from Iraq, 38
 port and base, 74, 147, 178, 195
 oil pipeline terminal from Mosul, 147, 192
 in the Great Palestinian Revolt, 186
 refinery, 206
 British disgrace when some 100,000 of its inhabitants expelled by Irgun and Hagana (1948), 220, 265*n*
 1937/8 uprising, 256*n*
- Haining, Gen. Sir Robert, 187, 188
- Hall, Sir Reginald 'Blinker', 38, 40, 234*n*
- Hama, 61
 District (sic), 31, 32
- Hamas, 228*n*
- Hardinge, Lord Charles, 34, 41, 52, 77
- Hashimites, 65, 66, 111
- HaTikvah, 101, 152
- Hawran Plain, 131, 173
- Haycraft Commission Report, 121
 blames Zionist Commission for Naby Musa riots (Nov., 1920), 122
- Haydar, Rustum, 69
- Hebrew, 10, 41, 85, 87, 90, 95, 96, 97, 100, 107, 118, 172
- Hebrew University, 101, 111, 141
- Hebron, 59, 71, 85, 153, 183, 223
- Hejaz, see Hijaz
- Hermon, Mt., 130, 131
- Herodotus
 Palestine is part of Syria, 238*n*
- Herzl, Theodor, 44, 85, 221
 Zionism meaningless without Palestine (1896), 12
 advocates expulsion of Palestine's population, 12
 East European Jews would represent the West in Palestine, (1896), 12
 sets goal of a Jewish state, to be referred to only as a National Home (1897), 13
 Zionism's material benefits would silence Palestinian opposition (1899), 13
 proposes Jewish settlements in Al-'Arish, Cyprus, and Sinai with Muslims and Greeks replaced (1902), 14
- Herzog, Chaim, 196
 on Dair Yasin massacre, 219
- Hess, Moses, 10, 11
- Hibbáth Tsiyón, 10, 11, 13
- Hijaz, Railway, 66, 74, 106
 Vilayet, 26, 31, 49, 57, 62, 65, 69, 71, 106
- Histadrut (Dec., 1921), 99–100, 102, 107, 112, 245*n*
- Hitler, 151, 162, 168, 195, 212, 216
- Hoare, Sir Samuel, 141
- Hodgkin, Thomas, 174
- Hogarth, David, 75, 93, 233*n*
 'Hogarth Message'
 Antonius deems it inexcusable (Jan., 1918), 63–4
 shows that McMahon did not exclude Palestine, 64
- Homs, 61
 District (sic), 31, 32

- Hope-Simpson Report (1930), 161, 164, 251*n*
avodah ivrit contrary to the mandate, Jewish settlers 'aliens', 158
- Hovév Tsiyón, Hovevéi Tsiyón, 115
 assimilation unthinkable, 10
- Hulah, Lake, 39, 131
- Husain, Husein, see Husayn
- Husayn, Sharif, 1, 3, 19, 31, 32, 33, 35, 53, 58, 59, 60, 72, 86, 106, 108, 111, 120
 quoted, 25
 might rebel against the Ottomans with UK guarantee of support, 26
 UK 'the pivot of justice', 29
 hoped UK would support the Arabs at the peace negotiations, 34
 enlarges the 'portions of Syria', which are 'purely Arab provinces', 34
 negotiates with Cemal, 36
 as 'the Arab Prince', to be consulted about Sykes-Picot, 38, 40, 44
 not consulted about the Balfour Declaration, 45, 62
 begins the Arab Revolt on the basis of false British assurances (1916), 36, 57
 deceives himself about McMahon's 'pledge' and puts his trust in British honour, 57
 the British 'promise' in McMahon's letters 'good enough for me', 62
 welcomes the Jews 'to all the land' (Feb., 1918), 64, 65
 asks Wingate to deny UK and French designs on Syria and Palestine (Feb., 1918), 64
 rejects Cemal's Sykes-Picot claims (Nov., 2017), 67
 treated as a simpleton by London, 68
 instructs Faysal to speak for all Arabs at the Peace Conference, 69
 not consulted over the administration of Palestine, as required by Sykes-Picot, 78
 his dealings with Germany before and during the war, 233*n*
- Husayn/McMahon Correspondence, 1, 25-37, 57, 61, 67, 68, 72, 103, 134, 216
 part published in *The DailyMail* (1923), 134
 published in Antonius's *The Arab Awakening* (c. 1937), 190
- Husayni, see Husayny
- Husayny, Al-Hajj Amin al-, 98, 99, 100, 104, 109, 113, 132, 139, 141, 142, 153, 154, 156, 157, 160, 168, 169, 174, 175, 194, 195, 209-10, 215, 224, 226, 249*n*, 255*n*
- Zionism, not Nazism, 'the greatest evil', 5
 becomes Grand Mufty (May, 1921), 115
 after the Naby Musa riots, mostly used political means to further the Palestinian cause, 115
 President, SMC (1922), 123-4
 offers to ally with the Zionists against the An-Nashashiby faction (1927), 149
 Jews have the right to return to Palestine if Arab rights protected, 161
 granted no meetings with ministers on visit to London (c. 1931), 162
 supports 1936 strike, 173
 humiliated by Lord Peel, 176
 absolute opposition to Peel report, 179
 asks Germany for help (1936), 182
 flees to Damascus and Lebanon (1937), 183
 rejects 1939 White Paper, 193
 his crimes compared with those of the Jewish terrorist organisations, 216
 activities in Iraq, 256*n*
- Husayny, 'Abd al-Qadir al-, 182
 faction, 161, 171, 189
 family, 98, 100, 115, 138, 149
 failure to co-operate with An-Nashashiby family, 4
- Husayn al-, 59
- Isma'il al-, 108
- Jamal al-, 109, 133, 139, 156, 160, 163, 164, 171, 183, 189, 224
- Jamil, al-
 Zionist land purchases might lead to expulsion of Palestinians (1914), 17
- Kamil al-, 86, 98, 115
- Musa Kadhim al-, 88, 98, 118, 121, 123, 134, 136, 148, 153, 156, 163, 164, 168, 169, 236*n*
 dismissed as Mayor of Jerusalem, 100
 abandons idea of Greater Syria (July, 1921), 106

- Husayny, 'Abd al-Qadir al- (*continued*)
 President, AEC, 109
 calls on the Palestinians to 'put its hope' in the UK, 'which is famous for its justice' (May, 1920), 113
 advocates complete Palestinian–Jewish equality, 149
 career, 249*n*
 Sa'id al-, 16, 17
 Salim al-, 16
 Tahir II al-,
 halts sale of land to Jews (1897), 16
 Husein, see Husayn
- Ibn Sa'ud, 176, 177
- Immigration, Jewish, 121, 122, 127, 128, 130, 135, 136, 137, 140, 142, 151, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, 163, 170, 171, 173, 175, 180, 189, 190, 191, 295, 297, 209, 213
 Samuel, Weizmann and Sokolow immigration strategy (1920), 107
 10,000 legal immigrants (1920), 112
 net figures fall (1925–8), 148
 9,500 legal migrants (1932), 168–9
 record immigration figures, plus 24,000 illegals (1935), 168
 illegal, 169, 194
 Peel on, 179
 quota prompts Jewish terror campaign (March–Sept. 1938), 186–7
 20,600 migrants in nine months (1939), 194
 categories of immigrants, 249*n*
 figures for 1927–35, 252*n*
- India, 2, 18, 21, 40, 86, 128, 168, 212
 UK route to, 12
 Office, 34
- Indian Army, 25, 27
- International Workers' Day Revolt (May, 1920), 112–15, 143, 245*n*
 modifies Samuel's attitude to National Home and UK policy, 114
- Iraq, Iraqis, 1, 21, 26, 27, 33, 36, 67, 68, 69, 78, 86, 94, 95, 101, 110, 128, 156, 173, 175, 189, 190, 192
 mandate 129
 on Israeli independence, its Army begins to invade Palestine, 221
 Army holds West Bank (June, 1948), 224
- Irgun Zeva'i Le'umi, 187, 197, 205, 206, 209, 211
 blows up *Patria* (1940), 195
 King David Hotel massacre (1946), 208
 hangs two UK Intelligence Corps' sergeants (1947), 212, 214, 215
 Dair Yasin massacre, 219
 drives 50,000 Palestinians from Jaffa (1948), 220
 strength (1948), 222
 defectors to Irgun disagreed with Hagana's policy of restraint, 257*n*
 Islamic Society (London), 49
 Islington, Lord, 124
 Balfour Declaration and mandate unacceptable (1922), 134
- Israel, 97, 107, 195
 ingratitude to Britain, 5, 199, 221
 anti-Arab name-calling, 87
 after independence, drives Jews from Iraq and other Arab capitals to Israel, 210
 claims of its defencelessness in 1948 false, 222, 225
 comparative strengths of the Israeli and Arab armies, 222
 'new' or 'revisionist' historians, 222
 after first truce ends (July, 1948), occupies much of W. Galilee and seizes Lydda and Ramlah, expelling 60–70,000 Palestinians, 224
 flouts conditions of its UN admission (May, 1949), 224
 occupies the Negev (Oct., 1948), 225
 downs five UK aircraft (early 1949), 225
 its false claim that Iraq drove its Jews out the excuse for not allowing return of refugees, 225
 in occupation of almost 80% of Palestine (August, 1949), 225–6
 Al-Hajj Amin 'among the biggest Nazi war criminals' and 'mastermind of the final solution', 228*n*
 'not a state with an army but an army with a state', 229*n*
 forced the exodus of Jews from Arab countries, 260*n*
 overwhelming strength vis-à-vis the Arab armies (1948), 266*n*
- Istiqlal, Hizb al-, 173, 253*n*
- Italy, 40, 43, 45, 53, 59, 75, 77, 91, 93, 195, 197

- offers land for a National Home in Abyssinia (1930), 229*n*
Izvestia, 63
- Jabotinsky, Vladimir, 100, 104, 108, 166
 disparages Palestinians, who need to be subdued by Jewish bayonets (1918), 87
 founds Irgun (1931), 187
 the Arabs must make way for the Jews (1939), 193
- Jaffa, 16, 17, 59, 67, 84, 86, 89, 110, 113, 122, 135, 142, 153, 168, 169, 179, 187, 207, 209, 215, 218, 220, 221
 character, 173
 port, 112, 173
 urban clearance demolitions by UK garrison (1936), 174
 67,000 of population of 70,000 driven out, 265*n*
- Jawlan, see Golan
- Jeffries, J.M.N., 124, 127, 134, 142, 171, 181
 mandate Zionist 'in all that mattered', 130
 Ormsby-Gore 'Zion itself', 183
 Jews have no 'true, durable, historic connection whatsoever' with Palestine, 230*n*
- Jenin, 175, 187
- Jericho, 98
- Jerusalem, 17, 20, 46, 52, 67, 71, 84, 85, 88, 91, 92, 98, 111, 112, 115, 153, 168, 178, 186, 187, 207, 214, 215, 220, 225
 District/Sanjaq, 15, 33, 39, 60, 61, 126
 its delegates to the Istanbul 1908–12 Parliament claim Jews plan to create a state of Palestine, Syria and Iraq, 16
 taken by EEF (Dec., 1917), 59
- Jewish Agency Executive, 11, 112, 123, 137, 138, 148, 157, 161, 162, 166, 172, 184, 194, 197, 198, 207, 208, 209, 210, 218, 219, 222, 223, 255*n*
 takes over Zionist Executive (Jan., 1928), 150
 units used by UK in suppressing the 1936 strike, 176
 its 'outstanding achievement', 195–6
- demands entry to Palestine for 100,000 DPs (April, 1945), 204
 envisages Jewish statehood throughout Palestine (Jan., 1947), 211–12
 replaced in Nov. 1947 by a Jewish Executive Council, 221
 brigade/battalions (1944), 197, 242*n*
 Colonisation Association, 13
 Consultative Assembly (1920), 90, 100, 106, 107, 108
 Executive Committee, 197, 221, 223
 ethnic cleansing begins (Dec., 1947), 217–18
 Legion battalions 38–40
 National Fund, see *Keren Kayemeth*
 National Home, 3, 4, 71, 88, 92, 97, 98, 102, 104, 105, 112, 114, 133, 136, 140, 142, 143, 155, 160, 163, 164, 166, 167, 198
 a National Home or a state?, 83
 dimensions and boundaries, 130
 'a home in Palestine' 46, 127 (1922 White Paper), 129, 130, 159, 217
 'as Jewish as England is English', 120, 123, 127; Weizmann, 74; Faysal, 95
something as Jewish as England is English (Weizmann to Peel), 178
 Regiment, 197
 Territorial Organisation, 229*n*
 terrorist organisations
 repeated offer to fight for Germany if Hitler would sponsor a state (1940/1), 195
 their strength (1946), 206
Jewish Chronicle, The, 46, 77, 89, 94, 95, 116
- Jews, 61, 84, 86, 87, 139, 155
 'a people without land', 2
- Jezreel Valley, see Marj Ibn 'Amar
- Jiddah, 28, 57
- Jordan, 69, 95, 111, 128, 130, 184
 Arab Legion, 198
- Jordan, R., 2, 10, 61, 66, 74, 111, 112, 126, 127, 130, 131, 215
- Joyce, Col. Pierce, 65, 66
- Joynson-Hicks, Sir William, 128
- Judah, 13
- Judea, Judaea, 50, 178
- Judenstaat, Der* (1896), 12
- Kalisher, Rabbi Zvi Hersh, 10

- Karmil, Al-*, 16, 149
- Kedourie, Elie, 40
 no incompatibility between
 Husayn/McMahon and Sykes–
 Picot, 39
 Muslim Palestinians supported the
 Ottomans throughout the war, 58
 quoted, 62, 78
 on Al-Hajj Amin, 115
 on Kitchener's talk (to Husayn) of
 Caliphs, 232*n*
- Keith-Roach, Edward, 183, 244*n*
 career, 257*n*
 on MacMichael, 257*n*
- Keren Kayemeth*, 13, 15
- Kfar Etzion, 219
- Khalidy, Dr. Husayn, 183, 249*n*
 career, 249*n*
- King-Crane Commission and report,
 75–6, 92, 95
 mandatories to be selected in
 accordance with wishes of
 communities visited, 93
 recommends creation of Greater Syria,
 including Lebanon, with Faysal as
 King, 94
 recommends major modifications to
 ‘the extreme Zionist programme’,
 94
- King, Dr. Henry Churchill, 239*n*
- King David Hotel atrocity (1946), 208
- Kirkuk, 39
- Kisch, Col. Frederick, 103, 139, 147,
 148, 153, 156, 160, 162, 166
 career, 243*n*
 criticism of Samuel as High
 Commissioner, 142
- Kitchener, Gen. Sir Herbert, 19, 26, 31,
 33, 37, 38
 gives Husayn guarantees and makes
 hints about the Caliphate (Nov.,
 1914), 27
- Koestler, Arthur, 204–5
 quoted, 3, 48
 ‘one nation solemnly promised to a
 second the country of a third’, 39
- Kovel, Joel
 only Israeli claim to Palestine ‘that
 generated by their ideology’,
 231*n*
- Laharanne, Ernest, 9
- Lamington, Lord, 118, 171
- Lampson, Sir Miles, 192
- Lancaster House Conference (1946–7),
 209, 210, 213
- Latrun, 215
- Lausanne Peace Conference (1922–3),
 134
 (1949), 225
- Law, Bonar, 45, 133, 136
- Lawrence, T.E., 2, 35, 54, 58, 59, 60,
 65, 66, 69, 70, 72, 74, 76, 111
 most accurate interpreter of
 McMahon's ‘pledge’, 32
 Sykes–Picot ‘absurd’, 40
 the Revolt based ‘on false pretences’,
 ‘the promises to the Arabs . . . dead
 paper’, 57
 Syria not ‘an Arabian country’, 233*n*
- League of Nations, 73, 76, 93, 94, 118,
 138, 194
- Council, 112, 129
 gives Zionist Organisation the right
 to advise on Britain's mandate
 policies (July, 1922), 129
- Covenant Part 1, 77
 Article 20, 119, 132
 Article 22, 77, 119, 129,
 132
- Permanent Mandates' Commission,
 124, 138, 158, 163, 194, 247*n*
 opposes ‘transfer’ (1937),
 181
- Lebanon, 30, 32, 35, 37, 73, 106, 126,
 197
- South, 130
- Vichy, 206
 on Israeli independence, the Lebanese
 Army begins to invade Palestine,
 221
- LEHI, see Stern Gang
- Litany R., 69, 74, 131
- Lloyd, Lord George, 175–6, 203
- Lod, 224
 airport, 206
 rail junction, 206
- Longrigg, S.H.
 quoted on Sykes–Picot, 25
- Lords, UK House of
 motion deeming mandate unaccept-
 able carried (June, 1922), 124–5
 government defeat (March, 1923),
 134
- Luke, Cmdr. Harry, 153
- Lydd, Lydda, 178, 199, 224
- Maan, Ma'an, 66

- MacDonald, Malcolm, 193, 258*n*
 visit to Palestine boycotted by the
 Arabs (1938), 187
 describes Great Rebellion Palestinians
 as 'patriots', says Jews were let into
 Palestine without their consent, 189
 halts scheduled immigration (1939),
 194
 claims Jewish Agency using illegal
 migrants to defeat the White Paper,
 194
 pro-Palestinian remarks (1930), 189
 expresses compunction for UK treat-
 ment of the Palestinians, 251*n*
 Ramsay, 151, 156, 157, 161, 164,
 166
 the Palestine mandate an 'onerous
 obligation imposed' on the UK by
 the League 'from which there can
 be no receding' (June, 1930), 158
 'Black Letter' (1931), 160–3
- Macdonough, Gen. Sir George, 61
- MacMichael, Sir Harold, 186–203
 career, 186, 256*n*
 Provincial Autonomy ('cantonisation')
 Scheme (Sept., 1943), 198–9
 its proposed legislature greatly favours
 the Palestinians, 199, 260*n*
- Magnes, Judah, 45, 52, 141
 quoted, 1
 mandates disregard the principle of
 self-determination, 78
 Jewish Palestine 'conceived and born
 in uncleanness' (1920), 78
 advocates binational Arab/Jewish
 state in Palestine, 235*n*
- Manchester
 cradle of Israel, 19
 University, 14, 41, 47
- Manchester Guardian*, 19
 adduces strategic arguments for the
 UK acquisition of Palestine (1914),
 21
- Mandate, Palestine, 76, 77, 96, 97, 100,
 101, 103, 109, 111, 121, 128, 133,
 134, 135, 138, 139, 149, 152, 154,
 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163,
 170, 177, 194, 213
 never intended to apply to
 Transjordan, 112
 largely the work of Zionists,
 Palestinians not mentioned, 129
 League-awarded 'A' status ignored
 (July, 1922), 129
- omits *in* Palestine, 130
 in force (July, 1923), 137
 terminates early (1948), 217
 text, 240*n*
 Article 4, 112, 123, 137
 Samuel asks Churchill to scrap or
 modify it (May, 1921), 114
 Article 6, 130, 132, 179
- Mandates, 75, 83, 85, 86, 88, 90, 128,
 244*n*
- Marj Ibn 'Amar, 17, 107, 131
- Marlowe, John
 quoted, 4
- massacres, Palestinian, 219
 Zionist and Israeli, 208, 219, 223,
 265*n*
- Maxwell, Gen. Sir John, 33
 urges understanding with Husayn
 (1915), 30
 career, 233*n*
- May Day riots (1920), 112–13
- McDonnell, Sir Michael, 155
 makes mincemeat of Churchill's
 Palestine exclusion claim (1939),
 190
- McMahon, Sir Henry, 1, 25, 39, 43, 54,
 57, 58, 59, 70, 72, 75, 89, 93, 125,
 126, 209
 proclamation (1914): UK has 'no
 intention of possessing any Arab
 country', 27
 (1915): London would welcome an
 Arab Caliphate and would not
 annex 'one foot of your land', 28
 HMG prepared, with exceptions, to
 recognise Arab independence in
 accordance with Husayn's demand
 (Oc., 1915), 31, 62, 124, 134
 his slapdash second letter to Husayn
 does not mention Palestine, 32–4
 districts on the *northern* coast of
 Syria, where French interests have
 been recognised, are not Arab, 32
 intended, by 'portions of Syria', to
 exclude Palestine, 33, 37
 British and Arab interpretations of his
 second letter, 33
 Husayn/McMahon Correspondence
 intended to give the UK everything
 short of 'open annexation', 34
 Declaration to Husayn, 34
 assurances to Husayn, 35
 fails to comment on Husayn's enlarge-
 ment of 'the portions' (1915), 35

- McMahon, Sir Henry (*continued*)
 justifies exclusions by reference to French interests, 35
 fails to indicate his intention not to support an independent Palestine, 35
- Mecca, 57, 59, 65
- Medina, 36
- Meinertzhagen, Col. Richard, 74, 93, 95, 96, 100, 241*n*, 243*n*
- Meir, Golda, pact with 'Abd Allah (1947), 216
- Memel, 180
 Rabbi advocates 'population transfer', 11
- Mesopotamia, 25, 52, 53, 57, 68, 95, 135
- Metulla, 98, 131
- MI5, 205
- MI6, 205–6, 213
- Milner, Lord, 44, 45, 47, 48, 52, 74, 95, 233*n*
 the National Home 'an experiment', 127–8
 repeats the 'notch' argument, 135
- Misry, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-, 233*n*
- Monaco, 4, 19, 128, 130
- Money, Major-Gen (Sir) Arthur W., 85, 88, 90, 91, 100
 removal engineered by Weizmann (1919), 92
- Montagu, Edwin, 71, 108
 chief Jewish opponent of the National Home project, 4
 Zionism a 'mischievous political creed', to whose National Home the Muslims and Christians would have to give way (August, 1917), 45
 HMG should provide complete liberty and equality for all Palestine's inhabitants, 45
 Palestine not a suitable place for Jews, 50
- Montgomery, (Field Marshal) Bernard, 211, 250*n*
- Morning Post, The*, 118, 124, 134
- Morrison/Grady Plan, 193, 209
- Morton, H.V., 171
- Mosul, 37
 pipeline to Haifa, 147, 192
- Mount Vernon Address, 67
- Moyné, Lord
 Jews without legitimate claim to the Holy Land, 203
 killed by Stern Gang (1944), 203
- Mufti of Jerusalem, see Husayny, Al-Hajj Amin al-
- Murray, General Sir Archibald. 58, 59
- Muslim Christian Association, 49, 68, 71, 87, 88, 92, 98, 108, 113, 139, 238*n*, 239*n*, 242*n*
- Mussolini, Benito, 162, 195
- Myerson, Golda, see Meir, Golda
- Nablus, 16, 59, 168, 175, 215
 Sanjaq, 61
- Naby Musa Festival 'Easter' riots (April, 1920), 92, 98–100, 104–105, 113
- Nashashiby, Raghib an-, 16, 100, 113, 133, 135, 149, 153, 156, 189, 226
 faction, 138, 161, 169, 171, 174, 182, 189
 family, 115, 149, 255*n*
 failure to co-operate with the Al-Husayny family, 4
- Nasif, Sulayman Bey, 84, 108, 135
- Nassar, Najib
 call to resist Zionism, 'a set of independent, quasi-military institutions' (1910), 16
- National Council of the Jews of Palestine, see Va'ad Le-ummi
- Nazareth, 17, 178
- Negev, The, 39, 42, 178, 209, 215
 occupied by Israel (1948), 225
- Negev/Beersheba District, 209
- Netanyahu, Binyamin, 216
 Al-Hajj Amin 'one of the initiators of the systematic extermination of European Jewry', 228*n*
 unconfident about the Jewish right to Palestine, 20
- Newcombe, Col. Stewart 'Skinface', 60, 62, 171
- Newton, Frances, 99, 105, 118, 171
- Nimr, Dr. Faris, 84
- Northcliffe, Lord, 124, 127
- 'notch' concept, 50, 135, 156
- OETA areas, 61, 71
 East, 61, 71
 South, 61, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90
 becomes Military Administration (Nov., 1918), 88, 101
- Oliphant, Laurence, 8, 9, 227*n*, 228*n*
 scheme to establish a Jewish colony in Gilead (1878), 10
- Oradour, 219

- Ormsby-Gore, William, 66, 84, 136, 187
 quoted, xi
 only the Zionists can make Palestine
 British (Dec., 1917), 50
 Zionist leaders 'so sincere, so British,
 so straightforward', 50
 cautions Zionist Commission to
 eschew the word 'state' (1919), 85
 contempt for Palestinians, 87
 'Zion itself, 183
- Ottoman armies, 26, 29, 36, 58, 61
 armistice (October, 1918), 88
 Caliph, 65
 Empire, 14, 17, 53, 61, 69
 government, 8, 10, 12, 15, 18, 30, 33,
 36, 37, 94, 111
 chief guardian of UK gateways to
 India, 25
 sides with Germany in First World
 War, 25
 feelers about a separate peace
 (1917), 52–3
 milletler, 180
 offer to cede Palestine and Syria to the
 Arabs, 65
 Parliament
 Arab deputies urge Husayn to lead
 in throwing off the Ottoman yoke,
 26
 Sultan, 12
 Ottomans, 1, 10, 25, 34, 36, 59, 64, 65,
 83, 110
- Palestine
 93% Arab, 7% Jewish, 2
 'a land without people', 2
 strategic considerations, 12, 40, 41,
 42, 86, 117, 137, 158, 205, 212,
 247*n*, 263*n*
 buffer for Britain against the French,
 21, 28
 fallback guardian of UK routes to
 India, 21
 exclusion by McMahon claimed, 33,
 37
 Syria, as a unit with, 49, 58, 68, 95
 becomes OETA South, 61
 under the Ottoman Empire, 151
 strike (1936), 171
 Arab Congress, see National Congress
 Arab Party (April, 1944), 260*n*
 Commission (1947), 217
 Delegations
 1st (1921), 33, 118, 128, 133, 134
 calls for inclusion of Palestine in an
 Arab federation, 119
 rejects 1922 White Paper, 127
 2nd (1922–3), 134
 3rd (1924), 136–7
 4th (1930), 155
 5th invited by H.M.G. (April, 1936)
 but cancelled by disturbances in
 Palestine, 170–1
 6th (unofficial, June, 1936), 171
 Greater, 39, 88, 95
 Great Palestinian Rebellion (1937–9),
 182–8
 much of south Palestine under Arab
 rebel control, 187
 National Arab Party (1935), 138,
 156, 169, 171, 173
 National Congresses, 100, 108–9,
 110, 116, 118, 135, 149, 244*n*
 urges Palestine/Syrian union with
 Faysal as Head of State (1919), 71
 rejects Legislative Council (1922), 132
 National Defence Party, 169, 183,
 173, 193
 Police, 208
 in 1936, 175, 176, 253*n*
 Regiment, 197, 260*n*
Palestine Weekly, 42, 88
 Palestinians
 willing until 1930 to co-operate in the
 National Home project, 3, 204
 in Arab Revolt, 58
 in EEF, 58
 no arms possessed, 60
 in Ottoman administrations, 151,
 249*n*
 in UK Army, 197
 75,000 expelled (Dec., 1947), 217
 700,000 made refugees, only 150,000
 remaining in Israel (1948–9), 222
 Palin Report (1920), 58, 105, 243*n*
 Balfour Declaration 'the starting point
 of the whole trouble', 104
 the Zionist Commission 'largely
 responsible for the present crisis',
 104
 no question of a National Home but
 only of a Jewish state, 104
 Palmach, 206, 207, 208, 264*n*
 in Syria and Lebanon (1941), 197
 Palmerston, Lord, 8
 Palumbo, Michael
 Jews have not sufficient reason 'to
 displace an indigenous population

- Palumbo, Michael (*continued*)
 that had lived on this land for centuries', 230*n*
- Pappe, Ilan, 223
 quoted, 166
- Paris Peace Conference (1919–20),
 69–77, 83, 84, 86, 89, 94, 102,
 103, 130
 no Palestinian spokesman, 72
- Passfield, Lord, 150, 152, 155, 156, 160,
 161, 162, 163
 White Paper (1930), 159–162
 compunction for the UK treatment of
 the Palestinians, 251*n*
- Patria* blown up by Irgun (1940), 195
- Patriotic Ottoman Party
 the Zionist Organisation a threat to
 Palestine (1910), 16
- Peel Royal Commission, 68, 147, 150,
 161, 171, 186, 194, 196, 214, 215
 report (1937), 51
 partition recommendation, 176–9,
 254*n*
 boycotted by the Palestinians, 177
 membership, 254*n*
- Permanent Court of International
 Justice, 129
- Petach Tikvah, 10, 85, 113
- Philby, Jack
 Balfour Declaration 'an act of
 betrayal', 48
- Pinsker, Dr. Yehuda, 11
- Plumer, Lord (1925–8), 147–50, 160,
 164, 178
- Poland, 140, 149, 151, 167, 195
 Polish Army, 195
- Porath, Yehoshua
 summary of Arab claims to greater
 right to Palestine than the Jews,
 231*n*
- Portugal
 offers a National Home in Angola,
 229*n*
- Provincial Autonomy ('cantonisation')
 Scheme (Sept., 1943), 198–9
- Qalqiliyyah, 113
- Qassam, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-, 256*n*
 Group, 183
- Qawukchy, Fawzy al-, 175, 219, 220,
 265*n*
 assessment, 253*n*
- Rabigh, 57
- Rabin, Yitzhak
 expels 60–70,000 inhabitants of
 Lydda and Ramlah, 224
- RAF, 113, 175
 in 1936, 254*n*
- Rafah, 215
- Railways
 Jaffa–Gulf (mooted by Herzl as
 alternative UK route to India
 (1896), 12
 Baghdad/Mosul and Haifa (proposed),
 28–9, 38
 Hijaz, 74, 106
 Haifa–Damascus, 131
 Lydda–Jaffa, 246*n*
- Ramat Gan, 297
- Ramlah, 17, 199
- Red Sea, 57, 126
- Repington, Lt.-Col. C à Court
 quoted, xi
- Rice, Michael
 Israeli claim to Palestine 'invented
 history', 230*n*
- Richmond, E.T., 108, 115, 132, 133,
 139, 140
- Ridha, Shaykh Rashid
 Zionist occupation of Palestine would
 leave no Muslims or Christians, 17
- Rishon Le-Tsiyón, 85, 124
- Romania, 151
- Roq, Alfred, 156, 171
- Rose, Norman, 11
 quoted, vi
- Round Table St James's Palace
 Conference (1939), 189–191, 199
 Husayn/McMahon Correspondence
 made public, 190
 UK delegation agrees that McMahon
 did exclude Palestine, 190
 Palestinians to be able to establish
 their National Home, 191
 Al-Hajj Amin consulted by the UK
 delegation, 258*n*
- Royal East Kent Regiment (the 'Buffs'),
 198
 Fusiliers' Jewish Legion Battalions 38–
 40, 59, 100
 Navy, 57, 213
- Ruppin, Dr. Arthur, 111, 114
 protagonist of 'transfer', 15
- Russia, 1, 14, 15, 37, 41, 45, 48, 51, 52,
 63, 65, 148
 late 19th century persecutions and
 pogroms, 10

- provides the Zionists with planes, 222
- Russian Jews, 13
- persecution and pogroms, 10
- refugees (1891), 15–16
- no Russian Jewish backing for the Allies in the war, 51
- Revolution, 54
- Safed, 85, 131, 153, 178, 220
- Sa'id, Nury as-, 69, 192
- St. Jean de Maurienne Conference confirms internationalisation of Palestine (April, 1917), 43
- SS *St. Louis*, 210
- Salt, As-, 106
- Samaria, 131, 178
- Samuel, Herbert, 4, 19, 25, 42, 44, 45, 74, 75, 77, 89, 93, 95, 101, 106, 111, 114, 121, 123, 124, 125, 128, 133, 134, 137, 139, 140, 141–2, 147, 160, 164, 205, 248*n*
- least dishonourable participant in the Zionist, project, 5
- sees prospect of a change in the status of Palestine (1914), 18
- Palestine strategically important to the British Empire, 18
- Palestine 'almost derelict' (1915), 20
- calls for Palestine to be a UK protectorate and not internationalised, 20
- Jewish connection with Palestine 'long antedated' the Palestinians' (1915), 20
- a state could not be established immediately (1915), 21
- calls for recognition of the rights of the Palestine Arabs (Dec., 1917), 50
- deprecates Zionist 'transfer' policy, 91
- visit to Palestine (1920), 96–7
- the Zionists should remove misunderstandings about their proposals (1920), 97
- proposes confederation (1920), 97
- career, 102
- quoted, 102
- High Commissioner, 102–43
- National Home would be good for Jews, the British Empire and Arabs, 102
- the Zionist programme must be very considerate for Arabs and Christians' (April, 1920), 103
- the prospect of a state 'rightly evokes such fine enthusiasm' (1920), 103
- 'injustice of any kind' to the Palestinians would be a shame to the Jews, 103
- reconstruction of the National Home would scrupulously respect non-Jewish rights (July, 1920), 103
- steps taken in favour of the Jews, 107–8
- tightens immigration regulations (June, 1920), 113
- National Home to be balanced with obligations to the Palestinians, 115, 118
- his greatly diminished enthusiasm for a Jewish state (Aug., 1921), 117
- advises Weizmann to renounce aspiration to a state (1921), 122
- his attempt to replace an Advisory by a Legislative Council boycotted by the Palestinians (1923), 132–33, 135
- placing Palestinians under a Jewish majority not entertained by the Zionist Commission (1920), 136
- objects to Peel, calls for Jews to be no more than 40% of the population, 179–80
- his 1923 and 1937 confederation proposals include Palestine, 180–1
- sanjak, see sanjaq
- San Remo Conference awards Palestine mandate to UK (April, 1920), 77, 98, 100, 105
- Sarafand, 207
- Saudi Arabia, 189
- Scott, C.P., 21, 41, 42
- meets Weizmann and introduces Lloyd George and Samuel to him (1914), 19
- reveals existence of Sykes–Picot to Weizmann, 41
- Sèvres, Treaty of
- awards provisional independence to Iraq and Syria (Aug., 1920), 78
- Shamir, Yitzhak, 196
- seeks collaboration with Nazi Germany, 5, 195
- justifies Jewish claim to Palestine, 20
- Sharett, Moshe, see Shertok
- Sharon, Plain, 178, 188
- Sharq, Mir'at ash-*, 138
- Shaw Commission Report (1931), 157, 244*n*

- Shertok, Moshe, 4, 11, 167, 208,
211–12, 225
contempt for Palestinians, 87
- Shlaim, Avi
quoted, 18, 147
- Shuckburgh, Sir John, 119, 120, 123,
136, 138, 156, 180
nobody in Cabinet thought ‘we should
have to meet (McMahon’s)
promises’, 34
Palestinian fears arise from
misunderstanding HMG’s
intentions, 133
- Sidebotham, Herbert, 42
the future of the British Empire
depends on a Jewish Palestine, 21
- Sieff, Israel, 74
- Sinai, 74
- Slavs
contempt for Britons, 96
- Smuts, General Jan Christian, 128, 159,
163
puts mandate plan before Peace
Conference, 75–6
- Sneh, Dr. Moshe, 206, 208
‘one serious incident’ (Oct., 1945),
206
- Sokolow, Nahum, 11, 15, 21, 42, 43,
44, 74, 77, 103, 107, 111, 166, 171
‘We are a peace-loving people’ (1917),
49
the National Home the ‘redress of a
two-thousand-year-old injustice’,
252*n*
- Special Night Squads, 197
- Stark, Freya (quoted), 1
- Statements of Policy
1939 (mandate to continue, partition
reimposed, Jewish immigration
limited to 75,000, Balfour
Declaration apparently abandoned),
191
- Stein, Leonard, 181
- Stern, Avraham, 261*n*
seeks collaboration with Nazi
Germany, 195
- Gang, 199, 205, 209, 211, 212
considers co-operation with Fascist
Italy, 195
assassinates Lord Moyne (1944),
203
on Dair Yasin massacre, 219
strength in 1948, 222
assassinates Bernadotte (1948), 225
splits from Irgun (1937), 260*n*
- Stirling, Lt. Col. W.F., 122, 139, 142,
198
on MacMichael, 257*n*
- Storrs, Sir Ronald, 31, 32, 33, 34, 64,
73, 75, 84, 86, 87, 88, 92, 99, 100,
101, 104, 114, 115, 140, 141, 143,
151, 157, 161, 194, 241*n*
influence of strategic considerations
on UK Palestine policy, 40
anti-Semitism quote: Balfour
Declaration handing Palestine to a
third party, 48
Palestine free to elect own government
(1918), 68
prevents MCA delegates from
attending the Peace Conference, 72
- Orientations*, 72
anticipates eventual state with the
non-Jews in a lower place, 85
mandate ‘imposed upon us by the will
of the nations’, 159
blames withdrawal of Legislative
Council for 1936’s strike and
violence, 171–6
Palestine Jews’ ‘callousness and lack
of regard for everyone non-Jewish’
(1936), 172
on the state within a state in the mid-
’30s, 172
Peel partition amounts to a Jewish
National Home, 181
‘Palestine was excluded’ by
McMahon, 234*n*
- Struma*, 199, 203
(Sublime) Porte, see Ottoman
government
- Suez Canal, 12, 21, 40, 43, 52, 86, 117,
191–2
gateway to India, 18, 205, 208
base, 215
- Supreme Muslim Council, 123–4, 132,
137, 139, 141, 142, 152, 169, 183,
246*n*
- Sydenham, Lord, 118, 121, 134
Jews no more right to Palestine than
the descendants of the ancient
Romans to Britain, 120
- Sykes, Christopher, 168
quoted, 126
‘a Zionist habit to speak.. in several
voices’, 83
- Sir Mark, 8, 20, 25, 31, 38, 52, 61,
63, 67, 70

- on Zionism, (1914), 21
- no part of Crusader-occupied Syria is 'purely Arab', 28
- Palestine and North Syria a French sphere of influence, 35
- criticises Sykes–Picot, 40
- the aspirations of Judaism are the hope of Arabia and the Middle East, 41
- hints to Weizmann at 'a Zionist solution' of Palestine (Jan., 1917), 42
- Zionism a lever against the French (April, 1917), 43
- name-caller, 49
- need for the Arabs of Palestine to be treated generously (Dec., 1917), 50
- urges abandonment of Sykes–Picot (March, 1918), 53
- with Georges-Picot, gives Husayn an incomplete account of Sykes–Picot (May, 1916), 62
- disillusioned by Zionism in Palestine, 90
- Sykes–Picot Agreement, 1, 25, 35, 36, 38–42, 42, 57, 60, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 90, 103, 108, 126
- Brown Zone, 39, 61, 62
- Zone B, 39, 61
 - reactions, 40
- A Zone, 61
 - terms made public by Cemal (1917), 63
- Symes, Stewart, 131, 140
- Syria, 2, 25, 33, 36, 40, 51, 52, 53, 59, 62, 64, 70, 76–7, 78, 86, 88, 89, 94, 95, 98, 101, 111, 175, 216
- 'portions', 31, 57, 73, 77, 106, 126
- the coast 'cannot said to be Arab', 32
- Greater/Southern Syria concept, 49, 57, 58, 68, 97
- dropped by Palestine's politicians (July, 1921), 106
- Vilayet, 126
- mandate, 129
- Vichy, 206
- on Israeli independence, the Syrian Army begins to invade Palestine, 221
- bases of France's claim to, 232*n*
- Syrians, 26, 173
- Syrie Intégrale, La, 2
- Ta'if, 57
- Talât Bey, Mehmet, 52
- Tancred*, 19
- Tannus, 'Izzat, 171
- Tantura, 188
- Taylor, A.J.P. on Smuts, 75–6
- Tegart Fence, 186
- Tel Aviv, 4, 59, 173, 181, 207, 209, 212, 221
 - port, 174
- Thomas, J.H., 170, 171
- Tiberias, 178
 - Lake, 41
 - Hagana terror tactics in (1948), 219
- Times*, *The*, 39, 43, 47, 48, 94, 124, 127, 160
 - 'The bestialities practised by the Nazis themselves could go no further' than those of Irgun' (1947), 213
- Toynbee, Prof. Arnold J.
 - Britain used the League to deny Palestinian self-determination, 78
 - Jews should not be allowed a state within a state (Nov., 1918), 88
 - all the inhabitants of a Palestine state should be Palestinians, 88
 - in relation to Palestine, the Arabs are the 'prior claimants and possessors', 230*n*
- 'transfer', 11, 12, 91, 112, 184
 - opposed by Ormsby-Gore (1937), 181
 - P.M.C. (1937), 181
 - Ben-Gurion on, 203, 223
 - UK Labour Party on, 204
 - Weizmann on, 125, 156
- Trans-Jordan, Transjordan,
 - Transjordanian, 2, 31, 57, 58, 100, 106, 111–12, 121, 125, 127, 150, 167, 175, 178, 180, 189, 209, 214, 216, 217
 - in control of E. Jerusalem, Hebron, Lydda and Ramlah (June, 1948), 224
 - Frontier Force, 254*n*
- Trotsky, 63
- Troutbeck, Sir John
 - Israel 'a gangster state headed by an utterly unscrupulous set of leaders', 223
- Truman, President Harry, 206, 209, 210, 212, 213, 224
 - demands entry to Palestine for 100,000 DPs (April, 1945), 204
 - 'neither Hitler nor Stalin has anything

- Truman, President Harry (*continued*)
 on (Jews) for cruelty or mistreatment to the underdog', 210
- Tulkarim, 113, 178
- Turkey, Turks, 53, 58, 60, 67, 69, 104, 133, 134, 142
- Tyrell, Sir William, 91
- UK
- irresolution over Palestine policy, 3
 - refines the Jewish military machine and keeps the Palestinians defenceless, 3, 196–8
 - recognises French claim to Syria, 28
 - prepared to abandon Balfour Declaration (1947–8), 52–3
 - fails to advocate the Arab cause at the Peace Conference, 72
 - evacuates Syria (Nov., 1919), 76–7
 - Zionists, 88, 93
 - anti-Zionist Conservatives defeated in House of Commons (July, 1922), 128, 132
 - pro-Palestinian Conservative group (1936), 134, 171
 - the mandate an onerous obligation imposed by the League, 158
 - actions against the Mufty, 182
 - air route to India, 192
 - makes use in its wars in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria of the Jewish terrorist organisations, 197
 - Operation Agatha, 208
 - Shark, 209
 - connives in 'Abd Allah/Zionist division of Palestine (1947)', 216
 - recognises Israel, 225
 - still offering areas for Jewish settlement in 1939, 229*n*
 - legislation against Jewish immigration in 1912 and 1914, 262*n*
- UK Cabinet: Palestine to be internationalised, 37
- Defence Committee, 211
 - GHQ (Cairo), 97
 - General Staff, 137
 - Palestine a buffer between the Suez Canal and the French in Syria (1916), 21
 - Garrison, 122, 125, 198
 - strength, 113 (1920 reductions) (1936), 175, 187 (1946), 206
 - Intelligence Corps' sergeants murdered by Irgun (1947), 212, 214, 215
 - takes back Jerusalem using Palestinians as human shields (Oct., 1938), 187
 - renounces all but law and order and responsibility for Jewish population centres; stands by as Palestinian villages are destroyed and their populations expelled (1947–48), 218
 - disgrace when it gives Irgun green light to de-Arabise Haifa as up to 100,000 of its inhabitants are expelled (1948), 220
- Imperial Cabinet, 116
- Conference, 148
- Labour Party Executive
- sees a convincing case for 'transfer' and replays the 'notch' argument (Dec., 1944), 204
- Palestine Advisory Committee (1919), 21, 91, 96
- Palestine Cabinet Committee, 136–7
- Statement of Policy (1939), 191–2, 193
- Sub-committee on Territorial Desiderata
- moves Palestine frontier deep into Lebanon (April, 2016), 41
- War Cabinet, 75
- Middle East Committee, 83
- War Office, 61, 74, 88, 95
- UN, 215
- General Assembly, 210, 214, 224, 225, 226
 - Resolution 181 partition decision (Nov., 1947), 217, 224; text, 263*n*
 - Resolution 194 call for refugees to be allowed to return (Dec., 1948), 224, 225
 - Palestine Commission, 217
 - Truce Commission (1948), 220
- United Resistance Movement (Hagana, Irgun and Stern), 205
- 'one serious incident', 206–7
- UNSCOP report (Aug., 1947), 214–15, 225, 226
- USA, 10, 44, 48, 49, 51, 53, 59, 73, 76, 91, 94, 140, 150, 152, 195, 198, 205, 210, 211, 212, 214, 217, 224, 225
- approves of final Balfour Declaration draft (Oct., 1917), 47

- Ussishkin, Menachem, 86
 takes charge of Zionist Commission (1919), 96
- USSR, 221
- ‘Uthmany, Hizb al-Watany al- (1911), 16, 141
- Va’ad Le-ummi, 106, 141
- Vansittart, Sir Robert, 129
- Vatican, 128
- Versailles Treaty (June, 1919), 77, 83, 129, 180
- Vester, Mrs. Bertha Spafford, 140
- Von Sanders, Liman, 58
- Wailing Wall, 87, 154
 Commission, 157
 riots (1929), 152, 250*n*
 provoked by Jews?, 152
 Jewish civilians armed by the UK, 153
 UK censured over, 158
- Wajh, 57, 58
- Walrond, Osmond, 66
- Watany, Al-Hizb al- see Palestine National Arab party
- Watany al-‘Araby al-‘Uthmany, Hizb al- (1911), 16, 141
- Waters-Taylor, Col. Harry, 100, 104, 118, 243*n*
- Watson, Maj-Gen Sir Harry, 92, 93
- Wauchope, Lieut-Gen. Sir Arthur Grenfell (1931–8), 164, 165, 166–185
 under him, 240,000 immigrants enter Palestine, 166
 regards Hajj Al-Amin as a moderate, 167
 Al-Amin on terms with him, 168, 173, 174
 receives united front ultimatum, 169
 attempted Legislative Council, overruled in London (1935), 170–2
 persuades Colonial Secretary to invite a delegation (1936), 170
 steps taken during the 1936 strike, 174
 unwise labour immigration schedule, 175
 ‘does not rule’ (Dill, 1936), 175
 not handling the situation firmly (Lloyd, 1936), 176
 weak vis-à-vis military and Zionists in the Great Palestinian Rebellion, 184
 ‘the best high commissioner we have had’ (Ben-Gurion), 185
- Wavell, Gen Archibald, 184
- Webb, Sidney, see Passfield
- Wedgewood, Col. Lord Josiah, 117
- Weizmann, Chaim, 15, 21, 42, 43, 45, 46, 51, 52, 63, 72, 77, 85, 93, 96, 97, 99, 102, 107, 108, 114, 116, 117, 123, 124, 132, 135, 136, 137, 147, 150, 160, 161, 162, 166–7, 173, 179, 189, 190, 194, 198, 204, 208, 210, 211, 221, 255*n*
 pen picture, 14
 a Monaco-sized National Home would be acceptable (1914), 4, 19
 agrees that Palestine should become a British protectorate, 19
 ‘we had Jerusalem when London was a marsh’, 20
 career, 41
 works to undo internationalisation of Palestine and any French control there, 41
 possible need to construct a state in part of Palestine, cut in two by Sykes–Picot (April, 1916), 41
 calls for full justice and liberty for ‘all races and sects’ in Palestine, 44
 ‘We do not seek to found a Jewish state’ (March, 1922), 48
- Weizmann/Faysal Agreement made and then repudiated by Faysal (1919), 70–1
 demands a Palestine ‘as Jewish as England is English’ (Feb., 1919), 74
 denies any Zionist Commission wish for a state ‘immediately’ (1918), 84
 Palestinians’ fundamental misconception of Zionist aims, 86
 contempt for Palestinians, 87
 Arab national aspirations ‘fully realised’ in Syria, 89
 never ‘our objective to turn anyone out of his property’, 89
 denounces Clayton and Storrs and secures removal of Clayton and Money (July, 1919), 92
 claims qualitative difference ‘between Jew and native’, 92
 first Palestinian delegation ‘fifth rate people . . . supported by an anti-semitic clique, 119, and ‘political blackmailers and “trash”’, 121
 National Home has no meaning unless a state, 122

- Weizmann, Chaim (*continued*)
 endorses 'transfer', 125
 Jews did not seek a state, non-Jews
 would not 'suffer at our hands', 127
 proposes 'transfer' (1930), 156
 we would never cause others to suffer
 as we have suffered (1925), 223
 a G.K. Chesterton doppel ganger?,
 235*n*
 Weizmann/Faysal Agreement
 published by Weizmann with
 Faysal's reservation omitted
 (1936), 239*n*
- Weizmann, Ezer, 225
- Wejh, see Wajh
- West Bank, 216, 222, 226
- White Papers
 1922 (Churchill), 134, 137, 139, 157
 ludicrous attempt to justify
 McMahon's claim to have excluded
 Palestine, 33
 the Jewish National Home to be a
 Home *in* Palestine, 127
 the McMahon 'pledge' did exclude
 Palestine, 125–7
 1930 (Passfield), 159–162
 obligation to Zionism already
 discharged, 159–160
 attacks on the White Paper, 160
 1939, 196, 198, 215
 illegal if Palestine became a Jewish
 state, 192
 abandons partition, intends an
 independent Palestinian state,
 192–3
 UK objective of a Jewish/Palestinian
 state rejected by Zionists and
 Palestinians, 193
 UK seeks Al-Hajj Amin's support,
 194
- Wilson, Sir Arnold T., 4, 101
 Col. C.E., 62, 236*n*
 President, 53, 72, 75
 'consent of the governed', 67
 'No peace can last . . .' (Jan.,
 1917), 67
 12th. of the 14th. Points, 60
- Wingate, Maj.-Gen. Orde
 Special Night Squads, 186, 197
 Sir Reginald (Rex), 34, 53, 54, 62, 64,
 65, 68, 113, 256*n*
 careless circular to the Palestinians
 (1916/17), 58–9
- Winterton, Edward Lord, 171
- Wise, Rabbi Dr Stephen, 74
- Woodhead, Sir John
 endorses the decision to abandon
 Peel's partition, 188
- Workers' Socialist Party (Mopsi), 112
- World Jewry, 33, 86, 150, 160, 161
- World Zionist Congress, 204
 Organisation, 12, 15, 150, 198, 255*n*
- Yanbu', 57
- Yarmuk R., 110
- Yellin, David, 106, 108
 Jews ready to take Palestine by war
 (1921), 120
- Yellin-Mor, Natan, 206
 seeks collaboration with Nazi
 Germany, 195
- Yemen, 189, 190
- Yiddish, 85
- Yishuv, 3, 10, 15, 41, 43, 53, 99, 108,
 122, 127, 138, 139, 141, 148, 150,
 154, 156, 159, 160, 173, 174, 189,
 211, 212
 views ignored by Zionist Commission,
 85
 make-up of population (1918), 89,
 102
 population (1920–5), 148; (Oct.,
 1922), 132; (1930), 159; (1931–5),
 173; (1939), 194
 doubled under Samuel, 148
 rises to 150,000 under Plumer, 148
 ingratitude to UK, 211
 number of members serving in UK
 forces, 259*n*, 260*n*
- Young, (Sir) Hubert, 126, 137
- Young Turks, 15, 16, 29
- Zayd b. Husayn, Amir, 106
- Zimmermann (German Foreign
 Secretary) proposes a
 German/Turkish declaration to
 replace Balfour's (1917), 235*n*
- Zionism
 takes shape as a concept, 10
 rise of modern, 10
 emergence (1882), 11
 ethnic cleansing intentions, 11
 the concept politicised, 11–12
 a 'movement of questionable straight-
 ness', 13
 tool to solve Russia's Jewish
 problems, 39
 lever against the French, 43, 52

- programme of 'transfer' to Syria, 91
 'transfer' policy, 112
- Zionists, 2, 25, 31, 3, 38, 40, 44, 47, 50, 53, 58, 64, 66, 70, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 83, 85, 88, 89, 91, 93, 111, 128, 133, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 178, 215, 217
- determined to take Palestine over, 3
 'pendant for misnomers', 3
 overtures to Nazis, 5, 195, 259*n*
 promise to rally Jewish support for the Allies in return for preference for the National Home, 19
 reject Sykes's suggestion of a Franco-British condominium over Palestine with Arab prince and Zionist charter company (1916), 21
 overturn internationalisation of Palestine, 40
 'state' aim obfuscated by National Home, 13 (Herzl), 44
 no Russian Jewish backing for the UK war effort, 51
 speak 'not in two but in several voices', 83
 'chronic mendacity', 86
 anti-Arab name-calling, 87, 216
 lose Transjordan, 112
 leaders call Samuel and Storrs traitors and cowards, 114
 ingratitude towards UK, 199, 221
 'dirty tricks': accuses the Arab Office of plotting subversion against the USA (1947), 214
 partition agreement with 'Abd Allah (Nov., 1947), 216, 263*n*
 ethnic cleansing, 217, 224
 leave no non-Jewish inhabitants in Haifa, Jaffa, Safed and Tiberias, 221
 trained strength of Zionist forces (April–May, 1948), 222
 destroy up to 400 villages, 223
 'some forty' massacres, 264*n*
- Zionist Commission, 72, 78, 88, 92, 93, 96, 98, 105, 109, 113, 120, 123, 140
 enters Palestine (April, 1918), 83
 its remit, 83
 its behaviour in Palestine, 85
 avoids formal contact with Palestinian leaders, 85
 contempt for Palestinians, 87
 parallel government in place, Palestinians discriminated against, 90–1
 Palin blames it as largely responsible for Naby Musa (1920), 104
 organises Jewish immigration, 107
 membership, 240*n*
- Congresses, 109, 113, 117, 120, 152, 166, 167, 179, 181, 211
 need for the responsible leaders of Zionism to overturn the Palestinian majority by immigration (1919), 95
- Organisation Executive, 11, 13, 41, 44, 76, 87, 89, 97, 103, 104, 107, 114, 119, 121, 123, 130, 140, 154, 181
 denies aim of a state (1910), 15
 seen by Palestinians as a threat to engulf their country, 16
 vainly asks for favouritism for a Jewish company to develop Palestine's resources (1916), 22
 demands UK sponsor an enlarged National Home as a commonwealth, 74
 points to need for Zionist leaders to overturn the Palestinian majority by immigration, 95, 99
 after Naby Musa (1920), 'either the Jews or the military Administration would have to go, 99
 successfully demands that League Council accept the mandate (24 July, 1922), 129; taken over by Jewish Agency Executive (Jan., 1928), 150; defined, 243*n*
- Political Committee (1915), 41, 43
 call for Palestine to become a British-protected Jewish state (Feb., 1917), 42
- Workers' Party, 112.



Thank you for reading this Sussex Academic e-Library book.

Sussex Academic serves the international academic community and promotes learning and scholarship to a global audience. The editorial and production staff are committed to publishing to the highest standards across a wide range of academic subject disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences. The Press supports authors through strong editorial and development skills, and is committed to serving the world of scholarship by promoting our authors' writing and research endeavours so that they make the maximum impact on their readership and profession.

The Press publishing programme addresses issues of contemporary relevance and debate in Middle East topics, Theology & Religion, History, and Literary Criticism. University editorship and publishing cooperation with universities mostly falls under the Sussex Libraries of Study, which include Latin American, First Nations, Spanish History, and Asian studies.

Full details of the Press publishing programme can be found at the Press website

www.sussex-academic.com

E-book availability of titles are indicated on the Press website book title pages by the logo



“Books are the treasured wealth of the world and the fit inheritance of generations and nations . . . Their authors are a natural and irresistible aristocracy in every society, and, more than kings and emperors, exert an influence on mankind.”

HENRY DAVID THOREAU, 1817–62

